Showing papers on "Morality published in 2015"

Moral Identity and Developmental Theory

Abstract: The notion that self-identity and morality are deeply implicated has long-standing roots in both ethical theory and psychology. In ethical theory it is evident in Harry Frankfurt’s [1971] account of what it means to be a person: A person (as opposed to a wanton ) is someone who cares about morality. A person cares about the desirability of one’s desires (second-order desires) and then wishes to will them all the way to action (second-order volitions). Similarly, Charles Taylor [1989] argued that identity is defined by reference to things that have significance for us. It is the result of strong evaluation about what is worthy or unworthy, and these discriminations are made against a horizon of significance that frames and constitutes who we are as persons. He writes, “My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good or valuable, or what ought to be done or what I endorse or oppose” [Taylor, 1989, p. 27]. The affinity of selfhood and morality is a theme in several psychological traditions as well. Erikson [1968, p. 39] argued, for example, that an ethical capacity is the “true criterion of identity,” but he also noted that “identity and fidelity are necessary for ethical strength” [Erikson, 1964, p. 126]. This suggests that moral identity is the clear goal of both moral and identity development and that in the moral person the two developmental tracks are ideally conjoined. Similarly, Damon and Hart [1982] showed that, within each domain of the “Me Self” (physical, active, social, psychological), the highest level of self-understanding implicates a moral point of view. This suggests that the moral self is the clear outcome of self-development [Lapsley, 2005]. Indeed, recent research has shown that morality is considered indispensable to selfhood; it is the moral self that is essential to our identity, more than personality traits,

A Treatise on Money

Abstract: Translation by Jeannine Emery The previously published article, Francisco Gomez Camaco, “Introduction,” Journal of Markets & Morality 8, no 1 (Spring 2005): 167-198, has been formally retracted by the editors of the Journal of Markets & Morality for improper use of published material without attribution For more information on this retraction, see Jordan J Ballor, “Editorial: Plagiarism in a Digital Age,” Journal of Markets & Morality 17, no 2 (Fall 2014): 349-352

Self-Serving Justifications Doing Wrong and Feeling Moral

Abstract: Unethical behavior by “ordinary” people poses significant societal and personal challenges. We present a novel framework centered on the role of self-serving justification to build upon and advance the rapidly expanding research on intentional unethical behavior of people who value their morality highly. We propose that self-serving justifications emerging before and after people engage in intentional ethical violations mitigate the threat to the moral self, enabling them to do wrong while feeling moral. Pre-violation justifications lessen the anticipated threat to the moral self by redefining questionable behaviors as excusable. Post-violation justifications alleviate the experienced threat to the moral self through compensations that balance or lessen violations. We highlight the psychological mechanisms that prompt people to do wrong and feel moral, and suggest future research directions regarding the temporal dimension of self-serving justifications of ethical misconduct.

Thirty Years of Terror Management Theory: From Genesis to Revelation

Abstract: Terror management theory posits that human awareness of the inevitability of death exerts a profound influence on diverse aspects of human thought, emotion, motivation, and behavior. People manage the potential for anxiety that results from this awareness by maintaining: (1) faith in the absolute validity of their cultural worldviews and (2) self-esteem by living up to the standards of value that are part of their worldviews. In this chapter, we take stock of the past 30 years of research and conceptual development inspired by this theory. After a brief review of evidence supporting the theory's fundamental propositions, we discuss extensions of the theory to shed light on: (1) the psychological mechanisms through which thoughts of death affect subsequent thought and behavior; (2) how the anxiety-buffering systems develop over childhood and beyond; (3) how awareness of death influenced the evolution of mind, culture, morality, and religion; (4) how death concerns lead people to distance from their physical bodies and seek solace in concepts of mind and spirit; and (5) the role of death concerns in maladaptive and pathological behavior. We also consider various criticisms of the theory and alternative conceptualizations that have been proposed. We conclude with a discussion of what we view as the most pressing issues for further research and theory development that have been inspired by the theory's first 30 years.

Religion and morality.

Abstract: The relationship between religion and morality has long been hotly debated. Does religion make us more moral? Is it necessary for morality? Do moral inclinations emerge independently of religious intuitions? These debates, which nowadays rumble on in scientific journals as well as in public life, have frequently been marred by a series of conceptual confusions and limitations. Many scientific investigations have failed to decompose “religion” and “morality” into theoretically grounded elements; have adopted parochial conceptions of key concepts—in particular, sanitized conceptions of “prosocial” behavior; and have neglected to consider the complex interplay between cognition and culture. We argue that to make progress, the categories “religion” and “morality” must be fractionated into a set of biologically and psychologically cogent traits, revealing the cognitive foundations that shape and constrain relevant cultural variants. We adopt this fractionating strategy, setting out an encompassing evolutionary framework within which to situate and evaluate relevant evidence. Our goals are twofold: to produce a detailed picture of the current state of the field, and to provide a road map for future research on the relationship between religion and morality.

Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm and Live with Themselves

Abstract: Preface.- 1. Nature Of Moral Agenc.- 2. Mechanisms Of Moral Disengagement.- 3. Entertainment Industry.- 4. Gun Industry.- 5. Corporate World.- 6. Capital Punishment.- 7. Terrorism And Counterterrorism.- 8. Environmental Sustainability.- References??.- Index.

Why do liberals drink lattes

Abstract: Popular accounts of “lifestyle politics” and “culture wars” suggest that political and ideological divisions extend also to leisure activities, consumption, aesthetic taste, and personal morality. Drawing on a total of 22,572 pairwise correlations from the General Social Survey (1972–2010), the authors provide comprehensive empirical support for the anecdotal accounts. Moreover, most ideological differences in lifestyle cannot be explained by demographic covariates alone. The authors propose a surprisingly simple solution to the puzzle of lifestyle politics. Computational experiments show how the self-reinforcing dynamics of homophily and influence dramatically amplify even very small elective affinities between lifestyle and ideology, producing a stereotypical world of “latte liberals” and “bird-hunting conservatives” much like the one in which we live.

From Gulf to Bridge When Do Moral Arguments Facilitate Political Influence

Abstract: Much of contemporary American political rhetoric is characterized by liberals and conservatives advancing arguments for the morality of their respective political positions. However, research suggests such moral rhetoric is largely ineffective for persuading those who do not already hold one's position because advocates advancing these arguments fail to account for the divergent moral commitments that undergird America's political divisions. Building on this, we hypothesize that (a) political advocates spontaneously make arguments grounded in their own moral values, not the values of those targeted for persuasion, and (b) political arguments reframed to appeal to the moral values of those holding the opposing political position are typically more effective. We find support for these claims across six studies involving diverse political issues, including same-sex marriage, universal health care, military spending, and adopting English as the nation's official langauge. Mediation and moderation analyses further indicated that reframed moral appeals were persuasive because they increased the apparent agreement between the political position and the targeted individuals' moral values.

Gender Differences in Responses to Moral Dilemmas A Process Dissociation Analysis

Abstract: The principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on its consistency with moral norms; the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action depends on its consequences. Previous research suggests that deontological judgments are shaped by affective processes, whereas utilitarian judgments are guided by cognitive processes. The current research used process dissociation (PD) to independently assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations in women and men. A meta-analytic re-analysis of 40 studies with 6,100 participants indicated that men showed a stronger preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments than women when the two principles implied conflicting decisions (d = 0.52). PD further revealed that women exhibited stronger deontological inclinations than men (d = 0.57), while men exhibited only slightly stronger utilitarian inclinations than women (d = 0.10). The findings suggest that gender differences in moral dilemma judgments are due to differences in affective responses to harm rather than cognitive evaluations of outcomes.

The moral self: A review and integration of the literature

Abstract: Summary The role of the self in moral functioning has gained considerable theoretical and empirical attention over the last 25 years. A general consensus has emerged that the self plays a vital role in individuals' moral agency. This surge of research produced a proliferation of constructs related to the moral self, each grounded in diverse theoretical perspectives. Although this work has advanced our understanding of moral thought and behavior, there has also been a lack of clarity as to the nature and functioning of the moral self. We review and synthesize empirical research related to the moral self and provide an integrative framework to increase conceptual coherence among the various relevant constructs. We then discuss emerging opportunities and future directions for research on the moral self as well as implications for behavioral ethics in organizational contexts. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Moral foundations vignettes: a standardized stimulus database of scenarios based on moral foundations theory

Abstract: Research on the emotional, cognitive, and social determinants of moral judgment has surged in recent years. The development of moral foundations theory (MFT) has played an important role, demonstrating the breadth of morality. Moral psychology has responded by investigating how different domains of moral judgment are shaped by a variety of psychological factors. Yet, the discipline lacks a validated set of moral violations that span the moral domain, creating a barrier to investigating influences on judgment and how their neural bases might vary across the moral domain. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by developing and validating a large set of moral foundations vignettes (MFVs). Each vignette depicts a behavior violating a particular moral foundation and not others. The vignettes are controlled on many dimensions including syntactic structure and complexity making them suitable for neuroimaging research. We demonstrate the validity of our vignettes by examining respondents’ classifications of moral violations, conducting exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, and demonstrating the correspondence between the extracted factors and existing measures of the moral foundations. We expect that the MFVs will be beneficial for a wide variety of behavioral and neuroimaging investigations of moral cognition.

Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them

Abstract: MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM, Joshua Greene, New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2013, Pp. 422. ISBN: 978-1-101-63867-5 Reviewed by Geoffrey W. Sutton (Springfield, MO).Joshua Greene invites us to consider the problem of morality by pitting the rights of one group against those of another group who must share common resources in order to survive. In a highly readable style, Greene leads us through classic runaway trolley dilemmas, philosophical conundrums, and neuropsychological investigations to an understanding of how moral psychology informs moral philosophy and offers a groundwork for a metamorality. Joshua Greene is an associate professor in the Psychology Department of Harvard University. He has a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Princeton.Early on Greene sets the social context for the importance of his work. We are members of different moral tribes-groups with different moral values. These values work pretty well most of the time within our tribe but when we encounter other tribes (think conservative vs. liberal political or religious groups) we have a problem which often seems impassable. Not surprisingly, Greene finds controversial issues are matters of sex and death.The tribal differences that erupt into public controversy typically concern sex (e.g., gay marriage, gays in the military, and the sex lives of public officials) and death at the margins of life (e.g., abortion, physician-assisted suicide, the use of embryonic stem cells in research). That such issues are moral issues is surely not arbitrary. Sex and death are the gas pedals and brakes of tribal growth . . . What's less clear is why different tribes hold different views about sex, life, and death, and why some tribes are more willing than others to impose their views on outsiders (p. 11).Greene's purpose is to understand morality. He wants to analyze the core of morality and how it works in our brains. Ultimately, he wishes to offer a solution-a way past the moral dilemmas of our time. The book is organized into 12 chapters spread over five parts. At the risk of being incomplete, I will summarize several subthemes, which I consider most relevant to readers of JPC. After making the case for the importance of resolving moral differences in a more amicable way than the history of war suggests, Greene offers a functionalist definition of morality as "a set of psychological adaptations that allow otherwise selfish individuals to reap the benefits of cooperation (23)." Greene postulates that humans learned to cooperate in order to survive, which sounds like a common sense speculation about the evolutionary origins of complex behavior. Presumably, those who are more altruistic and willing to consider the wellbeing of others will more likely survive than those who go it alone. But the problem is, we only cooperate with those we consider part of our tribe. And we do not naturally cooperate with those from other tribes.In Part I, Greene reviews a number of studies to illustrate the problems inherent in cooperating with others who do not easily resemble members of our tribe. Even 6-month old infants show a preference for those who speak with a local accent. Of course, as the trappings of culture accumulate so do the markers of Us vs. Them. Greene also concerns himself with explaining the psychology of cooperation within groups. We learn about reciprocity norms and the social punishments that can eventually force a person outside a group for violating tribal rules. Matters of honor, reputation, and free-riding are a few of the issues considered. In the end, we learn the importance of valuing moral diversity if we are to hope for peaceful interactions with those from other tribes. …

Origins and Development of Morality

Abstract: Origins and Development of Morality Morality is a central aspect of social life and has been at the core of psychological theories for more than a century. The scientific study of morality poses enduring questions about how individual psychological needs for autonomy and attachment to groups and society can be met while also ensuring the integrity, dignity, and fair treatment of others. Drawing on philosophy, biology, anthropology, and sociology, developmental scientists have addressed these questions by studying the origins and acquisition of morality as well as the sources and nature of change. We provide a brief review of the theories that provided the foundation for research over the past half-century and then reflect on the controversies and misconceptions that still exist. We review current psychological research on the developmental roots of morality, morality and mental state knowledge, and moral judgments and reasoning. We also examine the various contexts, ranging from the family and peer groups to society, in which moral development occurs. The rich and growing literature on children's moral judgments has demonstrated that children's concepts of harm, resource allocation, fair and equal treatment of others, social inequities, and rights each develop from a very focused and narrow form in early childhood to their application to broader situational and cultural contexts. As they grow older, children become able to weigh and coordinate competing concerns in different contexts as they apply their moral judgments and emotions to social situations. We conclude with implications and directions for research. Throughout the chapter, we demonstrate how the study of morality has shed light on fundamental topics in developmental science, contributed novel methods, and discovered new knowledge about child development. Keywords: equality; discrimination; fairness; family relationships; intergroup attitudes; justice; moral emotions; moral judgments; moral neuroscience; morality; peer interactions; prejudice; rights; theory of mind

Aristotelian Character Education

Abstract: This book provides a reconstruction of Aristotelian character education, shedding new light on what moral character really is, and how it can be highlighted, measured, nurtured and taught in current schooling. Arguing that many recent approaches to character education understand character in exclusively amoral, instrumentalist terms, Kristjansson proposes a coherent, plausible and up-to-date concept, retaining the overall structure of Aristotelian character education.After discussing and debunking popular myths about Aristotelian character education, subsequent chapters focus on the practical ramifications and methodologies of character education. These include measuring virtue and morality, asking whether Aristotelian character education can salvage the effects of bad upbringing, and considering implications for teacher training and classroom practice. The book rejuvenates time-honoured principles of the development of virtues in young people, at a time when ‘character’ features prominently in educational agendas and parental concerns over school education systems.Offering an interdisciplinary perspective which draws from the disciplines of education, psychology, philosophy and sociology, this book will appeal to researchers, academics and students wanting a greater insight into character education.

Moral Character in Person Perception

Abstract: Understanding how people form impressions of others is a key goal of social cognition research. Past theories have posited that two fundamental dimensions—warmth and competence—underlie impression formation. However, these models conflate morality with warmth and fail to capture the full role that moral character plays in impression formation. An emerging perspective separates moral character (or morality) from warmth on both theoretical and empirical grounds. When morality is pitted against warmth, morality is clearly a more important driver of impression formation, as revealed by correlational, experimental, and archival studies. Yet social warmth remains important and conveys distinct information that morality does not. Alongside competence, both factors matter not only for person perception but also for other aspects of social cognition, including group perception. Important unanswered questions remain regarding the perceived structure of moral character and the way it is appraised in everyday life.

The Unifying Moral Dyad Liberals and Conservatives Share the Same Harm-Based Moral Template

Abstract: Do moral disagreements regarding specific issues (e.g., patriotism, chastity) reflect deep cognitive differences (i.e., distinct cognitive mechanisms) between liberals and conservatives? Dyadic morality suggests that the answer is "no." Despite moral diversity, we reveal that moral cognition--in both liberals and conservatives--is rooted in a harm-based template. A dyadic template suggests that harm should be central within moral cognition, an idea tested--and confirmed--through six specific hypotheses. Studies suggest that moral judgment occurs via dyadic comparison, in which counter-normative acts are compared with a prototype of harm. Dyadic comparison explains why harm is the most accessible and important of moral content, why harm organizes--and overlaps with--diverse moral content, and why harm best translates across moral content. Dyadic morality suggests that various moral content (e.g., loyalty, purity) are varieties of perceived harm and that past research has substantially exaggerated moral differences between liberals and conservatives.

Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment.

Abstract: Research into moral decision-making has been dominated by sacrificial dilemmas where, in order to save several lives, it is necessary to sacrifice the life of another person It is widely assumed that these dilemmas draw a sharp contrast between utilitarian and deontological approaches to morality, and thereby enable us to study the psychological and neural basis of utilitarian judgment However, it has been previously shown that some sacrificial dilemmas fail to present a genuine contrast between utilitarian and deontological options Here, I raise deeper problems for this research paradigm Even when sacrificial dilemmas present a contrast between utilitarian and deontological options at a philosophical level, it is misleading to interpret the responses of ordinary folk in these terms What is currently classified as "utilitarian judgment" does not in fact share essential features of a genuine utilitarian outlook, and is better explained in terms of commonsensical moral notions When subjects deliberate about such dilemmas, they are not deciding between opposing utilitarian and deontological solutions, but engaging in a richer process of weighing opposing moral reasons Sacrificial dilemmas therefore tell us little about utilitarian decision-making An alternative approach to studying proto-utilitarian tendencies in everyday moral thinking is proposed

A Constructionist Review of Morality and Emotions No Evidence for Specific Links Between Moral Content and Discrete Emotions

Abstract: Morality and emotions are linked, but what is the nature of their correspondence? Many “whole number” accounts posit specific correspondences between moral content and discrete emotions, such that harm is linked to anger, and purity is linked to disgust. A review of the literature provides little support for these specific morality–emotion links. Moreover, any apparent specificity may arise from global features shared between morality and emotion, such as affect and conceptual content. These findings are consistent with a constructionist perspective of the mind, which argues against a whole number of discrete and domain-specific mental mechanisms underlying morality and emotion. Instead, constructionism emphasizes the flexible combination of basic and domain-general ingredients such as core affect and conceptualization in creating the experience of moral judgments and discrete emotions. The implications of constructionism in moral psychology are discussed, and we propose an experimental framework for rigorously testing morality–emotion links.

Empathy, Justice, and Moral Behavior

Abstract: Empathy shapes the landscape of our social lives. It motivates prosocial and caregiving behaviors, plays a role in inhibiting aggression, and facilitates cooperation between members of a similar social group. Thus, empathy is often conceived as a driving motivation of moral behavior and justice, and as such, everyone would think that it should be cultivated. However, the relationships between empathy, morality, and justice are complex. We begin by explaining what the notion of empathy encompasses and then argue how sensitivity to others' needs has evolved in the context of parental care and group living. Next, we examine the multiple physiological, hormonal, and neural systems supporting empathy and its functions. One troubling but important corollary of this neuro-evolutionary model is that empathy produces social preferences that can conflict with fairness and justice. An understanding of the factors that mold our emotional response and caring motivation for others helps provide organizational principles and ultimately guides decision-making in medical ethics.

Approach, Ability, Aftermath: A Psychological Process Framework of Unethical Behavior at Work

Abstract: Many of the scandalous organizational practices to have come to light in the last decade—rigging LIBOR, misselling payment protection insurance, rampant Wall Street insider trading, large-scale bribery of foreign officials, and the packaging and sale of toxic securities to naive investors—require ethically problematic judgments and behaviors. However, dominant models of workplace unethical behavior fail to account for what we have learned from moral psychology and cognitive neuroscience in the past two decades about how and why people make the moral decisions they do. In this review, we explain how intuition, affect, physiology, and identity support and inform more deliberative reasoning process in the construction and enactment of moral behavior. We then describe how these processes play into how individuals approach a potential moral choice, whether they have the ability in the moment to enact it, and how it is encoded in the action' aftermath, feeding back into future approaches. Throughout, we...

Understanding ordinary unethical behavior: why people who value morality act immorally

Abstract: Cheating, deception, organizational misconduct, and many other forms of unethical behavior are among the greatest challenges in today's society. As regularly highlighted by the media, extreme cases and costly scams are common. Yet, even more frequent and pervasive are cases of ‘ordinary’ unethical behavior — unethical actions committed by people who value and care about morality but behave unethically when faced with an opportunity to cheat. In this article, I review the recent literature in behavioral ethics and moral psychology on ordinary unethical behavior.

Impure or Just Weird? Scenario Sampling Bias Raises Questions About the Foundation of Morality

Abstract: Moral psychologists have used scenarios of abuse and murder to operationalize harm and chicken-masturbation and dog-eating to operationalize impurity. These scenarios reveal different patterns of m...

Three Principles to REVISE People’s Unethical Behavior

Abstract: Dishonesty and unethical behavior are widespread in the public and private sectors and cause immense annual losses. For instance, estimates of U.S. annual losses indicate $1 trillion paid in bribes, $270 billion lost due to unreported income, and $42 billion lost in retail due to shoplifting and employee theft. In this article, we draw on insights from the growing fields of moral psychology and behavioral ethics to present a three-principle framework we call REVISE. This framework classifies forces that affect dishonesty into three main categories and then redirects those forces to encourage moral behavior. The first principle, reminding, emphasizes the effectiveness of subtle cues that increase the salience of morality and decrease people's ability to justify dishonesty. The second principle, visibility, aims to restrict anonymity, prompt peer monitoring, and elicit responsible norms. The third principle, self-engagement, increases people's motivation to maintain a positive self-perception as a moral person and helps bridge the gap between moral values and actual behavior. The REVISE framework can guide the design of policy interventions to defeat dishonesty.

Groups and morality

Abstract: Across social and personality psychology, there is renewed interest in morality. Consistent with these fields’ general emphasis on subjective psychological processes, recent work tends to view any thought, feeling, or behavior that includes a notion of right and wrong as moral (for a review, see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). This makes moral psychology an unusually diverse topic. Therefore, this chapter reviews a wide swath of relevant work, on topics ranging from personality, self-perception, and self-esteem; to social cooperation, trust, and interdependence; to stereotypes, prejudice, and group identity. Although social and personality psychologists examine individuals’ use of specific notions of right and wrong—based on such concepts as justice, trustworthiness, warmth, cooperation, and harm— they tend to avoid the question of whether individuals’ subjective notions of right and wrong are actually moral in an objective sense (Blasi, 1990). In this respect, psychology diverges sharply from a philosophical or ethical approach, which typically compares individuals’ subjective notions of morality to a conception of morality that is defined objectively by principle or shared practice (Blasi, 1990; for discussions in philosophy, see MacIntyre, 1984; Rawls, 1971). Given that morality is not defined objectively in social and personality psychology, we must attend closely to which notions of right and wrong researchers consider to be in the moral domain. As explained in the following section, some notions of morality, such as trustworthiness and justice, are more compatible with an objective sense of the concept, given their basis in principles or shared practices. Perhaps because social psychology defines moral thought, feeling, and behavior as that which individuals subjectively consider right or wrong, the focus has been on individuals in general (for reviews, see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Monin & Jordan, 2009; Pagliaro, 2012). Thus, the morality of particular individuals has been relatively neglected by social psychologists. The first section discusses the roots of the individual approach to morality in social psychology. It also reviews distinct approaches to moral personality and honor, which focus on individuals’ particular moral self-views. Although moral personality may appear to have little to do with groups, individual ideas about morality rely on some reference to what a moral person is like (for a general discussion, see Harre, 1993). And, whatever their particularities, individuals are moral or immoral in their families, in their neighborhoods, in their workplaces, and in their countries. Thus, even individual morality operates within groups. For these reasons, and others that will be discussed, understanding groups and morality is essential to understanding morality in general. Thus, the second section reviews four of the central ways in which groups are important to morality. The third section reviews the ways in which perceived morality is important to examinations of stereotypes and prejudice toward out-groups. The fourth section

Deconstructing intent to reconstruct morality

Abstract: Mental state representations are a crucial input to human moral judgment. This fact is often summarized by saying that we restrict moral condemnation to ‘intentional’ harms. This simple description is the beginning of a theory, however, not the end of one. There is rich internal structure to the folk concept of intentional action, which comprises a series of causal relations between mental states, actions and states of affairs in the world. Moral judgment shows nuanced patterns of sensitivity to all three of these elements: mental states (like beliefs and desires), the actions that a person performs, and the consequences of those actions. Deconstructing intentional action into its elemental fragments will enable future theories to reconstruct our understanding of moral judgment.