Proceedings ArticleDOI
Side channel vulnerability metrics: the promise and the pitfalls
Tianwei Zhang,Fangfei Liu,Si Chen,Ruby B. Lee +3 more
- pp 2
TLDR
The CSV metric is suggested, which tries to show how to overcome some of the shortcomings of the SVF metric, without completely changing its character.Abstract:
Side-channels enable attackers to break a cipher by exploiting observable information from the cipher program's execution to infer its secret key. While some defenses have been proposed to protect information leakage due to certain side channels, the effectiveness of these defenses have mostly been given only qualitative analysis by their authors. It is desirable to have a general quantitative method and metric to evaluate a system's vulnerability to side-channel attacks.In this paper, we define the features of a good side-channel leakage metric. We review a recently proposed metric called the Side-channel Vulnerability Factor (SVF) and discuss its merits and issues. We suggest the CSV metric, which tries to show how to overcome some of the shortcomings of the SVF metric, without completely changing its character. We use software cache side-channel attacks and defenses as an example to compare the metrics with known and measurable results on system leakiness.read more
Citations
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
A high-resolution side-channel attack on last-level cache
TL;DR: New techniques to achieve high-resolution tracking of the victim accesses to enable attacks on ciphers where critical events have a small cache footprint and it is shown that this attack frequently obtains an equal quality channel.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Understanding contention-based channels and using them for defense
TL;DR: A general mathematical study of microarchitectural channels using information theory and a novel way of detecting intelligent adversaries that try to hide while running covert channel eavesdropping attacks is introduced.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
How secure is your cache against side-channel attacks?
Zecheng He,Ruby B. Lee +1 more
TL;DR: A novel probabilistic information flow graph is proposed to model the interaction between the victim program, the attacker program and the cache architecture, and a new metric, the Probability of Attack Success (PAS), is derived, which gives a quantitative measure for evaluating a cache’s resilience against a given class of cache side-channel attacks.
Journal ArticleDOI
An Overview of Hardware Security and Trust: Threats, Countermeasures, and Design Tools
TL;DR: An overview of hardware security and trust from the perspectives of threats, countermeasures, and design tools is presented to motivate hardware designers and electronic design automation tool developers to consider the new challenges and opportunities of incorporating an additional dimension of security into robust hardware design, testing, and verification.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
New models of cache architectures characterizing information leakage from cache side channels
Tianwei Zhang,Ruby B. Lee +1 more
TL;DR: This paper establishes side-channel leakage models based on the non-interference property, and defines how the security aspects of a cache architecture can be modeled as a finite-state machine (FSM) with state transitions that cause interference.
References
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Book ChapterDOI
Differential Power Analysis
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices. And they also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.
Book ChapterDOI
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
TL;DR: By carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform private key operalions, attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems.
Book ChapterDOI
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
Eli Biham,Adi Shamir +1 more
TL;DR: This work states that this attack is applicable only to public key cryptosystems such as RSA, and not to secret key algorithms such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES).
Posted Content
Cache attacks and Countermeasures: the Case of AES.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe side-channel attacks based on inter-process leakage through the state of the CPU's memory cache, which can be used for cryptanalysis of cryptographic primitives that employ data-dependent table lookups.