Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 2008"
TL;DR: This paper found that conflict is more likely when there are ethnic ties to groups in a neighboring conflict and that contagion is primarily a feature of separatist conflicts, which suggests that transnational ethnic linkages constitute a central mechanism of conflict contagion.
Abstract: Civil wars cluster in space as well as time. In this study, we develop and evaluate empirically alternative explanations for this observed clustering. We consider whether the spatial pattern of intrastate conflict simply stems from a similar distribution of relevant country attributes or whether conflicts indeed constitute a threat to other proximate states. Our results strongly suggest that there is a genuine neighborhood effect of armed conflict, over and beyond what individual country characteristics can account for. We then examine whether the risk of contagion depends on the degree of exposure to proximate conflicts. Contrary to common expectations, this appears not to be the case. Rather, we find that conflict is more likely when there are ethnic ties to groups in a neighboring conflict and that contagion is primarily a feature of separatist conflicts. This suggests that transnational ethnic linkages constitute a central mechanism of conflict contagion.
409 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that states plagued by chronic state failures are statistically more likely to host terrorist groups that commit transnational attacks, have their nationals commit trans-national attacks and are targeted by transnational terrorists themselves.
Abstract: A growing body of scholars and policymakers have raised concerns that failed and failing states pose a danger to international security because they produce conditions under which transnational terrorist groups can thrive. This study devises an empirical test of this proposition, along with counter-theories, using simple descriptive statistics and a timeseries, cross-national negative binomial analysis of 197 countries from 1973 to 2003. It finds that states plagued by chronic state failures are statistically more likely to host terrorist groups that commit transnational attacks, have their nationals commit transnational attacks, and are more likely to be targeted by transnational terrorists themselves. Addressing the problem of failed and failing states will undoubtedly yield significant security and humanitarian dividends for the international system. Is a reduction in transnational terrorism one of them? United States policymakers regard failed and failing states such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan to be festering incubators of terrorism, and lament that for too long United States foreign policy has ignored the threat that these types of states pose to the international order and to national security. Post September 11th national security documents explicitly describe failed states as, ‘‘…safe havens for terrorists’’ (National Security Council 2006, 15), while Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice proclaims, ‘‘Today…the greatest threats to our security are defined more by the dynamics within weak and failing states than by the borders between strong and aggressive
376 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the state's political use of the past and the function of history education in political transition and foreign relations is explored. But the authors focus on how such historical memory has been reinforced by the current regime's educational socialization through the national ‘‘Patriotic education campaign’’ after 1991.
Abstract: This manuscript explores the state’s political use of the past and the function of history education in political transition and foreign relations. Modern historical consciousness in China is largely characterized by the ‘‘one hundred years of humiliation’’ from mid-1800s to mid1900s when China was attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by imperialists. This research focuses initially on how such historical memory has been reinforced by the current regime’s educational socialization through the national ‘‘Patriotic Education Campaign’’ after 1991. It then explores the impact of this institutionalized historical consciousness on the formation of national identity and foreign relations. This study suggests that, even though existing theories and literature illuminate certain aspects of China’s political transition and foreign affairs behavior, a full explanatory picture emerges only after these phenomena and actions are analyzed through the ‘‘lenses’’ of history and memory. According to Eller (1999), the prime raw material for constructing ethnicity is usually the past—history. It is collective memory of the past that binds a group of people together. The powerful link between collective memory and history is particularly salient in the education system. Forging a country’s collective memory is an integral part of nation-building (Podeh 2000, 65). Schools are the primary social institutions that transmit national narratives about the past. All nation-states, whether Western democracies or nondemocratic societies, have placed great emphasis on teaching their national history with the aim of consolidating the bond between the individual citizen and the homeland. 1 This is particularly evident in the case of political transitions. As Evans (2003, 5) suggests, ‘‘seldom does history seem so urgently relevant or important as in moments of sudden political transition from one state form to another.’’ From postCommunist East Europe to East Asia and to South Africa, political transitions have often necessitated, among other things, the rewriting of school history textbooks. 2 What is the relationship between history education, historical memory and the formation of national identity? What are the implications of the uses and abuses of national history for political purposes? What role does history and history education play in political transition and foreign relations?
348 citations
TL;DR: This article found that natural disasters significantly increase the risk of violent civil conflict both in the short and medium term, specifically in low and middle-income countries that have intermediate to high levels of inequality, mixed political regimes, and sluggish economic growth.
Abstract: Does the occurrence of a natural disaster such as an earthquake, volcanic eruption, tsunami, flood, hurricane, epidemic, heat wave, and/or plague increase the risk of violent civil conflict in a society? This study uses available data for 187 political units for the period 1950–2000 to systematically explore this question that has received remarkably little attention in the voluminous literature on civil war. We find that natural disasters significantly increase the risk of violent civil conflict both in the short and medium term, specifically in low- and middle-income countries that have intermediate to high levels of inequality, mixed political regimes, and sluggish economic growth. Rapid-onset disasters related to geology and climate pose the highest overall risk, but different dynamics apply to minor as compared to major conflicts. The findings are robust in terms of the use of different dependent and independent variables, and a variety of model specifications. Given the likelihood that rapid climate change will increase the incidence of some types of natural disasters, more attention should be given to mitigating the social and political risks posed by these cataclysmic events.
343 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the relationship between economic sanctions and state-sponsored repression of human rights and find that sanctions negatively affect human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression.
Abstract: While intended as a nonviolent foreign policy alternative to military intervention, sanctions have often worsened humanitarian and human rights conditions in the target country. This article examines the relationship between economic sanctions and state-sponsored repression of human rights. Drawing on both the public choice and institutional constraints literature, I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. Specifically, sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents, leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime, protect core supporters, minimize the threat posed by potential challengers, and suppress popular dissent. The empirical results support this theory. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose political, social, and physical hardship on civilian populations. They also underscore a need for improvements in current strategies and mechanisms by which states pursue foreign-policy goals and the international community enforces international law and stability.
235 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore a perverse consequence of the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, or "Responsibility to Protect," contrary to its intent of protecting civilians from genocide and ethnic cleansing.
Abstract: This article explores a perverse consequence of the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, or “Responsibility to Protect,” contrary to its intent of protecting civilians from genocide and ethnic cleansing. The root of the problem is that such genocidal violence often represents state retaliation against a substate group for rebellion (such as an armed secession) by some of its members. The emerging norm, by raising expectations of diplomatic and military intervention to protect these groups, unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and increasing its likelihood of success. In practice, intervention does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but usually it is too late or inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians. Thus, the emerging norm resembles an imperfect insurance policy against genocidal violence. It creates moral hazard that encourages the excessively risky or fraudulent behavior of rebellion by members of groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but it cannot fully protect against the backlash. The emerging norm thereby causes some genocidal violence that otherwise would not occur. Bosnia and Kosovo illustrate that in at least two recent cases the moral-hazard hypothesis explains why members of a vulnerable group rebelled and thereby triggered genocidal retaliation. The article concludes by exploring whether potential interveners could mitigate genocidal violence by modifying their intervention policies to reduce moral hazard.
203 citations
TL;DR: The most commonly used weapon in the arsenal of human rights proponents is shaming the violating government through public criticism, but does this really affect the behavior of the violator? as mentioned in this paper examines how governments that are targeted for human rights criticism respond to subsequent contentious challenges.
Abstract: The most commonly used weapon in the arsenal of human rights proponents is shaming the violating government through public criticism. But does this really affect the behavior of the violator? This study examines how governments that are targeted for human rights criticism respond to subsequent contentious challenges. Analyzing 873 challenges in seven Latin American countries between 1981 and 1995, it is found that human rights criticism does lead governments to reduce repression of subsequent challenges in cases where there are relatively strong economic ties to other countries. However, the duration of this impact is relatively short—less than 6 months. Examination of the source of human rights criticism shows that criticism by NGOs, religious groups, and foreign governments was more effective than criticism from inter-governmental organizations.
173 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors draw on recent literature from International Relations, sociology, comparative politics, and public policy dealing with policy diffusion and policy transfer, but also differ from most of this work in two key aspects: First, it is argued that the process of diffusion in the developing world has been much more power-based than voluntary.
Abstract: Twenty years ago not a single country had a policy against money laundering; currently, over 170 have very similar anti-money laundering (AML) policies in place. Why have so many countries with so little in common adopted the same policy so rapidly? This extensive diffusion is particularly puzzling given the lack of evidence that AML policies actually work. In explaining the international spread of AML policies, this article draws on recent literature from International Relations, sociology, comparative politics, and public policy dealing with policy diffusion and policy transfer, but also differs from most of this work in two key aspects: First, it is argued that the process of diffusion in the developing world has been much more power-based than voluntary. Second, the mechanisms driving policy diffusion (direct coercion, mimicry, and competition) are all shown to be discursively mediated exercises of power, rather than reflecting rational learning or brute material forces. Evidence is drawn from surveys, interviews, and participant-observation in developing countries from three regions.
160 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the linked questions of under what conditions third parties provide and warring parties accept offers of mediation in civil wars and suggest that third-party offers are closely tied to the interests a third party has in a civil war state as well as the historical ties between the third party and civil war states.
Abstract: Facilitating peace settlements among parties to a civil war represents a key challenge for policymakers. In spite of the grave consequences and relatively high frequency of civil wars, we know little about how best to manage them. In this article we examine the linked questions of under what conditions third parties provide and warring parties accept offers of mediation in civil wars. Our analysis suggests that third-party offers are closely tied to the interests a third party has in a civil war state as well as the historical ties between the third party and civil war state. Importantly, we note critical distinctions between the conditions that encourage offers of mediation from those that foster its acceptance. The theoretical and policy implications of knowing when to offer and the conditions under which an offer will be accepted could have dramatic effects on civil war termination.
159 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine three private transnational governance (PTG) schemes in the field of global sustainability politics and their relation to the South, showing that, contrary to common assumptions, PTG schemes exert a significant influence on Southern stakeholders.
Abstract: While private authority beyond the state has become a popular theme of academic writing, the role of stakeholders in the Southern hemisphere as objects and subjects of private transnational governance has rarely been addressed in the literature. To fill this gap, this article examines three private transnational governance (PTG) schemes in the field of global sustainability politics and their relation to the South. The analysis shows that, contrary to common assumptions, PTG schemes exert a significant influence on Southern stakeholders. They shape the meaning of key normative concepts, induce discursive shifts that constrain the ways in which sustainability politics may or may not be framed, and establish new regulatory frameworks to which Southern actors need to respond. Yet, while Northern interests are well represented, the representation of Southern stakeholders remains low. It is particularly low in knowledge-centered elements of the governance schemes. In contrast, where issues are explicitly framed in political terms and where decision-making processes extend across multiple levels, the quality of Southern representation increases.
124 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine how certain characteristics of a mediator, such as the mediator's information about the disputants and bias toward them, affect the success of mediation of international conflicts.
Abstract: Why do some mediation episodes produce successful negotiated settlements between the disputants of international conflict while others fail to achieve success? This article examines how certain characteristics of a mediator, that is, a mediator’s information about the disputants and a mediator’s bias toward them, affect the success of mediation of international conflicts. By drawing a conceptual distinction between absolute and relative bias and measuring the type of information that is relevant for mediation success, I demonstrate that both the degree of bias a mediator holds toward the disputants and the degree of information a mediator has about the disputants are significant predictors of mediation success.
TL;DR: This paper found that government-biased third parties appear to be less effective than rebel-biased interveners when the government is facing a stronger rebel group, and empirically they appear to have less effective interventions in the "toughest" cases.
Abstract: Conventional wisdom suggests that biased military interventions in civil conflicts should increase the probability that the supported side will win. However, while this is the case for rebel groups, the same is not true for governments. The explanation for this surprising finding becomes clear once one considers the decision of a third-party intervener. Since interveners want to impact the outcomes of civil conflict, government- and rebel-biased interventions will be more likely when the government is facing a stronger rebel group. Given that government-biased third parties intervene in the “toughest” cases, empirically they appear to be less effective than rebel-biased interveners.
TL;DR: This article examined how the number of armed conflicts has declined in the decade and a half since Kegley's presidential address and showed that the severity of war has been declining over a period of over six decades.
Abstract: Fifteen years ago, Charles Kegley spoke of a neoidealist moment in international relations. This article examines how the number of armed conflicts has declined in the decade and a half since Kegley’s presidential address and shows that the severity of war has been declining over a period of over six decades. The number of countries participating in war has increased, but this is in large measure due to coalition-building in several recent wars. Overall, there is a clear decline of war. It seems plausible to attribute this to an increase in the three factors identified by liberal peace theorists: democracy, trade, and international organization. Four alternative interpretations are examined: the temporary peace, the hegemonic peace, the unsustainable peace, and the capitalist peace. The article concludes that the latter, while running close to the liberal peace interpretation, also presents the greatest challenge to it. Indeed, we seem to be living in a commercial liberal period rather than a world of neoidealism.
TL;DR: The authors make a broader theoretical argument about the importance of paying analytical attention to the discursive terrain of international institutions when analyzing the formulation and implementation of security policy, concluding that contemporary theorizing of international institution is product/productive of a particular configuration of political authority and legitimacy that can, and should, be challenged.
Abstract: United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 was adopted in 2000 with the aim of ensuring all efforts toward peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, as well as the conduct of armed conflict itself, would entail sensitivity toward gendered violence and gendered inequalities. In this article, I contrast two accounts of the writing of UNSCR 1325 that issue from the two institutions that claim authority over the document: the United Nations Security Council and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. I make a broader theoretical argument about the importance of paying analytical attention to the discursive terrain of international institutions when analyzing the formulation and implementation of security policy, concluding that contemporary theorizing of international institutions is product/productive of a particular configuration of political authority and legitimacy that can, and should, be challenged.
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that the internal relation of ideas as material social processes is appreciated better through an historical materialist theory of history, in which signs become part of the socially created world in a way that surpasses the deficits of constructivist and poststructuralist approaches alike.
Abstract: This article engages with the debate on how the role of ideas can be conceptualized within International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) and how this is related to the discursive production of meanings embedded in the economy. It is argued that although constructivist and poststructuralist approaches can conceptualize the structural relevance of ideas, thereby improving on neorealist and liberal institutionalist approaches, they nevertheless fail to explain why certain ideas dominate over others at a particular moment in time. In response to constructivist and poststructuralist criticism, it is argued that the internal relation of ideas as material social processes is appreciated better through an historical materialist theory of history. In other words, the article shows how ideas can be conceived as material social processes through which signs become part of the socially created world in a way that surpasses the deficits of constructivist and poststructuralist approaches alike, whilst avoiding the problems of economism.
TL;DR: The authors argue that the staff's initial adoption of the norm of capital freedom was largely shaped by three internal processes: administrative recruitment, adaptation, and learning, and emphasize the critical role of internal entrepreneurship.
Abstract: Beginning in the mid-1980s, in the absence of active encouragement from the IMF's management or member states, the staff began to encourage the liberalization of capital controls as a norm. This behavior constitutes a puzzle for the conventional wisdom, which sees the “Wall Street-Treasury Complex” as responsible for the IMF's approach, as well as a blind spot for rationalist approaches, which offer little insight into processes that shape preference formation “from within” international organizations (IOs). In a context where the Fund's member states permitted the staff considerable discretion and autonomy, I argue the staff's initial adoption of the norm of capital freedom was largely shaped by three internal processes: administrative recruitment, adaptation, and learning. But norm adoption did not mean the end of internal discussion, and a vigorous debate emerged between “gradualists” and supporters of the “big bang” over how the norm should be interpreted and applied. In this “battle of ideas,” I emphasize the critical role of internal entrepreneurship.
TL;DR: This article examined the influence of conflict on bilateral trade and argued that trading firms' expectations of armed conflict, both within and between nation-states, should decrease trade along with armed political violence.
Abstract: Does the shadow of war decrease trade? I examine the influence of conflict on bilateral trade and argue that trading firms’ expectations of armed conflict, both within and between nation-states, should decrease trade along with armed political violence. By assuming that firms care about future profits and assess the likelihood of a domestic or interstate conflict in the future that could disrupt trade, I argue that increasing the expectation of a domestic or interstate conflict raises the transportation, transaction, and production costs of trade. Empirically, contemporaneous trade levels should be negatively related to trading firms’ beliefs about the likelihood of domestic and interstate conflicts in the future. Statistical tests, using bilateral trade data from 1984 to 1997, show that expectations of domestic or interstate conflict, in addition to violent armed conflicts, are negatively correlated with bilateral trade levels. Theoretically and empirically, this research advances our understanding of the trade-conflict relationship by demonstrating how trading firms’ expectations about future conflict reduce bilateral trade levels.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on regional organizations as productive arenas for developing contingent propositions on institutions more generally, through sensitivity to scope conditions and to institutional genesis, forms and effects, in an effort to transcend axiomatic debates that often conflate different dependent variables.
Abstract: Why do regional institutions emerge, what accounts for their variation in design, and what are their effects? Several conceptual and epistemological perspectives—neorealism, neoliberal-institutionalism, constructivism, and domestic politics—provide competing and complementary answers to these questions. I focus on regional organizations as productive arenas for developing contingent propositions on institutions more generally. The purpose is to advance cross-paradigmatic dialogue in two ways: through sensitivity to scope conditions and to institutional genesis, forms, and effects, in an effort to transcend axiomatic debates that often conflate different dependent variables. The empirical analysis includes the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Arab League. The main findings from these cases suggest that understanding the nature of dominant domestic coalitions is often crucial for explaining incentives to create, design, and fine-tune the effects of institutions. However, this is mainly the case when the consequences of creating or designing institutions for power distribution, transaction costs, and norms are negligible or hard to estimate. In many cases these consequences are sizeable, reducing the explanatory influence of domestic coalitions. The latter often provide no more than permissive conditions for the emergence, design, and effect of institutions. Their influence is most decisive in explaining institutional genesis but is often underdetermining in explaining their design.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare four sets of pairwise similar disputes between the United States and the EU under GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO) respectively, and demonstrate that the judicialization (or legalization) of international dispute settlement procedures (IDSPs) can contribute to states compliance with (these) dispute settlement mechanisms.
Abstract: By analyzing disputes between the United States and the EU under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) respectively, the paper demonstrates that the judicialization (or legalization) of international dispute settlement procedures (IDSPs) can contribute to states’ compliance with (these) dispute settlement mechanisms. The article compares four sets of pairwise similar disputes which the United States had with the EU: the so-called Domestic International Sales Corporations case (which arose under GATT) and the Foreign Sales Corporations case (which was settled through WTO procedures), the Steel case (GATT) and the Patents case (WTO), the two Hormones cases under GATT and the WTO respectively, the Citrus case (GATT) and the Bananas case (WTO). In each of the four comparisons, the United States acted more in accordance with the judicial WTO dispute settlement procedures than with the diplomatic GATT procedures. We can therefore say that contrary to realist assumptions, the judicialization of IDSPs can contribute to their effectiveness. However, contrary to idealist assumptions the effectiveness of IDSPs does not automatically follow from their judicialization. Yet, as assumed by institutionalists, judicialized IDSPs are better than diplomatic IDSPs in sustaining states’ compliance with these procedures precisely because of their normative and strategic effects.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors define the concept of preventive war, distinguish it from preemption and other sources of better-now-than-later logic, and examine numerous conceptual issues that confound theoretical and empirical analyses of prevention.
Abstract: I define the concept of preventive war, distinguish it from preemption and other sources of better-now-than-later logic, and examine numerous conceptual issues that confound theoretical and empirical analyses of prevention. I then consider the argument that democracies rarely if ever adopt preventive war strategies because such strategies are contrary to the preferences of democratic publics and to the values and identities of democratic states. I examine a number of historical cases of anticipated power shifts by democratic states, and analyze the motivations for war and the mobilization of public support for war. The evidence contradicts both the descriptive proposition that democracies do not adopt preventive war strategies and causal propositions about the constraining effects of democratic institutions and democratic political cultures.
TL;DR: This article analyzed a model in which, as long as the dissatisfied state is not too impatient, equilibria exist in which an agreement is peacefully reached through the offer-counteroffer process.
Abstract: Many game-theoretic models of crisis bargaining find that under incomplete information, an initial offer is either accepted, or war occurs. However, this finding is odd in two ways: (a) empirically, there are many cases of an agreement being peacefully reached after a number of offers and counteroffers and (b) theoretically, it is not clear why a state would ever leave the bargaining table and opt for inefficient war. We analyze a model in which, as long as the dissatisfied state is not too impatient, equilibria exist in which an agreement is peacefully reached through the offer‐ counteroffer process. Our results suggest that private information only leads to war in conjunction with other factors that are correlated with impatience, such as domestic political vulnerability, exogenous obstacles to the ability to make counteroffers rapidly, and bargaining tactics that create incentives to strike quickly or that lock the actors into war.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the effect of institutional changes in dispute settlement procedures that occurred in the transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Abstract: Increasing legalization of international institutions has divergent effects on member countries. Whereas legalization decreases uncertainty and increases convergence of countries’ expectations on international outcomes, it imposes costs on countries by increasing the complexity and difficulty of procedures for them to utilize. Countries with the administrative capacity to follow elaborate procedures reap the benefits of increased legalization. For countries without such capacity—primarily developing countries—the potential benefits are offset by their difficulty in following the procedures. I examine this argument against the institutional changes in dispute settlement procedures that occurred in the transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Compared to the GATT era, developed countries—ones with greater capacity—are much more likely to utilize dispute settlement in the WTO than developing countries. Gains from the institutional changes in dispute settlement procedures have accrued to benefit mostly developed member countries in the WTO.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explored the impact of political factors on bond market behavior and foreign direct investment, but little attention has been paid to stock markets, and they found a positive association between stock-market valuations and levels of democracy, shareholder rights, legal traditions, and capital-account liberalization, and no association with fiscal deficits or surpluses.
Abstract: Are equity markets just another facet of global finance, or are they unique in their responses to—and influences on—government policies and institutions? Recent work has explored the impact of political factors on bond market behavior and foreign direct investment, but little attention has been paid to stock markets. On the basis of the particular concerns of equity investors, we hypothesize a positive association between stock-market valuations and levels of democracy, shareholder rights, legal traditions, and capital-account liberalization, a negative association with real interest rates, and no association with fiscal deficits or surpluses. We assess our expectations by analyzing the political and institutional determinants of aggregate price-to-earnings ratios for a sample of up to 37 countries from 1985 to 2004, using both cross-sectional and time-series cross-sectional analyses. We find support for most, but not all, of our hypotheses. Our findings suggest that we must disaggregate the effects of different asset markets to understand the impact of economic globalization on government policies.
TL;DR: For three decades, analysis of the Cuban missile crisis was dominated by a discursive framing produced in the ExComm, one in which Cuba was invisible as mentioned in this paper, and despite the oral history project's postcolonial intervention, and greater attention to Cuba's role in the crisis, this framing persists and is reproduced in the micro-practices of scholarship.
Abstract: Postcolonial scholars show how knowledge practices participate in the production and reproduction of international hierarchy. A common effect of such practices is to marginalize Third World and other subaltern points of view. For three decades, analysis of the Cuban missile crisis was dominated by a discursive framing produced in the ExComm, one in which Cuba was invisible. The effort to produce a critical oral history enabled Cuban voices—long excluded from interpretive debates about the events of October 1962—to challenge the myth of the crisis as a superpower affair. Despite the oral history project's postcolonial intervention, however, and greater attention to Cuba's role in the crisis, this framing persists and is reproduced in the micro-practices of scholarship. Decolonizing the crisis, and by extension the discipline itself, is not easy to do.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that within collapsed and fragmented states there exist autonomous armed groups, which make these states by definition anarchic systems, and they integrate the theoretical understanding of the relations between armed groups and (external) states.
Abstract: Systemic theories of international politics divide the world into anarchic and hierarchic systems. Conventionally, the boundary of each system is based on juridically defined territorial borders. This article argues that within collapsed and “fragmented” states there exist autonomous armed groups, which make these states by definition anarchic systems. Unlike earlier accounts of such “domestic anarchy,” this article argues that the domestic anarchy is “open” or connected to the international anarchic system. By taking this approach, it is possible to integrate the theoretical understanding of the relations between armed groups and (external) states. Specifically, the article illustrates how there can be “mixed security dilemmas” between states and armed groups, and that other theoretical concepts usually reserved for describing interstate relations can potentially be used to describe state-armed group relations.
TL;DR: The authors found that a good number of Americans believe that their government retains the room to maneuver, however, there exists a substantial minority that does not, characterized according to partisanship, knowledge levels, and age.
Abstract: Despite the increasing integration of markets, most political scientists contend that governments retain much policy “room to maneuver.” Moreover, citizens presumably support further economic integration because they believe their governments can cushion the impacts of market forces. In this sense, globalization is compatible with democracy. Rarely, however, are data provided that demonstrate citizens’ appreciation for the room to maneuver, let alone their positive evaluation of it. Who do citizens identify as most responsible for the performance of the U.S. economy, elected officials or national and international market forces? Which citizens attribute economic performance to these forces and not to their elected officials? In this article, we report results from an original experiment designed to answer these questions. We find that a good number of Americans believe that their government retains the room to maneuver. However, there exists a substantial minority that does not. We show, consistent with recent developments in the study of political psychology on distal associations and partisan motivated reasoning, that this minority is characterized according to partisanship, knowledge levels, and age. Republican partisans and more educated citizens believe there is less room to maneuver than Democratic partisans and members of older age cohorts. Generational factors also shape beliefs in the efficacy of policy control. Finally, priming subjects to think about economic globalization does not affect their responsibility attributions. The choice set matters, however. When provided the option, a significant number of respondents assign responsibility to market forces rather than elected officials.
TL;DR: In this article, an analysis of the patterns of donor funding to human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is presented, where the authors show that states have an impact on donor preferences, which, in turn, influences the agenda of human rights NGOs and their modes of operation.
Abstract: Focusing on the flow of funding to human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), we begin in this article to broach one of the least studied issues pertaining to transnational regimes—namely, their material underpinnings. Through an analysis of the patterns of donor funding to human rights NGOs, we underscore the triangulation between states, donors, and rights NGOs, whereby states have an impact on donor preferences, which, in turn, influences the agenda of human rights NGOs and their modes of operation, and these, in their turn, help shape the kind of NGO criticism voiced against the state. By emphasizing the important and frequently missing link of donors, we thus complicate the discussion concerning the impact human rights networks have on state policies and practices, showing how rights NGOs simultaneously weaken and strengthen the state. Accordingly, our examination of the political economy of human rights adds a new dimension to the literature analyzing how the state both reconfigures and is reconfigured by transnational regimes.
TL;DR: The authors argue that delegation makes it harder for interest groups to gain access to policy makers, which should raise the costs of all lobbying, thus, delegation should lead to less lobbying and lower tariff rates.
Abstract: During the twentieth century, the United States shifted from embracing protectionism to being an advocate for global free trade. Scholarly debate has focused on whether this shift was solely because of changes in preferences or if changes to institutions also played a role. Relying upon access point theory, this article argues that an institutional change, delegation to the President, led to endogenous changes in preferences. Delegation makes it harder for interest groups to gain access to policy makers, which should raise the costs of all lobbying. As protectionists dominate lobbying due to their collective action advantage, they will be disproportionately hurt. Thus, delegation should lead to less lobbying and lower tariff rates. These arguments are tested on time series data of tariff rates using an Error Correction Mechanism model and on data on interest group testimony before Congressional committees.
TL;DR: This article evaluated the effect of economic interests and security concerns on American intervention in civil and international conflict and found that exports have an important indirect effect by shaping alliance commitments in the long run.
Abstract: This paper evaluates the effect of economic interests and security concerns on American intervention in civil and international conflict. Generalizations about the relative importance of these considerations have played critical role in the historiography of American foreign relations. Although statistical analysis is well suited for evaluating such generalizations, quantitative researchers have devoted relatively little attention to the issue. Existing large-n research has generally found that security concerns matter more, but has not considered how the economic and security concerns thought to affect intervention might also influence each other. These subsidiary relationships complicate efforts to assess the relative importance of these two influences on intervention. Evidence concerning intervention in international crises and civil wars indicates that, while alliance commitments and rival behavior have a greater immediate impact on American intervention, exports have an important indirect effect by shaping alliance commitments in the long run.
TL;DR: The authors developed a repeated public-goods model for international cooperation and found that the relationship between the distribution of power and international cooperation is complex: a large leading state forms a narrow coalition of intensive contributors, and builds institutions, while a smaller leading state form a broader coalition that makes shallow contributions, and is more inclined to multilateralism.
Abstract: International relations theory has borrowed important intuitions from Olson’s static public-goods model (hegemonic stability) and the repeated prisoners’ dilemma (theories of international cooperation), and arguments often combine implications from both models. We develop a general, repeated public-goods model. We then allow the qualitative dimensions of cooperation to emerge endogenously: agreements can have broad or narrow membership and entail deep or shallow commitments; they can be multilateral or discriminatory; they can be ad hoc or institutionalized. We find that the relationship between the distribution of power and international cooperation is complex: a large leading state forms a narrow coalition of intensive contributors, and builds institutions, while a smaller leading state forms a broader coalition that makes shallow contributions, and is more inclined to multilateralism.