Open AccessProceedings Article
A dynamic and differential CMOS logic with signal independent power consumption to withstand differential power analysis on smart cards
Kris Tiri,M. Akmal,Ingrid Verbauwhede +2 more
- pp 403-406
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TLDR
A set of logic gates and flip-flops needed for cryptographic functions and compared those to Static Complementary CMOS implementations to protect security devices such as smart cards against power attacks are built.Abstract:
To protect security devices such as smart cards against power attacks, we propose a dynamic and differential CMOS logic style. The logic operates with a power consumption independent of both the logic values and the sequence of the data. Consequently, it will not reveal the sensitive data in a device. We have built a set of logic gates and flip-flops needed for cryptographic functions and compared those to Static Complementary CMOS implementations.read more
Citations
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References
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Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
TL;DR: An abstract model which approximates power consumption in most devices and in particular small single-chip devices is proposed, and a lower bound on the number of experiments required to mount statistical attacks on devices whose physical characteristics satisfy reasonable properties is proved.
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Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software
TL;DR: Under a simple power leakage model based on Hamming weight, a software implementation of a data-whitening routine is shown to be vulnerable to a first-order Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack and a second-order DPA attack that is optimal under certain assumptions is proposed.