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Showing papers in "Journal of Experimental Psychology: General in 2010"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Support is lent to the idea that anticipated cognitive demand plays a significant role in behavioral decision making by showing sensitivity to task incentives and covaried with individual differences in the efficacy of executive control.
Abstract: Behavioral and economic theories have long maintained that actions are chosen so as to minimize demands for exertion or work, a principle sometimes referred to as the law of less work. The data supporting this idea pertain almost entirely to demands for physical effort. However, the same minimization principle has often been assumed also to apply to cognitive demand. The authors set out to evaluate the validity of this assumption. In 6 behavioral experiments, participants chose freely between courses of action associated with different levels of demand for controlled information processing. Together, the results of these experiments revealed a bias in favor of the less demanding course of action. The bias was obtained across a range of choice settings and demand manipulations and was not wholly attributable to strategic avoidance of errors, minimization of time on task, or maximization of the rate of goal achievement. It is remarkable that the effect also did not depend on awareness of the demand manipulation. Consistent with a motivational account, avoidance of demand displayed sensitivity to task incentives and covaried with individual differences in the efficacy of executive control. The findings reported, together with convergent neuroscientific evidence, lend support to the idea that anticipated cognitive demand plays a significant role in behavioral decision making.

762 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Object categories with conceptually distinctive exemplars showed less interference in memory as the number of exemplars increased, and observers' capacity to remember visual information in long-term memory depends more on conceptual structure than perceptual distinctiveness.
Abstract: Humans have a massive capacity to store detailed information in visual long-term memory. The present studies explored the fidelity of these visual long-term memory representations and examined how conceptual and perceptual features of object categories support this capacity. Observers viewed 2,800 object images with a different number of exemplars presented from each category. At test, observers indicated which of 2 exemplars they had previously studied. Memory performance was high and remained quite high (82% accuracy) with 16 exemplars from a category in memory, demonstrating a large memory capacity for object exemplars. However, memory performance decreased as more exemplars were held in memory, implying systematic categorical interference. Object categories with conceptually distinctive exemplars showed less interference in memory as the number of exemplars increased. Interference in memory was not predicted by the perceptual distinctiveness of exemplars from an object category, though these perceptual measures predicted visual search rates for an object target among exemplars. These data provide evidence that observers’ capacity to remember visual information in long-term memory depends more on conceptual structure than perceptual distinctiveness.

362 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a wavelet-based multifractal analysis and a multiplicative cascading process was used to characterize interaction-dominant dynamics in human cognition, and the results indicated that the major portion of these response series had multiplicative interactions between temporal scales, visible as intermittent periods of large and irregular fluctuations.
Abstract: It has been suggested that human behavior in general and cognitive performance in particular emerge from coordination between multiple temporal scales. In this article, we provide quantitative support for such a theory of interaction-dominant dynamics in human cognition by using wavelet-based multifractal analysis and accompanying multiplicative cascading process on the response series of 4 different cognitive tasks: simple response, word naming, choice decision, and interval estimation. Results indicated that the major portion of these response series had multiplicative interactions between temporal scales, visible as intermittent periods of large and irregular fluctuations (i.e., a multifractal structure). Comparing 2 component-dominant models of 1/f(alpha) fluctuations in cognitive performance with the multiplicative cascading process indicated that the multifractal structure could not be replicated by these component-dominant models. Furthermore, a similar multifractal structure was shown to be present in a model of self-organized criticality in the human nervous system, similar to a spatial extension of the multiplicative cascading process. These results illustrate that a wavelet-based multifractal analysis and the multiplicative cascading process form an appropriate framework to characterize interaction-dominant dynamics in human cognition. This new framework goes beyond the identification of 1/f(alpha) power laws and non-gaussian distributions in response series as used in previous studies. The present article provides quantitative support for a paradigm shift toward interaction-dominant dynamics in human cognition.

222 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In line with the proposed attentional sensitization model, unconscious semantic processing is enhanced by a semantic and attenuated by a perceptual task set, Hence, automatic processing of unconscious stimuli is susceptible to top-down control for optimizing goal-related information processing.
Abstract: According to classical theories, automatic processes are autonomous and independent of higher level cognitive influence. In contrast, the authors propose that automatic processing depends on attentional sensitization of task-congruent processing pathways. In 3 experiments, the authors tested this hypothesis with a modified masked semantic priming paradigm during a lexical decision task by measuring event-related potentials (ERPs): Before masked prime presentation, participants attended an induction task either to semantic or perceptual stimulus features designed to activate a semantic or perceptual task set, respectively. Semantic priming effects on the N400 ERP component, an electrophysiological index of semantic processing, were obtained when a semantic task set was induced immediately before subliminal prime presentation, whereas a previously induced perceptual task set attenuated N400 priming. Across experiments, comparable results were obtained regardless of the difficulty level and the verbal or nonverbal nature of the induction tasks. In line with the proposed attentional sensitization model, unconscious semantic processing is enhanced by a semantic and attenuated by a perceptual task set. Hence, automatic processing of unconscious stimuli is susceptible to top-down control for optimizing goal-related information processing.

212 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Depressed and nondepressed participants exhibited biases in updating emotional content that reflects the tendency to keep negative information and positive information, respectively, active in WM that underlie the ability to effectively regulate negative affect.
Abstract: Difficulties in the ability to update stimuli in working memory (WM) may underlie the problems with regulating emotions that lead to the development and perpetuation of mood disorders such as depression. To examine the ability to update affective material in WM, the authors had diagnosed depressed and never-disordered control participants perform an emotion 2-back task in which participants were presented with a series of happy, sad, and neutral faces and were asked to indicate whether the current face had the same (match-set) or different (break-set or no-set) emotional expression as that presented 2 faces earlier. Participants also performed a 0-back task with the same emotional stimuli to serve as a control for perceptual processing. After transforming reaction times to control for baseline group differences, depressed and nondepressed participants exhibited biases in updating emotional content that reflects the tendency to keep negative information and positive information, respectively, active in WM. Compared with controls, depressed participants were both slower to disengage from sad stimuli and faster to disengage from happy facial expressions. In contrast, nondepressed controls took longer to disengage from happy stimuli than from neutral or sad stimuli. These group differences in reaction times may reflect both protective and maladaptive biases in WM that underlie the ability to effectively regulate negative affect.

203 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For example, the authors found that people tend to attach less value to a good if they know a delay will occur before they obtain it, and that the decision maker is more closely linked to the person (his or her future self) receiving $100 tomorrow than to the other person receiving$100 in 10 years.
Abstract: People tend to attach less value to a good if they know a delay will occur before they obtain it. For example, people value receiving $100 tomorrow more than receiving $100 in 10 years. We explored one reason for this tendency (due to Parfit, 1984): In terms of psychological properties, such as beliefs, values, and goals, the decision maker is more closely linked to the person (his or her future self) receiving $100 tomorrow than to the person receiving $100 in 10 years. For this reason, he or she prefers his or her nearer self to have the $100 rather than his or her more remote self. Studies 1 and 2 showed that the greater the rated psychological connection between 2 parts of a participant's life, the less he or she discounted future monetary and nonmonetary benefits (e.g., good days at work) over that interval. In Studies 3-5, participants read about characters who undergo large life-changing (and connectedness-weakening) events at different points in their lives and then made decisions about the timing of benefits on behalf of these characters. All 5 studies revealed a relation between perceived psychological connectedness and intertemporal choice: Participants preferred benefits to occur before large changes in connectedness but preferred costs to occur after these changes.

182 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is demonstrated that women perceive men to be more attractive and sexually desirable when seen on a red background and in red clothing, and it is shown that status perceptions are responsible for this red effect.
Abstract: In many nonhuman species of vertebrates, females are attracted to red on male conspecifics. Red is also a signal of male status in many nonhuman vertebrate species, and females show a mating preference for high-status males. These red-attraction and red-status links have been found even when red is displayed on males artificially. In the present research, we document parallels between human and nonhuman females' response to male red. Specifically, in a series of 7 experiments we demonstrate that women perceive men to be more attractive and sexually desirable when seen on a red background and in red clothing, and we additionally show that status perceptions are responsible for this red effect. The influence of red appears to be specific to women's romantic attraction to men: Red did not influence men's perceptions of other men, nor did it influence women's perceptions of men's overall likability, agreeableness, or extraversion. Participants showed no awareness that the research focused on the influence of color. These findings indicate that color not only has aesthetic value but can carry meaning and impact psychological functioning in subtle, important, and provocative ways.

160 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The SNARC effect is demonstrated and verbal-spatial coding influences processes and representations that have been believed to be purely visuospatial, and relations to other number-space interactions and implications for other tasks are discussed.
Abstract: A tight correspondence has been postulated between the representations of number and space. The spatial numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect, which reflects the observation that people respond faster with the left-hand side to small numbers and with the right-hand side to large numbers, is regarded as strong evidence for this correspondence. The dominant explanation of the SNARC effect is that it results from visuospatial coding of magnitude (e.g., the mental number line hypothesis). In a series of experiments, we demonstrated that this is only part of the story and that verbal-spatial coding influences processes and representations that have been believed to be purely visuospatial. Additionally, when both accounts were directly contrasted, verbal-spatial coding was observed in absence of visuospatial coding. Relations to other number-space interactions and implications for other tasks are discussed.

151 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The results indicate that spelling ability is selectively associated with inhibitory effects of lexical competition and the theories of visual word recognition and the lexical quality hypothesis of reading skill are discussed.
Abstract: Two experiments investigated the relationship between masked form priming and individual differences in reading and spelling proficiency among university students. Experiment 1 assessed neighbor priming for 4-letter word targets from high- and low-density neighborhoods in 97 university students. The overall results replicated previous evidence of facilitatory neighborhood priming only for low-neighborhood words. However, analyses including measures of reading and spelling proficiency as covariates revealed that better spellers showed inhibitory priming for high-neighborhood words, while poorer spellers showed facilitatory priming. Experiment 2, with 123 participants, replicated the finding of stronger inhibitory neighbor priming in better spellers using 5-letter words and distinguished facilitatory and inhibitory components of priming by comparing neighbor primes with ambiguous and unambiguous partial-word primes (e.g., crow#, cr#wd, crown CROWD). The results indicate that spelling ability is selectively associated with inhibitory effects of lexical competition. The implications for theories of visual word recognition and the lexical quality hypothesis of reading skill are discussed.

139 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The present study demonstrates that attention and eye movements can also be guided by a relational specification of how the target differs from the irrelevant distractors, suggesting that priming and contingent capture are really due to a relational selection mechanism.
Abstract: Current models of visual search assume that visual attention can be guided by tuning attention toward specific feature values (e.g., particular size, color) or by inhibiting the features of the irrelevant nontargets. The present study demonstrates that attention and eye movements can also be guided by a relational specification of how the target differs from the irrelevant distractors (e.g., larger, redder, darker). Guidance by the relational properties of the target governed intertrial priming effects and capture by irrelevant distractors. First, intertrial switch costs occurred only upon reversals of the coarse relationship between target and nontargets, but they did not occur when the target and nontarget features changed such that the relation remained the same. Second, irrelevant distractors captured most strongly when they differed in the correct direction from all other items-despite the fact that they were less similar to the target. This suggests that priming and contingent capture, which have previously been regarded as prime evidence for feature-based selection, are really due to a relational selection mechanism. Here I propose a new relational vector account of guidance, which holds promise to synthesize a wide range of different findings that have previously been attributed to different mechanisms of visual search. © 2010 American Psychological Association.

129 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Five experiments that involved reading novel texts showed that participants who view intelligence as a fixed attribute, and who tend to interpret experiences of processing difficulty as an indication that they are reaching the limits of their ability, reported lower levels of comprehension as fluency decreased.
Abstract: Previous research overwhelmingly suggests that feelings of ease people experience while processing information lead them to infer that their comprehension is high, whereas feelings of difficulty lead them to infer that their comprehension is low. However, the inferences people draw from their experiences of processing fluency should also vary in accordance with their naive theories about why new information might be easy or difficult to process. Five experiments that involved reading novel texts showed that participants who view intelligence as a fixed attribute, and who tend to interpret experiences of processing difficulty as an indication that they are reaching the limits of their ability, reported lower levels of comprehension as fluency decreased. In contrast, participants who view intelligence as a malleable attribute that develops through effort, and who do not tend to interpret experiences of processing difficulty as pertaining to some innate ability, did not report lower levels of comprehension as fluency decreased. In fact, when these participants were particularly likely to view effort as leading to increased mastery, decreases in fluency led them to report higher levels of comprehension.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Using the expertise approach together with carefully chosen controls and multiple dependent measures, object and pattern recognition are identified as two essential cognitive processes in expert visual cognition, which may also help to explain the mechanisms of everyday perception.
Abstract: Comparing experts with novices offers unique insights into the functioning of cognition, based on the maximization of individual differences Here we used this expertise approach to disentangle the mechanisms and neural basis behind two processes that contribute to everyday expertise: object and pattern recognition We compared chess experts and novices performing chess-related and -unrelated (visual) search tasks As expected, the superiority of experts was limited to the chess-specific task, as there were no differences in a control task that used the same chess stimuli but did not require chess-specific recognition The analysis of eye movements showed that experts immediately and exclusively focused on the relevant aspects in the chess task, whereas novices also examined irrelevant aspects With random chess positions, when pattern knowledge could not be used to guide perception, experts nevertheless maintained an advantage Experts' superior domain-specific parafoveal vision, a consequence of their knowledge about individual domain-specific symbols, enabled improved object recognition Functional magnetic resonance imaging corroborated this differentiation between object and pattern recognition and showed that chess-specific object recognition was accompanied by bilateral activation of the occipitotemporal junction, whereas chess-specific pattern recognition was related to bilateral activations in the middle part of the collateral sulci Using the expertise approach together with carefully chosen controls and multiple dependent measures, we identified object and pattern recognition as two essential cognitive processes in expert visual cognition, which may also help to explain the mechanisms of everyday perception

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A representational account of automatic evaluations specifies the conditions under which automatic evaluations reflect initially acquired information, subsequently acquired, counterattitudinal information, or (c) a mixture of both, and postulates that attention to contextual cues during the encoding of evaluative information determines whether this information is stored in a context-free representation or a contextualized representation.
Abstract: Research has shown that automatic evaluations can be highly robust and difficult to change, highly malleable and easy to change, and highly context dependent. We tested a representational account of these disparate findings, which specifies the conditions under which automatic evaluations reflect (a) initially acquired information, (b) subsequently acquired, counterattitudinal information, or (c) a mixture of both. The account postulates that attention to contextual cues during the encoding of evaluative information determines whether this information is stored in a context-free representation or a contextualized representation. To the extent that attention to context cues is low during the encoding of initial information but is enhanced by exposure to expectancy-violating counterattitudinal information, initial experiences are stored in context-free representations, whereas counterattitudinal experiences are stored in contextualized representations. Hence, automatic evaluations tend to reflect the valence of counterattitudinal information only in the context in which this information was learned (occasion setting) and the valence of initial experiences in any other context (renewal effect). Four experiments confirmed these predictions, additionally showing that (a) the impact of initial experiences was reduced for automatic evaluations in novel contexts when context salience during the encoding of initial information was enhanced, (b) context effects were eliminated altogether when context salience during the encoding of counterattitudinal information was reduced, and (c) enhanced context salience during the encoding of counterattitudinal information produced context-dependent automatic evaluations even when there was no contingency between valence and contextual cues. Implications for automatic evaluation, learning theory, and interventions in applied settings are discussed.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This work hypothesizes that priming should require search in the sense of a self-regulated making and testing of sequential predictions about the world and provides a mechanism for the underlying search process and investigates 3 alternative hypotheses for subgoal hierarchies using the central executive as a search process model (CESP).
Abstract: The trade-off between exploration and exploitation is common to a wide variety of problems involving search in space and mind. The prevalence of this trade-off and its neurological underpinnings led us to propose domain-general cognitive search processes (Hills, Todd, & Goldstone, 2008). We propose further that these are consistent with the idea of a central executive search process that combines goal-handling across subgoal hierarchies. In the present study, we investigate 3 aspects of this proposal. First, the existence of a unitary central executive search process should allow priming from 1 search task to another and at multiple hierarchical levels. We confirm this by showing cross-domain priming from a spatial search task to 2 different cognitive levels within a lexical search task. Second, given the neural basis of the proposed generalized cognitive search process and the evidence that the central executive is primarily engaged during complex tasks, we hypothesize that priming should require search in the sense of a self-regulated making and testing of sequential predictions about the world. This was confirmed by showing that when participants were allowed to collect spatial resources without searching for them, no priming occurred. Finally, we provide a mechanism for the underlying search process and investigate 3 alternative hypotheses for subgoal hierarchies using the central executive as a search process model (CESP). CESP envisions the central executive as having both emergent and unitary processes, with one of its roles being a generalized cognitive search process that navigates goal hierarchies by mediating persistence on and switching between subgoals.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Eye movement data indicated that classification learners were at a disadvantage at making novel distinctions because of a narrower attention profile that reduces the encoding of many category features and learned inattention that inhibits the reallocation of attention to newly relevant information.
Abstract: Research has shown that learning a concept via standard supervised classification leads to a focus on diagnostic features, whereas learning by inferring missing features promotes the acquisition of within-category information. Accordingly, we predicted that classification learning would produce a deficit in people's ability to draw novel contrasts--distinctions that were not part of training--compared with feature inference learning. Two experiments confirmed that classification learners were at a disadvantage at making novel distinctions. Eye movement data indicated that this conceptual inflexibility was due to (a) a narrower attention profile that reduces the encoding of many category features and (b) learned inattention that inhibits the reallocation of attention to newly relevant information. Implications of these costs of supervised classification learning for views of conceptual structure are discussed.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Three experiments provide evidence that the conceptualization of moving objects and events is influenced by one's native language, consistent with linguistic relativity theory.
Abstract: Three experiments provide evidence that the conceptualization of moving objects and events is influenced by one's native language, consistent with linguistic relativity theory. Monolingual English speakers and bilingual Spanish/English speakers tested in an English-speaking context performed better than monolingual Spanish speakers and bilingual Spanish/English speakers tested in a Spanish-speaking context at sorting novel, animated objects and events into categories on the basis of manner of motion, an attribute that is prominently marked in English but not in Spanish. In contrast, English and Spanish speakers performed similarly at classifying on the basis of path, an attribute that is prominently marked in both languages. Similar results were obtained regardless of whether categories were labeled by novel words or numbered, suggesting that an English-speaking tendency to focus on manner of motion is a general phenomenon and not limited to word learning. Effects of age of acquisition of English were also observed on the performance of bilinguals, with early bilinguals performing similarly in the 2 language contexts and later bilinguals showing greater contextual variation.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is suggested that people can be both overly optimistic and pessimistic in their beliefs about future events, depending on whether they focus on success or on failure, and that wishful thinking might be less prevalent than previously believed.
Abstract: People appear to be unrealistically optimistic about their future prospects, as reflected by theory and research in the fields of psychology, organizational behavior, behavioral economics, and behavioral finance. Many real-world examples (e.g., consumer behavior during economic recessions), however, suggest that people are not always overly optimistic. I suggest that people can be both overly optimistic and pessimistic in their beliefs about future events, depending on whether they focus on success or on failure. More specifically, people judge the likelihood of desirable and undesirable events to be higher than similar neutral events because they misattribute the arousal those events evoke to their greater perceived likelihood. I demonstrated this stake-likelihood effect in 4 studies. In Study 1, arousal was shown to increase likelihood judgments. Study 2 demonstrated that such elevated likelihood judgments are due to misattribution of the arousal from having a stake in the outcome. Study 3 demonstrated that such misattribution of arousal occurs for desirable and undesirable events. Study 4 showed the effects of optimism and pessimism on likelihood judgments in a field setting with soccer fans. Together, the findings suggest that wishful thinking might be less prevalent than previously believed. Pessimism might be as likely as optimism in subjective probabilities.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors report 9 new experiments and reanalyze 3 published experiments that investigate factors affecting the time course of perceptual processing and its effects on subsequent decision making. But their results imply that the onset of evidence accumulation in the decision process is time-locked to the perceptual encoding of the stimulus features needed to do the task.
Abstract: The authors report 9 new experiments and reanalyze 3 published experiments that investigate factors affecting the time course of perceptual processing and its effects on subsequent decision making. Stimuli in letter-discrimination and brightness-discrimination tasks were degraded with static and dynamic noise. The onset and the time course of decision making were quantified by fitting the data with the diffusion model. Dynamic noise and, to a lesser extent, static noise, produced large shifts in the leading edge of the response-time distribution in letter discrimination but had little effect in brightness discrimination. The authors interpret these shifts as changes in the onset of decision making. The different pattern of shifts in letter discrimination and brightness discrimination implies that decision making in the 2 tasks was affected differently by noise. The changes in response-time distributions found with letter stimuli are inconsistent with the hypothesis that noise increases response times to letter stimuli simply by reducing the rate at which evidence accumulates in the decision process. Instead, they imply that noise also delays the time at which evidence accumulation begins. The delay is shown not to be the result of strategic processes or the result of using different stimuli in different tasks. The results imply, rather, that the onset of evidence accumulation in the decision process is time-locked to the perceptual encoding of the stimulus features needed to do the task. Two mechanisms that could produce this time-locking are described.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In 2 experiments, neither the standard formulation of dual-process signal detection (DPSD) theory nor a widely used single-process model called the unequal-variance signal-detection (UVSD) model provides a satisfactory explanation of recognition memory across different types of stimuli.
Abstract: Dual-process theory hypothesizes that recognition memory depends on two distinguishable memory signals. Recollection reflects conscious recovery of detailed information about the learning episode. Familiarity reflects a memory signal that is not accompanied by a vivid conscious experience but nonetheless enables participants to distinguish recently-experienced probe items from novel ones. This dual-process explanation of recognition memory has gained wide acceptance among cognitive neuroscientists and some cognitive psychologists. Nonetheless, its difficulty in providing a quantitatively satisfactory description of performance in item recognition experiments has precluded a consensus not only about the theoretical structure of recognition memory but also about how to best measure recognition accuracy. In two experiments we show that neither the standard formulation of dual-process signal detection theory (DPSD) nor a widely-used single-process model (UVSD) provides a satisfactory explanation of recognition memory across different types of study materials (words and travel scenes). In the variable recollection dual-process model (VRDP), recollection fails for some old probe items, as in standard formulations of dual process signal detection theory, but gives rise to a continuous distribution of memory strengths when it succeeds. The VRDP can approximate both the DPSD and the UVSD. In both experiments it provides a consistently superior fit across materials to the superset of the DPSD and UVSD. The VRDP offers a simple explanation of the form of conjoint item-source judgments, something neither the DPSD nor the UVSD can accomplish. The success of the VRDP supports the core assumptions of dual-process theory by providing an excellent quantitative description of recognition performance across materials, response criteria and type of response.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The results suggest that permission for actions with ethical connotations may be harder to get than forgiveness for those same actions, and demonstrate a systematic way in which moral judgments of the same action are inconsistent across time.
Abstract: Logically, an unethical behavior performed yesterday should also be unethical if performed tomorrow. However, the present studies suggest that the timing of a transgression has a systematic effect on people's beliefs about its moral acceptability. Because people's emotional reactions tend to be more extreme for future events than for past events, and because such emotional reactions often guide moral intuitions, judgments of moral behavior may be more extreme in prospect than in retrospect. In 7 studies, participants judged future bad deeds more negatively, and future good deeds more positively, than equivalent behavior in the equidistant past. In addition, participants thought that future unfair actions deserved more punishment than past unfair actions, and were more willing to sacrifice their own financial gain to be treated fairly in the future compared with in the past. These patterns were explained in part by the stronger emotions that were evoked by thoughts of future events than by thoughts of past events. Taken together, the results suggest that permission for actions with ethical connotations may be harder to get than forgiveness for those same actions, and demonstrate a systematic way in which moral judgments of the same action are inconsistent across time.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Two fMRI experiments provide convergent evidence for a dissociation of articulatory suppression from the 2 irrelevant sound conditions and implications are considered for 4 prominent theories of working memory.
Abstract: Working memory is believed to play a central role in almost all domains of higher cognition, yet the specific mechanisms involved in working memory are still fiercely debated. We describe a neuroimaging experiment with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a companion behavioral experiment, and in both we seek to adjudicate between alternative theoretical models of working memory on the basis of the effects of interference from articulatory suppression, irrelevant speech, and irrelevant nonspeech. In Experiment 1 we examined fMRI signal changes induced by each type of irrelevant information while subjects performed a probed recall task. Within a principally frontal and left-lateralized network of brain regions, articulatory suppression caused an increase in activity during item presentation, whereas both irrelevant speech and nonspeech caused relative activity reductions during the subsequent delay interval. In Experiment 2, the specific timing of interference was manipulated in a delayed serial recall task. Articulatory suppression was found to be most consequential when it coincided with item presentation, whereas both irrelevant speech and irrelevant nonspeech effects were strongest when limited to the subsequent delay period. Taken together, these experiments provide convergent evidence for a dissociation of articulatory suppression from the 2 irrelevant sound conditions. Implications of these findings are considered for 4 prominent theories of working memory.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The findings show not only how causation by omission can be grounded in the physical world but also why only certain absences, among the potentially infinite number of absences), are causal.
Abstract: Causation by omission is instantiated when an effect occurs from an absence, as in The absence of nicotine causes withdrawal or Not watering the plant caused it to wilt. The phenomenon has been viewed as an insurmountable problem for process theories of causation, which specify causation in terms of conserved quantities, like force, but not for theories that specify causation in terms of statistical or counterfactual dependencies. A new account of causation challenges these assumptions. According to the force theory, absences are causal when the removal of a force leads to an effect. Evidence in support of this account was found in 3 experiments in which people classified animations of complex causal chains involving force removal, as well as chains involving virtual forces, that is, forces that were anticipated but never realized. In a 4th experiment, the force theory's ability to predict synonymy relationships between different types of causal expressions provided further evidence for this theory over dependency theories. The findings show not only how causation by omission can be grounded in the physical world but also why only certain absences, among the potentially infinite number of absences, are causal.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: 3 experiments investigating learning in changing environments show that participants were responsive to both abrupt and gradual changes in cue-outcome relations, and in contrast to earlier claims that these tasks are learned implicitly, participants showed good insight into what they learned.
Abstract: Multiple cue probability learning studies have typically focused on stationary environments. We present three experiments investigating learning in changing environments. A fine-grained analysis of the learning dynamics shows that participants were responsive to both abrupt and gradual changes in cue-outcome relations. We found no evidence that participants adapted to these types of change in qualitatively different ways. Also, in contrast to earlier claims that these tasks are learned implicitly, participants showed good insight into what they learned. By fitting formal learning models, we investigated whether participants learned global functional relationships or made localized predictions from similar experienced exemplars. Both a local (the Associative Learning Model) and a global learning model (the novel Bayesian Linear Filter) fitted the data of the first two experiments. However, the results of Experiment 3, which was specifically designed to discriminate between local and global learning models, provided more support for global learning models. Finally, we present a novel model to account for the cue competition effects found in previous research and displayed by some of our participants.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This research tested for counteractive optimism: a self-control strategy of generating optimistic predictions of future goal attainment in order to overcome anticipated obstacles in goal pursuit and revealed that emphasizing accuracy in predictions reverses the effect of anticipated obstacles on predictions and negatively affects the process of overcoming obstacles in Goals.
Abstract: This research tested for counteractive optimism: a self-control strategy of generating optimistic predictions of future goal attainment in order to overcome anticipated obstacles in goal pursuit. In support of the counteractive optimism model, participants in 5 studies predicted better performance, more time invested in goal activities, and lower health risks when they anticipated high (vs. low) obstacles in pursuing their goals. These predictions in turn motivated pursuing the goals. These studies further revealed that emphasizing accuracy in predictions reverses the effect of anticipated obstacles on predictions and negatively affects the process of overcoming obstacles in goal pursuit.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The results showed that the intensity of both negative and positive feelings diminished under a cognitive load and that this attenuation of feeling was not mediated by either distraction from external stimuli or demand characteristics.
Abstract: We propose that experience of emotion is a mental phenomenon, which requires resources. This hypothesis implies that a concurrent cognitive load diminishes the intensity of feeling since the 2 activities are competing for the same resources. Two sets of experiments tested this hypothesis. The first line of experiments (Experiments 1-4) examined the intensity of participants' feelings as they performed a secondary (backward counting) task. The results showed that the intensity of both negative and positive feelings diminished under a cognitive load and that this attenuation of feeling was not mediated by either distraction from external stimuli or demand characteristics. In the second set of experiments (Experiments 5-6), load was created by asking the participants to focus on the feelings. Even in these circumstances, the participants who were under load reported a lower intensity of feeling than those who were not under load. We explain these findings in terms of a resource-dependent model of emotional experience. Possible implications of our findings for a broader class of phenomenological experiences are succinctly discussed.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors demonstrated that causal relations with fixed temporal intervals are consistently judged as stronger than those with variable temporal intervals, and that causal judgments decline as a function of temporal uncertainty, which clearly indicate that temporal predictability facilitates causal discovery.
Abstract: Temporal predictability refers to the regularity or consistency of the time interval separating events. When encountering repeated instances of causes and effects, we also experience multiple cause–effect temporal intervals. Where this interval is constant it becomes possible to predict when the effect will follow from the cause. In contrast, interval variability entails unpredictability. Three experiments investigated the extent to which temporal predictability contributes to the inductive processes of human causal learning. The authors demonstrated that (a) causal relations with fixed temporal intervals are consistently judged as stronger than those with variable temporal intervals, (b) that causal judgments decline as a function of temporal uncertainty, and (c) that this effect remains undiminished with increased learning time. The results therefore clearly indicate that temporal predictability facilitates causal discovery. The authors considered the implications of their findings for various theoretical perspectives, including associative learning theory, the attribution shift hypothesis, and causal structure models.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that differences in the experienced predictiveness of groups with respect to evaluatively neutral information influence the extent to which participants later form attitudes and stereotypes about those groups.
Abstract: We propose that biases in attitude and stereotype formation might arise as a result of learned differences in the extent to which social groups have previously been predictive of behavioral or physical properties. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that differences in the experienced predictiveness of groups with respect to evaluatively neutral information influence the extent to which participants later form attitudes and stereotypes about those groups. In contrast, Experiment 3 shows no influence of predictiveness when using a procedure designed to emphasize the use of higher level reasoning processes, a finding consistent with the idea that the root of the predictiveness bias is not in reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrate that the predictiveness bias in formation of group beliefs does not depend on participants making global evaluations of groups. These results are discussed in relation to the associative mechanisms proposed by Mackintosh (1975) to explain similar phenomena in animal conditioning and associative learning.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper found that people misremember their forecasts as consistent with their experience and thus fail to perceive the extent of their forecasting error, as a result, people do not learn from past forecasting errors and fail to adjust subsequent forecasts.
Abstract: Why do affective forecasting errors persist in the face of repeated disconfirming evidence? Five studies demonstrate that people misremember their forecasts as consistent with their experience and thus fail to perceive the extent of their forecasting error. As a result, people do not learn from past forecasting errors and fail to adjust subsequent forecasts. In the context of a Super Bowl loss (Study 1), a presidential election (Studies 2 and 3), an important purchase (Study 4), and the consumption of candies (Study 5), individuals mispredicted their affective reactions to these experiences and subsequently misremembered their predictions as more accurate than they actually had been. The findings indicate that this recall error results from people’s tendency to anchor on their current affective state when trying to recall their affective forecasts. Further, those who showed larger recall errors were less likely to learn to adjust their subsequent forecasts and reminding people of their actual forecasts enhanced learning. These results suggest that a failure to accurately recall one’s past predictions contributes to the perpetuation of forecasting errors.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is concluded that affective analysis of scenes cannot bypass object recognition, and semantic categorization precedes and is required for affective evaluation.
Abstract: We compared the primacy of affective versus semantic categorization by using forced-choice saccadic and manual response tasks. Participants viewed paired emotional and neutral scenes involving humans or animals flashed rapidly in extrafoveal vision. Participants were instructed to categorize the targets by saccading toward the location occupied by a predefined target scene. The affective task involved saccading toward an unpleasant or pleasant scene, and the semantic task involved saccading toward a scene containing an animal. Both affective and semantic target scenes could be reliably categorized in less than 220 ms, but semantic categorization was always faster than affective categorization. This finding was replicated with singly, foveally presented scenes and manual responses. In comparison with foveal presentation, extrafoveal presentation slowed down the categorization of affective targets more than that of semantic targets. Exposure threshold for accurate categorization was lower for semantic information than for affective information. Superordinate-, basic-, and subordinate-level semantic categorizations were faster than affective evaluation. We conclude that affective analysis of scenes cannot bypass object recognition. Rather, semantic categorization precedes and is required for affective evaluation.

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TL;DR: The authors find an early emerging basis for judgments that some sciences are intrinsically more difficult than others, a bias that may persevere in adults in subtler forms in such settings as the courtroom.
Abstract: In 4 studies, the authors examined how intuitions about the relative difficulties of the sciences develop. In Study 1, familiar everyday phenomena in physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and economics were pretested in adults, so as to be equally difficult to explain. When participants in kindergarten, Grades 2, 4, 6, and 8, and college were asked to rate the difficulty of understanding these phenomena, children revealed a strong bias to see natural science phenomena as more difficult than those in psychology. The perceived relative difficulty of economics dropped dramatically in late childhood. In Study 2, children saw neuroscience phenomena as much more difficult than cognitive psychology phenomena, which were seen as more difficult than social psychology phenomena, even though all phenomena were again equated for difficulty in adults. In Study 3, we explored the basis for these results in intuitions about common knowledge and firsthand experience. Study 4 showed that the intuitions about the differences between the disciplines were based on intuitions about difficulty of understanding and not on the basis of more general intuitions about the feasibility or truth of the phenomena in question. Taken together, in the studies, the authors find an early emerging basis for judgments that some sciences are intrinsically more difficult than others, a bias that may persevere in adults in subtler forms in such settings as the courtroom.