Q1. What are the contributions in this paper?
Smith and Wilson this paper observed high rates of equilibrium play with highly unequal splits when responders choose to play such ultimatum games with both fixed and variable sums.
Equilibrium Play in Voluntary Ultimatum Games: Beneficence Cannot Be Extorted
Vernon L. Smith,Bart J. Wilson +1 more
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Motivated by Adam Smith's proposition that beneficence—like that of non- equilibrium play in the ultimatum game—cannot be extorted by force, this work offers the responder the opportunity to opt out of the game for a mere $1 payoff.About:
This article is published in Games and Economic Behavior.The article was published on 2018-05-01 and is currently open access. It has received 17 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Ultimatum game & Repeated game.read more
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Humanomics: Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations for the Twenty-First Century
Vernon L. Smith,Bart J. Wilson +1 more
TL;DR: In Humanomics as discussed by the authors, Smith and Wilson show how Adam Smith's model of sociality can rehumanize twenty-first century economics by undergirding it with sentiments, fellow feeling, and a sense of propriety -the stuff of which human relationships are built.
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Is earned bargaining power more fully exploited
TL;DR: The authors investigated the impact of earned bargaining power using theory and experiment and found that subjects are more responsive to changes in bargaining position when it is earned. But their results were limited to a single task.
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More or less money? An experimental study on receiving money
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors report results from seven experiments where on average, one-third of the participants chose to receive less money instead of more in one experiment, while the majority chose to get less money in all the other experiments.
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Financial Reporting and Moral Sentiments
TL;DR: The authors showed that financial reporting leads a manager to choose reinvestment and resource-sharing actions that better align with investor interests, even when the investor can impose no cost or confer no reward on the manager.
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Causal versus Consequential Motives in Mental Models of Agent Social and Economic Action: Experiments, and the Neoclassical Diversion in Economics
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe three prominent and unexpected failures of this utilitarian framework to predict the replicable outcomes of experiments, and demonstrate that the observed failures stem from modelling only the outcome consequences of actions, not the impulses from which action proceeds.
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An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
TL;DR: In this paper, the ultimatum bargaining games with two players and two stages were investigated. But the authors focused on situations with two agents and two stage bargaining games and only one agent has to decide and the set of outcomes is restricted to two results.
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The neural basis of economic decision-making in the Ultimatum Game.
Alan G. Sanfey,James K. Rilling,Jessica A. Aronson,Leigh E. Nystrom,Jonathan D. Cohen,Jonathan D. Cohen +5 more
TL;DR: Functional magnetic resonance imaging of Ultimatum Game players was used to investigate neural substrates of cognitive and emotional processes involved in economic decision-making and significantly heightened activity in anterior insula for rejected unfair offers suggests an important role for emotions in decision- making.
Book Chapter
Behavioral Game Theory
TL;DR: A behavioral game theory that explains the initial deviations (and their disappearance) could be useful, especially if the learning process is modeled carefully and better data are gathered as mentioned in this paper. But, with experience, these deviations sometimes disappear.
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Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives
Ernst Fehr,Urs Fischbacher +1 more
TL;DR: The authors show empirically that economists fail to understand fundamental economic questions when they disregard social preferences, in particular, that without taking social preferences into account, it is not possible to understand adequately (i) effects of competition on market outcomes, (ii) laws governing cooperation and collective action, effects and the determinants of material incentives, which contracts and property rights arrangements are optimal, and important forces shaping social norms and market failures.
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Unfairness, Anger, and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers
TL;DR: In this article, a psychological explanation for the rejection of ultimatum offers was proposed, based on the wounded pride/spite model, which predicts that informed, knowledgeable respondents may react to small ultimiatum offers by perceiving them as unfair, feeling anger, and acting spitefully.