In this paper, the authors propose three approaches to reduce informational rents to landowners: (1) acquire information on observable landowner attributes that are correlated with compliance costs; (2) offer landowners a menu of screening contracts; and (3) allocate contracts through procurement auctions.
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This article is published in Ecological Economics.The article was published on 2008-05-01 and is currently open access. It has received 588 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Additionality & Opportunity cost.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed the new organisational framework that now is derived and linked it to the Dutch tradition of environmental cooperatives, and concluded that the Dutch model is promising, although not without risks, in order to fully reap the benefits possible under the new system one need to reduce restrictions and increase incentives.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compared three modes of governance for sustainable development in the Dutch fen landscape, i.e., adaptive management, transition management, and payments for environmental services.
TL;DR: Find that the ecological compensation efficiency is not only determined by the extent to which incremental ecosystem services are provided, but also by the cost at which this was achieved.
TL;DR: In this article, a new general auction model was proposed, and the properties of affiliated random variables were investigated, and various theorems were presented in Section 4-8 and Section 9.
TL;DR: In this article, the seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for a single object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other.
TL;DR: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications and explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders and the theory of Auction with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
TL;DR: This article studied the second-price auctions run by eBay and Amazon and found that the fraction of bids submitted in the closing seconds of the auction is substantially larger in eBay than in Amazon, and more experience causes bidders to bid later on eBay but earlier on Amazon.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model of two-dimensional auctions, where firms bid on both price and quality, and bids are evaluated by a scoring rule designed by a buyer.