Showing papers on "Morality published in 2010"
Book•
26 Oct 2010
TL;DR: The works of the great thinkers, pioneers, radicals and visionaries whose ideas shook civilization and helped make us who we are are are presented in the book as mentioned in this paper, where the authors discuss human progress, civilization, morality and why, to be truly enlightened, we must all have the freedom and courage to use our own intellect.
Abstract: Immanuel Kant was one of the most influential philosophers in the whole of Europe, who changed Western thought with his examinations of reason and the nature of reality. In these writings he investigates human progress, civilization, morality and why, to be truly enlightened, we must all have the freedom and courage to use our own intellect. Throughout history, some books have changed the world. They have transformed the way we see ourselves - and each other. They have inspired debate, dissent, war and revolution. They have enlightened, outraged, provoked and comforted. They have enriched lives - and destroyed them. Now Penguin brings you the works of the great thinkers, pioneers, radicals and visionaries whose ideas shook civilization and helped make us who we are.
687 citations
TL;DR: In this article, moral self-licensing occurs when past moral behavior makes people more likely to do potentially immoral things without worrying about feeling or appearing immoral, i.e., when people are confident that their past behavior demonstrates compassion, generosity, or a lack of prejudice, such that an impeccable track record increases their propensity to engage in otherwise suspect actions.
Abstract: Past good deeds can liberate individuals to engage in behaviors that are immoral, unethical, or otherwise problematic, behaviors that they would otherwise avoid for fear of feeling or appearing immoral. We review research on this moral self-licensing effect in the domains of political correctness, prosocial behavior, and consumer choice. We also discuss remaining theoretical tensions in the literature: Do good deeds reframe bad deeds (moral credentials) or merely balance them out (moral credits)? When does past behavior liberate and when does it constrain? Is self-licensing primarily for others’ benefit (self-presentational) or is it also a way for people to reassure themselves that they are moral people? Finally, we propose avenues for future research that could begin to address these unanswered questions. How do individuals face the ethical uncertainties of social life? When under the threat that their next action might be (or appear to be) morally dubious, individuals can derive confidence from their past moral behavior, such that an impeccable track record increases their propensity to engage in otherwise suspect actions. Such moral self-licensing (Monin & Miller, 2001) occurs when past moral behavior makes people more likely to do potentially immoral things without worrying about feeling or appearing immoral. We argue that moral self-licensing occurs because good deeds make people feel secure in their moral self-regard. For example, when people are confident that their past behavior demonstrates compassion, generosity, or a lack of prejudice, they are more likely to act in morally dubious ways without fear of feeling heartless, selfish, or bigoted. In this article, we review the state of research on moral self-licensing, first by documenting in some detail empirical demonstrations of self-licensing and kindred phenomena, then by analyzing remaining questions about the model, and finally by sketching out directions for future research to cast light on these unresolved issues.
658 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that social psychology can best contribute to scholarship on religion by being relentlessly social, and begin with a social-functionalist approach in which beliefs, rituals, and other aspects of religious practice are best understood as means of creating a moral community.
Abstract: Social psychologists have often followed other scientists in treating religiosity primarily as a set of beliefs held by individuals. But, beliefs are only one facet of this complex and multidimensional construct. The authors argue that social psychology can best contribute to scholarship on religion by being relentlessly social. They begin with a social-functionalist approach in which beliefs, rituals, and other aspects of religious practice are best understood as means of creating a moral community. They discuss the ways that religion is intertwined with five moral foundations, in particular the group-focused “binding” foundations of Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, Purity/sanctity. The authors use this theoretical perspective to address three mysteries about religiosity, including why religious people are happier, why they are more charitable, and why most people in the world are religious.
648 citations
01 Sep 2010
TL;DR: This article examined whether morality really evolved, as many philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, and biologists claim, and concluded that two versions of the claim are relatively well supported, but that they are unlikely to have significant philosophical consequences, while the stronger version is in fact empirically unsupported.
Abstract: This chapter examines whether morality really evolved, as many philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, and biologists claim. It distinguishes three possible versions of this claim and reviews the evidence in support of each. It concludes that two versions of the claim that morality evolved are relatively well supported, but that they are unlikely to have significant philosophical consequences, while the stronger version, which is of real interest to philosophers, is in fact empirically unsupported.
471 citations
TL;DR: Research is described that supports the view that social norms, intergroup contact, and perceived outgroup threat affect the relative weight children place on moral and group-based criteria during the development of prejudice.
Abstract: We argue that prejudice should be investigated in the context of social-cognitive development and the interplay between morality and group identity. Our new perspective examines how children consider group identity (and group norms) along with their developing moral beliefs about fairness and justice. This is achieved by developing an integrated framework drawing on developmental and social psychological theories of prejudice. This synthesis results in a perspective that provides a more contextualized analysis of prejudice development than that previously offered by developmental theories. We describe research that supports our view that social norms, intergroup contact, and perceived outgroup threat affect the relative weight children place on moral and group-based criteria during the development of prejudice.
327 citations
TL;DR: It is found that the effect of power on moral hypocrisy depends on the legitimacy of the power: When power was illegitimate, the moral-hypocrisy effect was reversed, with the illegitimately powerful becoming stricter in judging their own behavior than in judging other people’s behavior.
Abstract: In five studies, we explored whether power increases moral hypocrisy (i.e., imposing strict moral standards on other people but practicing less strict moral behavior oneself). In Experiment 1, compared with the powerless, the powerful condemned other people's cheating more, but also cheated more themselves. In Experiments 2 through 4, the powerful were more strict in judging other people's moral transgressions than in judging their own transgressions. A final study found that the effect of power on moral hypocrisy depends on the legitimacy of the power: When power was illegitimate, the moral-hypocrisy effect was reversed, with the illegitimately powerful becoming stricter in judging their own behavior than in judging other people's behavior. This pattern, which might be dubbed hypercrisy, was also found among low-power participants in Experiments 3 and 4. We discuss how patterns of hypocrisy and hypercrisy among the powerful and powerless can help perpetuate social inequality.
311 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the role of depersonalization in objectification and find that when people are objectified, they are denied their personhood and treated as if they lack mental states and moral status associated with personhood.
Abstract: Department of Development and Socialization, University ofPadova, Padua, ItalyAbstractPhilosophers have argued that when people are objectified they are treated as if they lack the mental states and moralstatus associated with personhood. These aspects of objectification have been neglected by psychologists. This researchinvestigates the role of depersonalization in objectification. In Study 1, objectified women were attributed less mind andwere accorded lesser moral status than non-objectified women. In Study 2, we replicated this effect with male and femaletargetsandextendedittoincludeperceptionsofcompetenceandpainattribution.Further,weexploredwhethertargetandperceiver gender qualify depersonalization. Overall, this research indicates that when people are objectified they aredenied personhood. Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.When objectification occurs, the person is depersonalizedAndrea Dworkin (2000, p 30)Objectification has interested philosophers since the term was introduced by Immanuel Kant. Kant arguedthat the riskof objectification is present in all sexual encounters, where a person can become merely a need-satisfying ‘‘object ofappetite’’(Papadaki,2007).InKant’sview,objectifiedpeoplearedeniedhumanityandregardedasmeanstoothers’ends.Nussbaum (1995) elaborated this idea, arguing that objectification has many facets, some of which are more morallyproblematic than others. Treating a person as an object is especially troubling when certain human characteristics aredenied (i.e., autonomy, subjectivity, agency). From both Kant’s and Nussbaum’s standpoint, objectification has two keyfeatures: Emphasis on the target’s instrumentality and denial of their humanness or personhood. The second feature,depersonalization
301 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2010
TL;DR: The End of Faith as discussed by the authors was the first book to argue that science has nothing to say on the subject of human values and that our failure to address questions of meaning and morality through science has now become the primary justification for religious faith.
Abstract: Sam Harris's first book, The End of Faith, ignited a worldwide debate about the validity of religion. In the aftermath, Harris discovered that most people - from religious fundamentalists to nonbelieving scientists - agree on one point: science has nothing to say on the subject of human values. Indeed, our failure to address questions of meaning and morality through science has now become the primary justification for religious faith. In this highly controversial book, Sam Harris seeks to link morality to the rest of human knowledge. Defining morality in terms of human and animal well-being, Harris argues that science can do more than tell how we are; it can, in principle, tell us how we ought to be. In his view, moral relativism is simply false - and comes at an increasing cost to humanity. And the intrusions of religion into the sphere of human values can be finally repelled: for just as there is no such thing as Christian physics or Muslim algebra, there can be no Christian or Muslim morality. Using his expertise in philosophy and neuroscience, along with his experience on the front lines of our 'culture wars', Harris delivers a game-changing book about the future of science and about the real basis of human cooperation.
295 citations
TL;DR: This article found that moral conviction has important social and political consequences, such as increased intolerance of attitudinally dissimilar others, difficulties in conflict resolution, increased political participation, willingness to accept violent means to achieve preferred ends, strong ties to positive and negative emotions, and inoculation against the usual pressures to obey authorities, obey the law, or to conform to majority group influence.
Abstract: This paper reviews current theory and research that indicates that attitudes held with strong moral conviction (‘moral mandates’) represent something psychologically distinct from other constructs (e.g., attitude strength, partisanship, or religiosity), and that variance in moral conviction has important social and political consequences, such as increased intolerance of attitudinally dissimilar others, difficulties in conflict resolution, increased political participation, willingness to accept violent means to achieve preferred ends, strong ties to positive and negative emotions, and inoculation against the usual pressures to obey authorities, obey the law, or to conform to majority group influence. The normative implications of these findings are both reassuring (moral convictions can protect against obedience to potentially malevolent authorities) and terrifying (moral convictions are associated with rejection of the rule of law, and can provide a motivational foundation for violent protest and acts of terrorism). Implications and directions for future research are discussed.
285 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: This article analyzed consumer narratives through which a brand-mediated moral conflict is enacted and showed that consumers' moralistic identity work is culturally framed by the myth of the moral protagonist and further illuminate how consumers use this mythic structure to transform their ideological beliefs into dramatic narratives of identity.
Abstract: Consumer researchers have tended to equate consumer moralism with normative condemnations of mainstream consumer culture. Consequently, little research has investigated the multifaceted forms of identity work that consumers can undertake through more diverse ideological forms of consumer moralism. To redress this theoretical gap, we analyze the adversarial consumer narratives through which a brand-mediated moral conflict is enacted. We show that consumers’ moralistic identity work is culturally framed by the myth of the moral protagonist and further illuminate how consumers use this mythic structure to transform their ideological beliefs into dramatic narratives of identity. Our resulting theoretical framework ex- plicates identity-value–enhancing relationships among mythic structure, ideological meanings, and marketplace resources that have not been recognized by prior studies of consumer identity work.
269 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a theoretical reconstruction of sub-Saharan ethics that they argue is a strong competitor to typical Western approaches to morality, and highlight respects in which the African approach provides a unitary foundation for a variety of normative and empirical conclusions that are serious alternatives to dominant Western views.
Abstract: In this article we provide a theoretical reconstruction of sub-Saharan ethics that we argue is a strong competitor to typical Western approaches to morality. According to our African moral theory, actions are right roughly insofar as they are a matter of living harmoniously with others or honouring communal relationships. After spelling out this ethic, we apply it to several issues in both normative and empirical research into morality. With regard to normative research, we compare and contrast this African moral theory with utilitarianism and Kantianism in the context of several practical issues. With regard to empirical research, we compare and contrast our sub-Saharan ethic with several of Lawrence Kohlberg's views on the nature of morality. Our aim is to highlight respects in which the African approach provides a unitary foundation for a variety of normative and empirical conclusions that are serious alternatives to dominant Western views.
TL;DR: This article analyzed consumer narratives through which a brand-mediated moral conflict is enacted and showed that consumers' moralistic identity work is culturally framed by the myth of the moral protagonist and further illuminate how consumers use this mythic structure to transform their ideological beliefs into dramatic narratives of identity.
Abstract: Consumer researchers have tended to equate consumer moralism with normative condemnations of mainstream consumer culture. Consequently, little research has investigated the multifaceted forms of identity work that consumers can undertake through more diverse ideological forms of consumer moralism. To redress this theoretical gap, we analyze the adversarial consumer narratives through which a brand‐mediated moral conflict is enacted. We show that consumers’ moralistic identity work is culturally framed by the myth of the moral protagonist and further illuminate how consumers use this mythic structure to transform their ideological beliefs into dramatic narratives of identity. Our resulting theoretical framework explicates identity‐value–enhancing relationships among mythic structure, ideological meanings, and marketplace resources that have not been recognized by prior studies of consumer identity work.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify, review and assess two prominent recent trends in the literature on stakeholder engagement: the Habermasians' and the Ethical Strategists' position.
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to identify, review and assess two prominent recent trends in the literature on stakeholder engagement. Scholars in the first camp are referred to as Habermasians, owing to their reference and adherence to the work of the German philosopher most famous for elaborating on the concept of moral discourse. To these scholars, moral engagement is marked by specific conditions of communication which ensure that this communication is uncorrupted by power differences and strategic motivations. Others – those called here Ethical Strategists – argue that the engagement of stakeholders must be integral to a firm's strategy if it is to achieve real success. This camp is characterized by scholars contending that the distinction between strategy and morality is not only unfortunate, but logically unnecessary. They hold that good strategy properly understood must encompass what are typically recognized as moral concerns, because the very purpose of the firm and the capitalist system within which it operates is, when viewed rightly, the creation of value for all stakeholders. While recognizing the important contributions made by the Habermasians to the conversation about stakeholder engagement, it is concluded that, owing to the confluence of conceptual and practical concerns, the Ethical Strategists' position is the more attractive.
TL;DR: The authors propose that God is seen as the ultimate moral agent, the entity people blame and praise when they receive anomalous harm and help, and support for this proposition comes from research on mind perception, morality, and moral typecasting.
Abstract: Believing in God requires not only a leap of faith but also an extension of people’s normal capacity to perceive the minds of others. Usually, people perceive minds of all kinds by trying to understand their conscious experience (what it is like to be them) and their agency (what they can do). Although humans are perceived to have both agency and experience, humans appear to see God as possessing agency, but not experience. God’s unique mind is due, the authors suggest, to the uniquely moral role He occupies. In this article, the authors propose that God is seen as the ultimate moral agent, the entity people blame and praise when they receive anomalous harm and help. Support for this proposition comes from research on mind perception, morality, and moral typecasting. Interestingly, although people perceive God as the author of salvation, suffering seems to evoke even more attributions to the divine.
TL;DR: Only by accepting the fact that behavior is a function of both mind and environmental structures can realistic prescriptive means of achieving moral goals be developed.
Abstract: What is the nature of moral behavior? According to the study of bounded rationality, it results not from character traits or rational deliberation alone, but from the interplay between mind and environment. In this view, moral behavior is based on pragmatic social heuristics rather than moral rules or maximization principles. These social heuristics are not good or bad per se, but solely in relation to the environments in which they are used. This has methodological implications for the study of morality: Behavior needs to be studied in social groups as well as in isolation, in natural environments as well as in labs. It also has implications for moral policy: Only by accepting the fact that behavior is a function of both mind and environmental structures can realistic prescriptive means of achieving moral goals be developed.
TL;DR: In this paper, the mediating role of the concept of human dignity is discussed, and it is shown that membership in a constitutional political community can protect, by granting equal rights, the equal human dignity of everybody.
Abstract: Human rights developed in response to specific violations of human dignity, and can therefore be conceived as specifications of human dignity, their moral source. This internal relationship explains the moral content and moreover the distinguishing feature of human rights: they are designed for an effective implementation of the core moral values of an egalitarian universalism in terms of coercive law. This essay is an attempt to explain this moral-legal Janus face of human rights through the mediating role of the concept of human dignity. This concept is due to a remarkable generalization of the particularistic meanings of those “dignities” that once were attached to specific honorific functions and memberships. In spite of its abstract meaning, “human dignity” still retains from its particularistic precursor concepts the connotation of depending on the social recognition of a status – in this case, the status of democratic citizenship. Only membership in a constitutional political community can protect, by granting equal rights, the equal human dignity of everybody.
01 Oct 2010
TL;DR: The Hermeneutics of the Subject as discussed by the authors explores the relationship between subjectivity and truth in the context of ancient philosophy, and argues that the modern, strictly epistemological understanding of truth removes us from the possibility of having an ethical relationship to the truth.
Abstract: Is there a relationship between subjectivity and truth in our contemporary age? Foucault's answer is “no”. In this chapter, I seek to explicate Foucault's conclusion about the divorce of subjectivity and truth. Beginning with Foucault's account of the shift between ancient and modern philosophy, I show in the first section that the modern, strictly epistemological understanding of truth removes us from the possibility of having an ethical relationship to the truth. This ethical relationship to the truth, however, was the heart of ancient philosophy, whose goal was not “knowledge” but human flourishing. The second section explores the role of truth in ancient philosophy. The third section turns to an explication of Foucault's account of parrhēsia as it was understood in ancient philosophy. Parrhēsia is the act of telling the truth out of one's moral duty, even in dangerous situations. I then offer examples of how parrhēsia was used in ancient philosophy, followed by a brief discussion of whether or not we can recreate a meaningful relationship between subjectivity and truth. In the shadow of the Cartesian moment Foucault's 1982 lecture course The Hermeneutics of the Subject continues his investigation into the connection between subjectivity and truth begun in the 1981 course Subjectivity and Truth . In the 1981 lecture course, Foucault focused exclusively on Hellenic views of sexuality. In 1982, Foucault wants to ask the question of the relationship between subjectivity and truth in a more general way: “[i]n what historical form do the relations between the ‘subject’ and ‘truth,’ elements that do not usually fall within the historian's practice or analysis, take shape in the West?” (2005a: 2).
01 Jan 2010
TL;DR: The Palgrave Handbook of Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity as discussed by the authors, 7 Modern Roots of the Sociology of Love: Tolstoy, Addams.
Abstract: 10.1057/9781137391865 The Palgrave Handbook of Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity, 7 Modern Roots of the Sociology of Love: Tolstoy, Addams. 2014. the moral background: an inquiry into the history of business ethics. princeton in: handbook of the sociology of morality. edited by hitlin and vaisey (pdf). “Morally Bonded and Bounded: A Sociological Introduction to Neurology. In Handbook of the Sociology of Morality, Springer (Eds. Hitlin, Steven and Stephen.
01 Jan 2010
TL;DR: In the archaeological record there is sufficient evidence to make a judgment, the traces of war are to be found across all forms of social organization-in bands, chiefdoms, and states as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: War is older than the human species. It is found in every region of the world, among all the branches of humankind. It is found throughout human history, deeply and densely woven into its causal tapestry. It is found in all eras, and in earlier periods no less than later. There is no evidence of it having originated in one place, and spread by contact to others. War is reflected in the most fundamental features of human social life. When indigenous histories are composed, their authors invariably view wars-unlike almost all other kinds of events-as preeminently worth recording. The foundational works of human literature-the Iliad, the Bhagavad-Gita, the Tanakh, the Quran, the Tale of the Heike-whether oral or written, sacred or secular-reflect societies in which war was a pervasive feature. Wherever in the archaeological record there is sufficient evidence to make a judgment, the traces of war are to be found. It is found across all forms of social organization-in bands, chiefdoms, and states. It was a regular part of hunter-gatherer life wherever population densities were not vanishingly low, and often even in harsh and marginal habitats. The existence of intergroup 191
TL;DR: This article examined the bifurcation in the societal organizations of pre-modern China and Europe and focused on their distinct epitomizing social structures, the clan and the city, that sustain cooperation through different mixes of enforcement and intrinsic motivation.
Abstract: How to sustain cooperation is a key challenge for any society. Different social organizations have evolved in the course of history to cope with this challenge by relying on different combinations of external (formal and informal) enforcement institutions and intrinsic motivation. Some societies rely more on informal enforcement and moral obligations within their constituting groups. Others rely more on formal enforcement and general moral obligations towards society at large. How do culture and institutions interact in generating different evolutionary trajectories of societal organizations? Do contemporary attitudes, institutions, and behavior reflect distinct pre-modern trajectories? This paper addresses these questions by examining the bifurcation in the societal organizations of pre-modern China and Europe. It focuses on their distinct epitomizing social structures, the clan and the city, that sustain cooperation through different mixes of enforcement and intrinsic motivation. The Chinese clan is a kinship-based hierarchical organization in which strong moral ties and reputation among clan members are particularly important in sustaining cooperation. In Medieval Europe, by contrast, the main example of a cooperative organization is the city. Here cooperation is across kinship lines and external enforcement plays a bigger role. But morality and reputation,
TL;DR: In this paper, the role of the social environment, particularly the person and place interaction, in crime causation has been investigated using data from the ESRC financed Peterborough Adolescent and Young Adult Development Study (PADS+).
Abstract: Our current understanding of the role of the social environment in crime causation is at best rudimentary Guided by the theoretical framework of Situational Action Theory, and using data from the ESRC financed Peterborough Adolescent and Young Adult Development Study (PADS+), this paper aims to propose how we can better theorise and study the role of the social environment, particularly the person and place interaction, in crime causation We will introduce, and illustrate the usefulness of, a space–time budget methodology as a means of capturing people’s exposure to settings and describing their activity fields We will suggest and demonstrate that, combined with a small area community survey and psychometric measures of individual characteristics, a space–time budget is a powerful tool for advancing our knowledge about the role of the social environment, and its interaction with people’s crime propensity, in crime causation Our unique data allows us to study the convergence in time and space of crime propensity, criminogenic exposure and crime events As far as we are aware, such an analysis has never before been carried out The findings show that there are (a) clear associations between young people’s activity fields and their exposure to criminogenic settings, (b) clear associations between their exposure to criminogenic settings and their crime involvement, and, crucially, (c) that the influence of criminogenic exposure depends on a person’s crime propensity Having a crime-averse morality and strong ability to exercise self-control appears to make young people practically situationally immune to the influences of criminogenic settings, while having a crime-prone morality and poor ability to exercise self-control appears to make young people situationally vulnerable to the influences of criminogenic settings
TL;DR: This paper conducted a cross-cultural study of intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in subjects from the United States, Hong Kong, India and Colombia, finding that the majority of participants agreed that our universe is indeterministic and that moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism.
Abstract: Recent experimental research has revealed surprising patterns in people's intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. One limitation of this research, however, is that it has been conducted exclusively on people from Western cultures. The present paper extends previous research by presenting a cross-cultural study examining intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in subjects from the United States, Hong Kong, India and Colombia. The results revealed a striking degree of cross- cultural convergence. In all four cultural groups, the majority of participants said that (a) our universe is indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism. The question of free will is one of the oldest and most intractable in the history of Western philosophy; philosophers are still arguing about how best to answer it. But recent experimental research on the topic has arrived at a surprising result. Although philosophers remain divided about how to address the question of free will, it seems that a substantial majority of ordinary people have somehow converged on a single basic view. What's more, they seem to embrace a thesis—usually called incompatibilism—that most philosophers are prone to reject. Even while this research is suggestive, it suffers from an important limitation—all of the studies have been conducted on subjects in the United States. This opens up the possibility that the existing results merely reflect some idiosyncratic property of contemporary Western culture. To address this worry, we conducted a cross- cultural study of intuitions about free will. Our aim was to determine whether previous results merely pointed to some aspect of one particular culture or whether these results really were pointing to some more fundamental truth about the way people think about human freedom.
TL;DR: A review of the psychological literature reveals a complex relation between religious belief and moral action: leading to greater prosocial behavior in some contexts but not in others, and in some cases actually increasing antisocial behavior as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Historically, religion and religious belief have often been credited as the source of human morality. But what have been the real effects of religion on prosocial behavior? A review of the psychological literature reveals a complex relation between religious belief and moral action: leading to greater prosocial behavior in some contexts but not in others, and in some cases actually increasing antisocial behavior. In addition, different forms of religious belief are associated with different styles of co-operation. This body of evidence paints a somewhat messy picture of religious prosociality; however, recent examinations of the cognitive mechanisms of belief help to resolve apparent inconsistencies. In this article, we review evidence of two separate sources of religious prosociality: a religious principle associated with the protection of the religious group, and a supernatural principle associated with the belief in God, or other supernatural agents. These two principles emphasize different prosocial goals, and so have different effects on prosocial behavior depending on the target and context. A re-examination of the literature illustrates the independent influences of religious and supernatural principles on moral action.
TL;DR: The authors assesses the role of ideas in economic change, combining economic and historical analysis with insights from psychology, sociology and anthropology, and illustrate the model using the historical construction of racial categories.
Abstract: This paper assesses the role of ideas in economic change, combining economic and historical analysis with insights from psychology, sociology and anthropology. Belief systems shape the system of categories ("pre-confirmatory bias") and perceptions (confirmatory bias), and are themselves constrained by fundamental values. We illustrate the model using the historical construction of racial categories. Given the post-Reformation fundamental belief that all men had rights, colonial powers after the 15th century constructed ideologies that the colonized groups they exploited were naturally inferior, and gave these beliefs precedence over other aspects of belief systems. Historical work finds that doctrines of race came into their own in the colonies that became the US after, not before, slavery; that out of the "scandal of empire" in India emerged a "race theory that cast Britons and Indians in a relationship of absolute difference"; and that arguments used by the settlers in Australia to justify their policies towards the Aborigines entailed in effect the expulsion of the Aborigines from the human race. Racial ideology shaped categories and perceptions in ways that we show can give rise to equilibrium fictions. In our framework, technology, contacts with the outside world, and changes in power and wealth matter not just directly but because they can lead to changes in ideology.
TL;DR: This paper investigated the extent to which religion predicts certain attribution beliefs as well as attitudes toward samesex unions while controlling for attribution beliefs and found that religion is strongly associated with the belief that homosexuals choose their sexual orientation.
Abstract: Objective. Past research reveals how religion and opinions about the cause of homosexuality influence attitudes concerning same-sex unions. No study to date contains a comprehensive collection of religion measures while also accounting for views of the cause of homosexuality. Therefore, this study investigates the extent to which religion predicts certain attribution beliefs as well as attitudes toward samesex unions while controlling for attribution beliefs. Method. The Baylor Religion Survey (2007) is used to estimate binary logistic models predicting the effects of religion and attribution beliefs on attitudes toward same-sex unions. Findings. First, religion is strongly associated with the belief that homosexuals choose their sexual orientation. Second, religion maintains a significant association with attitudes toward same-sex unions despite inclusion of an attribution variable. Conclusion. Even if a biological explanation for homosexuality is ultimately proven, unfavorable attitudes toward same-sex unions will most likely endure due to religion’s persistent effect. The topic of same-sex unions has been a key political issue for many Americans since the 2004 presidential elections. Consider that in 2008 alone New Hampshire passed legislation allowing for homosexual civil unions, California’s supreme court ruled that homosexuals have the constitutional right to marry, Massachusetts’ House and Senate allowed for same-sex marriages for out-of-state couples, and in the November elections of 2008 voters in Arizona, Florida, and California all elected to amend their state constitutions to legally define marriage, thus outlawing same-sex unions. Considering all the attention given to the legality and morality of same-sex unions, the key follow-up question for social researchers is what determines individuals’ views toward those unions. More specifically, who is most likely to support or oppose same-sex unions? Recent research demonstrates the
01 Jan 2010
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that acts of crime are moral actions and therefore need to be analysed and explained as such, and that explaining act of crime is not different from explaining breaches of moral rules more generally.
Abstract: Morality is rarely the main topic in criminological theory and research. However, an analysis of what constitutes a crime and what moves people to engage in acts of crime suggests that questions of personal morality and the moral context in which people operate should play a central role in the explanation of acts of crime. The basic arguments of this chapter are that (i) acts of crime are moral actions and therefore need to be analysed and explained as such and (ii) explaining acts of crime is not different from explaining breaches of moral rules more generally (the explanatory process is the same). A theory of crime causation should therefore be regarded as a special case of a more general theory of moral action.
TL;DR: Good intuition and reasoning inform mature moral functioning, which needs to include capacities that promote sustainable human well-being, which also requires collective capacities for moral dialogue and moral institutions.
Abstract: Recently, intuitionist theories have been effective in capturing the academic discourse about morality. Intuitionist theories, like rationalist theories, offer important but only partial understanding of moral functioning. Both can be fallacious and succumb to truthiness: the attachment to one's opinions because they "feel right," potentially leading to harmful action or inaction. Both intuition and reasoning are involved in deliberation and expertise. Both are malleable from environmental and educational influence, making questions of normativity-which intuitions and reasoning skills to foster-of utmost importance. Good intuition and reasoning inform mature moral functioning, which needs to include capacities that promote sustainable human well-being. Individual capacities for habituated empathic concern and moral metacognition-moral locus of control, moral self-regulation, and moral self-reflection-comprise mature moral functioning, which also requires collective capacities for moral dialogue and moral institutions. These capacities underlie moral innovation and are necessary for solving the complex challenges humanity faces.
TL;DR: It is demonstrated that moral evaluations do inform ascriptions of intentional action, but that this relationship arises because behavior that conforms to norms is less informative about underlying mental states than is behavior that violates norms.
Book•
29 Apr 2010
TL;DR: In this article, the authors define the notion of lying as follows: 1.1 Lies and Falsehoods 1.2 falsehoods and lies 1.3 Concealing Information, Withholding Information, and Deception 2.4 Bullshit and Lack of Concern with the Truth 2.5 Bullshitters can be concerned with the truth of what they say 2.6 Chisholm and Feehan's Definition 1.7 My Definition of Lying (A Preliminary Version)
Abstract: Introduction and Precis PART I: CONCEPTS 1: LYING Introduction 1.1 MY DEFINITION OF LYING 1.I.1 Lies and Falsehoods 1.I.2 Falsehoods and Lies 1.I.3 A Reformulation of the Dictionary Definitions 1.I.4 Lying and the Right to Know the Truth 1.I.5 That the Intent to Deceive is not Necessary for Lying 1.I.6 Chisholm and Feehan's Definition 1.I.7 My Definition of Lying (A Preliminary Version) 1.I.8 "A Defence of the Transparency Thesis" 1.I.9 The Concept of Warranting 1.I.10 Conditions for Warranting the Truth of a Statement 1.I.11 Yet Another Revision 1.I.12 A Complication of My Final Definition 1.I.13 Some Comments on this Definition 1.I.14 An Objection: The Concept of Assertion Fried Williams Chisholm and Feehan 1.I.15 Reasons to Accept my Definition 1.II REPLIES TO CRITICISMS OF MY DEFINITION 1.II.1 Sorensen 1.II.2 Fallis Conclusions Endnotes 2. DECEPTION AND RELATED CONCEPTS Introduction 2.I DECEPTION 2.I.2 Several Objections and Modified Versions of My Definition 2.I.3 Some Considerations Relevant to Later Parts of the Book 2.II KEEPING SOMEONE IN THE DARK 2.III THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LYING, DECEPTION, KEEPING SOMEONE IN THE DARK, CONCEALING INFORMATION, AND WITHHOLDING INFORMATION 2.III.1 The Difference between Lying and Deception 2.III.2 Deception Versus Witholding Information 2.III.3 Concealing Information, Withholding Information, and Deception 2.IV TWO RELATED NOTIONS: "SPIN" AND "HALF-TRUTHS" 2.V BULLSHIT 2.V.1 Frankfurt on Bullshit, Deception, and Lying 2.V.2 Bullshit and Lack of Concern with the Truth 2.V.3 Bullshit Does Not Require the Intention to Deceive 2.V.4 Lying Can Constitute Producing Bullshit 2.V.5 Bullshitters Can be Concerned with the Truth of What they Say 2.VI A VERY BRIEF NOTE ON HONESTY Endnotes PART II: MORAL THEORY IIA NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY 3. KANT AND THE ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION AGAINST LYING Introduction 3.I KANT'S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 3.I.1 The Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative 3.I.2 Perfect and Imperfect Duties 3.I.3 The Second and Third Versions of the Categorical Imperative 3.II WHAT KANT SAYS ABOUT THE MORALITY OF LYING 3.II.1 The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) 3.II.2 Metaphysics of Morals (1797) 3.II.3 "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropic Concerns" 3.II.4 Allan Wood's Alternative Reading of "On a Supposed Right..." 3.II.5 Lectures on Ethics 3.III DOES THE FIRST VERSION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IMPLY THAT LYING IS ALWAYS WRONG? 3.IV DOES THE SECOND VERSION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IMPLY THAT LYING IS ALWAYS WRONG? 3.V A ROSSIAN ARGUMENT FOR THINKING THAT LYING IS SOMETIMES MORALLY PERMISSABLE Conclusions Endnotes 4. ACT-UTILITARIANISM Introduction 4.I THE DEFINITION OF (ACT) UTILITARIANISM Act and Rule Utilitarianism/Consequentialism 4.II GUIDE TO ACTION VERSUS CRITERION OF RIGHT AND WRONG 4.III THE IMPLICATIONS OF ACT-UTILITARIANISM FOR ISSUES OF LYING AND DECEPTION Direct Bad Consequences of Lying and Deception Conclusions and Transition to Chapter 5 Endnotes 5. ROSS AND RULE-CONSEQUENTIALISM Introduction 5.I ROSS'S THEORY 5.I.1 The Concept of Prima Facie Duty 5.I.2 Ross's List of Prima Facie Duties 5.I.3 Applying Ross's Theory to Cases 5.I.4 How Strong is the Moral Presumption against Lying? 5.II ROSS'S CRITICISMS OF ACT-UTILITARIANISM 5.II.1 Ross and Utilitarianism on Promise Keeping 5.II.2 Ross's Arguments about Promise-Keeping Modified to Apply to Cases of Lying 5.III ROSS ON THE BASIS OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF FUNDAMENTAL MORAL PRINCIPLES 5.III.1 Self-Evidence 5.III.2 The Data of Ethics 5.IV CRITICISMS OF ROSS'S VIEW ABOUT THE BASIS OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE 5.IV.1 Self-Evident Knowledge 5.IV.2 The Moral Convictions of Thoughtful and Well-Educated People 5.IV.3 A Possible Reply for Ross 5.IV.4 Two Other Possible Lines for Ross to Take 5.V HOOKER'S RULE-CONSEQUENTIALISM 5.V.1 Hooker's Theory 5.V.2 Hooker's Arguments for Rule Consequentialism 5.V.3 Problems with Hooker's Arguments 5.VI CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTERS 3-5 AND TRANSITION TO CHAPTER 6 Endnotes IIB MORAL REASONING 6. THE GOLDEN RULE AND A THEORY OF MORAL REASONING Introduction 6.I RATIONALITY CONDITIONS FOR MORAL JUDGEMENTS AND MORAL JUDGES 6.I.1 Consistency 6.I.2 Being Adequately Informed 6.I.3 Proper Cognitive Functioning 6.II THE GOLDEN RULE 6.II.1 Proof of the Golden Rule 6.II.2 Defense of Premises 1, 1a, 1b, and 1c 6.II.3 Defense of Premises 2, 2a, 2b, and 2c 6.III THE FORCE OF GOLDEN RULE ARGUMENTS An Example 6.IV OBJECTIONS TO THE GOLDEN RULE 6.IV.1 When are Differences Morally Relevant? 6.IV.2 Masochists and People with Unusual Preferences 6.IV.3 Punishing People and Doing Things that they Do Not Want One to Do 6.IV.4 People who are Depressed and Do Not Care what Happens to them 6.V APPLICATIONS: RATIONAL CONSISTENT MORAL JUDGES WILL ALL AGREE IN THEIR JUDGEMENTS ABOUT CERTAIN ISSUES 6.V.1 Nazis 6.V.2 Fraud 6.V.3 Another Case of Fraud 6.V.4 Ethical Egoism 6.VI WHY BE CONSISTENT? Question 1 Question 2 An Objection 6.VII MORAL NIHILISM/AMORALISM (OPTING OUT OF MORAL DISCOURSE) 6.VII.1 Consistency Arguments Only Apply to People Who Make Moral Judgements 6.VII.2 Reasons to Accept Morality 6.VII.3 A Reservation 6.VIII A NOTE ON R. M. HARE 6.IX LIMITATIONS/CAVEATS Endnotes IIC THE IMPLICATIONS OF IIA AND IIB FOR QUESTIONS ABOUT LYING AND DECEPTION 7. THE PARTIAL OVERLAP/CONVERGENCE OF REASONABLE VIEWS Introduction 7.I WHAT RATIONALITY/CONSISTENCY TESTS CAN AND CANNOT SHOW An Objection 7.II ABSOLUTISM 7.III REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 7.IV THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE RESULTS FOR THE REST OF THE BOOK Endnotes PART III: APPLICATIONS 8. DECEPTION AND WITHHOLDING INFORMATION ON SALES Introduction Caveat Emptor 8.I THE OBLIGATIONS OF SALESPEOPLE 8.I.1 My View 8.I.2 A Justification for My View A Qualification An Objection Reply The Justification of Duties 5 and 6 8.II CASE STUDIES 8.II.1 Deception in Sales Case 1: The Sales Tactics of the Holland Furnace Company Case 2: Falsifying an Odometer Case 3: College Admissions Case 4: Shoe Sales What about Cases in Which a Person Benefits by Being Deceived? Case 5: Paternalistic Deception 8.II.2 WithHolding Information in Sales Case 1: Health Insurance Case 2: Steering Customers Case 3: Withholding Information about Defects Endnotes 9. DECEPTION IN ADVERTISING Introduction 9.I DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING 9.I.1 The Harmfulness of Deceptive Advertising: Case Studies Sears Dishwasher Listerine Vioxx R. J. Reynolds 9.I.2 The Wrongness of Deceptive Advertising 9.II WHY FOLLOWING THE LAW IS NOT ENOUGH 9.II.1 The FTC's Definition of Deceptive Advertising 9.II.2 Why it's not Enough to Follow the Law 9.III TWO OBJECTIONS 9.III.1 Cases of Small Harms to Many People 9.III.2 What if Being Honest gives Dishonest Competitors an Advantage? Endnotes 10. BLUFFING AND DECEPTION IN NEGOTIATIONS Introduction 10.I WHAT IS BLUFFING? 10.II THE ECONOMICS OF BLUFFING 10.III IS IT MORALLY PERMISSIBLE TO MISSTATE ONE'S NEGOTIATING POSITION? An Objection 10.IV APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DEFENSE An Objection Replies A Related Objection Endnotes 11. HONESTY, PROFESSIONALS, AND THE VULNERABILITY OF THE PUBLIC Introduction 11.I THE FREQUENT INCENTIVE/TEMPTATION TO DECEIVE CLIENTS 11.II INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS 11.III INFORMED CONSENT Exceptions Endnotes 12. LYING AND DECEPTION ABOUT QUESTIONS OF WAR AND PEACE: CASE STUDIES Introduction 12.I LYING AND DECEPTION IN ORDER TO CREATE A JUSTIFICATION OR PRETEXT FOR WAR 12.I.1 Hearst and the Spanish American War 12.I.2 Franklin Roosevelt and World War II 12.I.3 Lyndon Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 12.II ANOTHER CASE: GEORGE W. BUSH, DICK CHENEY, AND THE IRAQ WAR OF 2003 12.II.1 Claims About Iraq's "Weapons of Mass-Destruction" 12.II.2 Claims About the Connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda 12.II.3 The Falsity of Claims about Iraq's Weapons and its Connections with Al Qaeda 12.II.4 Reasons to Think that Some of the Claims about Iraq's Weapons and Ties to Al Qaeda Constituted Lying or (Attempted) Deception 12.II.5 Lying and Deception about Other Matters Related to the Iraq War 12.III A CASE OF LYING/DECEPTION TO AVOID WAR? 12.IV A MORAL ASSESSMENT OF (SOME OF) THE CASES 12.IV.1 Lyndon Johnson 12.IV.2 Bush and Cheney 12.IV.3 Over-optimism as a Major Cause of Wars 12.IV.4 Franklin Roosevelt 12.IV.5 Acheson, Dulles, and Eisenhower Endnotes 13. HONESTY, CONFLICTS, AND THE TELLING OF HISTORY: MORE CASE STUDIES Introduction 13.I GERMANY, WORLD WAR I, AND THE MYTH OF THE "STAB IN THE BACK" American Versions of the Dolchstosslegenge? 13.II REWRITING HISTORY 13.II.1 Feel-Good Confederate History and the Post-Civil War South 13.II.2 Lying About the Crimes of Joseph Stalin 13.II.3 An Objection 13.III HALF-TRUTHS AND GROUP CONFLICT 13.III.1 Half-Truths 13.III.2 Examples of Harmful Half-Truths The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict The US and Iran Hitler and Germany's Suffering after WWI 13.III.3 Half-Truths in Personal Relations 13.IV INTELLECTUAL HONESTY Endnotes 14. HONESTY AS A VIRTUE Introduction 14.I DISSENTERS FROM CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 14.I.1 Lying, Deception, and Privacy 14.I.2 Lying, Honesty, and Interpersonal Conflicts 14.I.3 Lying, Deception, and Self-Esteem 14.II IN WHAT SENSE HONESTY IS AND IS NOT A VIRTUE Endnotes Bibliography Index