Showing papers on "Tournament published in 2013"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors model and empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs and develop measures for the tournament prize derive from the compensation gap between the CEO at her firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar competing firms.
Abstract: We model and empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs. The measures we develop for the tournament prize derive from the compensation gap between the CEO at her firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar competing firms. The model predicts that firm performance and risk increase in the external pay gap, with these incentive effects increasing in the probability of the executive winning the tournament. GMM-IV estimates indicate that the external, industry pay gap is reliably and positively associated with firm performance and risk and with the riskiness of investment and financial policy. The effect of the industry tournament incentive is stronger when empirical proxies indicate the probability of the executive winning is higher.
146 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a dynamic extension of the Bradley-Terry model for paired comparison data is introduced to model the outcomes of sporting contests, allowing for time varying abilities, assuming that teams' home and away abilities depend on past results through exponentially weighted moving average processes.
Abstract: Summary. In the course of national sports tournaments, usually lasting several months, it is expected that the abilities of teams taking part in the tournament will change over time. A dynamic extension of the Bradley–Terry model for paired comparison data is introduced to model the outcomes of sporting contests, allowing for time varying abilities. It is assumed that teams’ home and away abilities depend on past results through exponentially weighted moving average processes. The model proposed is applied to sports data with and without tied contests, namely the 2009–2010 regular season of the National Basketball Association tournament and the 2008–2009 Italian Serie A football season.
97 citations
TL;DR: This paper showed that the implementation of affirmative action did not result in a significant performance loss for either advantaged or disadvantaged subjects; instead, it rather enhanced the performance for a large group of participants.
81 citations
TL;DR: Coaches should consider a stronger emphasis on strength and power training in their conditioning programs to account for the higher activity of seasonal games and a focus on half-court tactics accounts for the lower number of possessions in tournaments.
Abstract: Competition-specific conditioning for tournament basketball games is challenging, as the demands of tournament formats are not well characterized. Purpose: To compare the physical, physiological, and tactical demands of seasonal and tournament basketball competition and determine the pattern of changes within an international tournament. Methods: Eight elite junior male basketball players (age 17.8 ± 0.2 y, height 1.93 ± 0.07 m, mass 85 ± 3 kg; mean ± SD) were monitored in 6 seasonal games played over 4 mo in an Australian second-division national league and in 7 games of an international under-18 tournament played over 8 days. Movement patterns and tactical elements were coded from video and heart rates recorded by telemetry. Results: The frequency of running, sprinting, and shuffling movements in seasonal games was higher than in tournament games by 8–15% (99% confidence limits ± ~8%). Within the tournament, jogging and low- to medium-intensity shuffling decreased by 15–20% (± ~14%) over the 7 games, wh...
78 citations
TL;DR: In a competitive soccer match, the teams demonstrate contrasts in techniques and tactics and some teams may favor open play with long passes while others may prefer a closely-knit pattern of play as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: IntroductionSoccer competitions provide avenues at which players and the coach apply the techniques and tactics acquired. In a competitive soccer match, the teams demonstrate contrasts in techniques and tactics (Docherty, 1978; Njororai, 2000; Wade, 1970; Winterbottom, 1964). Some teams may favor open play with long passes while others may prefer a closely - knit pattern of play. In a test game, the exchanges are so rapid that the observer has little time to study each separate movement of play. The pace of the game, the emotions aroused by the occasion, the partisan spirit of the observer, and the rapid succession of activities makes it difficult for a coach to give an objective and critical analysis of the factors underlying play (Armata et. al., 2007a, b; Njororai, 2000; Winterbottom, 1964). According to Winterbottom (1964) critical assessment of an individual or a team's performance requires not only a sound technical knowledge of the game, but also a disciplined mind in order to focus on separate factors. To overcome the deficiencies of mental analysis, an objective evaluation instrument is necessary (Hughes, 1995; Reilly, 1994). Proper analysis of performance enables the coach to retain and develop what is good and improve what a team is deficient in (Winterbottom, 1964). The coach uses the data to communicate to the players with regard to the level of play and the set objectives. Such data also provides feedback for motivation and further improvement of performance (Hughes, 1995). One critical area to match outcome requiring scrutiny is the goal scoring pattern.Scoring of goals in the game of association football or soccer is one of the most exciting aspects of the game (Mal, 1982; Mayes, 1975). Spectators love goals and players who manage to put the ball in the net also celebrate uncontrollably. Scoring of goals determines whether a team wins or loses a game. This is because the object of the game is to score goals even as you strive to stop your opponent from scoring. The football world cup tournament represents the pinnacle of the game globally. It is a dream of a player to, not only take part in the world cup final tournament but also, win it and be crowned as a world champion. Association football (soccer) is one of the most popular sports, with more than 265 million players worldwide and 207 national associations affiliated to FIFA (FIFA, 2007). The climax on the calendar is the international competition that all countries throughout the world can participate in - FIFA World Cup, an international football competition contested by the men's national football teams of the member nations of Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the global governing body of football. This championship has been held every four years since the first tournament in 1930 with the exceptions in 1942 and 1946 due to World War II (Wong, 2008).To determine the participating teams in the finals tournament, qualifying rounds take place during the preceding three years. They are held within six FIFA continental zones overseen by their respective confederations: the Asian Football Confederation (AFC); the Confederation Africaine de Football (CAF); the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF); the Confederacion Sudamericana de Futbol (CONMEBOL), the Oceania Football Confederation (OFC) and the Union Europeenne des Associations de Football (UEFA) (FIFA, 2011; Wong, 2008). The finals tournament features 32 teams competing over a month in the host nation(s). There are two stages: a group stage, followed by a knockout stage. In the group stage, teams compete within eight groups of four teams each. The top two teams from each group qualify to the knockout stage, which is a single-match elimination tournament (Wong, 2008). The knockout stage begins with the "round of 16" where the winners of each group play the runner-up of another group. This is followed by the quarterfinals, the semifinals, the third-place match (contested by the losing semifinalists) and the final. …
54 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explicitly describe all heroes in a tournament and show that all tournaments with at most four vertices are heroes, and that every tournament not containing a tournament H as a sub-tournament has chromatic number at most c.
53 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the performance effects of tournament compensation systems in a context of employee heterogeneity based on tournament and expectancy theory are analyzed in a company context using personnel records from incentive travel contests.
Abstract: Tournament compensation systems are widely used in practice and have been extensively analyzed theoretically. However, one major problem has hardly been studied in a company context so far: Although it is theoretically well understood that tournament compensation systems are only effective when employees are homogeneous, it has rarely been analyzed what companies can do when they are confronted with employee heterogeneity. In our article, we derive hypotheses on the performance effects of tournament compensation systems in a context of employee heterogeneity based on tournament and expectancy theory. Using personnel records from incentive travel contests, we are able to show that performance is lower in a situation with employee heterogeneity, but that in heterogeneous tournaments, incentives may still work for a subgroup of employees whom we term the “threshold group.” In addition, we also show how companies manage to design the information disclosure systems necessary to install effective “handicapping” or “league-building” systems in order to increase the effort-performance expectancy.
49 citations
TL;DR: There is no tournament with a partition A, B of its vertex set, such that every transitive subset of A is in the out-neighbour set of some vertex in B, and vice versa, and so Schwartz’ conjecture is false.
Abstract: In 1990, motivated by applications in the social sciences, Thomas Schwartz made a conjecture about tournaments which would have had numerous attractive consequences. In particular, it implied that there is no tournament with a partition A, B of its vertex set, such that every transitive subset of A is in the out-neighbour set of some vertex in B, and vice versa. But in fact there is such a tournament, as we show in this article, and so Schwartz’ conjecture is false. Our proof is non-constructive and uses the probabilistic method.
35 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the difference in competitiveness of 3-5 year-old boys and girls in the U.S. was investigated in a classroom activity using candy as an incentive.
Abstract: We experimentally investigate the difference in competitiveness of 3–5 year-old boys and girls in the U.S. 123 children from a preschool are randomly matched into girl–girl, boy–boy, and boy–girl pairs of similar age and participate in a gender-neutral, competitive classroom activity using candy as an incentive. Children participate in a piece rate incentive scheme and a tournament incentive scheme in rounds 1 and 2, and select their preferred incentive scheme for round 3. We find that girls and boys choose to compete at equal rates – with 80% of children choosing to compete overall. We also find that girls’ output in the task is significantly lower than that of boys under the tournament scheme, but not different in round 3 for the girls and boys who self-select into the tournament. All children display a remarkable rate of confidence – 84% of children believe they won under the tournament scheme. The gender of the match does not play a significant role.
32 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that every tournament on n vertices has at most 1.6740n minimal FVSs, and that there is an infinite family of tournaments, all having at least 1.5448n minimal vertex sets.
Abstract: We study combinatorial and algorithmic questions around minimal feedback vertex sets (FVS) in tournament graphs. On the combinatorial side, we derive upper and lower bounds on the maximum number of minimal FVSs in an n-vertex tournament. We prove that every tournament on n vertices has at most 1.6740n minimal FVSs, and that there is an infinite family of tournaments, all having at least 1.5448n minimal FVSs. This improves and extends the bounds of Moon (1971). On the algorithmic side, we design the first polynomial space algorithm that enumerates the minimal FVSs of a tournament with polynomial delay. The combination of our results yields the fastest known algorithm for finding a minimum-sized FVS in a tournament. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
(Part of this research has been supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), grant 639.033.403. A preliminary version of this article appeared in the Proceedings of ESA 2010.)
31 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: The authors argue that financial analysts can be viewed as participants of two tournaments (the All-Star and intra-firm tournaments) and examine whether analysts are incentivized by the tournament compensation structure, finding that interim losers are more likely to increase the boldness of their forecasts in the remainder of the tournament period than interim winners.
Abstract: We argue that financial analysts can be viewed as participants of two tournaments (the “All-star” tournament and the intrafirm tournament) and examine whether analysts are incentivized by the tournament compensation structure. Using data from 1991 to 2007, we find that interim losers are more likely to increase the boldness of their forecasts in the remainder of the tournament period than interim winners. This finding survives several robustness checks and is more pronounced when the interim assessment date is closer to the end of the tournament period, when analysts are inexperienced, and when the market activity is high. In addition, we show that interim losers’ changes in boldness are less informative than interim winners’. Collectively, our findings suggest that viewing financial analysts as participants of tournaments provides a useful framework for understanding analysts’ behavior.
TL;DR: This paper explored the determinants of compensation gaps between a firm's CEO and its other top executives, and compared the ability of two competing optimal contracting theories, namely tournament theory and productivity theory, to explain the cross sectional variability in these gaps across firms.
Abstract: We explore the determinants of compensation gaps between a firm’s CEO and its other top executives, and compare the ability of two competing optimal contracting theories, namely tournament theory and productivity theory, to explain the cross sectional variability in these gaps across firms. We find little evidence that firms design their executive compensation policies in a manner consistent with tournament theory. Our strongest evidence against tournament theory is from firms most likely to conduct tournament contests for selecting CEOs, which is prior to CEO turnovers, especially planned retirements, and in industries where firm-specific human capital is high. Empirically, we find that tournament predictions have weak explanatory power in these samples. In contrast, we find robust evidence that compensation is strongly linked to senior executives’ productivity measures, and that productivity differences among executives explain a large part of the cross sectional and time series variability in firm compensation gaps.
TL;DR: It is proved that if a tournament has pathwidth >=4@q^2+7@q then it has @q vertices that are pairwise @q-connected and a polynomial-time algorithm is obtained to test whether a tournament contains a subdivision of a fixed digraph H as a subdigraph.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the effect of employee heterogeneity on the incentive to put forth effort in a market-based tournament and demonstrate that the tournament outcome provides more information about employees' abilities in case they are heterogeneous.
Abstract: We investigate the effect of employee heterogeneity on the incentive to put forth effort in a market-based tournament. Employers use the tournament's outcome to estimate employees' abilities and accordingly condition their wage offers. Employees put forth effort, because by doing so they increase the probability of outperforming the rival, thereby increasing their ability assessment and thus the wage offer. We demonstrate that the tournament outcome provides more information about employees' abilities in case they are heterogeneous. Thus, employees get a higher incentive to affect the tournament outcome, and employers find it optimal to hire heterogeneous contestants.
TL;DR: From results, it is shown how the search depth of that particular engine correlates with the Elo ratings of human players, and related work on self-play experiments and the effect of diminishing returns is discussed.
Abstract: How deep does a chess Grandmaster think? This question has been asked many times, and yet there is hardly a definite answer. Raw depth and pure calculation are certainly not the only factors in the thinking process of a chess player, but it would be interesting to know more about the relationship between search depth and playing strength, so that the strength of a given player (which is usually expressed in terms of an Elo rating) can be said to correspond to a certain equivalent depth (of some given engine). Since the thinking depth of a human player is difficult to determine, we carry out an experiment with a chess engine running at different search depths in order to obtain an average score that can be translated into a rating difference in the Elo scale. However, knowing the rating difference is not sufficient; we need have at least one value of engine depth for which the corresponding Elo rating has been estimated, so that the Elo ratings for other values of search depth can also be determined. In order to obtain the Elo rating that corresponds to HOUDINI 1.5a 64-bit running at a fixed iteration depth of 20 plies, we carry out an analysis of the quality of play at the Candidates Tournament 2013. From these results, we show how the search depth of that particular engine correlates with the Elo ratings of human players. The paper also discusses related work on self-play experiments and the effect of diminishing returns, which becomes apparent in our experiment.
TL;DR: A simple computing technique for the tournament choice problem rests upon a relational modeling and uses the BDD-based computer system RelView for the evaluation of the relation-algebraic expressions that specify the solutions and for the visualization of the computed results.
TL;DR: A number of methods have been proposed for predicting game winners in the National Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA) annual men's college basketball championship tournament from 1985 to 2009.
Abstract: A number of methods have been proposed for predicting game winners in the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) annual men’s college basketball championship tournament. Since 1985, more than 70% of the teams in the fourth, fifth, and sixth rounds of the tournament have been high-seeded teams (i.e., teams assigned seeds of one, two, or three); a method that can accurately compare two such teams is often necessary to predict games in these rounds. This paper statistically analyzes tournaments from 1985 to 2009. A key finding is that there is an insignificant difference between the historical win percentages of high-seeded teams in each of the fourth, fifth, and sixth tournament rounds, which implies that choosing the higher seed to win games between these seeds does not provide accurate predictions in these rounds, and alternate predictors or methods should be sought. Implications on gambling point spreads are discussed.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate properties of fair tournaments and formulate a non-linear optimization model that con-cribes a fair tournament given the relative strengths of the teams involved, and demonstrate how to consistently obtain all fair tournaments for 8-and 16-teamproblems.
Abstract: In an eight-team single-elimination tournament without reseeding, teams are seeded from best (1) to worst (8). Teams 1/8, 4/5, 2/7 and 3/6 are paired in the first round, with the 1/8 winner facing the 4/5winner in the second round and so on. However, such tournaments are potentially unfair in the sense that inferior teams can be more likely to advance to certain stages of the tournament than better teams. Forinstance, if the top five teams are comparable in strength and are markedly better than the bottom three teams, then seeds 2 and 3 may be more likely to advance to the finals than team 1. We assign each teama unique power value and assume that the victory probability in a match-up is proportional to the teams' powers.We investigate properties of fair tournaments and formulate a non-linear optimization model thatprescribes a fair tournament given the relative strengths of the teams involved. Although the problem is highly non-convex, we demonstrate how to consistently obtain all fair tournaments for 8- and 16-teamproblems.
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that for every fixed even integer k ≥ 4, if close to half of the k-cycles in a tournament T are even, then T must be quasi-random.
Abstract: A cycle C = {v1;v2;:::;v1} in a tournament T is said to be even, if when walking along C, an even number of edges point in the wrong direction, that is, they are directed from vi+1 to vi In this short paper, we show that for every fixed even integer k ≥ 4, if close to half of the k-cycles in a tournament T are even, then T must be quasi-random This resolves an open question raised in 1991 by Chung and Graham [5]
TL;DR: In this article, the minimum size of a resolving set for an order n-strong tournament was shown to be bounded by O(lfloor n/3 \rfloor) and O(log n/2 -rfloor).
Abstract: We provide upper bounds for the determining number and the metric dimension of tournaments. A set of vertices $S \subseteq V(T)$ is a determining set for a tournament $T$ if every nontrivial automorphism of $T$ moves at least one vertex of $S$, while $S$ is a resolving set for $T$ if every two distinct vertices in $T$ have different distances to some vertex in $S$. We show that the minimum size of a determining set for an order $n$ tournament (its determining number ) is bounded by $\lfloor n/3 \rfloor$, while the minimum size of a resolving set for an order $n$ strong tournament (its metric dimension ) is bounded by $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor$. Both bounds are optimal.
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the difference in competitiveness of 3-5 year-old boys and girls in the U.S. was investigated in a classroom activity using candy as an incentive.
Abstract: We experimentally investigate the difference in competitiveness of 3-5 year-old boys and girls in the U.S. 123 children from a preschool are randomly matched into girl-girl, boy-boy, and boy-girl pairs of similar age and participate in a gender-neutral, competitive classroom activity using candy as an incentive. Children participate in a piece rate incentive scheme and a tournament incentive scheme in rounds 1 and 2, and select their preferred incentive scheme for round 3. We find that girls and boys choose to compete at equal rates – with 80% of children choosing to compete overall. We also find that girls’ output in the task is significantly lower than that of boys under the tournament scheme, but not different in round 3 for the girls and boys who self-select into the tournament. All children display a remarkable rate of confidence – 84% of children believe they won under the tournament scheme. The gender of the match does not play a significant role.
Patent•
22 Mar 2013
TL;DR: In this paper, a game system including a central server operable to communicate a plurality of different commands to multiple gaming devices to provide non-tournament game play and provide an elimination tournament is presented.
Abstract: A gaming system including a central server operable to communicate a plurality of different commands to a plurality of gaming devices to provide non-tournament game play and provide an elimination tournament. The gaming system contributes an average expected payout value of tournament games that were determined to be subsequently played by tournament players but were then not played because the players were eliminated before the end of the tournament to a tournament award. The tournament award is provided to a winner of the tournament.
TL;DR: In this article, a subjective promotion tournament where the winner is decided by the principal's posterior belief about the agents' abilities is considered, where the agents can choose the risk of their performance as well as their effort.
Abstract: This article considers a promotion tournament where the winner is decided by the principal's posterior belief about the agents’ abilities, called a subjective promotion tournament. If the agents can choose the risk of their performance as well as their effort, this article shows that such a subjective tournament can be better than an objective tournament where the winner is decided by the agents’ verifiable performance measures only. This is because the subjective tournament leads to lower uncertainty about the agents’ abilities and a higher level of agents’ effort, thereby providing better sorting and incentive effects.
TL;DR: A novel probabilistic model that outputs the final standings of a soccer league, based on a simple dynamics that mimics a soccer tournament, is proposed and is able to capture the stylized statistical features of double round robin system (DRRS) tournaments in general.
Patent•
24 Jun 2013
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe systems and methods utilizing in tournament game play, where a plurality of reels are included in an electronic gaming device, and one or more paylines may be formed on at least a portion of the reels.
Abstract: Examples disclosed herein relate to systems and methods utilizing in tournament game play. An electronic gaming device may include a plurality of reels. One or more paylines may be formed on at least a portion of the plurality of reels. The electronic gaming device may include a memory and one or more processors. The memory may include one or more tournament game structures with one or more skill-based tournament game play structures. The one or more processors may initiate the one or more tournaments based on one or more tournament game structures. The one or more tournaments may be at least based in part on one or more skill-based tournament game plays.
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that a tournament T is critical if and only if the indecomposable subtournament on 7 vertices of T is isomorphic to one and only one of the tournaments on 5 vertices.
Abstract: Given a tournament T=(V,A), a subset X of $V$ is an interval of T provided that for every a, b in X and x\in V-X, (a,x) in A if and only if (b,x) in A. For example, $\emptyset$, {x}(x in V) and V are intervals of T, called trivial intervals. A tournament, all the intervals of which are trivial, is indecomposable; otherwise, it is decomposable. A critical tournament is an indecomposable tournament T of cardinality $\geq 5$ such that for any vertex x of T, the tournament T-x is decomposable. The critical tournaments are of odd cardinality and for all $n \geq 2$ there are exactly three critical tournaments on 2n+1 vertices denoted by $T_{2n+1}$, $U_{2n+1}$ and $W_{2n+1}$. The tournaments $T_{5}$, $U_{5}$ and $W_{5}$ are the unique indecomposable tournaments on 5 vertices. We say that a tournament T embeds into a tournament T' when T is isomorphic to a subtournament of T'. A diamond is a tournament on 4 vertices admitting only one interval of cardinality 3. We prove the following theorem: if a diamond and $T_{5}$ embed into an indecomposable tournament T, then $W_{5}$ and $U_{5}$ embed into T. To conclude, we prove the following: given an indecomposable tournament T, with $\mid\!V(T)\!\mid \geq 7$, T is critical if and only if the indecomposable subtournaments on 7 vertices of T are isomorphic to one and only one of the tournaments $T_{7}$, $U_{7}$ and $W_{7}$.
Patent•
03 Sep 2013
TL;DR: A player terminal can have an outer housing, a controller located there within or thereabout, input and output component(s), and a communications interface to an outside gaming network having other functionally similar gaming devices, gaming tables, and a remote server as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Table game tournament systems can include player terminal(s), electronic gaming table(s), and/or a remote server. A player terminal can have an outer housing, a controller located therewithin or thereabout, input and output component(s), and a communications interface to an outside gaming network having other functionally similar gaming device(s), gaming table(s), and a remote server. The controller and/or server can facilitate providing tournament information to a player, which information can include whether the player would qualify for the next tournament round, who is the most serious opponent to the player, and/or the chip difference therebetween. A terminal can also facilitate asynchronous and individually paced tournament play, switching between different tournament tables on demand, and play of other non-tournament table games thereat simultaneously with the play of the table game tournament. Portable computing devices can be used as player terminals and can permit players to play in actual or practice play-along modes.
TL;DR: It is proved that the polynomial-time algorithm generates a 2n-team inter-league tournament schedule whose total distance is at most 1 + 2c/3 + 3- c/3n times the total distance of the optimal BTTP solution, where c is the approximation factor of the TSP.
Abstract: The bipartite traveling tournament problem BTTP is an NP-complete scheduling problem whose solution is a double round-robin inter-league tournament with minimum total travel distance. The 2n-team BTTP is a variant of the well-known traveling salesman problem TSP, albeit much harder as it involves the simultaneous coordination of 2n teams playing a sequence of home and away games under fixed constraints, rather than a single entity passing through the locations corresponding to the teams' home venues. As the BTTP requires a distance-optimal schedule linking venues in close proximity, we provide an approximation algorithm for the BTTP based on an approximate solution to the corresponding TSP.
We prove that our polynomial-time algorithm generates a 2n-team inter-league tournament schedule whose total distance is at most 1 + 2c/3 + 3-c/3n times the total distance of the optimal BTTP solution, where c is the approximation factor of the TSP. In practice, the actual approximation factor is far better; we provide a specific example by generating a nearly-optimal inter-league tournament for the 30-team National Basketball Association, with total travel distance just 1.06 times the trivial theoretical lower bound.