Showing papers in "Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 2016"

Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for "top-down" effects.

Abstract: What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional "modular" understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between perception and cognition may itself be unsustainable. We argue otherwise: none of these hundreds of studies - either individually or collectively - provide compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or "cognitive penetrability". In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls. And whereas abstract theoretical challenges have failed to resolve this debate in the past, our presentation of these pitfalls is empirically anchored: in each case, we show not only how certain studies could be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but how several alleged top-down effects actually are explained by the pitfall (in practice). Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects. We conclude by extracting the lessons provided by these pitfalls into a checklist that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. The discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized; but without addressing these pitfalls, no such empirical report will license such exciting conclusions. Language: en

The cultural evolution of prosocial religions.

Abstract: We develop a cultural evolutionary theory of the origins of prosocial religions and apply it to resolve two puzzles in human psychology and cultural history: (1) the rise of large-scale cooperation among strangers and, simultaneously, (2) the spread of prosocial religions in the last 10-12 millennia. We argue that these two developments were importantly linked and mutually energizing. We explain how a package of culturally evolved religious beliefs and practices characterized by increasingly potent, moralizing, supernatural agents, credible displays of faith, and other psychologically active elements conducive to social solidarity promoted high fertility rates and large-scale cooperation with co-religionists, often contributing to success in intergroup competition and conflict. In turn, prosocial religious beliefs and practices spread and aggregated as these successful groups expanded, or were copied by less successful groups. This synthesis is grounded in the idea that although religious beliefs and practices originally arose as nonadaptive by-products of innate cognitive functions, particular cultural variants were then selected for their prosocial effects in a long-term, cultural evolutionary process. This framework (1) reconciles key aspects of the adaptationist and by-product approaches to the origins of religion, (2) explains a variety of empirical observations that have not received adequate attention, and (3) generates novel predictions. Converging lines of evidence drawn from diverse disciplines provide empirical support while at the same time encouraging new research directions and opening up new questions for exploration and debate.

Norepinephrine ignites local hotspots of neuronal excitation: How arousal amplifies selectivity in perception and memory.

Abstract: Emotional arousal enhances perception and memory of high-priority information but impairs processing of other information. Here, we propose that, under arousal, local glutamate levels signal the current strength of a representation and interact with norepinephrine (NE) to enhance high priority representations and out-compete or suppress lower priority representations. In our "glutamate amplifies noradrenergic effects" (GANE) model, high glutamate at the site of prioritized representations increases local NE release from the locus coeruleus (LC) to generate "NE hotspots." At these NE hotspots, local glutamate and NE release are mutually enhancing and amplify activation of prioritized representations. In contrast, arousal-induced LC activity inhibits less active representations via two mechanisms: 1) Where there are hotspots, lateral inhibition is amplified; 2) Where no hotspots emerge, NE levels are only high enough to activate low-threshold inhibitory adrenoreceptors. Thus, LC activation promotes a few hotspots of excitation in the context of widespread suppression, enhancing high priority representations while suppressing the rest. Hotspots also help synchronize oscillations across neural ensembles transmitting high-priority information. Furthermore, brain structures that detect stimulus priority interact with phasic NE release to preferentially route such information through large-scale functional brain networks. A surge of NE before, during, or after encoding enhances synaptic plasticity at NE hotspots, triggering local protein synthesis processes that enhance selective memory consolidation. Together, these noradrenergic mechanisms promote selective attention and memory under arousal. GANE not only reconciles apparently contradictory findings in the emotion-cognition literature but also extends previous influential theories of LC neuromodulation by proposing specific mechanisms for how LC-NE activity increases neural gain.

The Now-or-Never bottleneck: A fundamental constraint on language.

Abstract: Memory is fleeting. New material rapidly obliterates previous material. How, then, can the brain deal successfully with the continual deluge of linguistic input? We argue that, to deal with this "Now-or-Never" bottleneck, the brain must compress and recode linguistic input as rapidly as possible. This observation has strong implications for the nature of language processing: (1) the language system must "eagerly" recode and compress linguistic input; (2) as the bottleneck recurs at each new representational level, the language system must build a multilevel linguistic representation; and (3) the language system must deploy all available information predictively to ensure that local linguistic ambiguities are dealt with "Right-First-Time"; once the original input is lost, there is no way for the language system to recover. This is "Chunk-and-Pass" processing. Similarly, language learning must also occur in the here and now, which implies that language acquisition is learning to process, rather than inducing, a grammar. Moreover, this perspective provides a cognitive foundation for grammaticalization and other aspects of language change. Chunk-and-Pass processing also helps explain a variety of core properties of language, including its multilevel representational structure and duality of patterning. This approach promises to create a direct relationship between psycholinguistics and linguistic theory. More generally, we outline a framework within which to integrate often disconnected inquiries into language processing, language acquisition, and language change and evolution.

Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: A sketch of the evidence.

Abstract: Human cooperation is highly unusual. We live in large groups composed mostly of non-relatives. Evolutionists have proposed a number of explanations for this pattern, including cultural group selection and extensions of more general processes such as reciprocity, kin selection, and multi-level selection acting on genes. Evolutionary processes are consilient; they affect several different empirical domains, such as patterns of behavior and the proximal drivers of that behavior. In this target article, we sketch the evidence from five domains that bear on the explanatory adequacy of cultural group selection and competing hypotheses to explain human cooperation. Does cultural transmission constitute an inheritance system that can evolve in a Darwinian fashion? Are the norms that underpin institutions among the cultural traits so transmitted? Do we observe sufficient variation at the level of groups of considerable size for group selection to be a plausible process? Do human groups compete, and do success and failure in competition depend upon cultural variation? Do we observe adaptations for cooperation in humans that most plausibly arose by cultural group selection? If the answer to one of these questions is "no," then we must look to other hypotheses. We present evidence, including quantitative evidence, that the answer to all of the questions is "yes" and argue that we must take the cultural group selection hypothesis seriously. If culturally transmitted systems of rules (institutions) that limit individual deviance organize cooperation in human societies, then it is not clear that any extant alternative to cultural group selection can be a complete explanation.

Homing in on consciousness in the nervous system: An action-based synthesis

Abstract: What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, serving the somatic nervous system. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and "low level" than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is descriptive (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than normative (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness.

Précis of After Phrenology: Neural Reuse and the Interactive Brain

Abstract: Neural reuse is a form of neuroplasticity whereby neural elements originally developed for one purpose are put to multiple uses. A diverse behavioral repertoire is achieved by means of the creation of multiple, nested, and overlapping neural coalitions, in which each neural element is a member of multiple different coalitions and cooperates with a different set of partners at different times. Neural reuse has profound implications for how we think about our continuity with other species, for how we understand the similarities and differences between psychological processes, and for how best to pursue a unified science of the mind. After Phrenology: Neural Reuse and the Interactive Brain (2014; henceforth After Phrenology in this Precis) surveys the terrain and advocates for a series of reforms in psychology and cognitive neuroscience. The book argues that, among other things, we should capture brain function in a multidimensional manner, develop a new, action-oriented vocabulary for psychology, and recognize that higher-order cognitive processes are built from complex configurations of already evolved circuitry.

Are groups more or less than the sum of their members? The moderating role of individual identification.

Abstract: This paper seeks to make a theoretical and empirical case for the importance of differentiated identities for group function. Research on groups has found that groups sometimes perform better and other times perform worse than the sum of their individual members. Differentiation of selves is a crucial moderator. We propose a heuristic framework that divides formation of work or task groups into two steps. One step emphasizes shared common identity and promotes emotional bonds. In the other step, which we emphasize, group members take increasingly differentiated roles that improve performance through specialization, moral responsibility, and efficiency. Pathologies of groups (e.g., social loafing, depletion of shared resources/commons dilemmas, failure to pool information, groupthink) are linked to submerging the individual self in the group. These pathologies are decreased when selves are differentiated, such as by individual rewards, individual competition, accountability, responsibility, and public identification. Differentiating individual selves contributes to many of the best outcomes of groups, such as with social facilitation, wisdom-of-crowds effects, and division of labor. Anonymous confidentiality may hamper differentiation by allowing people to blend into the group (so that selfish or lazy efforts are not punished), but it may also facilitate differentiation by enabling people to think and judge without pressure to conform. Acquiring a unique role within the group can promote belongingness by making oneself irreplaceable.

The economic origins of ultrasociality

Abstract: Ultrasociality refers to the social organization of a few species, including humans and some social insects, having a complex division of labor, city-states, and an almost exclusive dependence on agriculture for subsistence. We argue that the driving forces in the evolution of these ultrasocial societies were economic. With the agricultural transition, species could directly produce their own food and this was such a competitive advantage that those species now dominate the planet. Once underway, this transition was propelled by the selection of within-species groups that could best capture the advantages of (1) actively managing the inputs to food production, (2) a more complex division of labor, and (3) increasing returns to larger scale and larger group size. Together these factors reoriented productive life and radically altered the structure of these societies. Once agriculture began, populations expanded as these economic drivers opened up new opportunities for the exploitation of resources and the active management of inputs to food production. With intensified group-level competition, larger populations and intensive resource exploitation became competitive advantages, and the "social conquest of Earth" was underway. Ultrasocial species came to dominate the earth's ecosystems. Ultrasociality also brought a loss of autonomy for individuals within the group. We argue that exploring the common causes and consequences of ultrasociality in humans and the social insects that adopted agriculture can provide fruitful insights into the evolution of complex human society.

Précis of Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency.

Abstract: Does it make sense for people to hold one another responsible for what they do, as happens in countless social interactions every day? One of the most unsettling lessons from recent psychological research is that people are routinely mistaken about the origins of their behavior. Yet philosophical orthodoxy holds that the exercise of morally responsible agency typically requires accurate self-awareness. If the orthodoxy is right, and the psychology is to be believed, people characteristically fail to meet the standards of morally responsible agency, and we are faced with the possibility of skepticism about agency. Unlike many philosophers, I accept the unsettling lesson from psychology. I insist, however, that we are not driven to skepticism. Instead, we should reject the requirement of accurate self-awareness for morally responsible agency. In Talking to Our Selves I develop a dialogic theory, where the exercise of morally responsible agency emerges through a collaborative conversational process by which human beings, although afflicted with a remarkable degree of self-ignorance, are able to realize their values in their lives.

Self-interested agents create, maintain, and modify group-functional culture

Abstract: We agree that institutions and rules are crucial for explaining human sociality, but we question the claim of there not being "alternatives to CGS [that] can easily account for the institutionalized cooperation that characterizes human societies" (target article, sect. 7). Hypothesizing that self-interested individuals coercively and collaboratively create rules, we propose that agent-based hypotheses offer viable alternatives to cultural group selection (CGS).

Seeing and thinking: Foundational issues and empirical horizons.

Abstract: The spectacularly varied responses to our target article raised big-picture questions about the nature of seeing and thinking, nitty-gritty experimental design details, and everything in between. We grapple with these issues, including the ready falsifiability of our view, neuroscientific theories that allow everything but demand nothing, cases where seeing and thinking conflict, mental imagery, the free press, an El Greco fallacy fallacy, hallucinogenic drugs, blue bananas, subatomic particles, Boeing 787s, and the racial identities of geometric shapes.

Tweaking the concepts of perception and cognition.

Abstract: One approach to the issue of a joint in nature between perception and cognition is to investigate whether the concepts of perception and cognition can be tweaked to avoid direct, content-specific effects of cognition on perception.

Parochial prosocial religions: Historical and contemporary evidence for a cultural evolutionary process

Abstract: In our response to the 27 commentaries, we refine the theoretical claims, clarify several misconceptions of our framework, and explore substantial disagreements. In doing so, we (1) show that our framework accommodates multiple historical scenarios; (2) debate the historical evidence, particularly about "pre-Axial" religions; (3) offer important details about cultural evolutionary theory; (4) clarify the term prosociality; and (4) discuss proximal mechanisms. We review many interesting extensions, amplifications, and qualifications of our approach made by the commentators.

GANEing traction: The broad applicability of NE hotspots to diverse cognitive and arousal phenomena.

Abstract: The GANE (glutamate amplifies noradrenergic effects) model proposes that local glutamate-norepinephrine interactions enable "winner-take-more" effects in perception and memory under arousal. A diverse range of commentaries addressed both the nature of this "hotspot" feedback mechanism and its implications in a variety of psychological domains, inspiring exciting avenues for future research.

Attention alters predictive processing.

Abstract: Firestone & Scholl (F&S) bracket many attentional effects as "peripheral," altering the inputs to a cognitive process without altering the processing itself. By way of contrast, I highlight an emerging class of neurocomputational models that imply profound, pervasive, nonperipheral influences of attention on perception. This transforms the landscape for empirical debates concerning possible top-down effects on perception.

Passive frame theory: A new synthesis

Abstract: Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the "implementation" level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.

Cultural group selection follows Darwin's classic syllogism for the operation of selection.

Abstract: The main objective of our target article was to sketch the empirical case for the importance of selection at the level of groups on cultural variation. Such variation is massive in humans, but modest or absent in other species. Group selection processes acting on this variation is a framework for developing explanations of the unusual level of cooperation between non-relatives found in our species. Our case for cultural group selection (CGS) followed Darwin's classic syllogism regarding natural selection: If variation exists at the level of groups, if this variation is heritable, and if it plays a role in the success or failure of competing groups, then selection will operate at the level of groups. We outlined the relevant domains where such evidence can be sought and characterized the main conclusions of work in those domains. Most commentators agree that CGS plays some role in human evolution, although some were considerably more skeptical. Some contributed additional empirical cases. Some raised issues of the scope of CGS explanations versus competing ones.

An action-specific effect on perception that avoids all pitfalls.

Abstract: The visual system is influenced by action. Objects that are easier to reach or catch look closer and slower, respectively. Here, we describe evidence for one action-specific effect, and show that none of the six pitfalls can account for the results. Vision is not an isolate module, as shown by this top-down effect of action on perception.

Beyond disjoint brain networks: Overlapping networks for cognition and emotion.

Abstract: It is taken for granted that the brain is composed of a set of networks. But what is a brain network? How should we characterize them? Adding to Anderson's (2014) persuasive anti-modular framework, I propose that (1) networks do not have a single, unique function; (2) networks are highly overlapping and not disjoint; and (3) tasks reconfigure networks found at rest.

Why we forget our dreams: Acetylcholine and norepinephrine in wakefulness and REM sleep.

Abstract: The ascending fibers releasing norepinephrine and acetylcholine are highly active during wakefulness. In contrast, during rapid-eye-movement sleep, the neocortical tone is sustained mainly by acetylcholine. By comparing the different physiological features of the norepinephrine and acetylcholine systems in the light of the GANE (glutamate amplifies noradrenergic effects) model, we suggest how to interpret some functional differences between waking and rapid-eye-movement sleep.

Why a developmental perspective is critical for understanding human cognition.

Abstract: The evidence that Anderson (2014) marshals in support of his theory of neural reuse is persuasive. However, his theoretical framework currently lacks a developmental dimension. We argue that an account of the fundamental aspects of developmental change, as well as the temporal context within which change occurs, would greatly enhance Anderson's theory.

Ultrasociality, class, threat, and intentionality in human society.

Abstract: Gowdy & Krall neglect an important aspect of human societies, which is that class systems are not genetically based but rather based on threat. In turn, threat presupposes intentionality, so seems to distinguish human from arthropod ultrasociality. Class systems, in turn, seem to explain the distinctive mixture of persistence and instability characteristic of human, but not arthropod, ultrasocial populations.

The functions of ritual in social groups.

Abstract: Ritual cognition builds upon social learning biases that may have become specialized for affiliation within social groups. The adaptive problems of group living required a means of identifying group members, ensuring commitment to the group, facilitating cooperation, and maintaining group cohesion. We discuss how ritual serves these social functions.

Perception, as you make it.

Abstract: The main question that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) pose is whether "what and how we see is functionally independent from what and how we think, know, desire, act, and so forth" (sect. 2, para. 1). We synthesize a collection of concerns from an interdisciplinary set of coauthors regarding F&S's assumptions and appeals to intuition, resulting in their treatment of visual perception as context-free.

Not even wrong: The "it's just X" fallacy.

Abstract: I applaud Firestone & Scholl (F&S) in calling for more rigor. But, although F&S are correct that some published work on top-down effects suffers from confounds, their sweeping claim that there are no top-down effects on perception is premised on incorrect assumptions. F&S's thesis is wrong. Perception is richly and interestingly influenced by cognition.

The role of arousal in predictive coding.

Abstract: Within a predictive coding approach, the arousal/norepinephrine effects described by the GANE (glutamate amplifies noradrenergic effects) model seem to modulate the precision attributed to prediction errors, favoring the selective updating of predictive models with larger prediction errors. However, to explain how arousal effects are triggered, it is likely that different kinds of prediction errors (including interoceptive/affective) need to be considered.

Emotional memory: From affective relevance to arousal.

Abstract: Arousal is typically conceived as a key component of emotional response. We describe here the psychological processes thought to elicit arousal – in particular, the processes involved in the appraisal of affective relevance. The key role of relevance in attentional and memory processing, and its links with arousal, is discussed with respect to the GANE (glutamate amplifies noradrenergic effects) model described by Mather et al.

Convergent evidence for top-down effects from the "predictive brain".

Abstract: Modern conceptions of brain function consider the brain as a “predictive organ,” where learned regularities about the world are utilised to facilitate perception of incoming sensory input. Critically, this process hinges on a role for cognitive penetrability. We review a mechanism to explain this process and expand our previous proposals of cognitive penetrability in visual recognition to social vision and visual hallucinations.

Squeezing through the Now-or-Never bottleneck: Reconnecting language processing, acquisition, change, and structure.

Abstract: If human language must be squeezed through a narrow cognitive bottleneck, what are the implications for language processing, acquisition, change, and structure? In our target article, we suggested that the implications are far-reaching and form the basis of an integrated account of many apparently unconnected aspects of language and language processing, as well as suggesting revision of many existing theoretical accounts. With some exceptions, commentators were generally supportive both of the existence of the bottleneck and its potential implications. Many commentators suggested additional theoretical and linguistic nuances and extensions, links with prior work, and relevant computational and neuroscientific considerations; some argued for related but distinct viewpoints; a few, though, felt traditional perspectives were being abandoned too readily. Our response attempts to build on the many suggestions raised by the commentators and to engage constructively with challenges to our approach.