Showing papers on "Counterfactual conditional published in 2016"

Causal Counterfactual Theory for the Attribution of Weather and Climate-Related Events

Abstract: The emergence of clear semantics for causal claims and of a sound logic for causal reasoning is relatively recent, with the consolidation over the past decades of a coherent theoretical corpus of definitions, concepts, and methods of general applicability that is anchored into counterfactuals. The latter corpus has proved to be of high practical interest in numerous applied fields (e.g., epidemiology, economics, and social science). In spite of their rather consensual nature and proven efficacy, these definitions and methods are to a large extent not used in detection and attribution (D&A). This article gives a brief overview of the main concepts underpinning the causal theory and proposes some methodological extensions for the causal attribution of weather and climate-related events that are rooted into the latter. Implications for the formulation of causal claims and their uncertainty are finally discussed.

Is There A Monist Theory of Causal and Non-Causal Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to develop a counterfactual theory of explanation (for short, CTE). The CTE provides a monist framework for causal and non-causal explanations, according to which both causal and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans. I argue that the CTE is applicable to two paradigmatic examples of non-causal explanations: Euler’s explanation and renormalization group explanations of universality.

Characterizing the subjective experience of episodic past, future, and counterfactual thinking in healthy younger and older adults

Abstract: Recent evidence demonstrates remarkable overlap in the neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and episodic counterfactual thinking. However, the extent to which the phenomenological characteristics associated with these mental simulations change as a result of ageing remains largely unexplored. The current study employs adapted versions of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire and the Autobiographical Interview to compare the phenomenological characteristics associated with both positive and negative episodic past, future, and counterfactual simulations in younger and older adults. Additionally, it explores the influence of perceived likelihood in the experience of such simulations. The results indicate that, across all simulations, older adults generate more external details and report higher ratings of vividness, composition, and intensity than young adults. Conversely, younger adults generate more internal details across all conditions and rated positive and negative likely future events as more likely than did older adults. Additionally, both younger and older adults reported higher ratings for sensory, composition, and intensity factors during episodic memories relative to future and counterfactual thoughts. Finally, for both groups, ratings of spatial coherence and composition were higher for likely counterfactuals than for both unlikely counterfactuals and future simulations. Implications for the psychology of mental simulation and ageing are discussed.

Against Counterfactual Miracles

Abstract: This essay considers how counterfactuals should be evaluated on the assumption that determinism is true. It argues against Lewis's influential view that if anything had happened that did not actually happen, the actual laws of nature would have been false, and defends the competing view that history would have been different—but only microscopically different—all the way back.

Pragmatic skills predict online counterfactual comprehension: Evidence from the N400

Abstract: Counterfactual thought allows people to consider alternative worlds they know to be false. Communicating these thoughts through language poses a social-communicative challenge because listeners typically expect a speaker to produce true utterances, but counterfactuals per definition convey information that is false. Listeners must therefore incorporate overt linguistic cues (subjunctive mood, such as in If I loved you then) in a rapid way to infer the intended counterfactual meaning. The present EEG study focused on the comprehension of such counterfactual antecedents and investigated if pragmatic ability-the ability to apply knowledge of the social-communicative use of language in daily life-predicts the online generation of counterfactual worlds. This yielded two novel findings: (1) Words that are consistent with factual knowledge incur a semantic processing cost, as reflected in larger N400 amplitude, in counterfactual antecedents compared to hypothetical antecedents (If sweets were/are made of sugar). We take this to suggest that counterfactuality is quickly incorporated during language comprehension and reduces online expectations based on factual knowledge. (2) Individual scores on the Autism Quotient Communication subscale modulated this effect, suggesting that individuals who are better at understanding the communicative intentions of other people are more likely to reduce knowledge-based expectations in counterfactuals. These results are the first demonstration of the real-time pragmatic processes involved in creating possible worlds.

Understanding Counterfactuality: A Review of Experimental Evidence for the Dual Meaning of Counterfactuals

Abstract: Cognitive and linguistic theories of counterfactual language comprehension assume that counterfactuals convey a dual meaning Subjunctive-counterfactual conditionals (eg, 'If Tom had studied hard, he would have passed the test') express a supposition while implying the factual state of affairs (Tom has not studied hard and failed) The question of how counterfactual dual meaning plays out during language processing is currently gaining interest in psycholinguistics Whereas numerous studies using offline measures of language processing consistently support counterfactual dual meaning, evidence coming from online studies is less conclusive Here, we review the available studies that examine online counterfactual language comprehension through behavioural measurement (self-paced reading times, eye-tracking) and neuroimaging (electroencephalography, functional magnetic resonance imaging) While we argue that these studies do not offer direct evidence for the online computation of counterfactual dual meaning, they provide valuable information about the way counterfactual meaning unfolds in time and influences successive information processing Further advances in research on counterfactual comprehension require more specific predictions about how counterfactual dual meaning impacts incremental sentence processing

Williamsonian modal epistemology, possibility-based

Abstract: Williamsonian modal epistemology (WME) is characterized by two commitments: realism about modality, and anti-exceptionalism about our modal knowledge. Williamson’s own counterfactual-based modal epistemology is the best known implementation of WME, but not the only option that is available. I sketch and defend an alternative implementation which takes our knowledge of metaphysical modality to arise, not from knowledge of counterfactuals, but from our knowledge of ordinary possibility statements of the form ‘x can F’. I defend this view against a criticism indicated in Williamson’s own work, and argue that it is better connected to the semantics of modal language.

1−1=Counterfactual: on the potency and significance of quantum non-events

Abstract: We study the unique role played in quantum mechanics by non-events or counterfactuals. Our earlier analysis of quantum oblivion has revealed some subtle stages in the measurement process, which may...

Causal Exclusion and Downward Counterfactuals

Abstract: One of the main line of responses to the infamous causal exclusion problem has been based on the counterfactual account of causation. However, arguments have begun to surface to the effect that the counterfactual theory is in fact ill-equipped to solve the exclusion problem due to its commitment to downward causation. This argumentation is here critically analysed. An analysis of counterfactual dependence is presented and it is shown that if the semantics of counterfactuals is taken into account carefully enough, the counterfactual notion of causation does not need to be committed to downward causation. However, it is a further question whether this is eventually enough to solve the exclusion problem for the analysis shows how the problem itself can take various different forms.

Improving Physical Task Performance with Counterfactual and Prefactual Thinking.

Abstract: Counterfactual thinking (reflecting on "what might have been") has been shown to enhance future performance by translating information about past mistakes into plans for future action. Prefactual thinking (imagining "what might be if…") may serve a greater preparative function than counterfactual thinking as it is future-orientated and focuses on more controllable features, thus providing a practical script to prime future behaviour. However, whether or not this difference in hypothetical thought content may translate into a difference in actual task performance has been largely unexamined. In Experiment 1 (n = 42), participants performed trials of a computer-simulated physical task, in between which they engaged in either task-related hypothetical thinking (counterfactual or prefactual) or an unrelated filler task (control). As hypothesised, prefactuals contained more controllable features than counterfactuals. Moreover, participants who engaged in either form of hypothetical thinking improved significantly in task performance over trials compared to participants in the control group. The difference in thought content between counterfactuals and prefactuals, however, did not yield a significant difference in performance improvement. Experiment 2 (n = 42) replicated these findings in a dynamic balance task environment. Together, these findings provide further evidence for the preparatory function of counterfactuals, and demonstrate that prefactuals share this same functional characteristic.

Explanatory Pluralism and the (Dis)Unity of Science: The Argument from Incompatible Counterfactual Consequences

Abstract: What is the relationship between different sciences or research approaches that deal with the same phenomena, for instance, with the phenomena of the human mind? Answers to this question range from a monist perspective according to which one of these approaches is privileged over the others, through an integrationist perspective according to which they must strive to form a unity greater than the sum of its parts, to an isolationist perspective according to which each of them has its own autonomous sphere of validity. In order to assess these perspectives in this article, I discuss the debates about the unity of science and about explanatory pluralism. The most pressing issue turns out to be the choice between the integrative and the isolationist perspective: the question is whether the integrative tendencies in science should be fully indulged in or whether they should be held in check by acknowledging that a certain amount of isolation is necessary. I argue that the issue can be further distilled into the question of whether two true explanations of the same fact can ever fail to be combinable into one single explanation. I show that this can indeed be the case, namely, when the explanations have incompatible counterfactual consequences, something that is often the case when we try to combine explanations from different sciences or research approaches. These approaches thus embody perspectives on the world that are to a certain extent autonomous. This leads to the conclusion that although interdisciplinarity may have many advantages, we should not take the project of integration too far. At the end of the day, the different research approaches with their different perspectives and insights must remain precisely that: different and somewhat disunified.

Estimation of counterfactual distributions with a continuous endogenous treatment

Abstract: Policy makers are often interested in the distributional effects that a policy would have. In this paper I propose a method to estimate such effects when the treatment variable is endogenous, continuous, and has a heterogeneous effect. I consider a triangular system of equations in which the unobservables are related by a copula that captures the endogeneity of the model. The copula is nonparametrically identified by inverting the quantile processes conditional on a vector of covariates. I estimate both conditional quantile processes using existing quantile regression methods, and propose a parametric and a nonparametric estimator of the copula, showing the asymptotic properties of the estimators. I consider three kinds of counterfactual experiments: changing the distribution of the treatment, changing the distribution of the instrument, and changing the determination of the treatment, discussing the estimation for each counterfactual. I illustrate these methods by estimating several counterfactuals that affect the distribution of the share of food consumption.

Causation in Science

Abstract: This article discusses some philosophical theories of causation and their application to several areas of science. Topics addressed include regularity, counterfactual, and causal process theories of causation; the causal interpretation of structural equation models and directed graphs; independence assumptions in causal reasoning; and the role of causal concepts in physics. In connection with this last topic, this article focuses on the relationship between causal asymmetries, the time-reversal invariance of most fundamental physical laws, and the significance of differences among varieties of differential equations (e.g., hyperbolic versus non-hyperbolic) in causal interpretation. It concludes with some remarks about “grounding” special science causal generalizations in physics.

Historical Explanations Always Involve Counterfactual History

Abstract: Historical explanations are a form of counterfactual history. To offer an explanation of what happened, historians have to identify causes, and whenever they identify causes, they immediately conjure up a counterfactual history, a parallel world. No one doubts that there is a great deal of distance between science fiction novelists and the world’s great historians, but along an important dimension, they are playing the same game.

Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations

Abstract: This article is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation that obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this article aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The second is to set out two related analyses of the basing relation, each of which seems quite plausible.

If Counterfactuals Were Excluded from Historical Reasoning . . .

Abstract: The argument of this paper is that counterfactuals are indispensable in reasoning in general and historical reasoning in particular. It illustrates the role of counterfactuals in the study of history and explores the connection between counterfactuals and the notions of historical necessity and contingency. Entertaining alternatives to the actual course of events is conducive to the assessment of the relative weight and impact of the various factors that combine to bring about a certain result. Counterfactuals are essentially involved in understanding what it means for an event, an action, or an individual to make a difference. Making a difference, in turn, is shown to be a central category of historical reasoning. Counterfactuals, though sensitive to the description they use, make objective claims that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence.

Possible World Semantics and True‐True Counterfactuals

Abstract: The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that rejecting the latter should be a consequence of rejecting the former. Instead I consider how one might defuse putative counterexamples to the truth of true-true counterfactuals.

Counterfactual Histories of Science and the Contingency Thesis

Abstract: Within the debate on the inevitability versus contingency of science for which Hacking’s writings (The social construction of what? Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999; Philos Sci 67:S58–S71; 2000) have provided the basic terminology, the devising of counterfactual histories of science is widely assumed by champions of the contingency thesis to be an effective way to challenge the inevitability thesis. However, relatively little attention has been devoted to the problem of how to defend counterfactual history of science against the criticism that it is too speculative an endeavor to be worth bothering with—the same critique traditionally levelled against the use of counterfactuals in general history. In this paper, we review the defense of counterfactuals put forward by their advocates within general history. According to such defense—which emphasizes the essential role of counterfactuals within explanations—good counterfactual scenarios need to exhibit the right kind of plausibility, characterized as continuity between said scenarios and what historians know about the world. As our discussion shows, the same requirement needs to be satisfied by good counterfactual histories of science. However, as we mention in the concluding part of the paper, there is at least one concern raised by counterfactual history of science as used to support the contingency thesis for which the defense based on the plausibility of the counterfactual scenarios does not seem to offer easy solutions.

There But for the Grace of God Counterfactuals Influence Religious Belief and Images of the Divine

Abstract: Past research suggests that thinking counterfactually leads to a perception that major life events are fated or predetermined. We hypothesized that a perception that events are fated will activate ...

Motivated by us But Not by Them: Group Membership Influences the Impact of Counterfactual Thinking on Behavioral Intentions

Abstract: Counterfactual thoughts about “what might have been” allow individuals to improve future outcomes based on insights from past events. Previous research has examined how counterfactuals about the self facilitate future improvement. The current research examined how group membership influences behavioral intentions developed from counterfactuals about another's actions. Participants who read counterfactual-inducing vignettes formed stronger intentions relative to participants who read non–counterfactual-inducing vignettes; this effect was stronger for in-group targets than for out-group targets (Study 1). Furthermore, when group membership was manipulated experimentally, counterfactuals facilitated behavioral intention judgments for in-group targets but not out-group targets (Study 2). Together, the current research demonstrates that group membership can influence the counterfactual-behavioral intention relationship.

Breaking de Morgan's law in counterfactual antecedents

Abstract: The main goal of this paper is to investigate the relation between the meaning of a sentence and its truth conditions. We report on a comprehension experiment on counterfactual conditionals, based on a context in which a light is controlled by two switches. Our main finding is that the truth-conditionally equivalent clauses (i) switch A or switch B is down and (ii) switch A and switch B are not both up make different semantic contributions when embedded in a conditional antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that (i) and (ii) differ in meaning, which implies that the meaning of a sentential clause cannot be identified with its truth conditions. We show that our data have a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: in a conditional antecedent, (i) introduces two distinct assumptions, while (ii) introduces only one. Independently of the complications stemming from disjunctive antecedents, our results also challenge analyses of counterfactuals in terms of minimal change from the actual state of affairs: we show that such analyses cannot account for our findings, regardless of what changes are considered minimal.

The possibilities of history

Abstract: Several kinds of historical alternatives are distinguished. Different kinds of historical alternatives are valuable to the practice of history for different reasons. Important uses for historical alternatives include representing different sides of historical disputes; distributing chances of different outcomes over alternatives; and offering explanations of why various alternatives did not in fact happen. Consideration of counterfactuals about what would have happened had things been different in particular ways plays particularly useful roles in reasoning about historical analogues of current conditions; reasoning about causal claims; and in evaluating historical explanations. When evaluating the role of alternative histories in historical thinking, we should keep in mind the uses of historical alternatives that go well beyond the long-term and specific scenarios that are the focus of so-called "counterfactual history".