Showing papers on "Moral psychology published in 2012"

The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays

Abstract: Preface Sources 1. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility 2. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person 3. Coercion and moral responsibility 4. Three concepts of free action 5. Identification and externality 6. The problem of action 7. The importance of what we care about 8. What we are mortally responsible for 9. Necessity and desire 10. On bullshit 11. Equality as a moral ideal 12. Identification and wholeheartedness 13. Rationality and the unthinkable.

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Abstract: Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.

Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers

Abstract: We examined the effects of order of presentation on the moral judgments of professional philosophers and two comparison groups. All groups showed similar- sized order effects on their judgments about hypothetical moral scenarios targeting the doctrine of the double effect, the action-omission distinction, and the principle of moral luck. Philosophers' endorsements of related general moral principles were also substantially influenced by the order in which the hypothetical scenarios had previously been presented. Thus, philosophical expertise does not appear to enhance the stability of moral judgments against this presumably unwanted source of bias, even given familiar types of cases and principles.

The social psychology of morality : exploring the causes of good and evil

Abstract: Humans are universally concerned with good and evil, although one person's "evil" can be another person's "good." How do individuals arrive at decisions about what is right and what is wrong? And how are these decisions influenced by psychological, social, and cultural forces? Such questions form the foundation of the field of moral psychology. In trying to understand moral behavior, researchers historically adopted a cognitive-rationalistic approach that emphasized reasoning and reflection. However, a new generation of investigators has become intrigued by the role of emotional, unconscious, and intra- and interpersonal processes. Their explorations are presented in this third addition to the Herzliya Series on Personality and Social Psychology. The contributors to this volume begin by presenting basic issues and controversies in the study of morality; subsequent chapters explore the psychological processes involved, such as the cognitive mechanisms and motives underlying immoral behavior and moral hypocrisy. Later chapters discuss personality, developmental, and clinical aspects of morality as well as societal aspects of good and evil, including the implications of moral thinking for large-scale violence and genocide. The wide-ranging findings and discussions presented in this volume make this work a provocative and engaging resource for social psychologists and other scholars concerned with moral judgments and both moral and immoral behavior.

Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism

Abstract: Where does morality come from? Why are moral judgments often so similar across cultures, yet sometimes so variable? Is morality one thing, or many? Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) was created to answer these questions. In this chapter we describe the origins, assumptions, and current conceptualization of the theory, and detail the empirical findings that MFT has made possible, both within social psychology and beyond. Looking toward the future, we embrace several critiques of the theory, and specify five criteria for determining what should be considered a foundation of human morality. Finally, we suggest a variety of future directions for MFT and for moral psychology.

Religion, Morality, Evolution

Abstract: How did religion evolve? What effect does religion have on our moral beliefs and moral actions? These questions are related, as some scholars propose that religion has evolved to enhance altruistic behavior toward members of one's group. I review here data from survey studies (both within and across countries), priming experiments, and correlational studies of the effects of religion on racial prejudice. I conclude that religion has powerfully good moral effects and powerfully bad moral effects, but these are due to aspects of religion that are shared by other human practices. There is surprisingly little evidence for a moral effect of specifically religious beliefs.

Lifting the Veil of Morality: Choice Blindness and Attitude Reversals on a Self-Transforming Survey

Abstract: Every day, thousands of polls, surveys, and rating scales are employed to elicit the attitudes of humankind. Given the ubiquitous use of these instruments, it seems we ought to have firm answers to what is measured by them, but unfortunately we do not. To help remedy this situation, we present a novel approach to investigate the nature of attitudes. We created a self-transforming paper survey of moral opinions, covering both foundational principles, and current dilemmas hotly debated in the media. This survey used a magic trick to expose participants to a reversal of their previously stated attitudes, allowing us to record whether they were prepared to endorse and argue for the opposite view of what they had stated only moments ago. The result showed that the majority of the reversals remained undetected, and a full 69% of the participants failed to detect at least one of two changes. In addition, participants often constructed coherent and unequivocal arguments supporting the opposite of their original position. These results suggest a dramatic potential for flexibility in our moral attitudes, and indicates a clear role for self-attribution and post-hoc rationalization in attitude formation and change.

The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario.

Abstract: Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.

Finding faults: How moral dilemmas illuminate cognitive structure

Abstract: Philosophy is rife with intractable moral dilemmas. We propose that these debates often exist because competing psychological systems yield different answers to the same problem. Consequently, philosophical debate points to the natural fault lines between dissociable psychological mechanisms, and as such provides a useful guide for cognitive neuroscience. We present two case studies from recent research into moral judgment: dilemmas concerning whether to harm a person in order to save several others, and whether to punish individuals for harms caused accidentally. Finally, we analyze two features of mental conflict that apparently contribute to philosophical discord: the insistence that one answer to a problem must be correct (“non-negotiability”) and the absence of an independent means of determining the correct answer (“non-adjudicability”). Fiery Cushman thanks the Mind/Brain/Behavior Initiative for its generous support during the preparation of this work.

Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and the God Machine

Abstract: 1. The Science of MoralityOne of the emerging subdisciplines of the cognitive sciences is the science of morality. Advanced techniques in neuroscience, such as neuroimaging, together with sophisticated pharmacological, psychological, and economic experiments have begun to shed light on the neural and psychological underpinnings of moral judgement and behaviour. Such research has created great controversy. Some neuroscientists have argued for 'brain-based' ethics (Gazzaniga 2005), claiming that moral decisions have to be compatible with our knowledge of the human brain or even directly inferred from it. Neuroscientists have already claimed that their research has dramatic implications for the practice and substance of ethics. It has been argued, for example, that neuroscientific findings show that political debate is conducted largely at the emotional level (Westen 2007) or that they undermine the common ethical practice of appealing to intuitions (Sunstein 2005; Singer 2005). Moreover, it has been claimed that such research undermines common moral views, exposing Kantian ethics as a 'mere confabulation' based on gut reactions, and supports utilitarianism (Singer 2005; Greene 2008). Some ethical positions have been criticized as 'neurally implausible' (Casebeer and Churchland 2003; Churchland 201 1).2. Moral EnhancementAlthough these claims are at this point speculative, science is likely to reshape our conceptions of justified morality. Indeed, it might even offer means of conforming to morality. In a recent series of articles and books (Persson and Savulescu 2012; Persson and Savulescu 201 la, b, and c; Persson and Savulescu 2010; Persson and Savulescu 2008), we have argued that there is an urgent need to explore the possibility of using the emerging science of morality to develop means of enhancing moral dispositions. The argument goes roughly like this.For most of the time the human species has existed, human beings have lived in comparatively small and close-knit societies, with primitive technology that enabled them to affect only their most immediate environment. Their moral psychology adapted to make them fit to live in these conditions. This moral psychology is 'myopic', restricted to concern about people in the neighbourhood and the immediate future. But through science and technology, humans have radically changed their living conditions, while their moral psychology has remained fundamentally the same throughout this technological and social evolution, which continues at an accelerating speed. Human beings now live in societies with millions of citizens and with an advanced scientific technology which enables them to exercise an influence that extends all over the world and far into the future. This is leading to increasing environmental degradation and to harmful climate change. The advanced scientific technology has also equipped human beings with nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction which might be used by states in wars over dwindling natural resources or by terrorists. Liberal democracies cannot overcome these problems by developing novel technology. What is needed is an enhancement of the moral dispositions of their citizens, an extension of their moral concern beyond a small circle of personal acquaintances, including those existing further in the future. The expansion of our powers of action as the result of technological progress must be balanced by a moral enhancement on our part. Otherwise, our civilization, we argued, is itself at risk. It is doubtful whether this moral enhancement could be accomplished by means of traditional moral education. There is therefore ample reason to explore the prospects of moral enhancement by biomedical means.In the first part of this paper, we will summarise the science that indicates that moral enhancement itself may be a realistic prospect. In the second part, we will examine whether moral bioenhancement is compatible with individual freedom and autonomy. …

Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a Unified Account*

Abstract: In his recent article “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility,” David Shoemaker argues that our actual moral practices embody three distinct conceptions of responsibility and that some recent accounts of moral responsibility that draw their inspiration from the work of T. M. Scanlon fail to capture these distinct conceptions. My aim in this essay is to argue that our moral practices do not, in fact, embody three different conceptions of moral responsibility and that what Shoemaker aptly calls “responsibility as answerability” is indeed the only kind of moral responsibility there is.

An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism

Abstract: The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage foetus. Holists accord no moral status to any of these beings, assigning it only to groups to which they belong, while individualists such as welfarists grant an equal moral status to humans and many animals, and Kantians accord no moral status either to animals or severely mentally incapacitated humans. I argue that an underexplored, modal-relational perspective does a better job of accounting for degrees of moral status. According to modal-relationalism, something has moral status insofar as it capable of having a certain causal or intensional connection with another being. I articulate a novel instance of modal-relationalism grounded in salient sub-Saharan moral views, roughly according to which the greater a being's capacity to be part of a communal relationship with us, the greater its moral status. I then demonstrate that this new, African-based theory entails and plausibly explains the above judgments, among others, in a unified way.

Moral distress: a comparative analysis of theoretical understandings and inter-related concepts.

Abstract: Research on ethical dilemmas in health care has become increasingly salient during the last two decades resulting in confusion about the concept of moral distress. The aim of the present paper is to provide an overview and a comparative analysis of the theoretical understandings of moral distress and related concepts. The focus is on five concepts: moral distress, moral stress, stress of conscience, moral sensitivity and ethical climate. It is suggested that moral distress connects mainly to a psychological perspective; stress of conscience more to a theological–philosophical standpoint; and moral stress mostly to a physiological perspective. Further analysis indicates that these thoughts can be linked to the concepts of moral sensitivity and ethical climate through a relationship to moral agency. Moral agency comprises a moral awareness of moral problems and moral responsibility for others. It is suggested that moral distress may serve as a positive catalyst in exercising moral agency. An interdisciplinary approach in research and practice broadens our understanding of moral distress and its impact on health care personnel and patient care.

Morality shifting in the context of intergroup violence

Abstract: We propose morality shifting as a mechanism through which individuals can maintain a moral image of the ingroup. We argue that a shift from the moral principles of harm and fairness to those of loyalty and authority occurs when assessing a potentially threatening event, particularly among high ingroup glorifiers. Three studies confirmed this hypothesis using three different methodologies. Study 1 compared the use of language related to four moral foundations formulated in moral psychology in response to ingroup- and outgroup-committed wrongdoings. Results showed that loyalty- and authority-related words were used more, whereas harm- and fairness-related words were used less in response to ingroup- compared with outgroup-committed wrongdoings. Study 2 replicated this effect with regards to the cognitive accessibility of these moral principles. Study 3 confirmed that morality shifting is a motivated response to social identity threat, rather than a response to mere activation of social identity. Finally, as predicted, Study 3 demonstrated the effect of morality shifting to be moderated by ingroup glorification but not ingroup attachment. Implications and consequences for intergroup and individual wrongdoings, as well as for intergroup relations, are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Can Animals Be Moral

Abstract: The dichotomy between moral agents and moral patients is a recognized and well established one in moral philoso- phy. Animals, if they are thought of as having moral standing at all, are, almost invariably, regarded as moral patients rather than moral agents. The main thesis of this paper is that there is a third option: while animals are in- deed moral patients, and not moral agents, they can also be moral subjects, where: X is a moral subject if and only if X is, at least sometimes, motivated to act by moral consid- erations. By means of a series of arguments, the paper attempts to show that there are no logical or conceptual obstacles to thinking of animals as motivated by moral considera- tions, specifically by emotions that have iden - tifiable moral content.

Liberating Reason From the Passions Overriding Intuitionist Moral Judgments Through Emotion Reappraisal

Abstract: A classic problem in moral psychology concerns whether and when moral judgments are driven by intuition versus deliberate reasoning. In this investigation, we explored the role of reappraisal, an emotion-regulation strategy that involves construing an emotion-eliciting situation in a way that diminishes the intensity of the emotional experience. We hypothesized that although emotional reactions evoke initial moral intuitions, reappraisal weakens the influence of these intuitions, leading to more deliberative moral judgments. Three studies of moral judgments in emotionally evocative, disgust-eliciting moral dilemmas supported our hypothesis. A greater tendency to reappraise was related to fewer intuition-based judgments (Study 1). Content analysis of open-ended descriptions of moral-reasoning processes revealed that reappraisal was associated with longer time spent in deliberation and with fewer intuitionist moral judgments (Study 2). Finally, in comparison with participants who simply watched an emotion-i...

Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community

Abstract: Nationalism is one of modern history's great surprises. How is it that the nation, a relatively old form of community, has risen to such prominence in an era so strongly identified with the individual? Bernard Yack argues that it is the inadequacy of our understanding of community - and especially the moral psychology that animates it - that has made this question so difficult to answer. Yack develops a broader and more flexible theory of community and shows how to use it in the study of nations and nationalism. What makes nationalism such a powerful and morally problematic force in our lives is the interplay of old feelings of communal loyalty and relatively new beliefs about popular sovereignty. By uncovering this fraught relationship, Yack moves our understanding of nationalism beyond the oft-rehearsed debate between primordialists and modernists, those who exaggerate our loss of individuality and those who underestimate the depth of communal attachments. A brilliant and compelling book, "Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community" sets out a revisionist conception of nationalism that cannot be ignored.

Community and Progress in Kant's Moral Philosophy

Abstract: Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy has often been criticised for ignoring a crucial dimension of community in its account of the lives that agents ought to lead. Historical and contemporary critics alike often paint Kant's moral theory, with its emphasis on rationality, as overly formalistic and unrealistically isolating. Against these criticisms, Kate A. Moran argues that Kant's moral philosophy reserves a central role for community in several important respects. In the first part of her book, Moran asserts that Kant's most developed account of the goal toward which agents ought to strive is actually a kind of ethical community. Indeed, Kant claims that agents have a duty to pursue this goal. Moran argues that this duty entails a concern for the development of agents' moral characters and capacities for moral reasoning, as well as the institutions and relationships that aid in this development. Next, Moran examines three specific social institutions and relationships that, according to Kant, help develop moral character and moral reasoning. In three separate chapters, Moran examines the role that moral education, friendship, and participation in civil society play in developing agents' moral capacities. Far from being mere afterthoughts in Kant's moral system, Moran maintains that these institutions are crucial in bringing about the end of an ethical community. The text draws on a wide range of Immanuel Kant's writings, including his texts on moral and political philosophy and his lectures on ethics, pedagogy, and anthropology. Though the book is grounded in an analysis of Kant's writing, it also puts forward the novel claim that Kant's theory is centrally concerned with the relationships we have in our day-to-day lives. It will, therefore, be an invaluable tool in understanding both the complexities ofKant's moral philosophy, and how even a liberal, deontological theory like Kant's can give a satisfying account of the importance of community in our moral lives.

Two Minds Vs. Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism

Abstract: Mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. Broadly, moral standing is linked to perceptions of mind, with moral responsibility tied to perceived agency, and moral rights tied to perceived experience. More specifically, moral judgments are based on a fundamental template of two perceived minds—an intentional agent and a suffering patient. This dyadic template grows out of the universal power of harm, and serves as a cognitive working model through which even atypical moral events are understood. Thus, all instances of immorality are perceived to involve both blameworthy agents (i.e., acts) and suffering victims (i.e., consequences). Because moral cognition simultaneously concerns acts and consequences, theories which focus primarily on acts (i.e., deontology) or consequences (i.e., utilitarianism) do not accurately describe moral cognition. Indeed, the phenomenon of dyadic completion suggests that deontological and utilitarian concerns are not only simultaneously active, but also typically compatible and reinforcing: wrong acts have harmful consequences, and harmful consequences stem from wrong acts. The cognitive fusion of acts with consequences suggests that normative conflicts between deontology and utilitarianism are not reflected in everyday moral judgment. This in turn suggests that empirical conclusions drawn from moral dilemmas that pit utilitarianism against deontology—i.e., trolley problems—give an skewed account of moral cognition.

Moral hypocrisy, moral inconsistency, and the struggle for moral integrity.

Abstract: If future archaeologists unearthed an untitled social psychology textbook, its cover eaten by discerning worms, they would have to figure out what social psychologists studied from the papers they most prominently featured and the topics that recurrently received the field's attention. One reasonable hypothesis might be that ours was the science of moral hypocrisy. Social psychologists are suspicious of actors' self-reported motives, in part because people are surprisingly unaware of their actual motives (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), but also because two central features of the social psychological model of human behavior, that people care deeply about making a good impression on others (e.g. Schlenker, 1980) and also wish to hold positive views of themselves (e.g., Greenwald, 1980), contribute to their claiming purer moral intentions than they actually have. More than any other social scientists, social psychologists make a living by showing that proclaimed moral intentions cannot be taken at face value. Distinguishing Moral Hypocrisy and Moral Inconsistency Hypocrisy is often defined in social psychology as not " practicing what you preach "

On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology

Abstract: According to Joshua Greene's influential dual process model of moral judgment, different modes of processing are associated with distinct moral outputs: automatic processing with deontological judgment, and controlled processing with utilitarian judgment. This article aims to clarify and assess Greene's model. I argue that the proposed tie between process and content is based on a misinterpretation of the evidence, and that the supposed evidence for controlled processing in utilitarian judgment is actually likely to reflect, not ‘utilitarian reasoning’, but a form of moral deliberation which, ironically, is actually in serious tension with a utilitarian outlook. This alternative account is further supported by the results of a neuroimaging study showing that intuitive and counterintuitive judgments have similar neural correlates whether or not their content is utilitarian or deontological.

Moral Psychology is Relationship Regulation

Abstract: Author(s): Rai, Tage Shakti | Advisor(s): Holyoak, Keith; Fiske, Alan | Abstract: Genuine moral disagreement exists and is widespread To understand such disagreement, we must examine the basic kinds of social relationships people construct across cultures and the distinct moral obligations and prohibitions these relationships entail In Chapter 2 of the dissertation, I develop Relationship Regulation Theory, which postulates that there are four fundamental and distinct moral motives embedded in different social-relational schemas Unity is the motive to care for and support the integrity of in-groups by avoiding or eliminating threats of contamination, and providing aid and protection based on need or empathic compassion Hierarchy is the motive to respect rank in social groups where superiors are entitled to deference and respect but must also lead, guide, direct, and protect subordinates Equality is the motive for balanced, in-kind reciprocity, equal treatment, equal say, and equal opportunity Proportionality is the motive for rewards and punishments to be proportionate to merit, benefits to be calibrated to contributions, and judgments to be based on a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits The four moral motives are universal, but cultures, ideologies, and individuals differ in when they activate these motives and how they implement them Unlike existing theories (Haidt, 2007; Hauser, 2006; Turiel, 1983), Relationship Regulation Theory predicts that any action, including violence, unequal treatment, and "impure" acts, may be perceived as morally correct depending on the moral motive employed and how the relevant social relationship is construed In Chapter 3, I report two experiments that I conducted to investigate whether activating social-relational schemas would lead to corresponding activation of moral motives In Experiment 1, I found that framing a social group in terms of Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking social-relational schemas led to activation of Unity and Hierarchy motives, respectively In Experiment 2, I found that priming Communal Sharing and Market Pricing Schemas led participants to allocate bonuses in a hypothetical vignette differently in ways that reflected the use of Unity and Proportionality motives, respectively In Chapter 4, I incorporate notions of character into Relationship Regulation Theory Specifically, I argue that moral judgments are partially based on evaluations of other people as prospects for social relationships I use this relationship-based perspective of moral judgment to explain cases where an actor's intentions are neglected in observers' moral judgments of them

Moral distress in nursing practice in Malawi

Abstract: The aim of this study was to explore the existence of moral distress among nurses in Lilongwe District of Malawi. Qualitative research was conducted in selected health institutions of Lilongwe District in Malawi to assess knowledge and causes of moral distress among nurses and coping mechanisms and sources of support that are used by morally distressed nurses. Data were collected from a purposive sample of 20 nurses through in-depth interviews using a semi-structured interview guide. Thematic analysis of qualitative data was used. The results show that nurses, irrespective of age, work experience and tribe, experienced moral distress related to patient/nursing care. The major distressing factors were inadequate resources and lack of respect from patients, guardians, peers and bosses. Nurses desire teamwork and ethics committees in their health institutions as a means of controlling and preventing moral distress. There is a need for creation of awareness for nurses to recognize and manage moral distress, thus optimizing their ability to provide quality and uncompromised nursing care.

The Two Sources of Moral Standing

Abstract: There are two primary traditions in philosophical theorizing about moral standing—one emphasizing Experience (the capacity to feel pain and pleasure) and one emphasizing Agency (complexity of cognition and lifestyle). In this article we offer an explanation for this divide: Lay judgments about moral standing depend importantly on two independent cues (Experience and Agency), and the two philosophical traditions reflect this aspect of folk moral cognition. In support of this two-source hypothesis, we present the results of a series of new experiments providing evidence for our account of lay judgments about moral standing, and argue that these results lend plausibility to the proposed causal link between folk moral cognition and the philosophical traditions.

A Model of Intuitive Morality and Exemplars

Abstract: Understanding the relationship between media and morality has been a central goal for media scholars, but this work has been limited by conceptions of morality that cannot explain the reflexive reactions that seem to characterize media use in so many instances. In an earlier paper (Tamborini, 2011), I introduced a model representing the reciprocal influence of media and moral judgment that attempted to address these limitations. I called it the model of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME). The model combined theory from moral psychology with theories of media influence to describe how moral intuitions and an individual’s environment (both mediated and non-mediated) are intertwined in a reciprocal influence process. This chapter provides a more detailed description of the relationships suggested in the short-term and long-term components of the model, as well as some of the model’s implications. The chapter begins by discussing the limitations found in early mediaresearch on morality, and the need for an alternative approach to overcome these shortcomings. After this, it introduces logic from two cognitive theories that provide the theoretical foundation for the MIME: The first is logic from the dual-process model of morality used in moral foundations theory (MFT; Haidt & Joseph, 2007), and the second is information-processing logic from the exemplification theory of media influence (hereafter called exemplification theory; Zillmann, 2002). Once the logic underlying shortterm processes in the model is provided, I introduce the MIME and go on to describe its components in depth. I begin by detailing how the two cognitive frameworks just described combine to govern the short-term processes in the model. Following this, I describe the long-term components of the model. Discussion starts with a synopsis of logic explaining the over-time reciprocal influence of media choice and media effect (Slater, 2007). It thendescribes how this process can be applied specifically to the MIME’s dualprocess logic to make predictions about the dynamic relationship between media and morality. After describing the model in detail, I review evidence from initial research showing the model’s potential predictive utility in entertainment settings. Finally, I conclude the chapter by discussing other applications of the model, along with potential challenges and opportunities for future study in this area. Taken as a whole, the MIME stipulates two things: First micro-levelprocesses influence individual cognitions to shape the foundation upon which moral judgments are formed by individuals. Moral judgments depend on the salience of different psychological domains of intuitive ethics, and individuals can be described in terms of their pattern of domain salience. Notably, the micro-level processes that influence these patterns of domain salience are highly susceptible to media influence. Second, over time, microand macro-level processes influenced by media combine to create shared patterns of domain salience among aggregate groups. These shared patterns determine moral judgments by group members that influence subsequent media choice.