Showing papers on "Social cognitive theory of morality published in 2017"
TL;DR: It is shown that the expression of moral emotion is key for the spread of moral and political ideas in online social networks, a process the authors call “moral contagion” and which offers insights into how moral ideas spread within networks during real political discussion.
Abstract: Political debate concerning moralized issues is increasingly common in online social networks. However, moral psychology has yet to incorporate the study of social networks to investigate processes by which some moral ideas spread more rapidly or broadly than others. Here, we show that the expression of moral emotion is key for the spread of moral and political ideas in online social networks, a process we call "moral contagion." Using a large sample of social media communications about three polarizing moral/political issues (n = 563,312), we observed that the presence of moral-emotional words in messages increased their diffusion by a factor of 20% for each additional word. Furthermore, we found that moral contagion was bounded by group membership; moral-emotional language increased diffusion more strongly within liberal and conservative networks, and less between them. Our results highlight the importance of emotion in the social transmission of moral ideas and also demonstrate the utility of social network methods for studying morality. These findings offer insights into how people are exposed to moral and political ideas through social networks, thus expanding models of social influence and group polarization as people become increasingly immersed in social media networks.
502 citations
TL;DR: This research examines how new technologies change the expression of moral outrage and its social consequences on digital media and online social networks.
Abstract: Moral outrage is an ancient emotion that is now widespread on digital media and online social networks. How might these new technologies change the expression of moral outrage and its social consequences?
253 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that moral injury is a condition distinct from PTSD and other disorders and, using a functional approach, propose enhanced definitions for the terms, morally injurious event, moral pain, moral injury, and moral healing.
Abstract: The term moral injury has been coined to describe the suffering that may develop following a violation of deeply held moral beliefs and values and subsequent difficulties in functioning. Yet despite an increase in research and intervention approaches for this topic, the relationship between moral injury and mental health diagnoses such as Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) remains unclear and concern exists that, in some cases, moral injury might be used to unnecessarily pathologize moral processes. With the goal of further refining the construct, we argue that moral injury is a condition distinct from PTSD and other disorders and, using a functional approach, propose enhanced definitions for the terms, morally injurious event , moral pain , moral injury, and moral healing . Consistent with these new definitions, we then argue for Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) as a feasible and promising treatment for moral injury and present initial qualitative data supporting the intervention.
135 citations
TL;DR: The authors reconstructs what they take to be the central evolutionary debunking argument that underlies recent critiques of moral realism and argues that many of our highly presumptively warranted moral beliefs are immune to evolutionary influence and so can be used to assess and eventually resuscitate the epistemic merits of those that have been subject to such influence.
Abstract: This paper reconstructs what I take to be the central evolutionary debunking argument that underlies recent critiques of moral realism. The argument claims that given the extent of evolutionary influence on our moral faculties, and assuming the truth of moral realism, it would be a massive coincidence were our moral faculties reliable ones. Given this coincidence, any presumptive warrant enjoyed by our moral beliefs is defeated. So if moral realism is true, then we can have no warranted moral beliefs, and hence no moral knowledge. In response, I first develop what is perhaps the most natural reply on behalf of realism – namely, that many of our highly presumptively warranted moral beliefs are immune to evolutionary influence and so can be used to assess and eventually resuscitate the epistemic merits of those that have been subject to such influence. I then identify five distinct ways in which the charge of massive coincidence has been understood and defended. I argue that each interpretation is subject to serious worries. If I am right, these putative defeaters are themselves subject to defeat. Thus many of our moral beliefs continue to be highly warranted, even if moral realism is true.
98 citations
TL;DR: This article found substantial variability in individual-level moral foundations across time, and little evidence that these changes account for changes in political attitudes, and they also found no evidence that moral foundations are heritable.
Abstract: Originally developed to explain cultural variation in moral judgments, moral foundations theory (MFT) has become widely adopted as a theory of political ideology. MFT posits that political attitudes are rooted in instinctual evaluations generated by innate psychological modules evolved to solve social dilemmas. If this is correct, moral foundations must be relatively stable dispositional traits, changes in moral foundations should systematically predict consequent changes in political orientations, and, at least in part, moral foundations must be heritable. We test these hypotheses and find substantial variability in individual-level moral foundations across time, and little evidence that these changes account for changes in political attitudes. We also find little evidence that moral foundations are heritable. These findings raise questions about the future of MFT as a theory of ideology.
93 citations
TL;DR: It is argued that betrayal and spirituality should be core components for understanding, defining and addressing moral injury and supports the role of chaplains being involved in the holistic care and rehabilitation of those affected by moral injury.
Abstract: This article explores the developing definition of moral injury within the current key literature Building on the previous literature regarding 'Moral Injury, Spiritual Care and the role of Chaplains' (Carey et al in JORH 55(4):1218-1245, 2016b doi: 101007/s10943-016-0231-x ), this article notes the complexity that has developed due to definitional variations regarding moral injury-particularly with respect to the concepts of 'betrayal' and 'spirituality' Given the increasing recognition of moral injury and noting the relevance and importance of utilizing a bio-psycho-social-spiritual model, this article argues that betrayal and spirituality should be core components for understanding, defining and addressing moral injury It also supports the role of chaplains being involved in the holistic care and rehabilitation of those affected by moral injury
78 citations
TL;DR: Intervention was significantly associated with gender, grade, previous experiences of cyberbullying, and the interaction between individual and collective moral variables; collective moral disengagement moderated the effects of individual morality.
77 citations
TL;DR: It is found that both altruistic and selfish behaviors were judged as more moral, and less deserving of punishment, when common than when rare, which could be explained by a classical formal model of behavioral conformity.
Abstract: Moral norms are fundamental for virtually all social interactions, including cooperation. Moral norms develop and change, but the mechanisms underlying when, and how, such changes occur are not well-described by theories of moral psychology. We tested, and confirmed, the hypothesis that the commonness of an observed behavior consistently influences its moral status, which we refer to as the common is moral (CIM) heuristic. In 9 experiments, we used an experimental model of dynamic social interaction that manipulated the commonness of altruistic and selfish behaviors to examine the change of peoples' moral judgments. We found that both altruistic and selfish behaviors were judged as more moral, and less deserving of punishment, when common than when rare, which could be explained by a classical formal model (social impact theory) of behavioral conformity. Furthermore, judgments of common versus rare behaviors were faster, indicating that they were computationally more efficient. Finally, we used agent-based computer simulations to investigate the endogenous population dynamics predicted to emerge if individuals use the CIM heuristic, and found that the CIM heuristic is sufficient for producing 2 hallmarks of real moral norms; stability and sudden changes. Our results demonstrate that commonness shapes our moral psychology through mechanisms similar to behavioral conformity with wide implications for understanding the stability and change of moral norms. (PsycINFO Database Record
73 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a new analytical framework to examine and test how moral reasoning underpins and legitimizes governance and practice on adaptation to climate change risks is proposed, which develops a typology of eight categories of vulnerability-based and system-based moral reasoning.
Abstract: Moral foundations theory argues that moral reasoning is widely observed and fundamental to the legitimacy of relevant governance and policy interventions. A new analytical framework to examine and test how moral reasoning underpins and legitimizes governance and practice on adaptation to climate change risks is proposed. It develops a typology of eight categories of vulnerability-based and system-based moral reasoning that pertain to the dilemmas around adaptation and examines the prevalence of these moral categories in public discourse about specific adaptation issues. The framework is tested using data on climate change impact, adaptation, and societal responsibility, drawn from 14 focus groups comprising 148 participants across the UK. Participants consistently use moral reasoning to explain their views on climate adaptation; these include both vulnerability-based and system-based framings. These findings explain public responses to adaptation options and governance, and have implications for t...
70 citations
TL;DR: It is revealed that virtually all individuals irrationally inflated their moral qualities, and the absolute and relative magnitude of this irrationality was greater than that in the other domains of positive self-evaluation.
Abstract: Most people strongly believe they are just, virtuous, and moral; yet regard the average person as distinctly less so. This invites accusations of irrationality in moral judgment and perception-but direct evidence of irrationality is absent. Here, we quantify this irrationality and compare it against the irrationality in other domains of positive self-evaluation. Participants (N = 270) judged themselves and the average person on traits reflecting the core dimensions of social perception: morality, agency, and sociability. Adapting new methods, we reveal that virtually all individuals irrationally inflated their moral qualities, and the absolute and relative magnitude of this irrationality was greater than that in the other domains of positive self-evaluation. Inconsistent with prevailing theories of overly positive self-belief, irrational moral superiority was not associated with self-esteem. Taken together, these findings suggest that moral superiority is a uniquely strong and prevalent form of "positive illusion," but the underlying function remains unknown.
67 citations
TL;DR: The findings show that the foreign language effect is robust across various contexts and that multiple factors affect it, such as the severity of the negative consequences associated with saving the larger group.
Abstract: Though moral intuitions and choices seem fundamental to our core being, there is surprising new evidence that people resolve moral dilemmas differently when they consider them in a foreign language (Cipolletti et al., 2016; Costa et al., 2014a; Geipel et al., 2015): People are more willing to sacrifice 1 person to save 5 when they use a foreign language compared with when they use their native tongue. Our findings show that the phenomenon is robust across various contexts and that multiple factors affect it, such as the severity of the negative consequences associated with saving the larger group. This has also allowed us to better describe the phenomenon and investigate potential explanations. Together, our results suggest that the foreign language effect is most likely attributable to an increase in psychological distance and a reduction in emotional response. (PsycINFO Database Record
TL;DR: In this paper, a collection of geographically diverse articles in various work contexts, which are thematically organized in terms of moral emotions, ethical behaviour and social pressure, moral emotions and their consequences within/across levels of analysis, psychoanalytic perspectives on the management of moral emotion, virtue and moral emotions in particular; the moral standing of leaders, managers and followers; moral challenges raised by obedience and resistance to organisational power and ethical blindspots induced by what may appear as deeply moral emotions.
Abstract: The aim of our special issue is to deepen our understanding of the role moral emotions play in organisations as part of a wider discourse on organisational ethics and morality. Unethical workplace behaviours can have far-reaching consequences—job losses, risks to life and health, psychological damage to individuals and groups, social injustice and exploitation and even environmental devastation. Consequently, determining how and why ethical transgressions occur with surprising regularity, despite the inhibiting influence of moral emotions, has considerable theoretical and practical significance to management scholars and managers alike. In this introduction, we present some of the core arguments in the field; notably, the effect of organisational life and bureaucracy on emotions, in general, and moral emotions, in particular; the moral standing of leaders, managers and followers; moral challenges raised by obedience and resistance to organisational power and ethical blindspots induced by what may appear as deeply moral emotions. These issues are explored by a collection of geographically diverse articles in various work contexts, which are thematically organised in terms of (i) moral emotions, ethical behaviour and social pressure, (ii) moral emotions and their consequences within/across levels of analysis, (iii) psychoanalytic perspectives on the management of moral emotions, (iv) virtue and moral emotions and (v) moral emotions and action tendencies. We end by suggesting certain avenues for future research in the hope that the endeavour initiated here will inspire improved practice at work.
TL;DR: In this paper, a person-center approach was used to analyze individual moral identity: self-transcendence, mixed, and self-enhancement, which indicated three clusters of moral identity.
TL;DR: In this article, moral aspects of cognitive artifacts have been discussed, including their consequences for brains, cognition, and culture; their moral status; and their relation to personal identity. But they are not addressed by cognitive enhancement debates nor situated cognition.
Abstract: This article connects philosophical debates about cognitive enhancement and situated cognition. It does so by focusing on moral aspects of enhancing our cognitive abilities with the aid of external artifacts. Such artifacts have important moral dimensions that are addressed neither by the cognitive enhancement debate nor situated cognition theory. In order to fill this gap in the literature, three moral aspects of cognitive artifacts are singled out: their consequences for brains, cognition, and culture; their moral status; and their relation to personal identity.
TL;DR: Results suggest that high psychopathy trait affects choices of action in sacrificial dilemmas because of reduced emotional reactivity to harmful acts and the dissociation between choice of action and moral judgement suggests that the former is more closely related to emotional experience.
Abstract: This research investigated whether emotional hyporeactivity affects moral judgements and choices of action in sacrificial moral dilemmas and in everyday moral conflict situations in which harm to other's welfare is differentially involved. Twenty-six participants with high trait psychopathy (HP) and 25 with low trait psychopathy (LP) were selected based on the primary psychopathy scale of the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale. HP participants were more likely to sacrifice one person to save others in sacrificial dilemmas and to pursue a personal advantage in everyday moral situations entailing harm to another's good. While deciding in these situations, HP participants experienced lower unpleasantness as compared to LP participants. Conversely, no group differences emerged in choice of action and unpleasantness ratings for everyday moral situations that did not entail harm to others. Importantly, moral judgements did not differ in the two groups. These results suggest that high psychopathy trait affects choices of action in sacrificial dilemmas because of reduced emotional reactivity to harmful acts. The dissociation between choice of action and moral judgement suggests that the former is more closely related to emotional experience. Also, emotion seems to play a critical role in discriminating harmful from harmless acts and in driving decisions accordingly.
TL;DR: The role that social relationships play in judgments of identity and the implications for psychology and philosophy are discussed.
TL;DR: It was found that older adolescents engaged less in pro-environmental behaviors such as energy conservation and recycling, and the effect of age was mediated by the prescriptiveness of moral judgment as well as emotional affinity for nature.
Abstract: Previous research has demonstrated that children take a strong moral stance toward protecting the natural environment. However, the question of how this moralization of pro-environmental behavior develops in adolescence has been rarely investigated. This study investigated age-related differences in adolescents' pro-environmental behavior as it relates to moral judgments about environmental issues and emotions. The study was based on a cross-sectional sample of 325 Canadian adolescents from early, middle, and late adolescence. It was found that older adolescents engaged less in pro-environmental behaviors such as energy conservation and recycling. The effect of age was mediated by the prescriptiveness of moral judgment as well as emotional affinity for nature. The study calls for a systematic investigation of factors that suppress pro-environmentalism in adolescence.
TL;DR: In this article, a dual-processing model of moral whistleblowing in organizations is proposed, which explores how moral intuition and deliberative reasoning processes might interact to influence the whistleblowing behavior of moral agents.
Abstract: A dual-processing model of moral whistleblowing in organizations is proposed. In this theory paper, moral whistleblowing is described as a unique type of whistleblowing that is undertaken by individuals that see themselves as moral agents and are primarily motivated to blow the whistle by a sense of moral duty. At the individual level, the model expands on traditional, rational models of whistleblowing by exploring how moral intuition and deliberative reasoning processes might interact to influence the whistleblowing behavior of moral agents. The model combines individual variables (e.g., moral identity), organizational variables (e.g., organizational culture), and external, societal variables (e.g., media perceptions) to explain the moral whistleblowing process and the impact of moral agents on organizations and society.
TL;DR: This model explains how children can build from sparse noisy observations of how a small set of individuals make moral decisions to a broad moral competence, able to support an infinite range of judgments and decisions that generalizes even to people they have never met and situations they have not been in or observed.
23 Oct 2017
TL;DR: This paper examined how empathy, moral obligation, social entrepreneurial self-efficacy, perceived social support, and prior experience with social problems are associated with social entrepreneurial intentions through a survey of Hong Kong students.
Abstract: This study examined how empathy, moral obligation, social entrepreneurial self-efficacy, perceived social support, and prior experience with social problems are associated with social entrepreneurial intentions. Through a survey, a sample of 252 Hong Kong students was used for analyses. Factor analyses supported that the antecedents of social entrepreneurial intentions could be divided into dimensions of empathy, moral obligation, social entrepreneurial self-efficacy, perceived social support, and prior experience with social problems. Multiple regression analysis results indicated that perceived social support was the most prominent antecedent of social entrepreneurial intentions, followed by moral obligation, empathy, and prior experience with social problems. Notably, moral obligation was revealed to be negatively associated with social entrepreneurial intentions.
TL;DR: It is concluded, in optimistic agreement with Railton, that progress in moral philosophy depends on having a better understanding of the mechanisms behind the authors' moral intuitions, and that a computational perspective on moral learning underscores these conclusions.
TL;DR: Preschoolers' and adults' perceptions of moral beliefs alongside facts and opinions are examined, revealing the perception that disagreements about widely shared moral beliefs have only one right answer while disagreements about controversial moral beliefs do not emerges relatively early.
TL;DR: This article found that conservatives' pro-environmental attitudes substantially increased after an appeal to binding and liberty moral concerns, while a second experiment demonstrated the enhanced efficacy of an appeal that affirmed diverse ideological and moral values in the context of a shared concern for the health of the natural environment.
TL;DR: For example, the authors found that women reported greater dislike for targets whose decisions were consistent with utilitarianism than men, and that women may be particularly sensitive to the implications of the various motives underlying moral decision-making.
Abstract: Although various motives underlie moral decision-making, recent research suggests that deontological moral decision-making may have evolved, in part, to communicate trustworthiness to conspecifics, thereby facilitating cooperative relations. Specifically, social actors whose decisions are guided by deontological (relative to utilitarian) moral reasoning are judged as more trustworthy, are preferred more as social partners, and are trusted more in economic games. The current study extends this research by using an alternative manipulation of moral decision-making as well as the inclusion of target facial identities to explore the potential role of participant and target sex in reactions to moral decisions. Participants viewed a series of male and female targets, half of whom were manipulated to either have responded to five moral dilemmas consistent with an underlying deontological motive or utilitarian motive; participants indicated their liking and trust toward each target. Consistent with previous research, participants liked and trusted targets whose decisions were consistent with deontological motives more than targets whose decisions were more consistent with utilitarian motives; this effect was stronger for perceptions of trust. Additionally, women reported greater dislike for targets whose decisions were consistent with utilitarianism than men. Results suggest that deontological moral reasoning evolved, in part, to facilitate positive relations among conspecifics and aid group living and that women may be particularly sensitive to the implications of the various motives underlying moral decision-making.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the moral filtering hypothesis using face-to-face household survey data from 573 adults in the Dhaka District of Bangladesh and find individuals with higher levels of personal morality (moral beliefs; guilt from contemplating violence; moral identity; emotional empathy) and exposure to strong moral settings are less likely to contemplate aggressive and violent actions in response to a provocation.
Abstract: Many theories assume legal compliance stems from rational deliberations about consequences of disobedience. In contrast, morality theories such as Wikstrom’s Situational Action Theory contend personal morality and moral contexts provide a “filter” prohibiting some people from perceiving and contemplating criminal actions as realistic possibilities. We examine this moral filtering hypothesis using face-to-face household survey data from 573 adults in the Dhaka District of Bangladesh. Results suggest individuals with higher levels of personal morality (moral beliefs; guilt from contemplating violence; moral identity; emotional empathy) and exposure to strong moral settings are less likely to contemplate aggressive and violent actions in response to a provocation. Furthermore, these dimensions of personal and contextual morality appear to be indirectly linked to violent criminal actions through individuals’ tendencies to contemplate aggressive actions when provoked. Overall, our initial inspection of the mor...
TL;DR: This work studied how inferences about moral character affect blame and praise judgments, and inferring bad character amplified effects of consequences on judgments.
TL;DR: This paper showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements, and they found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses are in conflict; the resolution of this conflict depends on both the subject and the dilemma.
Abstract: Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system (“default interventionist”) model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements (utilitarian or deontological) subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses are in conflict; the resolution of this conflict depends on both the subject and the dilemma. While thinking about this conflict, subjects sometimes change their minds in both directions, as suggested by the data from a mouse-tracking task.
TL;DR: It is suggested that athletes, who feel that being a moral person is central to their self-concept, are less likely to use banned substances due to their lower tendency to morally disengage and the more intense feelings of guilt they expect to experience for using banned substances.
Abstract: In this study, we integrated elements of social cognitive theory of moral thought and action and the social cognitive model of moral identity to better understand doping likelihood in athletes. Participants (N = 398) recruited from a variety of team sports completed measures of moral identity, moral disengagement, anticipated guilt, and doping likelihood. Moral identity predicted doping likelihood indirectly via moral disengagement and anticipated guilt. Anticipated guilt about potential doping mediated the relationship between moral disengagement and doping likelihood. Our findings provide novel evidence to suggest that athletes, who feel that being a moral person is central to their self-concept, are less likely to use banned substances due to their lower tendency to morally disengage and the more intense feelings of guilt they expect to experience for using banned substances.
TL;DR: If moral learning is indeed integral with the acquisition and updating of casual and evaluative models, this affords a new way of understanding well-known but seemingly puzzling patterns in intuitive moral judgment-including the notorious "trolley problems."
TL;DR: A moral virtue theory of status attainment is proposed to provide a generalized account of the role of morality in status attainment, and how the scope and priority of moralities and virtues endorsed by a moral community are bound by culture and social class to affect which moral characteristics enhance status.
Abstract: Recognition has grown that moral behavior (e.g., generosity) plays a role in status attainment, yet it remains unclear how, why, and when demonstrating moral characteristics enhances status. Drawing on philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and organizational behavior, I critically review a third route to attaining status: virtue, and propose a moral virtue theory of status attainment to provide a generalized account of the role of morality in status attainment. The moral virtue theory posits that acts of virtue elicit feelings of warmth and admiration (for virtue), and willing deference, toward the virtuous actor. I further consider how the scope and priority of moralities and virtues endorsed by a moral community are bound by culture and social class to affect which moral characteristics enhance status. I end by outlining an agenda for future research into the role of virtue in status attainment.