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Journal ArticleDOI

Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions

Keith DeRose
- 01 Nov 1992 - 
- Vol. 52, Iss: 4, pp 913-929
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This article is published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.The article was published on 1992-11-01. It has received 578 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Contextualism & Contemporary philosophy.

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Journal ArticleDOI

Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them)

TL;DR: The authors introduce the notion of conversational implicatures, discuss some of the key issues that lie at the heart of the recent debate, and explicates tests that allow us to reliably distinguish between semantic entailments and conventional implicacies on the one hand and conversationalimplicatures on the other.
BookDOI

Analytic Philosophy in America

Abstract: The leading pre-analytic philosopher in America, and one of its giants of all time, was Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). Receiving a scientific education (including a Harvard BS in chemistry in 1863), he lectured on logic and philosophy of science at Harvard (1864-5, 1869-71), and Johns Hopkins (1879-84), after which he moved to Milford, Pennsylvania, where he continued to write prodigiously. His greatest contributions were in logic, including a syntax for quantification theory (1870) and (1883), and a truth-functionally complete system based on what later came to be called " the Sheffer stroke. " Though his contributions were, in many respects, parallel to those of Gottlob Frege, the two logicians worked independently, with the writing of Frege, through its influence on Bertrand Russell, becoming the more widely known. Still, Alfred North Whitehead was an admirer, whose knowledge of quantification theory was said to have come substantially from Peirce, while Hilary Putnam (1982) observes that much that is " quite familiar in modern logic actually became known to the logical world through the efforts of Peirce and his students. " In (1985), W. V. Quine identified Peirce as sharing credit with Frege for the development of modern quantification theory, and cited his influence on Schroder and Peano. Outside of logic, Peirce's philosophy of pragmatism – or, as he called it, " pragmaticism " – was widely admired. In epistemology, he was an anti-foundationalist, resisting the idea of a privileged starting point of maximally certain statements (e.g. of private sensation), and adopting, as a guiding hypothesis, the idea that the application of scientific method to 2 2 intersubjectively verifiable claims would, through a process of self-correction, lead different investigators to converge on a common result, no matter what their starting points. While not definitively identifying truth with that which would be confirmed in the limit of ideal (scientific) inquiry, he did think that the practical consequences of true beliefs provided grounds for expecting them to be confirmed by continuing investigation. Correspondingly, he took the meaning of a theoretical claim to be its experiential " cash value " – the collection of possible empirical observations that would verify it. He had little patience with metaphysical speculation about " things in themselves " underlying observed phenomena, or grand metaphysical systems. In all these ways, Peirce exerted a strong influence on those who would follow. Peircean reverence for logic, respect for science, suspicion of apriori metaphysics, …
Journal ArticleDOI

Nothing at Stake in Knowledge

David Rose, +45 more
- 01 Mar 2019 - 
Journal ArticleDOI

Experimenting on Contextualism

TL;DR: In this article, the authors refine the design of context shifting experiments, which play a central role in contextualist debates, and subject a large number of scenarios involving different types of expressions of interest to contextualists, including "know" and color adjectives like "green" to experimental investigation.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been Greatly Exaggerated

TL;DR: In this article, a contextualist resolution of the collapse problem of logical pluralism has been proposed, which clarifies the mechanism responsible for a plurality of logics and handles the motivating data better than the original view.