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Book ChapterDOI

SoK: Lessons Learned from SSL/TLS Attacks

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TLDR
This paper presents an overview on theoretical and practical attacks of the last 17 years, in chronological order and four categories: Attacks on the Handshake protocol, on the Record and Application Data Protocols, onThe PKI infrastructure and various other attacks.
Abstract
Since its introduction in 1994 the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol (later renamed to Transport Layer Security (TLS)) evolved to the de facto standard for securing the transport layer. SSL/TLS can be used for ensuring data confidentiality, integrity and authenticity during transport. A main feature of the protocol is flexibility: Modes of operation and security aims can easily be configured through different cipher suites. However, during the evolutionary development several flaws were found. This paper presents an overview on theoretical and practical attacks of the last 17 years, in chronological order and four categories: Attacks on the Handshake protocol, on the Record and Application Data Protocols, on the PKI infrastructure and various other attacks. We try to give a short "Lesson(s) Learned" at the end of each paragraph.

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Journal Article

Traitor Tracing with constant transmission rate

TL;DR: This work presents a general methodology and two protocol constructions that result in the first two public-key traitor tracing schemes with constant transmission rate in settings where plaintexts can be calibrated to be sufficientlylarge.
Journal ArticleDOI

Software-defined networking (SDN): a survey

TL;DR: This paper aims to shed light on SDN related issues and give insight into the challenges facing the future of this revolutionary network model, from both protocol and architecture perspectives, and present different existing solutions and mitigation techniques that address SDN scalability, elasticity, dependability, reliability, high availability, resiliency, security, and performance concerns.
Proceedings Article

Protocol state fuzzing of TLS implementations

TL;DR: This approach can catch an interesting class of implementation flaws that is apparently common in security protocol implementations: in three of the TLS implementations analysed new security flaws were found (in GnuTLS, the Java Secure Socket Extension, and OpenSSL).
Posted Content

Assuring the Machine Learning Lifecycle: Desiderata, Methods, and Challenges.

TL;DR: This paper provides a comprehensive survey of the state-of-the-art in the assurance of ML, i.e. in the generation of evidence that ML is sufficiently safe for its intended use, at different stages of the machine learning lifecycle.
References
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The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2

Eric Rescorla
TL;DR: This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which provides communications security over the Internet by allowing client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery.

The TLS Protocol Version 1.0

T. Dierks, +1 more
TL;DR: This document specifies Version 1.0 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which provides communications privacy over the Internet by allowing client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery.
Book ChapterDOI

Entity authentication and key distribution

TL;DR: This work provides the first formal treatment of entity authentication and authenticated key distribution appropriate to the distributed environment and presents a definition, protocol, and proof that the protocol meets its goal, assuming only the existence of a pseudorandom function.
Journal ArticleDOI

Speeding the Pollard and elliptic curve methods of factorization

TL;DR: In this paper, a parametrization of elliptic curves is proposed to speed up the p 1 and Monte Carlo methods. But the parametrized elliptic curve method requires n/2 + o(n) multiplications.
Book ChapterDOI

Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4

TL;DR: It is shown that RC4 is completely insecure in a common mode of operation which is used in the widely deployed Wired Equivalent Privacy protocol (WEP, which is part of the 802.11 standard), in which a fixed secret key is concatenated with known IV modifiers in order to encrypt different messages.