Showing papers on "Morality published in 2012"

The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion

Abstract: In "The Righteous Mind", psychologist Jonathan Haidt answers some of the most compelling questions about human relationships: Why can it sometimes feel as though half the population is living in a different moral universe? Why do ideas such as 'fairness' and 'freedom' mean such different things to different people? Why is it so hard to see things from another viewpoint? Why do we come to blows over politics and religion? Jonathan Haidt reveals that we often find it hard to get along because our minds are hardwired to be moralistic, judgemental and self-righteous. He explores how morality evolved to enable us to form communities, and how moral values are not just about justice and equality - for some people authority, sanctity or loyalty matter more. Morality binds and blinds, but, using his own research, Haidt proves it is possible to liberate ourselves from the disputes that divide good people. "A landmark contribution to humanity's understanding of itself". ("The New York Times"). "A truly seminal book". (David Goodhart, "Prospect"). "A tour de force - brave, brilliant, and eloquent. It will challenge the way you think about liberals and conservatives, atheism and religion, good and evil". (Paul Bloom, author of "How Pleasure Works"). "Compelling ...a fluid combination of erudition and entertainment". (Ian Birrell, "Observer"). "Lucid and thought-provoking ...deserves to be widely read". (Jenni Russell, "Sunday Times"). Jonathan Haidt is a social and cultural psychologist. He has been on the faculty of the University of Virginia since 1995 and is currently a visiting professor of business ethics at New York University's Stern School of Business. He is the co-editor of "Flourishing: Positive Psychology" and the "Life Well Lived", and is the author of "The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom".

Human Nature and Conduct An introduction to social psychology

Abstract: This insightful treatise on the essential components of human nature by the great American philosopher and educator John Dewey, in his own words, "sets forth a belief that an understanding of habit and of different types of habit is the key to social psychology, while the operation of impulse and intelligence gives the key to individualized mental activity." Beginning with habits, Dewey discusses these basic patterns of conduct as essential mechanisms that allow individuals to coexist harmoniously within society and to adjust to the outer environment. The process of habit formation is a major part of childhood education as the growing individual learns the established modes of behavior in society. In the next section Dewey focuses on impulses, which motivate action and are regulated in response to the reactions of others and the learned habits that the society around us instills. Intelligence, the subject of the next part, in Dewey's view, is the chief instrument that allows human beings to act creatively and experimentally in response to the demands of both inner impulses and outer challenges. How we use our intelligence to deal with our impulses and habits reflects individual variations of character and largely determines life destinies. Intelligence is also the key to morality. If we use our intelligence to make moral judgments based on a clear understanding of empirical facts, then there is a far better chance, says Dewey, that our judgments will be good and our actions right, than if we blindly accept moral rules from traditional authorities or unthinkingly give way to natural instincts. Unless we use the tool of intelligence to understand the natural world around us and our own human nature, we cannot make wise value judgments to serve our best interests. Some eighty years after its original publication, Dewey's commonsensical approach, rooted in experience and objective observation, still has much to recommend it to students of ethics, psychology, and sociology.

The Social Conquest of Earth

Abstract: Sparking vigorous debate in the sciences, The Social Conquest of Earth upends "the famous theory that evolution naturally encourages creatures to put family first" (Discover). Refashioning the story of human evolution, Wilson draws on his remarkable knowledge of biology and social behavior to demonstrate that group selection, not kin selection, is the premier driving force of human evolution. In a work that James D. Watson calls "a monumental exploration of the biological origins of the human condition," Wilson explains how our innate drive to belong to a group is both a "great blessing and a terrible curse" (Smithsonian). Demonstrating that the sources of morality, religion, and the creative arts are fundamentally biological in nature, the renowned Harvard University biologist presents us with the clearest explanation ever produced as to the origin of the human condition and why it resulted in our domination of the Earth's biosphere.

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Abstract: Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.

Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy.

Abstract: Morally judicious behavior forms the fabric of human sociality. Here, we sought to investigate neural activity associated with different facets of moral thought. Previous research suggests that the cognitive and emotional sources of moral decisions might be closely related to theory of mind, an abstract-cognitive skill, and empathy, a rapid-emotional skill. That is, moral decisions are thought to crucially refer to other persons’ representation of intentions and behavioral outcomes as well as (vicariously experienced) emotional states. We thus hypothesized that moral decisions might be implemented in brain areas engaged in ‘theory of mind’ and empathy. This assumption was tested by conducting a large-scale activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies, which assessed 2,607 peak coordinates from 247 experiments in 1,790 participants. The brain areas that were consistently involved in moral decisions showed more convergence with the ALE analysis targeting theory of mind versus empathy. More specifically, the neurotopographical overlap between morality and empathy disfavors a role of affective sharing during moral decisions. Ultimately, our results provide evidence that the neural network underlying moral decisions is probably domain-global and might be dissociable into cognitive and affective sub-systems.

Understanding Libertarian Morality: The Psychological Dispositions of Self-Identified Libertarians

Abstract: Libertarians are an increasingly prominent ideological group in U.S. politics, yet they have been largely unstudied. Across 16 measures in a large web-based sample that included 11,994 self-identified libertarians, we sought to understand the moral and psychological characteristics of self-described libertarians. Based on an intuitionist view of moral judgment, we focused on the underlying affective and cognitive dispositions that accompany this unique worldview. Compared to self-identified liberals and conservatives, libertarians showed 1) stronger endorsement of individual liberty as their foremost guiding principle, and weaker endorsement of all other moral principles; 2) a relatively cerebral as opposed to emotional cognitive style; and 3) lower interdependence and social relatedness. As predicted by intuitionist theories concerning the origins of moral reasoning, libertarian values showed convergent relationships with libertarian emotional dispositions and social preferences. Our findings add to a growing recognition of the role of personality differences in the organization of political attitudes.

Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame

Abstract: From the age of Darwin to the present day, biologists have been grappling with the origins of our moral sense Why, if the human instinct to survive and reproduce is "selfish," do people engage in self-sacrifice, and even develop ideas like virtue and shame to justify that altruism? Many theories have been put forth, some emphasizing the role of nepotism, others emphasizing the advantages of reciprocation or group selection effects But evolutionary anthropologist Christopher Boehm finds existing explanations lacking, and in Moral Origins, he offers an elegant new theory Tracing the development of altruism and group social control over 6 million years, Boehm argues that our moral sense is a sophisticated defense mechanism that enables individuals to survive and thrive in groups One of the biggest risks of group living is the possibility of being punished for our misdeeds by those around us Bullies, thieves, free-riders, and especially psychopaths-those who make it difficult for others to go about their lives-are the most likely to suffer this fate Getting by requires getting along, and this social type of selection, Boehm shows, singles out altruists for survival This selection pressure has been unique in shaping human nature, and it bred the first stirrings of conscience in the human species Ultimately, it led to the fully developed sense of virtue and shame that we know today A groundbreaking exploration of the evolution of human generosity and cooperation, Moral Origins offers profound insight into humanity's moral past-and how it might shape our moral future

The Moral Neoliberal: Welfare and Citizenship in Italy

Abstract: Morality is often imagined to be at odds with capitalism and its focus on the bottom line, but in "The Moral Neoliberal" morality is shown as the opposite: an indispensable tool for capitalist transformation. Setting her investigation within the shifting landscape of neoliberal welfare reform in the Lombardy region of Italy, Andrea Muehlebach tracks the phenomenal rise of voluntarism in the wake of the state's withdrawal of social service programs. Using anthropological tools, she shows how socialist volunteers are interpreting their unwaged labor as an expression of social solidarity, with Catholic volunteers thinking of theirs as an expression of charity and love. Such interpretations pave the way for a mass mobilization of an ethical citizenry that is put to work by the state. Visiting several sites across the region, from Milanese high schools to the offices of state social workers to the homes of the needy, Muehlebach mounts a powerful argument that the neoliberal state nurtures selflessness in order to cement some of its most controversial reforms. At the same time, she also shows how the insertion of such an anticapitalist narrative into the heart of neoliberalization can have unintended consequences.

Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement

Abstract: 1. Introduction 2. Human Nature and Common Sense Morality 3. Liberal Democracy 4. Catastrophic Misuses of Science 5. Responsibility for Omissions to Aid 6. The Tragedy of the Commons 7. The Tragedy of the Environment and Liberal Democracy 8. Authoritarianism and Democracy 9. Liberal Democracy and the End of History 10. Moral Enhancement as a Possible Way-Out Index

Does power corrupt or enable? When and why power facilitates self-interested behavior

Abstract: Does power corrupt a moral identity, or does it enable a moral identity to emerge? Drawing from the power literature, we propose that the psychological experience of power, although often associated with promoting self-interest, is associated with greater self-interest only in the presence of a weak moral identity. Furthermore, we propose that the psychological experience of power is associated with less self-interest in the presence of a strong moral identity. Across a field survey of working adults and in a lab experiment, individuals with a strong moral identity were less likely to act in self-interest, yet individuals with a weak moral identity were more likely to act in self-interest, when subjectively experiencing power. Finally, we predict and demonstrate an explanatory mechanism behind this effect: The psychological experience of power enhances moral awareness among those with a strong moral identity, yet decreases the moral awareness among those with a weak moral identity. In turn, individuals' moral awareness affects how they behave in relation to their self-interest.

Cyberbullying and traditional bullying in adolescence: Differential roles of moral disengagement, moral emotions, and moral values

Abstract: The aim of this study was to investigate whether different aspects of morality predict traditional bullying and cyberbullying behaviour in a similar way. Students between 12 and 19 years participated in an online study. They reported on the frequency of different traditional and cyberbullying behaviours andcompleted self-report measures on moral emotions and moral values. A scenario approach with open questions was used to assess morally disengaged justifications. Tobit regressions indicated that a lack of moral values and a lack of remorse predicted both traditional and cyberbullying behaviour. Traditional bullying was strongly predictive for cyberbullying. A lack of moral emotions and moral values predicted cyberbullying behaviour even when controlling for traditional bullying. Morally disengaged justifications were only predictive for traditional, but not for cyberbullying behaviour. The findings show that moral standards and moral affect are important to understand individual differences in engagement...

Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty

Abstract: Early research and teaching on ethics focused either on a moral development perspective or on philosophical approaches and used a normative approach by focusing on the question of how people should act when resolving ethical dilemmas. In this article, we briefly describe the traditional approach to ethics and then present a (biased) review of the behavioral approach to ethics. We define behavioral ethics as the study of systematic and predictable ways in which individuals make ethical decisions and judge the ethical decisions of others when these decisions are at odds with intuition and the benefits of the broader society. By focusing on a descriptive rather than a normative approach to ethics, behavioral ethics is better suited than traditional approaches to addressing the increasing demand from society for a deeper understanding of what causes even good people to cross ethical boundaries.

When Does Feeling Moral Actually Make You a Better Person? Conceptual Abstraction Moderates Whether Past Moral Deeds Motivate Consistency or Compensatory Behavior

Abstract: According to the moral licensing literature, moral self-perceptions induce compensatory behavior: People who feel moral act less prosocially than those who feel immoral. Conversely, work on moral identity indicates that moral self-perceptions motivate behavioral consistency: People who feel moral act more prosocially than those who feel less so. In three studies, the authors reconcile these propositions by demonstrating the moderating role of conceptual abstraction. In Study 1, participants who recalled performing recent (concrete) moral or immoral behavior demonstrated compensatory behavior, whereas participants who considered temporally distant (abstract) moral behavior demonstrated behavioral consistency. Study 2 confirmed that this effect was unique to moral self-perceptions. Study 3 manipulated whether participants recalled moral or immoral actions concretely or abstractly, and replicated the moderation pattern with willingness to donate real money to charity. Together, these findings suggest that concrete moral self-perceptions activate self-regulatory behavior, and abstract moral self-perceptions activate identity concerns.

The social psychology of morality : exploring the causes of good and evil

Abstract: Humans are universally concerned with good and evil, although one person's "evil" can be another person's "good." How do individuals arrive at decisions about what is right and what is wrong? And how are these decisions influenced by psychological, social, and cultural forces? Such questions form the foundation of the field of moral psychology. In trying to understand moral behavior, researchers historically adopted a cognitive-rationalistic approach that emphasized reasoning and reflection. However, a new generation of investigators has become intrigued by the role of emotional, unconscious, and intra- and interpersonal processes. Their explorations are presented in this third addition to the Herzliya Series on Personality and Social Psychology. The contributors to this volume begin by presenting basic issues and controversies in the study of morality; subsequent chapters explore the psychological processes involved, such as the cognitive mechanisms and motives underlying immoral behavior and moral hypocrisy. Later chapters discuss personality, developmental, and clinical aspects of morality as well as societal aspects of good and evil, including the implications of moral thinking for large-scale violence and genocide. The wide-ranging findings and discussions presented in this volume make this work a provocative and engaging resource for social psychologists and other scholars concerned with moral judgments and both moral and immoral behavior.

Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism

Abstract: Where does morality come from? Why are moral judgments often so similar across cultures, yet sometimes so variable? Is morality one thing, or many? Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) was created to answer these questions. In this chapter we describe the origins, assumptions, and current conceptualization of the theory, and detail the empirical findings that MFT has made possible, both within social psychology and beyond. Looking toward the future, we embrace several critiques of the theory, and specify five criteria for determining what should be considered a foundation of human morality. Finally, we suggest a variety of future directions for MFT and for moral psychology.

A Theory of the Self for the Sociology of Morality

Abstract: Sociology has seen a renewed interest in the study of morality. However, a theory of the self that explains individual variation in moral behavior and emotions is noticeably absent. In this study, we use identity theory to explain this variability. According to identity theory, actors are self-regulating entities whose goal is to verify their identities. An individual’s moral identity—wherever it falls on the moral–immoral continuum—guides behavior, and people experience negative emotions when identity verification does not ensue. Furthermore, the identity verification process occurs within situations that have cultural expectations—that is, framing rules and feeling rules—regarding how individuals should act and feel. These cultural expectations also influence the degree to which people behave morally. We test these assumptions on a sample of more than 350 university students. We investigate whether the moral identity and framing situations in moral terms influences behavior and feelings. Findings reveal...

Consumer‐oriented CSR communication: focusing on ability or morality?

Abstract: Purpose – This article aims to investigate young people's opinions and attitudes towards companies' engagement and communication about corporate social responsibility (CSR).Design/methodology/approach – The study employs a survey designed to uncover the underlying attitudes and values guiding young consumers' perception and evaluation of companies' engagement in and communication about CSR. The respondents are Danish students enrolled in eight different types of further or higher education.Findings – The survey shows that consumers are interested in and expect more explicit CSR communication than currently assumed by corporations and academics alike. They favour communication that is personally relevant and factually based, and consumer scepticism is not as high as suggested by current literature. The findings reflect that the value system guiding CSR evaluation and perception is not based on moral aspects and social, society‐centred values. On the contrary, consumers' focus tends to be on competence and ...

Functional and clinical neuroanatomy of morality

Abstract: Morality is among the most sophisticated features of human judgement, behaviour and, ultimately, mind. An individual who behaves immorally may violate ethical rules and civil rights, and may threaten others' individual liberty, sometimes becoming violent and aggressive. In recent years, neuroscience has shown a growing interest in human morality, and has advanced our understanding of the cognitive and emotional processes involved in moral decisions, their anatomical substrates and the neurology of abnormal moral behaviour. In this article, we review research findings that have provided a key insight into the functional and clinical neuroanatomy of the brain areas involved in normal and abnormal moral behaviour. The 'moral brain' consists of a large functional network including both cortical and subcortical anatomical structures. Because morality is a complex process, some of these brain structures share their neural circuits with those controlling other behavioural processes, such as emotions and theory of mind. Among the anatomical structures implicated in morality are the frontal, temporal and cingulate cortices. The prefrontal cortex regulates activity in subcortical emotional centres, planning and supervising moral decisions, and when its functionality is altered may lead to impulsive aggression. The temporal lobe is involved in theory of mind and its dysfunction is often implicated in violent psychopathy. The cingulate cortex mediates the conflict between the emotional and the rational components of moral reasoning. Other important structures contributing to moral behaviour include the subcortical nuclei such as the amygdala, hippocampus and basal ganglia. Brain areas participating in moral processing can be influenced also by genetic, endocrine and environmental factors. Hormones can modulate moral behaviour through their effects on the brain. Finally, genetic polymorphisms can predispose to aggressivity and violence, arguing for a genetic-based predisposition to morality. Because abnormal moral behaviour can arise from both functional and structural brain abnormalities that should be diagnosed and treated, the neurology of moral behaviour has potential implications for clinical practice and raises ethical concerns. Last, since research has developed several neuromodulation techniques to improve brain dysfunction (deep brain stimulation, transcranial magnetic stimulation and transcranial direct current stimulation), knowing more about the 'moral brain' might help to develop novel therapeutic strategies for neurologically based abnormal moral behaviour.

The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition

Abstract: Preface I. Hegelian Roots From Desire to Recognition: Hegel's Grounding of Self-Consciousness The Realm of Actualized Freedom: Hegel's Notion of a "Philosophy of Right" II. Systematic Consequences The Fabric of Justice: On the Limits of Contemporary Proceduralism Labour and Recognition: A Redefinition Recognition as Ideology: The Connection between Morality and Power Dissolutions of the Social: The Social Theory of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thevenot Philosophy as Social Research: David Miller's Theory of Justice III. Social and Theoretical Applications Recognition between States: On the Moral Substrate of International Relations Organized Self-Realisation: Paradoxes of Individualisation Paradoxes of Capitalist Modernisation: A Research Programme (with Martin Hartmann) IV. Psychoanalytical Ramifications The Work of Negativity: A Recognition-Theoretical Revision of Psychoanalysis The I in the We: Recognition as a Driving Force of Group Formation Facets of the Presocial Self: A Rejoinder to Joel Whitebook Disempowering Reality: Secular Forms of Consolation

Where in the brain is morality? Everywhere and maybe nowhere.

Abstract: The neuroscience of morality has focused on how morality works and where it is in the brain. In tackling these questions, researchers have taken both domain-specific and domain-general approaches—searching for neural substrates and systems dedicated to moral cognition versus characterizing the contributions of domain-general processes. Where in the brain is morality? On one hand, morality is made up of complex cognitive processes, deployed across many domains and housed all over the brain. On the other hand, no neural substrate or system that uniquely supports moral cognition has been found. In this review, we will discuss early assumptions of domain-specificity in moral neuroscience as well as subsequent investigations of domain-general contributions, taking emotion and social cognition (i.e., theory of mind) as case studies. Finally, we will consider possible cognitive accounts of a domain-specific morality: Does uniquely moral cognition exist?

The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World

Abstract: 1. The fundamental problem Part I. Social Order and Social Morality: 2. The failure of instrumentalism 3. Social morality as the sphere of rules 4. Emotion and reason in social morality Part II. Real Public Reason: 5. The justificatory problem and the deliberative model 6. The rights of the moderns 7. Moral equilibrium and moral freedom 8. The moral and political orders Appendix A: the plurality of morality Appendix B: Mozick's attempt to solve the prisoner's dilemma Appendix C: deontic utility functions Appendix D: the Kantian coordination game Appendix E: protection of property rights and economic freedom in states that do best at protecting civil rights.

Sacred values and evil adversaries: A moral foundations approach.

Abstract: At the age of 87, several years after he had stopped writing, Isaiah Berlin responded to an invitation from a Chinese professor to summarize his ideas for publication in China. He produced an extraordinary essay that defended moral pluralism and warned against its enemy, moral monism (or moral absolutism), which he defined as the thesis that “to all true questions there must be one true answer and one only, all the other answers being false.” He then wrote: Most revolutionaries believe, covertly or overtly, that in order to create the ideal world eggs must be broken, otherwise one cannot obtain the omelette. Eggs are certainly broken—never more violently or ubiquitously than in our times—but the omelette is far to seek, it recedes into an infinite distance. That is one of the corollaries of unbridled monism, as I call it—some call it fanaticism, but monism is at the root of every extremism. (Berlin, 1998) In this essay we build upon Berlin’s idea and argue that the elevation or “sacralization” of a moral principle or symbol is a major cause of evil. This idea has been developed quite ably by others in recent years (see Baumeister, 1997, on “idealistic evil”; Glover, 1999, on tribalism; and Skitka & Mullen, 2002, on the “dark side” of moral convictions). We hope to add to these analyses of morality and evil by offering a map of moral space which may be helpful in

Ethics, Technology, and Engineering: An Introduction

Abstract: Acknowledgments. Introduction. 1 The Responsibilities of Engineers. 1.1 Introduction. 1.2 Responsibility. 1.3 Passive Responsibility. 1.4 Active Responsibility and the Ideals of Engineers. 1.5 Engineers versus Managers. 1.6 The Social Context of Technological Development. 1.7 Chapter Summary. 2 Codes of Conduct. 2.1 Introduction. 2.2 Codes of Conduct. 2.3 Possibilities and Limitations of Codes of Conduct. 2.4 Codes of Conduct in an International Context. 2.5 Chapter Summary. 3 Normative Ethics. 3.1 Introduction. 3.2 Ethics and Morality. 3.3 Descriptive and Normative Judgments. 3.4 Points of Departure: Values, Norms, and Virtues. 3.5 Relativism and Absolutism. 3.6 Ethical Theories. 3.7 Utilitarianism. 3.8 Kantian Theory. 3.9 Virtue Ethics. 3.10 Care Ethics. 3.11 Applied Ethics. 3.12 Chapter Summary. 4 Normative Argumentation. 4.1 Introduction. 4.2 Valid Arguments. 4.3 Deductive and Non-Deductive Arguments. 4.4 Arguments in Ethical Theories. 4.5 Fallacies. 4.6 Chapter Summary. 5 The Ethical Cycle. 5.1 Introduction. 5.2 Ill-Structured Problems. 5.3 The Ethical Cycle. 5.4 An Example. 5.5 Collective Moral Deliberation and Social Arrangements. 5.6 Chapter Summary. 6 Ethical Questions in the Design of Technology. 6.1 Introduction. 6.2 Ethical Issues During the Design Process. 6.3 Trade-offs and Value Conflicts. 6.4 Regulatory Frameworks: Normal and Radical Design. 6.5 Chapter Summary. 7 Designing Morality (Peter-Paul Verbeek). 7.1 Introduction. 7.2 Ethics as a Matter of Things. 7.3 Technological Mediation. 7.4 Moralizing Technology. 7.5 Designing Mediations. 7.6 Chapter Summary. 8 Ethical Aspects of Technical Risks. 8.1 Introduction. 8.2 Definitions of Central Terms. 8.3 The Engineer's Responsibility for Safety. 8.4 Risk Assessment. 8.5 When are Risks Acceptable? 8.6 Risk Communication. 8.7 Dealing with Uncertainty and Ignorance. 8.8 Chapter Summary. 9 The Distribution of Responsibility in Engineering. 9.1 Introduction. 9.2 The Problem of Many Hands. 9.3 Responsibility and the Law. 9.4 Responsibility in Organizations. 9.5 Responsibility Distributions and Technological Designs. 9.6 Chapter Summary. 10 Sustainability, Ethics, and Technology (Michiel Brumsen). 10.1 Introduction. 10.2 Environmental Ethics? 10.3 Environmental Problems. 10.4 Sustainable Development. 10.5 Can a Sustainable Society be Realized? 10.6 Engineers and Sustainability. 10.7 Chapter Summary. Study Questions. Discussion Questions. Appendix I: Engineering Qualifications and Organizations in a Number of Countries. Appendix II: NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers. Appendix III: FEANI Position Paper on Code of Conduct: Ethics and Conduct of Professional Engineers. Appendix IV: Shell Code of Conduct. Appendix V: DSM Values and Whistle Blowing Policy. Glossary. References. Index of Cases. Index.

Religion, Morality, Evolution

Abstract: How did religion evolve? What effect does religion have on our moral beliefs and moral actions? These questions are related, as some scholars propose that religion has evolved to enhance altruistic behavior toward members of one's group. I review here data from survey studies (both within and across countries), priming experiments, and correlational studies of the effects of religion on racial prejudice. I conclude that religion has powerfully good moral effects and powerfully bad moral effects, but these are due to aspects of religion that are shared by other human practices. There is surprisingly little evidence for a moral effect of specifically religious beliefs.

The Moral Stereotypes of Liberals and Conservatives: Exaggeration of Differences across the Political Spectrum

Abstract: We investigated the moral stereotypes political liberals and conservatives have of themselves and each other. In reality, liberals endorse the individual-focused moral concerns of compassion and fairness more than conservatives do, and conservatives endorse the group-focused moral concerns of ingroup loyalty, respect for authorities and traditions, and physical/spiritual purity more than liberals do. 2,212 U.S. participants filled out the Moral Foundations Questionnaire with their own answers, or as a typical liberal or conservative would answer. Across the political spectrum, moral stereotypes about “typical” liberals and conservatives correctly reflected the direction of actual differences in foundation endorsement but exaggerated the magnitude of these differences. Contrary to common theories of stereotyping, the moral stereotypes were not simple underestimations of the political outgroup's morality. Both liberals and conservatives exaggerated the ideological extremity of moral concerns for the ingroup as well as the outgroup. Liberals were least accurate about both groups.

Foundations of Chinese psychology : Confucian social relations

Abstract: The Epistemological Goal of Indigenous Psychology.- The Modernization of Non-Western Societies: A Perspective of Constructive Realism.- Western Philosophy's Concepts of Person and Paradigm Shifts.- The Construction of the Face and Favor Model.- The Deep Structure of Confucianism.- Paradigms for Studying Chinese Moral Thought:A Meta-theoretical Analysis.- Moral Thought in Confucian Society.- Confucian Relationalism and Social Exchange.- Life Goals and Achievement Motivation in Confucian Society.- Face and Morality in Confucian Society.- Guanxi and Organizational Behaviors in Chinese Societies.- Chinese Models of Conflict Resolution.