Contextualists such as Cohen and DeRose claim that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions vary contextually, in particular that the strength of epistemic position required for one to be truly ascribed knowledge depends on features of the attributor’s context. Contextualists support their view by appeal to our intuitions about when it’s correct (or incorrect) to ascribe knowledge. Someone might argue that some of these intuitions merely reflect when it is conversationally appropriate to ascribe knowledge, not when knowledge is truly ascribed, and so try to accommodate these intuitions even on an invariantist view. DeRose (Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, 1998; Philosophical Review, 2002) argues that any such ‘warranted assertibility manoeuvre’, or ‘WAM’, against contextualism is unlikely to succeed. Here, I argue that his objections to a WAM against contextualism are not persuasive and offer a pragmatic account of the data about ascriptions of knowledge.

background

Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions

Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres

Leading proponents of a wide variety of contemporary accounts of knowledge assume that knowledge is the norm of assertion. The assumption is central to the debate between contextualists and invariantists about the correct account of knowledge. DeRose (2002) argues that the knowledge norm for assertion favours contextualism, Hawthorne (2004) uses the knowledge norm to support subject-sensitive invariantism, whereas Williamson (2005) combines the knowledge norm and an invariantist account of knowledge. To assess these arguments, we need to clarify the idea that knowledge is the norm of assertion. While much of the literature has focussed on the idea that knowledge is necessary for warranted assertion, here I focus on a different idea, that knowledge is sufficient for warranted assertion.

Knowledge and Assertion

IX—Moral Encroachment

A new form of philosophizing known as ordinary language philosophy took root in England after the Second World War, promising a fresh start and a way out of long-standing dead-end philosophical debates. Pioneered by Wittgenstein, Austin, and others, OLP is now widely rumored, within mainstream analytic philosophy, to have been seriously discredited, and consequently its perspective is ignored. Avner Baz begs to differ. In "When Words Are Called For", he shows how the prevailing arguments against OLP collapse under close scrutiny. All of them, he claims, presuppose one version or another of the very conception of word-meaning that OLP calls into question and takes to be responsible for many traditional philosophical difficulties. Worse, analytic philosophy itself has suffered as a result of its failure to take OLP's perspective seriously. Baz blames a neglect of OLP's insights for seemingly irresolvable disputes over the methodological relevance of "intuitions" in philosophy and for misunderstandings between contextualists and anti-contextualists (or "invariantists") in epistemology. Baz goes on to explore the deep affinities between Kant's work and OLP and suggests ways that OLP could be applied to other philosophically troublesome concepts. "When Words Are Called For" defends OLP not as a doctrine but as a form of practice that might provide a viable alternative to work currently carried out within mainstream analytic philosophy. Accordingly, Baz does not merely argue for OLP but, all the more convincingly, practices it in this eye-opening book.

When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy

To illustrate, Folk stakes sensitivity says that all else equal, people are less likely to say that Sarah knows that her health insurance is current, if she is about to get hit by a bus and incur huge medical bills. Folk stakes sensitivity holds intrinsic interest to anyone interested in the psychological basis of knowledge ascription. It holds further interest to epistemologists by featuring as the lead premise in an abductive argument to the radical conclusion— defended by Fantl & McGrath (2002), Hawthorne (2004), and Stanley (2005)—that knowledge itself is sensitive to stakes. It holds a different sort of interest to experimental philosophers as an empirical claim made from the armchair. We offer an opinionated discussion of the “state of the art” on Folk stakes sensitivity. We draw on a first wave of empirical studies—due to Feltz & Zarpentine (2010), May et al. (2010), and Buckwalter (2010)—which cast doubt on the claim, and a second wave of empirical studies—due to Pinillos (2012) and Sripada & Stanley (2012)—said to vindicate it, as well as new studies of our own. We think that the balance of evidence to date best fits a very different view, namely that of:

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Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions

Citations

Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres

Knowledge and Assertion

IX—Moral Encroachment

When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy

Knowledge, stakes, and mistakes

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