Maximizing Capacity in Arbitrary Wireless Networks in the SINR Model: Complexity and Game Theory
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Citations
A constant-factor approximation for wireless capacity maximization with power control in the SINR model
Optimal Link Scheduling for Age Minimization in Wireless Systems
Distributed contention resolution in wireless networks
Wireless link scheduling under physical interference model
Maximizing Capacity in Multihop Cognitive Radio Networks under the SINR Model
References
Wireless Communications: Principles and Practice
The capacity of wireless networks
Stability properties of constrained queueing systems and scheduling policies for maximum throughput in multihop radio networks
A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
A framework for uplink power control in cellular radio systems
Related Papers (5)
Frequently Asked Questions (14)
Q2. What are the contributions mentioned in the paper "Maximizing capacity in arbitrary wireless networks in the sinr model: complexity and game theory" ?
In this paper the authors consider the problem of maximizing the number of supported connections in arbitrary wireless networks where a transmission is supported if and only if the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio at the receiver is greater than some threshold. The aim is to choose transmission powers for each connection so as to maximize the number of connections for which this threshold is met. The authors believe that analyzing this problem is important both in its own right and also because it arises as a subproblem in many other areas of wireless networking. The authors study both the complexity of the problem and also present some game theoretic results regarding capacity that is achieved by completely distributed algorithms. The authors show that maximizing the number of supported connections is NP-hard, even when there is no background noise. The authors present a number of approximation algorithms for the problem. The authors examine a completely distributed algorithm and analyze it as a game in which a connection receives a positive payoff if it is successful and a negative payoff if it is unsuccessful while transmitting with nonzero power. The authors show that in this game there is not necessarily a pure Nash equilibrium but if such an equilibrium does exist the corresponding price of anarchy is independent of the number of connections. The authors also show that a mixed Nash equilibrium corresponds to a probabilistic transmission strategy and in this case such an equilibrium always exists and has a price of anarchy that is independent of the number of connections. This work was supported by NSF contract CCF-0728980 and was performed while the second author was visiting Bell Labs in Summer, 2008.
Q3. What is the probability of a transmitter succeeding at power 1?
Note that if i has non-zero probability of broadcasting at some power greater than 0 but less than 1 then the probability of it succeeding at that power must be equal to the probability of it succeeding at power 1, since otherwise it could just switch to power 1 and strictly increase its expected payoff.
Q4. What is the interference caused by connection i at receiver ri′?
The interference caused by connection i at receiver ri′ is pi min{1, (d0/d(ti, ri′))α} ≥ pi min{1, (d0/(d(ri, ri′) + d(ti, ri)))α}
Q5. What is the way to view this setting?
A natural way of viewing this setting is as a game where the transmitters are the players and the pure strategies are power settings.
Q6. What is the problem of maximizing the number of satisfied connections in a linear system?
In general the problem of maximizing the number of satisfied inequalities in a linear system cannot be approximated to within a factor better than nδ for some δ >
Q7. What is the interference heard from the other connections?
The signal received at receiver ri is given by pig(ti, ri) and the interference heard from theother connections is ∑j 6=i pjg(tj , ri).
Q8. What is the definition of a pure Nash equilibrium?
A pure Nash equilibrium is a very natural solution concept, since it would guarantee that everyone broadcasting is doing so successfully while no one not broadcasting could succeed even if they went at maximum power.
Q9. What is the sum of the b values of receivers in B(a, 2d?
Since every transmitter x in M ∩ B(a, d) contributes qxb |OPT\\L|−kkT c to the sum of the b values, and each receiver that it contributes to must be in B(a, 2d), the sum of the b values of receivers in B(a, 2d) is at least z(d)b
Q10. How can the authors get constant approximation algorithms in polynomial time?
in this section the authors show that if dmax is constant then the authors can obtain constant approximation algorithms in polynomial time.
Q11. What is the probability that a transmitter is able to transmit?
If |OPT \\ L| = o(|OPT |) then a superconstant fraction of transmitters are broadcasting with probability 1 in the Nash, which by Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 means that the expected number of successful transmissions in the Nash is at least Ω(|OPT |), which would prove the theorem.
Q12. What is the case in Section IV?
In Section IV the authors consider the extreme case of completely decentralized algorithms that do not exchange any information but instead selfishly maximize their payoffs in a game that the authors design in which a strategy is a transmit power.
Q13. What is the probability that a transmitter would not be successful?
For each transmitter i, let pgood(i) be the probability (over the randomness in the strategies of the other transmitters) that i would be successful if it were to broadcast at power 1. Let pbad(i) = 1 − pgood(i) be the probability that i would not be successful.
Q14. How do the authors get the probability that a hears interference?
By using Markov’s inequality, the authors get that the probability that a hears interference at least twice the expected interference is at most 1/2.