Showing papers on "Delegation published in 2008"

Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of Regulatory Agencies

Abstract: European networks of regulators in industries such as telecommunications, securities, energy and transport have been cited as important examples of the growth of network governance in Europe. Using a principal-agent perspective as a starting point, the article examines why a double delegation to networks of regulators has taken place. It looks at how and why the European Commission, national governments and independent regulatory agencies have driven the creation of networks, their institutional character and their implications for regulatory governance in Europe. It argues that problems of co-ordination were the main factor advanced to justify establishing networks of regulators. The new networks have been given a wide range of tasks and broad membership, but enjoy few formal powers or resources. They are highly dependent on the European Commission and face rivals for the task of co-ordinating European regulators. Thus in institutional terms the spread of network governance has in fact been limited.

Delegation in the Regulatory State: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe

Abstract: Contents: Preface 1. Introduction 2. The Institutional Foundations of the Regulatory State 3. Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Credibility, Political Uncertainty, and Veto Players 4. The Formal Independence of Regulators: Empirical Analysis 5. Interdependent Delegation: The Diffusion of Independent Regulators Agencies 6. The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies: Empirical Analysis 7. Conclusion 8. Appendixes Bibliography Index

Delegating Capabilities in Predicate Encryption Systems

Abstract: In predicate encryption systems, given a capability, one can evaluate one or more predicates on the plaintext encrypted, while all other information about the plaintext remains hidden. We consider the role of delegation in such predicate encryption systems. Suppose Alice has a capability, and she wishes to delegate to Bob a more restrictive capability allowing the decryption of a subset of the information Alice can learn about the plaintext encrypted. We formally define delegation in predicate encryption systems, propose a new security definition for delegation, and give an efficient construction supporting conjunctive queries. The security of our construction can be reduced to the general 3-party Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, and the Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in composite order bilinear groups.

Escaping the International Governance Dilemma? Incorporated Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union

Abstract: This article investigates the role of transgovernmental networks of national regulators in addressing collective action problems endemic to international cooperation. In contrast to recent work on transgovernmental actors, which emphasizes such networks as alternatives to more traditional international institutions, we examine the synergistic interaction between the two. Building on the broader premise that patterns of “dual delegation” above and below the nation-state enhance the coordinating role of networks of national agencies in two-level international governance, the article examines the formal incorporation of transgovernmental networks into European Union (EU) policymaking. The focus on authoritative rule-making adds a crucial dimension to the landscape of EU governance innovations while connecting to the broader study of transgovernmental networks in international governance. The article develops an analytical framework that maps these incorporated networks across different sectors in terms of function, emergence, and effectiveness. Two case studies of data privacy and energy market regulation are presented to apply and illustrate the insights of this mapping.

Public Management Reform and Organizational Performance: An Empirical Assessment of the U.K. Labour Government’s Public Service Improvement Strategy

Abstract: We present the first empirical assessment of the U.K. Labour government’s program of public management reform. This reform program is based on rational planning, devolution and delegation, flexibility and incentives, and enhanced choice. Measures of these variables are tested against external and internal indicators of organizational performance. The setting for the study is upper tier. English local governments, and data are drawn from a multiple informant survey of 117 authorities. The statistical results indicate that planning, organizational flexibility, and user choice are associated with higher performance. Conclusions are drawn for the theoryand practice of public management reform.

Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis

Abstract: An enduring and controversial debate centers on whether there exist “two presidencies,” that is, whether presidents exercise fundamentally greater influence over foreign than domestic affairs. This paper makes two contributions to understanding this issue and, by extension, presidential power more generally. First, we distill an institutional logic that both supports the two presidencies thesis and implies that Congress has incentives to delegate foreign policy powers to the president. Accordingly, the logic suggests that empirical analysis should incorporate these incentives. Our second contribution, then, is to test for the existence of two presidencies in a domain that Congress cannot delegate, budgetary appropriations, and a domain that explicitly incorporates delegation, agency creation. Consistent with expectations, we find presidents exercise considerably greater influence over foreign policy.

Delegation in the Regulatory State

Abstract: During the past 25 years, independent regulatory agencies have become widespread institutions for regulatory governance. This book studies how they have diffused across Europe and compares their formal independence in 17 countries and seven sectors. Through a series of quantitative analyses, it finds that governments tend to be more prone to delegate powers to independent regulators when they need to increase the credibility of their regulatory commitments and when they attempt to tie the hands of their successors. The institutional context also matters: political institutions that make policy change more difficult are functional equivalents of delegation. In addition to these factors, emulation has driven the diffusion of independent regulators, which have become socially valued institutions that help policymakers legitimize their actions, and may even have become taken for granted as the appropriate way to organize regulatory policies.

Method and system for performing delegation of resources

Abstract: A method for performing delegation of resources, in particular services, wherein a user—resource owner—has access to a resource offered by a service provider and wherein the resource is delegated to at least one other user—delegate—by using delegation credentials, is characterized in that the method includes the steps of defining authorization rules for the delegate regarding resource access restrictions and registering the authorization rules at an identity provider thereby employing the delegation credentials, performing an authentication of the delegate at the service provider, and performing an authorization of the delegate at the identity provider based on the authorization rules. Furthermore, a corresponding system is disclosed.

Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context:

Abstract: In International Relations applications, theorists employing Principal‐ Agent (P‐A) theory have posited that the fact of delegation defines a relationship between states (collective Principals) and international organizations (Agents) where recontracting threats are the predominant way states influence IOs. Developing a category of delegation to international Trustees, I argue that recontracting tools will be both harder to use and less effective at influencing the Trustees. Trustees are (1) selected because of their personal reputation or professional norms, (2) given independent authority to make decisions according to their best judgment or professional criteria, and (3) empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary. These three factors account for the different politics between Principals and Trustees, a politics aimed at either keeping issues outside of the domain of the Trustee or at rhetorically engaging the Trustee’s authority in an effort to persuade the common ‘beneficiary’ whose loyalty and respect both States and the Trustee seek. In explaining why recontracting threats are not central to Principal‐Trustee relations, the analysis bounds the realm in which we might expect P‐A theory to apply, and provides a theoretical basis to question the ‘rational expectations’ claim that ICs are tailoring their decisions to reflect the wishes of powerful states and avoid adverse recontracting.

Delegation of powers in the European union: The need for a multi-principals model

Abstract: Whereas a principal–agent model has widely been used to analyse the establishment of manifold autonomous agencies at the European level, it fails to capture some key elements of this process, such as the recurrent inter-institutional struggle of agency institutional design or the Commission's basic ambivalence vis-a-vis independent regulators. In contrast, acknowledging the absence of a clearly defined principal in the EU enables us to understand the relative weakness of existing agencies and the multiplicity of controls to which they are subjected. In such a system, strong EU regulators are unlikely to be established.

Facilitating high achievement: High school principals' reflections on their successful leadership practices

Abstract: Purpose – The burden for school improvement in a time of accountability falls squarely on the shoulders of principals as new requirements demand that they act as instructional leaders. The purpose of this study is to discover the common themes of school leadership and instructional practices of high school principals at successful schools in Virginia.Design/methodology/approach – An inductive exploratory study was designed to provide insight into how successful high school principals facilitate high levels of student achievement. The research was grounded by allowing principals to talk about their actual practices as leaders.Findings – The principals provided valuable insights into their daily practices that foster an environment which is supportive of high‐student achievement. These practices are categorized in the following themes: developing personnel and facilitating leadership, responsible delegation and empowering the team, recognizing ultimate accountability, communicating and rapport, facilitating...

Specific knowledge and performance measurement

Abstract: I examine optimal incentives, performance measurement and delegation in a model where an agent has specific knowledge (in the sense of Jensen and Meckling) about the consequences of his actions for the principal. Incentive contracts can be based both on measures closely related to the agent's actions ("inputs"), and a measure closely related to the principal's payoff ("output"). While input-based pay minimizes the agent's income risk, only output-based pay encourages the agent to use his knowledge in choosing his actions. To balance these objectives, it is in general optimal to use both performance measures. The results of the analysis provide a common explanation for why central predictions of agency theory, notably predictions implied by the Informativeness Principle, are often not supported by evidence. Moreover, they lead to many novel and testable predictions about properties of incentive contracts and optimal delegation decisions.

Collaborative email with delegable authorities

Abstract: Writing a collaborative email document with hierarchical authorities including establishing a collaborative email document on an administrator's computer, identifying one or more signatories for the document, identifying one or more collaborators who are authorized to view and edit the document, providing to the collaborators copies of the document for viewing and editing, where the collaborators' copies reside on collaborators' computers, updating the copies of the document on collaborators' computers with revisions from the collaborators, and sending the collaborative email document from the administrator's computer to addressees when the document bears valid digital signatures from all signatories. Typical embodiments also include providing at least one user authority to delegate signature authority, establishing a hierarchy of delegation authority for signatures, establishing at least one authority delegation policy including at least one rule for automated delegation of signature authority among signatories and delegating signature authority from at least one signatory to another.

A Model of Delegated Project Choice

Abstract: We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which other projects are available to the agent. Two frameworks are considered: (i) a static setting in which the collection of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain, and (ii) a dynamic setting in which the agent searches for projects.

Striving for No: Saudi Arabia in the Climate Change Regime

Abstract: The international relations literature often assumes that negotiators in global regimes are actively seeking a collective agreement to the problem on the table. There are cases, however, where a delegation may instead be “striving for no,” that is, participating with the aim of obstructing a deal. This article explores the challenges surrounding such cases of “obstructionism,” using the example of Saudi Arabia in the climate change regime. It examines the evidence for diagnosing Saudi Arabia as an obstructionist in that regime, the delegation's negotiating tactics, strategies for addressing obstructionism, and finally the repercussions for both the climate change regime, and Saudi Arabia itself. In conclusion, the article considers whether Saudi Arabia may be moving beyond obstruction.

Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments' Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers

Abstract: This paper analyzes whether nation-state governments can increase their credibility by becoming members of international organizations Credibility is an important asset because it determines the real interest rate and is expected to have an important impact on investment and growth It is hypothesized that the degree of delegation to international organizations can improve the credibility of nation-state governments This hypothesis is tested by introducing three new indicators for international delegation On the basis of panel data for up to 136 countries and the time period from 1984 to 2004, membership in international organizations is significantly and robustly linked with better credibility, here proxied for by country risk ratings Two more results stand out: the longer a country has had a high level of membership, the higher its credibility, ceteris paribus; and: the credibility-enhancing effect is strongest in countries whose domestic institutions are weak

The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions

Abstract: An established line of research demonstrates that vague judicial opinions are less likely to be implemented than clear opinions. Vague opinions thus present a puzzle. Why would judges craft opinions that risk noncompliance? We argue that the relationships between judges and other policy makers in separation-of-powers systems are central to understanding this puzzle. Opinion vagueness can reflect efforts to resolve core tradeoffs associated with judicial policymaking that bear some resemblance to standard accounts of political delegation. Vagueness offers judges the ability to manage their uncertainty over policy outcomes and to hide likely defiance from public view. At the same time, vagueness removes a central source of pressure for compliance that judges can place on other policy makers. Using a game-theoretic model, we identify conditions under which judges use vagueness precisely as legislatures use statutory discretion. We also demonstrate conditions under which judges use vagueness in ways unanticipated by standard delegation accounts.

An Efficient Mobile Authentication Scheme for Wireless Networks

Abstract: This paper proposes an efficient authentication scheme, which is suitable for low-power mobile devices. It uses an elliptic-curve-eryptosystem based trust delegation mechanism to generate a delegation passcode for mobile station authentication, and it can effectively defend all known attacks to mobile networks including the denial-of-service attack. Moreover, the mobile station only needs to receive one message and send one message to authenticate itself to a visitor's location register, and the scheme only requires a single elliptic-curve scalar point multiplication on a mobile device. Therefore, this scheme enjoys both computation efficiency and communication efficiency as compared to known mobile authentication schemes.

Delegation in role-based access control

Abstract: User delegation is a mechanism for assigning access rights available to one user to another user. A delegation can either be a grant or transfer operation. Existing work on delegation in the context of role-based access control models has extensively studied grant delegations, but transfer delegations have largely been ignored. This is largely because enforcing transfer delegation policies is more complex than grant delegation policies. This paper, primarily, studies transfer delegations for role-based access control models. We also include grant delegations in our model for completeness. We present various mechanisms that authorize delegations in our model. In particular, we show that the use of administrative scope for authorizing delegations is more efficient than using relations. We also discuss the enforcement and revocation of delegations. Finally, we study delegation in the context of workflow systems. In particular, we demonstrate the application of the administrative scope and administrative domain concepts to control delegation of tasks in worklist-based workflow systems.

A Theory of Policy Expertise

Abstract: The role of expertise in policy making has been a focus of political science research in recent decades. Underlying formal models in this area is a conception of expertise that is very simple: expertise is a single piece of information. Combined with a condition on the set of possible processes, this simplicity implies that expertise is invertible . Thus, a single recommendation by an expert can render a layperson an expert. In this paper, I offer a broader representation of expertise and policy making that relaxes these features. To demonstrate that this generality matters to political behavior, I develop a simple model of delegation and show that imperfect invertibility of expertise provides a resolution of the commitment problem of legislative–bureaucratic policy making. The theory predicts that only issues of sufficient complexity can be delegated, consistent with anecdotal evidence.

PERMIS: a modular authorization infrastructure

Abstract: Authorization infrastructures manage privileges and render access control decisions, allowing applications to adjust their behavior according to the privileges allocated to users. This paper describes the PERMIS role-based authorization infrastructure along with its conceptual authorization, access control, and trust models. PERMIS has the novel concept of a credential validation service, which verifies a user's credentials prior to access control decision-making and enables the distributed management of credentials. PERMIS also supports delegation of authority; thus, credentials can be delegated between users, further decentralizing credential management. Finally, PERMIS supports history-based decision-making, which can be used to enforce such aspects as separation of duties and cumulative use of resources. Details of the design and the implementation of PERMIS are presented along with details of its integration with Globus Toolkit, Shibboleth, and GridShib. A comparison of PERMIS with other authorization and access control implementations is given, along with suggestions where future research and development are still needed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Delegation and incentives

Abstract: This article analyzes the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal-agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent’s subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal.

The Concept of International Delegation

Abstract: I INTRODUCTION Most nations today participate in a dense network of international cooperation that requires them to grant authority to international actors. At varying levels this means that the individual state surrenders some autonomy to international bodies or other states by authorizing them to participate in decisionmaking processes and to take actions that affect the state. While some international agreements involve only commitments, in many cases they also include provisions that delegate some authority to a body to make decisions and take actions. The continued growth in international organizations and various standing bodies associated with international agreements suggests that states increasingly find international delegation useful in addressing the challenges associated with their growing interdependence. Although delegation is often present in international cooperation, there has been little systematic thinking about how delegation differs from other cooperation and how it varies across cooperative ventures. There is little analysis, for example, of what constitutes international delegation and what features of such delegation may be important for understanding its causes, consequences, and legal validity. A better conceptualization of the institutional features of delegation may be useful for understanding how states weigh the benefits and costs in making decisions concerning delegation. It may also be important in addressing the increasing concern with the legitimacy and accountability of global governance institutions. (1) This article defines and clarifies the concept of international delegation from both a legal and a social-science perspective. In this respect, its approach is similar to that of The Concept of Legalization, by Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. (2) Although these authors properly treat international delegation as one component of legalization in international relations, delegation is worth considering separately because it raises unique issues. The factors that affect how one might classify international delegations may also differ from legalization more generally. Indeed, some factors may even weigh in opposite directions--for example, precision indicates a high level of legalization, but it may indicate a low level of delegation. The article begins by presenting a definition of international delegation as a grant of authority by two or more states to an international body to make decisions or take actions. Next, it describes the types of international bodies to which states may grant authority. Much of the work on international delegation to date has focused on grants of authority to bureaucracies and courts. While we of course include these grants of authority in our analysis, our focus is broader, in that it also includes grants of authority to collective bodies and subgroups of states. The article then identifies eight types of authority that states may grant: legislative, adjudicative, regulatory, monitoring and enforcement, agenda-setting, research and advice, policy implementation, and redelegation. International bodies will often exercise more than one type of authority, and there will sometimes be uncertainties about whether a particular type of authority falls into a particular category. Distinguishing between the different types of authority is important, however, because many of the existing arguments and theories about delegation may not apply equally across the different types of authority delegated. Failure to appreciate the variety in the types of authority delegated may therefore lead to misleading generalizations. Next, the article discusses how the extent of an international delegation can vary depending on its legal effect and the degree of independence of the international body. These factors have not yet been systematically explored, although they modify the nature of delegation in significant ways. …

Consumer involvement in fair trade and local food systems: delegation and empowerment regimes

Abstract: Today, various types of fair trade systems propose new forms of relationships between producers and consumers. If several studies have provided accurate understandings of consumers’ motivations to buy fair trade products, the specific kinds of consumer involvement that are emphasized in those systems remain partly unknown. In France, controversies about the regulation and organization of fair trade with producers from Southern countries has led to broader debates about how consumers can best express their solidarity with producers. In these debates local food networks are often portrayed as good examples of fair trade and as having potential to redefine the role of the consumer in the marketplace (or in commercial relations). Based on examination of the type of mechanisms used to enrol consumers in local and fair trade networks, we have distinguished two main kinds of consumers’ involvement. The first one may be called “delegation” and is based on market mechanisms. The second one is called “empowerment” and is based on contractual mechanisms between consumers and producers and on the construction of collective choices. This latter kind of consumer involvement points out the capacity of alternative food networks to empower consumers in a more broadly political sense.

Contracting for Information under Imperfect Commitment

Abstract: Organizational theory suggests that authority should lie in the hands of those with information, yet the power to transfer authority is rarely absolute in practice. We investigate the validity and application of this advice in a model of optimal contracting between an uninformed principal and informed agent where the principal’s commitment power is imperfect. We show that while full alignment of interests combined with delegation of authority is feasible, it is never optimal. The optimal contract is “bang-bang”— in one region of the state space, full alignment takes place, in the other, no alignment takes place. We then compare these contracts to those in which the principal has full commitment power as well as to several “informal”institutional arrangements. JEL Classi…cation D23, D82.

‘Mission impossible’, but mission accomplished: the Kinnock reforms and the European Commission

Abstract: The Kinnock reforms have unsurprisingly attracted attention, but important aspects have been overlooked in existing accounts. Closer inspection reveals three puzzles: an atypical pattern of administrative change, where a ‘big bang’ reform followed four decades of inaction; the adoption of a more radical set of measures by the Commission than was demanded of it; and the successful implementation of a far-reaching reform programme in defiance of the expectations of leading theories of administrative change. This article argues that these puzzles contradict the conclusion suggested by a casual reading of the developments. They reveal not an arrogant institution oblivious to its shortcomings and forced to change by external diktat, but an organization in a reform predicament: aware of its failings, but unable to remedy them through its own action. When crisis forced member governments to intervene, the Commission in a case of self-reform under delegation seized the ‘once-in-a-generation’ opportunity to implem...

Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress*

Abstract: This article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds. In a legislative bargaining model, we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas, and two channels underlie this result. The proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments, and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation. In our empirical analysis, we find that small states, relative to large states, receive more funding in the US Senate, relative to the House. We also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship. Throughout the history of federations and international organisations, a key consti tutional design question involves how jurisdictions of different sizes are represented in legislative bodies and how their votes will ultimately be weighted. Large jurisdictions typically argue for delegation sizes or voting weights that are roughly proportional to population whereas small jurisdictions typically argue for an equal number of delegates or votes for each jurisdiction. This conflict over representation is presumably driven, at least in part, by a belief that increased representation strengthens bargaining power in the battle over the geographic distribution of funds authorised by these legislative bodies. In this article, I analyse the relationship between legislative representation, bar gaining power and the geographic distribution of federal funds from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. In addition to investigating the existence of a relationship between representation and federal funds, I also explore the underlying mechanisms. That is, I ask which political institutions, such as agenda control provided to commit tees and the formation of coalitions under majority rule, shape the bargaining power of jurisdictions in central legislatures and thus facilitate the relationship between repre sentation and the distribution of federal spending. To provide a framework for analysing these issues, I begin by developing a simple theoretical model of a central legislature that determines the crossjurisdiction distri bution of local public goods, which are financed by a national tax base. Both delegation sizes and population are variable, allowing me to consider a variety of institutional arrangements for jurisdictional representation. Legislators represent local interests, and, given the common pool problem associated with concentrated benefits and dis persed tax costs, attempt to increase ownjurisdiction spending but to restrain spending elsewhere. The model follows a recent literature on legislative bargaining, in which a proposer must secure a majority of votes in order to pass legislation and, due to the

When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?

Abstract: I INTRODUCTION The introductory article in this symposium offers a rich conceptual framework for understanding international delegation Curtis A Bradley and Judith Kelley make great strides in variable conceptualization, defining and elaborating some key dimensions of delegation and thereby serving as a very useful springboard for more refined theoretical and empirical work (1) Many of the other articles in this symposium provide case-study evidence of delegation in some major agreements, with some of them richly examining the consequences of delegation for the implementation of the agreements (2) Employing a random sample of international agreements, this article is the first systematic look at when, what, and why states choose to delegate (3) As the descriptive statistics below indicate, delegation is widespread, and, as the theory elaborated here would predict, it is more likely to be incorporated into agreements when states are trying to solve complex cooperation problems and when larger numbers of states are involved in the cooperative endeavor Throughout this article, internal delegation is defined as delegation to a collective formed by the members of the agreement themselves, as distinguished from external delegation, defined as delegation to a third party outside of the agreement This distinction turns out to be quite relevant Other interesting, and often surprising, findings emerge For example, given this initial probe into the data, delegation is evidently not limited by factors like hegemony or risk aversion, whereas democracy is negatively correlated with delegation Additionally, this article analyzes the correlation between delegation and other dependent variables--that is, other institutional design variables that are under the control of the states making the agreement Both withdrawal clauses (also known as exit or denunciation clauses) and finite duration provisions are significantly correlated with delegation The positive correlation between withdrawal clauses and delegation suggests that states are minimizing their sovereignty costs by creating an outside option The negative correlation between finite duration provisions and delegation suggests that delegation can function as a form of flexibility, thereby acting as a substitute for finite duration This article confirms the importance of international delegation as a topic of focused study by documenting it as an important and nontrivial empirical phenomenon The empirical work in this article is anchored in the theoretical framework of Rational Design (4) The starting point for Rational Design is a very simple observation: institutionalized international cooperation is organized in significantly diversified ways (5) More important, however, is the theoretical reason for this observation: different international institutions are solving different combinations of cooperation problems This implies that differences among international institutions are not random; rather, states and other international actors shape institutions to solve the specific problems they face In other words, design variations are largely the result of rational, purposive interactions The goal of the Rational Design volume is to offer a systematic account of five design variables (membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility--the dependent variables in the framework), relating them to recurrent cooperation problems faced by states, the independent variables This article uses Rational Design to explain the institutional-design choice of international delegation, where delegation is equivalent to the rational-design variable of centralization A state delegates functions to an international body if the expected benefits from delegation outweigh the expected costs Empirically, the extent and type of delegation should vary according to the importance of delegation in solving the particular cooperation problems faced by states …

The Juxtaposition of Social Surveillance Controls with Traditional Organizational Design Components

Abstract: This study investigates how the relatively contemporary phenomenon of social surveillance controls, such as the use of teams and managerial monitoring, affects the design of the firm's more traditional organizational architecture, which is classically defined to consist of three primary components: incentive compensation, the delegation of decision rights, and performance measurement. We find that vertical surveillance (i.e., high-level monitoring) substitutes for delegation while horizontal surveillance (i.e., teams) substitutes for incentives. We find that the allocation of decision rights is positively associated with the use of incentives and that the use of incentives and reliance on,output-based performance measures are complements. Overall, our-data support the general notion that there are complementarities and substitutes among and between social surveillance controls and traditional organizational design components. Our study has implications for managers and boards responsible for organizational design decisions at the departmental or smaller business unit level.