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EDITORIAL
Disaster resilience: a bounce back or bounce forward ability?
Introduction
The debate on disaster resilience has continued to grow, albeit at a slow pace, since the 2005
World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan. One of the most
important and striking aspects is that despite the conceptual differences, the resilience
and vulnerability paradigms are still locked together and are increasingly being treated as
if they are one and the same. The reason for this is not a difficult one. Resilience and vul-
nerability are viewed as opposite sides of the same coin (Twigg 2007). However, the notion
of “bounce back” differentiates resilience from vulnerability. The “bounce back” notion is
important to the extent that it liberates resilience from the vulnerability conundrum. Yet, the
“bounce back” notion does not seem to acknowledge that disasters are accompanied by
change.
This paper posits that resilience should be viewed as the ability to “bounce forward” and
“move on” following a disaster (Manyena 2009). Three arguments are presented in this
paper. First, the “bounce forward” ability conceptualisation of resilience has implications
on disaster research and scholarship. It helps us to re-think about the underlying philosophi-
cal arguments, particularly those around structure and agency. Secondly, resilience has tem-
poral and continuity elements, which have implications for pre- and post-disaster planning,
including community continuity recovery planning. Lastly, the “bounce forward” con-
ception has psychological implications. It is optimistic, with a potential of assisting disaster
victims and service providers to adopt positive behaviour changes prior to and after the
disaster.
The ascendancy of the disaster resilience paradigm
The disaster resilience paradigm has gained currency since the start of the new millennium.
Central to the resilience paradigm is its stronger emphasis on capabilities and the ways
people and communities deal with crises and disasters (IFRC 2004, UNISDR 2005). A resi-
lient community is ideally the safest possible disaster-prone community that has the ability
to overcome the damages brought about by disasters either by maintaining their pre-disaster
social fabric or by accepting marginal or larger change in order to survive (Gaillard 2007).
Manyena’s (2006) deconstruction of resilience illustrates that its evolution has not been
straightforward.
The current interest in the resilience concept for disasters mirrors shifts in thinking
about disasters. Furedi (2007) traces three major shifts in disaster “thought”: as Acts of
God; Acts of Nature and Acts of Men and Women. From time immemorial, disast ers
were explained as Acts of God’s anger towards his people implying that nothing could be
done about it. During the Enlightenment, with the emergence of science, the causation of
disasters shifted to Acts of Nature. Disasters were blamed on hazards, and hazards were
CE: PR/SJ QA: Coll:
ISSN 1354-9839 print/ISSN 1469-6711 online
# 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13549839.2011.583049
http://www.informaworld.com
Local Environment
Vol. 16, No. 6, July 2011, 1–8
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disasters per se. It was not until the 1970s that disaster causation shifted from Acts of Nature
to Acts of Men and Women. O’Keefe et al. (1976) argue, in Taking the naturalness out of
natural disasters, that disasters were neither Acts of God nor Acts of Nature but a conse-
quence of vulnerability. Wisner et al. (2004) described the 1976 Guatemala earthquake
as “class-quake” due to its selective impact on the poor, as it left the upper and middle
classes virtually unscathed. The emergence of the resilience concept has shifted the focus
to self-reliance as a counter to vulnerability, particularly for the poor and the marginalised.
Whether resilience and vulnerability are one and the same concept or discrete constructs
is still contested. Like most social science constructs, there is some confusion over the defi-
nition of resilience. Twigg (2007) argues that the terms “resilience” and “vulnerability” are
opposite sides of the same coin, but both are relative terms. In this instance, vulnerability
and resilience are assumed to lie on the same continuum but on the opposite poles, with
vulnerability being negative and resilience being positive (Manyena 2006). In this way,
it might be appropriate to assume that when reference is made to vulnerability, there is
an assumption that one would also be referring to resilience as dual terms meaning the
absence of the other means the presence of the other.
Notwithstanding that both constructs may rely on the same factors such as demographic,
social, cultural, economic and political aspects, the two are arguably discrete constructs
(Manyena 2006, Gaillard 2007). The original notion of resilience, from the Latin word
resilio, means to “jump back” or “bounce back”. This refers to people’s recovery within
the shortest possible time with minimal or no assistance at all. The “bounce back” notion
differentiates resilience from vulnerability, implying that the two constructs are discrete.
The “bounce back” ability has its limitations as well; it may be more acceptable to
elastic material than to human systems. Elastic can be stretched (not necessarily in a disaster
situation) and can return to its normal position without change. That disasters are
accompanied by change is a given. Take a few examples. The Bam earthquake, which
occurred on 26 December 2003, in south-east Iran, claimed more than 35,000 lives,
another 23,620 were injured, almost 20,000 homes were destroyed and essential services
including water supply, power, telephone, health care, main roads and the city’s only
airport were crippled (Akbari et al. 2004); this led to major shifts in the social, economic
and physical environments. In Sri Lanka, the 2004 tsunami had a major impact on the
fishing community. Some 90% of the surviving fishing community lost their boats,
fishing nets and homes; this transformed their lives and livelihoods (Venkatachalam
et al. 2009). In Zimbabwe, a decade-long complex political emergency has triggered disas-
ters such as a cholera epidemic. This affected some 100,000 people and claimed 4200 lives
between mid-2008 and mid-2009 (Nelson 2009); this severely disrupted social and econ-
omic stability. In Japan, the 2011 earthquake and subsequent tsunami caused severe
damage to homes, businesses and infrastructure, including the almost total destruction of
the Fukushima nuclear power plant. In terms of change, the plight of the Fukushima
nuclear plant has caused those countries that operate such facilities to re-think about
their power-generation strategies. As Paton and Johnston (2006 Q1) argues, these examples
show that the “bouncing back” neither captures the changed reality nor encapsulates the
new possibilities opened by the changes wrought by a disaster:
This usage [of bounce back], however, captures neither the reality of disaster experience nor its
full implications. Even if people wanted to return to previous state, changes to the physical,
social and psychological reality of societal life emanating from a disaster can make this unten-
able. That is, the post-disaster reality, irrespective of whether it reflects the direct consequences
of disaster or recovery and re-building activities undertaken, will present community members
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with a new reality that may differ in several fundamental ways form that prevailing pre-disaster.
It is the changed reality (whether from the disaster itself or social response to it) that people
must adapt to. Paton and Johnston (2006, pp. 7 –8) Q1
Arguably, the “bounce back” notion does signal change. But returning to the original pos-
ition does not signal change. It might mean a return to vulnerability and bouncing back to
the conditions that caused the disaster in the first place; they may re-create and strengthen
the pre-disaster structures and institutions. Thus, the “bounce back” notion can be associ-
ated with strengthening existing structures and institutions to resist or withstand disasters,
which may also increase community vulnerability rather than their resilience to disasters.
Resilience should be viewed as the ability to “bounce forward” and “move on” follow-
ing a disaster (Manyena 2009). Although this might be considered rather simplistic, there
could be merit in this thinking. As disasters can be conceptualised as a catalyst for change
(Paton and Johnston 2006 Q1), the “bounce forward” notion encapsulates social engineering, if
not community agency, in change processes within the context of new realities brought
about by a disaster. Community agency through advocacy programmes may influence dis-
aster risk governance where institutions maybe reorganised to increase their capabilities to
deal with the changing nature of risk. What is fundamental here is that the disaster risk gov-
ernance structures and institutions are subordinate to the community agency. Changes that
may take place after a disaster are not by chance – they are a result of rational choices made
by the affected communities and should be transformative. They can include physical,
economic, political and psychological issues. Thus, disaster resilience could be viewed
as the intrinsic capacity of a system, community or society predisposed to a shock or
stress to “bounce forward” and adapt in order to survive by changing its non-essential attri-
butes and rebuilding itself.
Conceptualising resilient or “bounce forward” abilities
A fundamental issue in conceptualising “bounce forward ability” is the evaluation of current
response systems and, more broadly, how we approach prevention and preparedness Q2. The
ways in which societies have prepared themselves to deal with uncertainties and change
have shaped norms, values, customs and practices and governance systems. Adjusting to
changing circumstances and learning from experience have always been part of human devel-
opment. Arguably, we have always recognised risk as a part of the everyday life and that often
risk-taking can bring rewards. The ancient Egyptians lived with the risk of annual flood. But
the floods regenerated their agricultural capacity: an example of both risks and rewards.
In instances where a rapid change has occurred, there has been little time for social learning
processes to re-shape preparedness strategies. Today, the state, in many instances, has taken
the lead in dealing with hazardous events and rapid socio-technological and economic
changes. There has been a drive to make people feel “safe”. Alongside this, there has been
a drive towards the centre and the imposition of a command and control structure.
This drive to centralism can clearly be seen in the way the UK response to disastrous
events has developed after the World War II. This approach was dominated by a civil
defence perspective that was shaped by the threat of a nuclear war. This gradually
shifted to a civil protection perspective. Following the collapse of the Soviet Unio n, a
series of disasters leading up to and following the millennium led to a root-and-branch
reform of civil protection. Though resilience was used as a term to characterise the
reform process, in reality, the focus was on institutional resilience (O’Brien and Read
2005, O’Brien 2006). This is a narrow interpretation of resilience, as it restricts the focus
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to an internal view of the capacities needed. For routine events, such as traffic accidents, this
can be very effective and there are many examples of emergency responders who are being
able to cope in quite complex situations and able to use their expertise and specialis t equip-
ment to good effect. This view of deploying the right assets to deal with a parti cular event
and then returning to base sees resilience as the ability to bounce back and prepare for the
next event. Any post-evaluation will be restricted to evaluating how well, or otherwise, the
event was dealt with. This is single-loop learning or error correction. This does not mean
that single-loop learning is not an important part of the preparedness of the response func-
tion. It certainly is. But single-loop learning is practitioner focussed and does not allow a
broader and deeper consideration of the role of the response function. It is the double-
loop or organisational learning that questions the values, assumptions and policies that
led to the actions in the first place. If there is scope to modify these, then the organisation
is able to adapt to the signals from both internal and external environments. In short, it exhi-
bits adaptive capacity to changing environments. This is a pre-disaster planning that recog-
nises the importance of adjusting to new post-disaster realities. This is recognition of
resilience as a bounce forward ability.
The case studies of the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) in the UK and the post-disaster
response to the 2004 tsunami in Somalia show resilience as a “bounce forward ability”. The
UK case study shows how a change in the legislative framework enabled the FRS to focus
on prevention, an example of a questioning approach to the function of the service: in short,
double-loop learning. The Somalia case study shows how a community was able to reflect
on the impact of tsunami. This led to a greater understanding of their vulnerability, the start-
ing point for building resilience.
UK FRS case study
The UK Fire Service prior to 2004 was regulated under the Fire Services Act of 1947. The
Act laid down arrangements that were geared primarily to the needs of the Second World
War: it prescribes staffing levels; the location of the firefighters, stations and appliances; and
exactly how many appliances should be used to attend to a fire and within what time frame.
In 2001, the UK government established the Arson Control Forum, a government-led
multi-agency body, to lead the fight against arson. Arson had been an increasing
problem, particularly vehicle arson, since the 1990s. Other studies showed that 50% of
all fire deaths occur before the fire brigade is even called. The FRS Act 2004 replaced
the 1947 Act and put the prevention of fires at the heart of legislation by, for example, creat-
ing a new duty to promote fire safety and by providing the flexibility for fire and rescue
authorities to work with others in the community to carry out this duty, as studies
showed that 50% of all fire deaths occur before the fire brigade is even called. This has
seen a marked shift in the operational mode of the FRS.
This initiative coupled with the 2004 Act saw a surge of effort at fire prevention through
working with young people via the Arson Task Forces. There has been a dramatic drop in
the number of arson incidents. Since then, campaigns aimed at vulnerable households have
signalled a shift to a more proactive approach. This engagement with the public and empha-
sis on prevention are evidence of double-loop learning at the organisational level in
response to changing signals.
Somalia case study
On 26 December 2004, near the coast of Sumatra in Indonesia, the world’s most powerful
earthquake in 40 years struck. The earthquake triggered a series of large tsunami waves
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