Showing papers in "Journal of Conflict Resolution in 2004"
TL;DR: The empirical literature on civil war has seen tremendous growth because of the compilation of quantitative data sets, but there is no consensus on the measurement of civil war as discussed by the authors, which increases the...
Abstract: The empirical literature on civil war has seen tremendous growth because of the compilation of quantitative data sets, but there is no consensus on the measurement of civil war. This increases the ...
764 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the effect of economic globalization on the number of transnational terrorist incidents within countries was analyzed statistically, using a sample of 112 countries from 1975 to 1997, and the results show that economic globalization has a significant impact on transnational terrorism.
Abstract: The effect of economic globalization on the number of transnational terrorist incidents within countries is analyzed statistically, using a sample of 112 countries from 1975 to 1997. Results show t...
416 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, two estimation techniques, a fixed-effects panel estimator with contemporaneous effects only and a dynamic generalized method of moments estimator, are used to test the impact of various forms of political violence on tourism.
Abstract: The hypothesis that political violence deters tourism is mainly based on case study evidence and a few quantitative studies confined to a small sample of countries. Two estimation techniques—a fixed-effects panel estimator with contemporaneous effects only and a dynamic generalized method of moments estimator—are used to test the impact of various forms of political violence on tourism. Both models show strong evidence that human rights violations, conflict, and other politically motivated violent events negatively affect tourist arrivals. In a dynamic model, even if autocratic regimes do not resort to violence, they have lower numbers of tourist arrivals than more democratic regimes. Results also show evidence for intraregional, negative spillover, and cross-regional substitution effects.
299 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that people monitor the violent behavior of both the government and dissidents and assess the threat such behavior poses to their lives, physical person, and liberty.
Abstract: Why would people abandon their homes in favor of an uncertain life elsewhere? The short answer, of course, is violence. More specifically, the authors contend that people monitor the violent behavior of both the government and dissidents and assess the threat such behavior poses to their lives, physical person, and liberty. The greater the threat posed by the behavior of the government and dissidents, the larger the number of forced migrants a country will produce. To test hypotheses drawn from this argument the authors use a global sample of countries over more than forty years. Their findings are held to be consistent with their argument, showing that violent behavior has a substantially larger impact on forced migration than variables such as the type of political institution or the average size of the economy.
249 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a model of bargaining embedded within a random-walk model of warfare is developed, which contains aspects of both lottery-based and war-of-attrition models of conflict.
Abstract: A model of bargaining embedded within a random-walk model of warfare is developed. The conflict model contains aspects of both lottery-based and war-of-attrition models of conflict. Results show that future disputes are less likely to lead to armed conflict following long rather than short wars. Furthermore, should a subsequent dispute lead to armed conflict, the higher the cost and the longer the previous war, the shorter the conflict is likely to last.
242 citations
TL;DR: Fears of rogue states, withdrawal of cold war-era security guarantees, a falling technological threshold, and availability to terrorist organizations ensure that nuclear weapons proliferation will continue to accelerate as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Fears of rogue states, withdrawal of cold war-era security guarantees, a falling technological threshold, and availability to terrorist organizations ensure that nuclear weapons proliferation remai
235 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the existence and extent of altruistic reciprocity is explored in the context of a simple experimental game, "the sequential dictator", and it is shown that altruistic cooperation is frequent and robust and does not erode if stakes are raised.
Abstract: In two experiments, the existence and extent of altruistic reciprocity is exploredin the context of a simple experimental game, “the sequential dictator.” Findings show that altruistic reciprocity is frequent and robust, and the reciprocity norm does not erode if stakes are raised. Implications of the findings for social theory and further empirical research are discussed.
201 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the level of proactive activity and the choice of terrorist target is endogenized in a two-player proactive response game, where the targeted government first chooses its measures to weaken the terrorists, and the terrorists then choose the type of event (normal or spectacular).
Abstract: In a two-player proactive response game the level of proactive activity and the choice of terrorist target is endogenized The targeted government first chooses its measures to weaken the terrorists, and the terrorists then choose the type of event—normal or spectacular Unlike previous analyses, proactive policy has a downside by increasing grievances and, consequently, terrorist recruitment If the government responds too harshly, its actions can empower the terrorists by providing a larger constituency Aggressive antiterrorist actions, encouraged by a high perceived loss from terrorism and low marginal proactive costs, may result in spectacular events with dire consequences If spectaculars are transferred abroad to soft targets, then proactive operations may be excessive from a global viewpoint as external costs are ignored The analysis explains why some target nations engage in a modest level of offense but a prime target chooses a large level
191 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the author applies poliheuristic theory to individual, sequential, and interactive decision settings and provides theoretical extensions and multiple tests of the theory using multiple methods (formal, statistical, experimental).
Abstract: Poliheuristic theory (PH) bridges the gap between cognitive and rational theories of decision making. PH postulates a two-stage decision process. During the first stage, the set of possible options is reduced by applying a “noncompensatory principle” to eliminate any alternative with an unacceptable return on a critical, typically political, decision dimension. Once the choice set has been reduced to alternatives that are acceptable to the decision maker, the process moves to a second stage, during which the decision maker uses more analytic processing in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits. In this article, the author applies poliheuristic theory to individual, sequential, and interactive decision settings. Subsequent articles in this issue offer theoretical extensions and multiple tests of the theory using multiple methods (formal, statistical, experimental).
176 citations
TL;DR: This paper used a principal agent model to test the hypothesis that when proposed uses of force attract the support of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the rally in support of American president increases significantly.
Abstract: A principal agent model is used to test the hypothesis that when proposed uses of force attract the support of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the rally in support of the American president increases significantly. Regression analysis is applied to rallies during all militarized interstate disputes from 1945 to 2001. Results show that UN Security Council support significantly increases the rally behind the president (by as many as 9 points in presidential approval), even after including an array of control variables. This finding is generally robust across most model specifications. This effect is unique among international institutions because other actions by the UN or regional security organizations do not significantly affect rallies. These findings provide new insight into how international institutions can matter and influence the foreign policies of states by affecting public opinion.
153 citations
TL;DR: The authors show that high levels of inflation increase the probability of diversionary use of military force in settings of rivalry but decrease it in nonrival settings, but the results are contingent on the regime type of the potential initiator.
Abstract: Scholars have argued for some time that the rally ’round the flag phenomenon creates incentives for political leaders to use military force to divert attention away from domestic turmoil. It is hypothesized that a state’s strategic or historical context conditions its use of military force abroad, and that the probability of diversionary uses of force is higher in opportunity-rich environments of enduring rivalry. Empirical analyses lend support to this hypothesis, showing that high levels of inflation increase the probability of militarized dispute initiation in settings of rivalry but actually decrease it in nonrival settings. However, the results are contingent on the regime type of the potential initiator. Consistent with recent strategic models of diversion, the analyses demonstrate that although democratic leaders have the greatest incentives to divert, they have fewer opportunities to do so due to the transparency of their regimes.
TL;DR: The authors explored the link between democracy and multilateral peace operations in liberal theory, and the expanding UN global presence and its in debtedness to democracies are examined, and provided strong support for the proposition that the UN peace operations of the post-cold war era relied on democratic contributions.
Abstract: Does the level of democracy of a country incline it toward participation in post-cold war era, United Nations (UN) peace operations? The link between democracy and multilateral peace operations in liberal theory is explored, and the expanding UN global presence and its in debtedness to democracies are examined. Hypotheses drawn from liberal and realist theory are tested on a global set of countries in the period between 1993 and 2001, using cross-sectional, time-series data and a Heckman selection model. The descriptive evidence and robust model results provide strong support for the proposition that the UN peace operations of the post-cold war era relied on democratic contributions. A country’s level of democracy accounts for why and how much countries contributed to these operations when competing with a host of alternative explanations derived from a realist and liberal perspective.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that a subtle shift in the primary independent variable of the commercial peace literature, from trade to free trade, provides an opportunity to respond to some of the strongest criticisms of this research program.
Abstract: This study argues that a subtle shift in the primary independent variable of the commercial peace literature—from trade to free trade—provides an opportunity to respond to the some of the strongest criticisms of this research program. Free trade, and not just trade, promotes peace by removing an important foundation of domestic privilege—protective barriers to international commerce—that enhances the domestic power of societal groups likely to support war, reduces the capacity of free-trading interests to limit aggression in foreign policy, and simultaneously generates political support for the state often used to build its war machine. A series of statistical tests demonstrates that higher levels of free trade, rather than trade alone, reduce military conflict between states. Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom, these arguments suggest how the puzzling case of World War I may confirm, rather than contradict, the central claims of commercial liberalism.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied the effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good and found significantly higher cooperation in correspondence to unidirectional partner selection than to bidirectional selection and random rematching.
Abstract: This paper studies the eect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, subjects can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrate significantly higher cooperation in correspondence to unidirectional partner selection than to bidirectional selection and random rematching. Average monetary eort for being able to choose a partner is substantially high and remains stable.
TL;DR: A selection model for 68 countries between 1970 and 1998 is used to test the impact of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs on international capital markets and examine how agreements are perceived by multinational investors as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: A selection model for 68 countries between 1970 and 1998 is used to test the impact of International Monetary Fund(IMF) programs on international capital markets and examine how agreements are perceived by multinational investors. Results reveal that even after controlling for the factors that lead countries to seek IMF support, IMF agreements lead to lower levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). Countries that sign IMF agreements, ceteris paribus, attract 25% less FDI inflows than countries not under IMF agreements.
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of sanction duration that focuses on differences between democratic and non-democratic states in the structure of leaders' support coalitions is tested, using a hazard model to analyze a data set of 47 sanction events with 272 observations.
Abstract: A theory of sanction duration that focuses on differences between democratic and nondemocratic states in the structure of leaders’ support coalitions is tested, using a hazard model to analyze a data set of 47 sanction events with 272 observations. Results show that leadership change strongly affects the duration of sanctions only in the case of nondemocratic states. Leadership change in democratic states is unrelated to the duration of sanctions; however, leadership change in nondemocratic sender and nondemocratic target states is strongly related to the ending of economic sanctions.
TL;DR: The authors found that superior human capital, harmonious civil-military relations, and Western cultural background are largely responsible for the success of democracies in war, and that these traits correlate positively with democracy.
Abstract: Why are democracies unusually successful in war? We find that superior human capital, harmonious civil-military relations, and Western cultural background are largely responsible. These traits correlate positively with democracy, and account for democracy’s apparent effectiveness bonus. This is either good news or bad news for democratic effectiveness theorists. Many believe that democracy causes these traits. If so, our findings strengthen democratic effectiveness theory by explicating its causal mechanism. But others see democracy as a consequence rather than a cause of such traits. If so, our findings challenge the thesis by identifying alternative causes of the effectiveness bonus previously attributed to democracy. Either way, the results show a powerful effect for unit level variables in military performance. In the process, these same results sharpen our understanding of military effectiveness in general, and the relationship between military performance and regime type in particular.
TL;DR: The authors showed that states with strong civilian control are on average less prone to initiate military action than states without it, and suggested that civilian control should play a central role in future models of conflict initiation.
Abstract: The dominant (though contested) wisdom among international relations scholars is that military officers tend to be more cautious than their civilian counterparts about initiating the use of force. Sobered by the experience of combat, the theory holds, soldiers are hesitant to recommend military action except under the most favorable of circumstances. It might be the case, however, that military conservatism is simply a product of strong civilian oversight. Indeed, scholars have suggested that military officers actually have powerful incentives to promote the use of force, but these predilections may be muted when civilian leaders can punish officers for botched military adventures. In this article, the author details a quantitative, competitive test of these propositions, showing that states with strong civilian control are on average less prone to initiate military action than states without it. The results suggest that civilian control should play a central role in future models of conflict initiation.
TL;DR: The authors investigates why, despite the potential credibility enhancement associated with generating domestic audience costs, leaders frequently opt to "go private" and "go public" to generate domestic audience cost for U.S. presidents.
Abstract: This study investigates why, despite the potential credibility enhancement associated with generating domestic audience costs, leaders (in this instance, U.S. presidents) frequently opt to “go priv...
TL;DR: In this article, the role of domestic politics is investigated, using a model to show how domestic opposition during a crisis can reveal to a rival state private information about the incumbent, and how the public nature of democratic competition results in the institutionally induced credibility of the message.
Abstract: The role of domestic politics is investigated, using a model to show how domestic opposition during a crisis can reveal to a rival state private information about the incumbent. In particular, the public nature of democratic competition results in the institutionally induced credibility of the message.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used event data on the Israel-Lebanon and Israel-Palestinian conflicts in the Levant (1979-1999) and the Serbia-Croatia and Serbia-Bosnia conflicts (1991-1999), to test two sets of process related hypotheses embedded in the theoretical and qualitative literatures on mediation.
Abstract: Event data on the Israel-Lebanon and Israel-Palestinian conflicts in the Levant (1979-1999) and the Serbia-Croatia and Serbia-Bosnia conflicts in the Balkans (1991-1999) are used to test two sets of process-related hypotheses embedded in the theoretical and qualitative literatures on mediation. Cross-correlation analysis is used to examine the time delay in the effects of mediation on the level of violence over time. Results show that these effects vary somewhat, depending on the conflict, and differ substantially, depending on who is conducting the mediation. Whether conflict reduction is most effectively achieved with sanctions or rewards is tested. Results show that a reduction in violence is generally associated with mediation combined with conflictual action directed toward both of the antagonists and combined with cooperative action directed to the weaker antagonist.
TL;DR: This paper examined transnational actors' influence on the dynamics of civil war and found that transnational third parties often alter levels of cooperation among domestic adversaries, and that consistency affects the strength and direction of third-party influence.
Abstract: Scholars argue that third parties make rational calculations and intervene to influence interstate dispute outcomes in favor of their own objectives. Third parties affect not only conflict outcomes but also escalation and duration. Theories of third-party involvement are applied to understand the dynamics of intrastate war. An analysis of event data for three Central American conflicts (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua) from 1984 to 2001 is used to examine transnational actors’ influence on the dynamics of civil war. Findings show that transnational third parties often alter levels of cooperation among domestic adversaries, and that consistency affects the strength and direction of third-party influence.
TL;DR: In this article, the effect of familiarity on the decision strategy change of high-ranking officers of the U.S. Air Force is tested to see whether and how familiar versus unfamiliar decision tasks affect decision strategy changes during the decision-making process.
Abstract: The concept of policy makers’ familiarity with a decision task has received considerable attention in recent years in the literature on decision making by analogy, intuitive decision making, and dynamic versus static decision making. The effect of familiarity on the decision strategy change of high-ranking officers of the U.S. Air Force is tested to see whether and how familiar versus unfamiliar decision tasks affect decision strategy change during the decision-making process. Results support the noncompensatory principle of political decision making and poliheuristic theory: Leaders are sensitive to negative political advice, which is often noncompensatory. They first use dimensions to eliminate noncompensatory alternatives and then evaluate acceptable alternatives. This two-stage process is even more pronounced in unfamiliar decision settings with low or high levels of ambiguity—a situation that characterizes many foreign policy crises.
TL;DR: The effects of economies of scale in government, trade openness, preference heterogeneity, and regime type are used to explain why the average size of states within the international system nearly doubled between 1816 and 1876 and then contracted over the 20th century as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The effects of economies of scale in government, trade openness, preference heterogeneity, and regime type are used to explain why the average size of states within the international system nearly doubled between 1816 and 1876 and then contracted over the 20th century. No one variable appears to explain the trend fully. Results suggest that the rise in territorial size during the 19th century is the product of a growing number of federal democracies, which tend to be large, and that the decline in average size during the 20th century is the result of a growing number of unitary democracies, which tend to be small. Increasing economies of scale in the 19th century may have led to the rise of large federal democracies, whereas economic liberalism may have allowed unitary democracies to prosper in the 20th century.
TL;DR: In this paper, a measure called trade efficiency, which models the extent to which individual economic entities within two countries trade with each other, is used to investigate the claim that symmetrical dependence on tr...
Abstract: A measure—trade efficiency—that models the extent to which individual economic entities within two countries trade with each other is used to investigate the claim that symmetrical dependence on tr...
TL;DR: This article examined the impact of foreign policy frames on public support or opposition to U.S. military intervention in humanitarian crises around the world and found that public support for such interventions depends on the policy frame.
Abstract: Factors that may affect public support or opposition to U.S. military intervention in humanitarian crises around the world are examined to determine the impact of foreign policy frames on individua...
TL;DR: This paper found that military capabilities increase the frequency with which force is used, but although past uses of force influence the construction of military capabilities, evidence that decision makers can effectively anticipate their current needs is weak.
Abstract: Many international relations theorists suggest that improved military capabilities will make the use or threat of military force a more attractive policy choice. Tests of this argument are complicated because policy makers’anticipation of their future needs for military capabilities could also produce a relationship between capabilities and policy choice. Results show that military capabilities indeed increase the frequency with which force is used, but although past uses of force influence the construction of military capabilities, evidence that decision makers can effectively anticipate their current needs is weak. The results also suggest that the recent trend in force structure toward a smaller number of high-value weapons and relatively well-paid personnel has mitigated the relationship between military spending and the use of force.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated how people distribute income, using participants in two experimental treatments, one with and the other without a veil of ignorance, and found that the proportion of Rawlsian choices is bigger in those groups in which there is no Veil of ignorance.
Abstract: How people distribute income is investigated, using participants in two experimental treatments—one with and the other without a veil of ignorance. The experiment tests two major hypotheses: (1) the veil of ignorance generates Rawlsian choices, and (2) equal bargaining power and the veto rule generate Rawlsian choices, even though there is no veil of ignorance. Rawlsian choices are defined as those that maximize the income of the lowest income group. Results show that the proportion of Rawlsian choices is bigger in those groups in which there is no veil of ignorance. In group discussions, arguments related to justice are also more common in the no veil of ignorance than in the veil of ignorance treatment.
TL;DR: In this paper, the non-compensatory decision making under constraints is argued to be a core part of poliheuristic theory, and a class of utility functions are proposed.
Abstract: Noncompensatory decision making forms a core part of poliheuristic theory. At the same time, decision making under constraints is a common view among expected utility theorists. It is argued that poliheuristic theory permits one to endogenize constraints. Views about the rules ofwar are used to contrast the exogenous versus endogenous perspectives, and the noncompensatory perspective is formalized in terms of a class of utility functions. Finally, these poliheuristic, noncompensatory utility functions are contrasted with those typically used in the literature on spatial modeling.
TL;DR: The poliheuristic theory of decision is placed in its proper historical context through a brief diachronic overview of the evolution of the foreign policy decision-making tradition from Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin to the present.
Abstract: The poliheuristic theory of decision (PH) is placed in its proper historical context through a brief diachronic overview of the evolution of the foreign policy decision-making tradition from Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin to the present. The PH program is examined and contextualized in synchronic fashion via juxtaposition with three parallel lines of theoretical and empirical foreign policy decision-making research: cognitive institutionalism, problem representation, and decision units. These approaches are found to exhibit different methodological strengths and weaknesses and to emphasize different aspects of the decision-making process. Substantial complementarities exist, suggesting that the potential for synergy and cross-fertilization is great.