I maintain that among the main views concerning the central questions of epistemology (in particular, the question of justified belief) are evidentialism, (Pyrrhonian) scepticism and fideism. In this paper, I first present the arguments in favour of a form of evidentialism, according to which no false belief can be epistemically justified on the basis of evidence. Second, I consider the historical emergence of evidentialism during the period of the early Enlightenment. In particular, I explore the disagreement between Pierre Bayle and Jean-Pierre de Crousaz, which demonstrates the emergence of the modern opposition between evidentialism and fideism.

Les principales attitudes adoptees devant les questions centrales de l’epistemologie generale (en particulier la question de la croyance justifiee) sont selon nous l’evidentialisme, le scepticisme (pyrrhonien) et le fideisme. Dans cet article, nous presentons d’une part les arguments permettant d’accepter une forme de l’evidentialisme selon laquelle aucune croyance fausse ne peut etre justifiee sur la base de raisons probantes. D’autre part, nous proposons de considerer l’aspect historique de l’emergence de l’evidentialisme au debut des Lumieres. Nous explorons un cas particulier qui temoigne de l’emergence de l’evidentialisme moderne comme opposition au fideisme. Il s’agit de l’opposition entre Pierre Bayle et Jean-Pierre de Crousaz.

background

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0012217313000292

Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions

Scepticisme, fidéisme et évidentialisme : oppositions et origines

That knowledge ascriptions exhibit some form of sensitivity to context is uncontroversial. How best to account for the context-sensitivity at issue, however, is the topic of heated debates. A certain version of nonindexical contextualism seems to be a promising option. Even so, it is incumbent upon any contextualist account to explain in what way and to what extent the epistemic standard operative in a particular context of epistemic evaluation is affected by non-epistemic factors (such as practical interests). In this paper, I investigate how non-epistemic factors come into play when knowledge is ascribed. I argue that knowledge ascriptions often serve the purpose of providing actionable information. This, in turn, requires that epistemic interests be balanced against non-epistemic interests. Moreover, it raises the question of whose interests matter, those of the ascriber, the addressee (of the knowledge ascription), or the subject of ascription. Eventually, an answer to the question is suggested.

/pdf/epistemic-evaluation-and-the-need-for-impure-epistemic-30uv2rhi16.pdf

Epistemic evaluation and the need for ‘impure’ epistemic standards

Abstract In this paper, I engage with a recent contextualist account of gender terms (particularly, “woman”) proposed by Díaz-León, E. 2016. “Woman as a Politically Significant Term: A Solution to the Puzzle.” Hypatia 31 (2): 245–58. Díaz-León’s main aim is to improve both on previous contextualist and non-contextualist views and solve a certain puzzle for feminists. Central to this task is putting forward a view that allows trans women who did not undergo gender-affirming medical procedures to use the gender terms of their choice to self-identify. My goal is to investigate Díaz-León’s proposal, point out (what I take to be) several shortcomings of the view and discuss possible replies on her part.

/pdf/subject-contextualism-and-the-meaning-of-gender-terms-3ljuekft6j.pdf

Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions

Citations

Scepticisme, fidéisme et évidentialisme : oppositions et origines

Epistemic evaluation and the need for ‘impure’ epistemic standards

Subject-Contextualism and the Meaning of Gender Terms

The Epistemic Significance of Values in Science

Contextualism and Semantic Ascent

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