Q1. What are the contributions in this paper?
In this paper, the authors focus on contract issues related to hidden information in the context of PES contracts.
Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services
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In this paper, the authors propose three approaches to reduce informational rents to landowners: (1) acquire information on observable landowner attributes that are correlated with compliance costs; (2) offer landowners a menu of screening contracts; and (3) allocate contracts through procurement auctions.About:
This article is published in Ecological Economics.The article was published on 2008-05-01 and is currently open access. It has received 588 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Additionality & Opportunity cost.read more
Citations
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Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts with early-exit options: The case of conservation contracts
TL;DR: It is shown that bidders’ payoff is lower when competing for contracts with unenforceable contract terms and that neglecting the risk of opportunistic behavior by sellers can lead to contract awards that do not maximize the buyer’s potential payoff.
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Participation in Payments for Ecosystem Services programmes: accounting for participant heterogeneity
Katrina Mullan,Andreas Kontoleon +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine heterogeneity in the preferences of households regarding participation in a payments for ecosystem services (PES) program and argue that such heterogeneity is particularly likely for schemes that are implemented in a developing country setting, where households differ in their degree of integration into markets.
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The Economic and Legal Sides of Additionality in Payments for Environmental Services
Alain Karsenty,Sigrid Aubert,Laura Brimont,Céline Dutilly,Sébastien Desbureaux,Driss Ezzine de Blas,Gwenolé Le Velly +6 more
TL;DR: In this article, a renewed framework of analysis is proposed to distinguish compensation and reward in PES by crossing the opportunity cost dimension and the legal constraint vis-a-vis the environment.
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Parks versus payments: reconciling divergent policy responses to biodiversity loss and climate change from tropical deforestation
Jonah Busch,Hedley S. Grantham +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that biodiversity loss and climate change both result from tropical deforestation, yet strategies to address biodiversity loss have focused primarily on protected areas while strategies to mitigate climate change have focused on carbon payments.
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Incentivizing and tendering conservation contracts: The trade-off between participation and effort provision
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate landholder responses to, and the resulting outcome performance of, programs that incentivize and tender conservation contracts, and find that increasing the share of payment linked to uncertain environmental outcomes raises the level of individual stewardship effort but reduces participation, thereby creating a tradeoff.
References
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A theory of auctions and competitive bidding
Paul Milgrom,Robert J. Weber +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a new general auction model was proposed, and the properties of affiliated random variables were investigated, and various theorems were presented in Section 4-8 and Section 9.
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Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
TL;DR: In this article, the seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for a single object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other.
Book
Putting Auction Theory to Work
TL;DR: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications and explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders and the theory of Auction with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
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Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet
Alvin E. Roth,Axel Ockenfels +1 more
TL;DR: This article studied the second-price auctions run by eBay and Amazon and found that the fraction of bids submitted in the closing seconds of the auction is substantially larger in eBay than in Amazon, and more experience causes bidders to bid later on eBay but earlier on Amazon.
Journal ArticleDOI
Design competition through multidimensional auctions
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model of two-dimensional auctions, where firms bid on both price and quality, and bids are evaluated by a scoring rule designed by a buyer.