Showing papers in "Mathematical Social Sciences in 2011"

TL;DR: A dynamic model of rational workaholism is developed, demonstrating that it is not necessary for work to be addictive per se in order to exhibit an addictive pattern throughout which work intensity monotonically increases with time.

TL;DR: It is shown that this one way "downstream" trading process implements the unique efficient allocation as well as a welfare distribution and that the welfare distribution is in the core of the associated game of the problem.

TL;DR: This work considers single machine scheduling problems with a non-renewable resource and presents some properties of feasible schedules for several problems of these types with standard objective functions, including the minimization of makespan and total tardiness.

TL;DR: Suppose some non-degenerate preferences R, with strict part P, over risky outcomes satisfy Independence, and when they satisfy any two of the following axioms they satisfy the third.

TL;DR: This work determines the optimal levels of the two variables and analyze substitution between them and introduces insurance into the model and extends the separation result, derived in the literature, to the case where prevention is considered too.

TL;DR: The weak top-choice property is introduced and shown to be sufficient for the existence of a strongly Nash stable partition and it is also shown that descending separable preferences guarantee theexistence of a strong Nash stable partitions.

TL;DR: For non-trivial preorders, it shows that, unlike the standard definitions, the weak preference relation defined in Galaabaatar and Karni (2010) allows for incomplete preferences while maintaining all the continuity properties of complete preference relations.

TL;DR: The outcome that the bargaining finally reaches exactly coincides with the non-cooperative outcome, and it cannot be improved upon even by any objections with almost zero cost, so it is strongly stable.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors give necessary and sufficient conditions for a simple game to have rough weights and define two functions f ( n ) and g( n ) that measure the deviation of a simple games from a weighted majority game and roughly weighted majority games, respectively.

TL;DR: It is shown that n-player bargaining problems have a unique self-supporting outcome under the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, which satisfies PCI if moving the utopia point in the direction of the solution outcome does not change this outcome.

TL;DR: Skewness affinity is shown to be equivalent to the marginal rate of substitution between mean and variance of wealth being decreasing in the skewness, which allows for the comparative static effect of increases in the Skewness in quasi-linear decision problems.

TL;DR: An existence theorem for accessible outcomes is given, which implies that the minimal dominant set of a cohesive game is exactly the coalition structure core or the collection of accessible outcomes, either of which can be reached from any outcome in linear time.

TL;DR: This note proposes in this note some further analytical (and complementary) methods to compute the probability of this paradox.

TL;DR: This work focuses on a new condition: "update monotonicity" for preference rules, which implies that the rule equals the union of preferences which extend all preference pairs unanimously agreed upon by k agents, where k is related to the number of alternatives and agents.

TL;DR: In anti-coordination games under smoothed best-response dynamics, a small probability of delay can stabilize the equilibrium, while a large probability can destabilize it, and the relationship between information lags and the stability of equilibria is not "monotonic."

TL;DR: A contracting model in which the principal frames the contract when the agent is unaware of some contingencies, yet is aware that she may be unaware, and it is shown that the optimal contract is vague if and only if the principal exploits the agent.

TL;DR: An envelope theorem is used to show that results from local utility analysis still hold in the authors' setting, without any further differentiability assumptions on the preference functionals.

TL;DR: The Tempered Aspirations solution can be understood as a “dual” version of the Gupta–Livne solution or, alternatively, as a version of Chun and Thomson’s (1992) Proportional solution in which the claims point is endogenous.

TL;DR: This paper defines relative demands and investigates their properties for the more general situation where a commodity group consists of more than two similar but quality-differentiable brands and extends the AA theorem and the law of relative demand.

TL;DR: A model in which imperfectly informed voters with common interests participate in a multicandidate election decided by either plurality rule or a runoff shows that all candidates receive significant vote shares in any equilibrium in which information fully aggregates under plurality rule.

TL;DR: The authors extended the original model to operate within an agent-based computational context, with a distribution of heterogeneous agents occupying coordinates in a two dimensional lattice, making repeated decisions over time.

TL;DR: These preferences are combined lexicographically as to examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides, the restriction of agents' preferences over groups to strict orderings, and the extent to which individual preferences respect common rankings shape the existenceof core stable coalitional matchings.

TL;DR: This work analyzes bargaining situations where the agents’ payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations and characterize the uncountably large classes of decomposable rules that survive the Nash (1950), Kalai (1977), and Thomson (1981) properties.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show how infinite horizon stochastic optimal control problems can be solved via studying their finite horizon approximations, which often leads to analytical solutions for the infinite horizon problem by studying phase diagrams.

TL;DR: A method for solving in closed form a general class of nonlinear modified Hamiltonian dynamic systems (MHDS) and uses the exact solutions to study both uniqueness and indeterminacy of the optimal path when the dynamic system has not a well-defined isolated steady state.

TL;DR: This work develops a two-sector monetary economy with human capital accumulation and a cash constraint applied to both consumption and investment to examine the ways in which social status affects the impact of monetary policy on the long-run economic growth rate.

TL;DR: It is shown that an external regulating agency can increase total social welfare without running a deficit by offering to subsidize one firm an amount which depends on the output level of that firm and the market price.

TL;DR: It is shown how the class of minimal exact balanced collections can be partitioned into three basic types each of which can be systematically generated.

TL;DR: It is proved that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome and it is shown that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters.

TL;DR: It is shown that for any non-degenerate prior with bounded support there exists a conditional distribution and pair of signals such that the lower signal's posterior stochastically dominates that of the higher signal.