Q1. What are the contributions in this paper?
In this paper, the authors focus on contract issues related to hidden information in the context of PES contracts.
Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services
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In this paper, the authors propose three approaches to reduce informational rents to landowners: (1) acquire information on observable landowner attributes that are correlated with compliance costs; (2) offer landowners a menu of screening contracts; and (3) allocate contracts through procurement auctions.About:
This article is published in Ecological Economics.The article was published on 2008-05-01 and is currently open access. It has received 588 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Additionality & Opportunity cost.read more
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The Bobolink Project: Selling Public Goods From Ecosystem Services Using Provision Point Mechanisms☆
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors report a two-year field experiment that solicited residents of Jamestown, Rhode Island, USA, to fund contracts with farmers willing to provide public goods associated with improving the nesting success of grassland birds, particularly the Bobolink.
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Effects of Exclusion from a Conservation Policy: Negative Behavioral Spillovers from Targeted Incentives
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use a field experiment to examine the changes in contributions to forest conservation when each of these selection rules is introduced, and they find that targeting additionality (rule 2) is the only scheme to increase contributions.
BookDOI
Policy Instruments for Water Pollution Control in Developing Countries
Sheila M. Olmstead,Jiameng Zheng +1 more
TL;DR: This article surveys the economic theory behind regulatory and other solutions to the stark ambient water pollution problems that exist in many developing countries, and what is known from the empirical economics literature about the effectiveness of these solutions.
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REDD+ as a Public Policy Dilemma: Understanding Conflict and Cooperation in the Design of Conservation Incentives
TL;DR: It is found that electoral interests and bureaucratic politics exerted pressure on policy design teams, which eventually traded off long-term societal efficiency concerns against short-term administrative goals in two government-led incentive schemes in Ecuador and Peru.
Undermined by adverse selection: Australias Direct Action abatement subsidies
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine economic challenges faced by Australia's Direct Action abatement subsidy scheme and present a model of the adverse selection problem and describes the early experience with Direct Action.
References
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A theory of auctions and competitive bidding
Paul Milgrom,Robert J. Weber +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a new general auction model was proposed, and the properties of affiliated random variables were investigated, and various theorems were presented in Section 4-8 and Section 9.
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Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
TL;DR: In this article, the seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for a single object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other.
Book
Putting Auction Theory to Work
TL;DR: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications and explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders and the theory of Auction with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
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Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet
Alvin E. Roth,Axel Ockenfels +1 more
TL;DR: This article studied the second-price auctions run by eBay and Amazon and found that the fraction of bids submitted in the closing seconds of the auction is substantially larger in eBay than in Amazon, and more experience causes bidders to bid later on eBay but earlier on Amazon.
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Design competition through multidimensional auctions
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model of two-dimensional auctions, where firms bid on both price and quality, and bids are evaluated by a scoring rule designed by a buyer.