In this paper, the authors propose three approaches to reduce informational rents to landowners: (1) acquire information on observable landowner attributes that are correlated with compliance costs; (2) offer landowners a menu of screening contracts; and (3) allocate contracts through procurement auctions.
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This article is published in Ecological Economics.The article was published on 2008-05-01 and is currently open access. It has received 588 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Additionality & Opportunity cost.
TL;DR: The Deepwater Horizon Oil Leak, June 2010; Global Warming Report: UN Warms Up to Climate Change, February 2007] as mentioned in this paper showed that fossil fuels are and have been our chief energy source, but they pose significant dangers.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show the potential for opportunity costs to vary substantially between agricultural producers, and across industries, catchments and pollutants, and demonstrate how they can be used to reveal opportunity costs.
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors identified five groups of potential drivers of compliance based on the concepts of material costs and benefits; social pressure; environmental values and beliefs; trust, fairness and reciprocity; and household characteristics.
TL;DR: In this article, a new general auction model was proposed, and the properties of affiliated random variables were investigated, and various theorems were presented in Section 4-8 and Section 9.
TL;DR: In this article, the seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for a single object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other.
TL;DR: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications and explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders and the theory of Auction with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
TL;DR: This article studied the second-price auctions run by eBay and Amazon and found that the fraction of bids submitted in the closing seconds of the auction is substantially larger in eBay than in Amazon, and more experience causes bidders to bid later on eBay but earlier on Amazon.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model of two-dimensional auctions, where firms bid on both price and quality, and bids are evaluated by a scoring rule designed by a buyer.