Q1. What are the contributions in this paper?
In this paper, the authors focus on contract issues related to hidden information in the context of PES contracts.
Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services
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In this paper, the authors propose three approaches to reduce informational rents to landowners: (1) acquire information on observable landowner attributes that are correlated with compliance costs; (2) offer landowners a menu of screening contracts; and (3) allocate contracts through procurement auctions.About:
This article is published in Ecological Economics.The article was published on 2008-05-01 and is currently open access. It has received 588 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Additionality & Opportunity cost.read more
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Efficient Procurement of Ecosystem Services – Adverse versus Beneficial Selection
Noel Russell,Johannes Sauer +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the principal-agent characteristics of adverse selection were investigated in the context of the UK Environmental Stewardship Scheme and the tradeoffs that arise in designing ecosystem procurement mechanisms where payment of informational rents to participants can be used to increase overall efficiency.
Dissertation
Managing innovation complexity: About the co-existence of innovation types
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a framework for managing co-existing and new innovation types in the context of research design and management of organizational complexity, and the missing link between innovation and complexity.
Three-Stage Tradable Set-Aside Requirements, Interdependent Values, and Biodiversity Production on Private Lands
Mark D. Agee,Thomas D. Crocker +1 more
TL;DR: In this article , a static three-stage incentive compatible, budget-balanced, execution-contingent mechanism for a regulator to allocate biodiversity protection responsibilities across a landscape mosaic with multiple value-interdependent owners is proposed.
Journal ArticleDOI
Appropriate Types of Payments in Construction Contracts Based on Agency Theory Parameters
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the choice between behavior-based and objectivity-based compensation strategies in construction contracts, and concluded that behavior based compensation strategies are more preferable than objectivity based strategies.
Journal Article
Price auction and regulation in experimental built heritage conservation market
TL;DR: In this article, the authors applied methods from experimental economics to allocate a limited amount of financial funds to conservation efforts of heritage house owners in George Town, Penang, Malaysia and compared two procurement auction mechanisms borrowing elements from Economic theory.
References
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A theory of auctions and competitive bidding
Paul Milgrom,Robert J. Weber +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a new general auction model was proposed, and the properties of affiliated random variables were investigated, and various theorems were presented in Section 4-8 and Section 9.
Journal ArticleDOI
Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
TL;DR: In this article, the seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for a single object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other.
Book
Putting Auction Theory to Work
TL;DR: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications and explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders and the theory of Auction with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Journal ArticleDOI
Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet
Alvin E. Roth,Axel Ockenfels +1 more
TL;DR: This article studied the second-price auctions run by eBay and Amazon and found that the fraction of bids submitted in the closing seconds of the auction is substantially larger in eBay than in Amazon, and more experience causes bidders to bid later on eBay but earlier on Amazon.
Journal ArticleDOI
Design competition through multidimensional auctions
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model of two-dimensional auctions, where firms bid on both price and quality, and bids are evaluated by a scoring rule designed by a buyer.