background

https://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8005&context=etd

Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions

Knowledge, infallibility, and skepticism

Separately, and in quite different ways, Mikkel Gerken and Jennifer Nagel have attempted to defend moderate classical invariantism (MCI) by appealing to recent work in cognitive psychology. They claim that by understanding the psychological processing that underlies our knowledge judgements, we can reconcile their apparent shiftiness with traditional non-shifty epistemology. The aim of this paper is to show how and why these attempts to exploit work in cognitive psychology to defend MCI run aground.

Knowledge judgements and cognitive psychology

P our exprimer le fait que des entreprises se trouvent engagees dans des strategies articulant a la fois concurrence et cooperation, le vocable de coopetition s'est impose, surtout avec le livre de Brandeburger et Nalebuff (1996 ; Le Roy & Yami, 2007). Dans ce papier, nous voudrions developper quelques theses : 1. La coopetition est un phenomene complexe (synchronie) et dynamique (diachronie) ; 2. Cette complexite et cette dynamique ne peuvent pas s'expliquer uniquement en considerant les firmes qui elaborent les strategies de concurrence et de cooperation, mais il faut prendre en consideration les autres acteurs que sont l'autre cote du marche (les clients) et les regulateurs ; ces acteurs peuvent en effet jouer un role architectural (Jacobides, 2007) ; 3. Ce role architectural peut etre structurel (les clients ou les regulateurs peuvent jouer sur les structures de marche qui favorisent la concurrence ou la cooperation, et qui jouent sur la maniere dont les deux peuvent se combiner) ou peser sur les comportements (par des incitations a la concurrence ou la cooperation, ou certaines combinaisons des deux) ; 4. Sur le plan synchronique, il faut etudier les differentes dimensions sur lesquelles peuvent se developper la concurrence et la cooperation a un meme instant ou a une meme periode ; notamment, l'etude doit prendre en compte la concurrence et la cooperation a l'interieur et a l'exterieur des entreprises ; 5. Sur le plan diachronique, il faut etudier la maniere dont, d'une periode a une autre, la concurrence et la cooperation evoluent selon les differentes dimensions ; 6. Pour etudier de maniere fine a la fois la complexite synchronique de la coopetition et sa dimension diachronique, pour construire des sequences multidimensionnelles (Dumez et Jeunemaitre, 2005), il faut tenter de representer le phenomene sous la forme de templates qui permettent a la fois de mettre en serie et de presenter sous une forme synoptique les donnees qui sont constitutives de ce phenomene (Dumez & Rigaud, 2008). Le cas etudie est celui de l'industrie americaine de defense1. Il est nourri de l'analyse de rapports emanant d'institutions publiques (comme le Government Accountability Office, le Department of Defense lui-meme), d'institutions privees a but non lucratif (Randk Corporation), des rapports annuels des entreprises, et d'entretiens menes dans le secteur (aupres de militaires, de firmes, d'analystes financiers, d'experts universitaires).

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00408506/document

Le concept de coopétition: quelques voies de recherche à partir d'une analyse de cas

In this paper I explore the pragmatic phenomenon of Steering Thrust, and specifically how speakers steer others to action and the mechanism that underpins how they so steer. In addition to opening the door to a rich pragmatic domain (of Action-Directed Pragmatics), understanding the pragmatics of various locutions and assertions (and sayings) in deliberative action-oriented contexts resolves the puzzle of bank-type cases by a pragmatic treatment of the puzzle, and undermines the motivation to seek a semantic remedy, such as via Pragmatic Encroachment. When speakers steer others to action, they transmit ‘steering thrust’ to the actor (the one they attempt to steer to action). Steering-Thrust is a non-linguistic phenomenon, although it’s generated by the speaker’s assertion: it is a gradable pressure, or a ‘push’, or a mild nudge. The Steering mechanism is ‘on’ when certain norms are operative in the context, primarily instrumental norms (in addition to epistemic/semantic norms), which is the case when the context is deliberative with, typically, in core cases, a decision on an action on the agenda. In such cases, various locutions modify the degree (strength) of Steering Thrust transmitted by a speaker in making an assertion. ‘I know that p’, in addition to its semantic profile, has a distinctive pragmatic/action-directed profile. In particular, a mere assertion in such a context normally carries Steering Thrust (unless it’s cancelled, as by a caveat). Adding the prefix ‘I know that …’ intensifies further the Steering Thrust transmitted to the actor. Steering Thrust can be ‘pro’ or ‘con’—steering towards a certain action, or away from an action. The prefix ‘I know that …’ is a main locution for transmitting pro Steering Thrust (as is ‘I am sure that …). It’s denial, e.g., ‘Now I don’t know that p’, is a main locution for transmitting con Steering Thrust—away from a certain action. Action-Directed Pragmatics focuses on pragmatic contents transmitted in deliberative contexts. Asserting a simple utterance functions in such contexts as conveying pro steering thrust (and functions as an admissible premise in a Practical Inference). In such contexts, the main operative norms, in addition to semantic/epistemic norms, are instrumental norms. Asserting Knowledge denials (i.e.: I don’t know that p) employs literal semantic content in order to convey pragmatic, action-directed content—steering the actor away from the action under consideration. Asserting a Knowledge Ascription conveys a stronger Steering Thrust (than asserting a simple utterance) towards an action. In Action-Directed cases, it is the Action-Directed content of the assertion of a denial of a Knowledge Ascription that is the conveyed content (side-stepping the literal—semantic—content), with a con steering thrust—steering the actor away from the action invoked by asserting that p (the assertion in the scope of the knowledge operator). This pragmatic perspective enables the resolution of bank-type puzzles: Asserting the denial of the knowledge ascription conveys its pragmatic, action-directed content rather than its literal content. Hence, in such cases, it’s a mistake to invoke and employ the ‘intuitive usage’ (i.e., the literal—semantic—content) of the Knowledge Ascription as providing semantic evidence—here, regarding the semantics of ‘know’, since this literal content has not been conveyed by the action-directed assertion token. The intuitive sayability (See below) of the denial of the pertinent knowledge-ascription in such cases is due to the recognition by competent speakers that its pragmatic, action-directed, content is what is being conveyed in the deliberative, ‘action-pregnant’, context (thereby side-stepping its literal semantic content). Saying it strikes one as ‘intuitive’ since what’s conveyed is consteering-to-action by the speaker, which is the function that her saying it performs; and further, saying it steers to non-action that, the reader feels, is the ‘right’ action to take.

The steering thrust phenomenon in action-directed-pragmatics

\n Is there an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism? The answer to this question has implications for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity. For example, some philosophers have argued from claims that epistemic judgement is not necessarily motivating to the view that epistemic judgement is not normative. This paper examines the options for spelling out an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism. It is argued that the most promising approach connects epistemic judgements to doxastic dispositions, which are related to motivation in a fairly tenuous sense. It is also argued that this approach currently lacks a plausible and informative account of the nature and workings of these doxastic dispositions, and, hence, an explanation of the range of phenomena internalist theses typically set out to explain. The most promising route for developing such an account, based on recent expressivist work, is investigated and found inadequate for the task.

/pdf/epistemic-judgement-and-motivation-v5fqhkjkde.pdf

Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions

Citations

Knowledge, infallibility, and skepticism

Knowledge judgements and cognitive psychology

Le concept de coopétition: quelques voies de recherche à partir d'une analyse de cas

The steering thrust phenomenon in action-directed-pragmatics

Epistemic Judgement and Motivation

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