A region of their making:visions of regional orders and paths to peace making in northeast Asia

Abstract: China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, by Peter Hayes Gries. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. x + 215 pp. US$24.95/£15.95 (hardcover). The aim of this book, as stated in the Introduction, is to present a balanced view of "China's new nationalism", "one that acknowledges its legitimate grievances and recognizes its potential dangers" (p. 12). It argues from a social psychological point of view that Chinese identity "evolves in dynamic relationship with other nations and the past" and "involves both the Chinese people and other passions" (p. 19). These interrelated arguments are intended not only to challenge what the author calls "the dominant Western interpretation of Chinese nationalism" and the "West's state-centric view of Chinese nationalism" but also to draw attention to the dangers of China-bashing in the US and America-bashing in China. "Nationalism" in this book refers to "any behavior designed to restore, maintain, or advance public images" of a national community (p. 9). What seems to make "China's new nationalism" new is its "genuine popularity" and "independent existence". This conclusion is based on the evidence that Chinese nationalism increasingly challenges the Party-state; that the Chinese, like all peoples, have deep-seated emotional attachments to their national identity; and that Chinese public opinion now plays a role in national politics. Another new feature of today's Chinese nationalism is the way in which it constructs narratives of a "century of humiliation". The national narrative of heroism and victory that served the requirements of Communist revolutionaries and nation-building goals under Mao are now superseded by a new and popular victimization narrative that blames the West, including Japan, for China's suffering. It is not immediately clear in the book why long-suppressed memories of past suffering resurfaced in the 1990s, but this seems to have much to do with a psychological need to return continually to unresolved traumas in the hope of mastering them. These themes are developed through an examination of nationalist writings-mostly by Chinese intellectuals-and the official and popular responses to a number of well-known events in the 1990s and more recently. Chapter 1 looks at the protests in 1999 in the wake of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Chapter 2 discusses the ways that Chinese national identity is shaped in a dialogic process of comparison with and distinction from the US and Japan. Chapter 3 turns to the effect of Chinese visions of the "century of humiliation" on their self-image, as well as the impact of changes to their national identity on Chinese views of the century. Chapters 4 and 5 revisit Chinese views of the US and Japan, although this time the focus shifts to writings about past and future Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations. In Chapter 6-probably the most substantive and interesting chapter-Gries explores the motivation of Chinese nationalists, focusing on China's apology diplomacy. Chapters 7 and 8 can be thought of as a conclusion in two parts, in that they pull together and highlight once again some of the book's main themes. The book does an admirable job in demonstrating that the way US policymakers and commentators talk about China dangerously distorts US interpretations of, and responses to, Chinese policies and actions, and influences Chinese understandings of the US. It also shows convincingly that anti-American and anti-Chinese polemics easily spiral into mutual dehumanization and demonization and thus lay the foundations for violent conflict. A no less significant contribution the book makes is its perspective on Chinese nationalism. Central to Gries' perception is the concept of face-so much so that he has consistently italicized the word in the book. What he means by face is not simply the figurative self shown to others but also a prerequisite for maintaining authority and the ability to pursue instrumental goals. …

Abstract: Questionnaire Q1. Do you think that it is more likely that someday China's economy will grow to be as large as the US economy or that the US economy will always stay larger than China's? China's economy will grow as large as the US economy The US economy will always stay larger than China's Not sure/ Decline (%) (%) Q2. If China's economy were to grow to be as large as the US economy, do you think that would be mostly positive, mostly negative, or equally positive and negative?

Abstract: Contents: Preface Aim and concepts Theoretical premises of the argument The phenomenon to be explained: the long peace of East Asia The main argument: the contribution of the ASEAN/Chinese way to the long peace of East Asia Developmentalism and the prevention of the onset of conflicts Non-intervention and the prevention of the escalation of conflicts into wars Face saving and the termination of conflicts Generation of the successful ASEAN/Chinese approach Will the long peace survive? How could it be made broader, positive and more sustainable? What can the East Asian experience offer to theories of international relations, peace and conflicts? Bibliography Index

Abstract: The state has lost its position of centrality in contemporary political theory ideas of moral individualism and an emphasis on bargaining among conflicting interest have usurped ideas that embedded morality in institutions, such as the legal system and the corporation, as foundations for political identity. The authors propose a new theory of political behavior that re-invigorates the role of institutions - from laws and bureaucracy to rituals, symbols and ceremonies - as essential to understanding the modern political and economic systems that guide contemporary life.

Abstract: The debate between realists and liberals has reemerged as an axis of contention in international relations theory.’ Revolving in the past around competing theories of human nature, the debate is more concerned today with the extent to which state action is influenced by ‘structure’ (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus ‘process’ (interaction and learning) and institutions. Does the absence of centralized political authority force states to play competitive power politics? Can international regimes overcome this logic, and under what conditions? What in anarchy is given and immutable, and what is amenable to change?

Abstract: While much attention has been focused on Japan's meteoric rise as an economic power, South Korea has been quietly emerging as the next industrial giant to penetrate the world market. South Korea is one of a series of countries (ranging from Taiwan, India, Brazil, and Turkey, to Mexico, and including Japan) to have succeeded through borrowing foreign technology rather than by generating new products or processes. Describing such countries as `late-industrializers,' Amsden demonstrates why South Korea has become the most successful of this group. Available in OSO: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/0195076036/toc.html

Abstract: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, sadly shattered these idyllic illusions, and John Mearsheimer's masterful new book explains why these harmonious visions remain utopian. To Mearsheimer, great power politics are tragic because the anarchy of the international system requires states to seek dominance at one another's expense, dooming even peaceful nations to a relentless power struggle. Mearsheimer illuminates his theory of offensive realism through a sweeping survey of modern great power struggles and reflects on the bleak prospects for peace in Europe and northeast Asia, arguing that the United States's security competition with a rising China will intensify regardless of \"engagement\" policies.

Abstract: Scholars of security affairs can stop their dreary quarrels over military doctrine and balance assessments, and turn their attention to finding ways to prevent global warming and preserve the ozone layer. European leaders can contemplate how to spend peace dividends. This chapter assesses this optimistic view by exploring in detail the consequences for Europe of an end to the Cold War. It examines the effects of a scenario under which the Cold War comes to a complete end. The chapter argues that bipolarity, an equal military balance, and nuclear weapons have fostered peace in Europe. It offers an explanation for the peacefulness of the post-World War II order. The chapter examines the theories underlying claims that a multipolar Europe is likely to be as peaceful, if not more peaceful, than Cold War Europe. The peace-loving democracies theory holds that domestic political factors, not calculations about military power or the international economic system, are the principal determinant of peace.