https://ccrma.stanford.edu/workshops/mir2009/references/ROCintro.pdf

An introduction to ROC analysis

A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X00003435

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

In this review, we examine the oft-made claim that peer-relationship difficulties in childhood predict serious adjustment problems in later life. The article begins with a framework for conceptualizing and assessing children's peer difficulties and with a discussion of conceptual and methodological issues in longitudinal risk research. Following this, three indexes of problematic peer relationships (acceptance, aggressiveness, and shyness/withdrawal) are evaluated as predictors of three later outcomes (dropping out of school, criminality, and psychcpathology). The relation between peer difficulties and later maladjustment is examined in terms of both the consistency and strength of prediction. A review and analysis of the literature indicates general support for the hypothesis that children with poor peer adjustment are at risk for later life difficulties. Support is clearest for the outcomes of dropping out and criminality. It is also clearest for low acceptance and aggressiveness as predictors, whereas a link between shyness/withdrawal and later maladjustment has not yet been adequately tested. The article concludes with a critical discussion of the implicit models that have guided past research in this area and a set of recommendations for the next generation of research on the risk

Peer relations and later personal adjustment: Are low-accepted children at risk?

Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The analytic system uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The experiential system is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it's safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought. Both systems have their advantages, biases, and limitations. Now that we are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational behavior, the challenge before us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the one hand, how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? On the other hand, how do we infuse needed "doses of feeling" into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too "coldly rational"? This article addresses these important questions.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=931686

Risk As Analysis and Risk As Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality

Legal and extra-legal coercion are pervasive in mental hospital admission and there are sharp disputes about its appropriate role. This article presents two scales for measuring psychiatric patients' perceptions of coercion during hospital admission and reports data on these scales' internal consistency. We measure patients' perceptions of coercion by asking questions, in either an interview or questionnaire format, about their experience of lack of control, choice, influence, and freedom in hospital admission. Patients' responses to questions about their perceptions of coercion were highly internally consistent. The internal consistency of the scale was robust with respect to variation in site, instrument format, patient population, and interview procedure. Correspondence analysis was used to construct two numerical scales of perceived coercion.

Two scales for measuring patients' perceptions for coercion during mental hospital admission

Background: Patients' perceptions of coercion in admission may affect their attitude toward subsequent treatment, including their inclination to adhere to treatment plans. This study looks at the determinants of patients' perceptions of coercion. Methods: A sample of 157 patients admitted to a rural Virginia state hospital and a Pennsylvania community hospital were interviewed within 48 hours of admission about their experience of coming to the hospital. All subjects were 17 years or older. Diagnoses were diverse, and 42% were involuntarily committed. The interview gathered an openended description of the admission experience followed by a structured interview that included several measures. Results: Perceptions of being respectfully included in a fair decision-making process ("procedural justice") and legal status were most closely associated with perceived coercion, and a significant relationship was found with perceived negative pressures, ie, force and threats. However, only procedural justice was related to the perception of coercion at both sites and with both voluntary and involuntary patients. Conclusions: Patients' feelings of being coerced concerning admission appears to be closely related to their sense of procedural justice. It may be that clinicians can minimize the experience of coercion even among those legally committed by attending more closely to procedural justice issues.

Perceived Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission: Pressures and Process

Coercion and commitment: understanding involuntary mental hospital admission.

Over recent years, a variety of instruments that improve clinicians' ability to forecast the likelihood that an individual will behave violently have been published. Increasingly, these instruments are being applied in response to laws that require specialized risk assessments. In this article, we present a framework that goes beyond the “clinical” and “actuarial” dichotomy to describe a continuum of structured approaches to risk assessment. Despite differences among validated instruments, there is little evidence that one predicts violence better than another. We believe that these group-based instruments are useful for assessing an individual’s risk and that an instrument should be chosen based on an evaluation’s purpose (i.e., risk assessment vs. risk reduction). The time is ripe to shift attention from predicting violence to understanding its causes and preventing its (re)occurrence.

/pdf/current-directions-in-violence-risk-assessment-32tvxklac6.pdf

John Monahan

Papers

Two scales for measuring patients' perceptions for coercion during mental hospital admission

Perceived Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission: Pressures and Process

Coercion and commitment: understanding involuntary mental hospital admission.

Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment

Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior