In this paper, the authors propose three approaches to reduce informational rents to landowners: (1) acquire information on observable landowner attributes that are correlated with compliance costs; (2) offer landowners a menu of screening contracts; and (3) allocate contracts through procurement auctions.
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This article is published in Ecological Economics.The article was published on 2008-05-01 and is currently open access. It has received 588 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Additionality & Opportunity cost.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide insights into the multiple dimensions of fairness in payments for ecosystem services (PES) using the results of pilot agrobiodiversity conservation auctions in two sites in the Bolivian and Peruvian Andes farming groups bid for payments for the conservation of traditional crop varieties.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used a pilot auction to address the issues of determining the level of payment and selecting participants of a PES program in Tanzania's Uluguru Mountains, where two hundred fifty-one local farmers submitted sealed bids in the auction.
TL;DR: Evaluations of carbon stocks and biodiversity in pure and mixed native tree plantations in Costa Rica and Colombia show systems that incorporate bundling or layering of multiple services can make sustainable land uses more attractive to farmers and reduce perverse incentives.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that government PES investment into social co-benefit can provide a socially efficient and environmentally effective investment strategy in the absence of opportunity cost differential and the presence of extreme social disadvantage of service providers.
TL;DR: Wang et al. as mentioned in this paper used a random-coefficients logistic regression model to examine the roles that these two PES programs, together with other factors, played in cropland abandonment.
TL;DR: In this article, a new general auction model was proposed, and the properties of affiliated random variables were investigated, and various theorems were presented in Section 4-8 and Section 9.
TL;DR: In this article, the seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for a single object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other.
TL;DR: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications and explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders and the theory of Auction with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
TL;DR: This article studied the second-price auctions run by eBay and Amazon and found that the fraction of bids submitted in the closing seconds of the auction is substantially larger in eBay than in Amazon, and more experience causes bidders to bid later on eBay but earlier on Amazon.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model of two-dimensional auctions, where firms bid on both price and quality, and bids are evaluated by a scoring rule designed by a buyer.