Showing papers on "Reciprocity (social psychology) published in 2006"

The grammar of society

Abstract: In The Grammar of Society, first published in 2006, Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and change. Drawing on several intellectual traditions and methods, including those of social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account of how social norms emerge, why and when we follow them, and the situations where we are most likely to focus on relevant norms. Examining the existence and survival of inefficient norms, she demonstrates how norms evolve in ways that depend upon the psychological dispositions of the individual and how such dispositions may impair social efficiency. By contrast, she also shows how certain psychological propensities may naturally lead individuals to evolve fairness norms that closely resemble those we follow in most modern societies.

Promises and Partnership

Abstract: We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations in order to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game theory. When players exhibit such guilt aversion, communication may influence motivation and behavior by influencing beliefs about beliefs. Promises may enhance trustworthy behavior, which is what we observe. We argue that guilt aversion may be relevant for understanding strategic interaction in variety of settings, and that it may shed light on the role of language, discussions, agreements, and social norms in these contexts.

Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories

Abstract: Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that material self-interest exclusively motivates all people. Experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence in recent years, however, that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis, suggesting that concerns for altruism, fairness, and reciprocity strongly motivate many people. Moreover, several theoretical papers demonstrate that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories then induced a first wave of experimental research which offered exciting insights into both the nature of preferences and the relative performance of competing fairness theories. The purpose of this chapter is to review these developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research. We also discuss recent neuroeconomic evidence that is consistent with the view that many people have a taste for mutual cooperation and the punishment of norm violators. We further illustrate the powerful impact of fairness concerns on cooperation, competition, incentives, and contract design.

Let's Get Personal: An International Examination of the Influence of Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other Regarding Preferences

Abstract: This paper identifies when other-regarding preferences (ORPs) such as trust, reciprocity and altruism will likely arise. We experimentally examine the influence of social distance and communication on ORPs in four countries. We demonstrate that country of origin significantly influences ORPs, but also find mixed support for the relationship between ORPs and social distance; increasing social distance has the expected negative effect in the individually oriented U.S., but its effects internationally are different. This interaction is explained by an individual's cultural orientation. Finally, we show strong evidence that personal but irrelevant communication significantly increases ORPs.

Reciprocity and Constructions of Informed Consent: Researching with Indigenous Populations

Abstract: In this article, the authors present a discussion of institutional review boards and potential challenges qualitative researchers may face when presenting human subjects research proposals to these boards for approval. In particular, they focus on issues of consent and reciprocity with Indigenous populations, whose culture and traditions might be quite different from those review boards typically see. After presenting these issues, the authors close with a framework that can be used as a guide for ethical considerations in research with Indigenous peoples.

Let's get personal: An international examination of the influence of communication, culture and social distance on other regarding preferences

Abstract: This paper identifies when other-regarding preferences (ORPs) such as trust, reciprocity and altruism will likely arise. We experimentally examine the influence of social distance and communication on ORPs in four countries. We demonstrate that country of origin significantly influences ORPs, but also find mixed support for the relationship between ORPs and social distance; increasing social distance has the expected negative effect in the individually oriented U.S., but its effects internationally are different. This interaction is explained by an individual's cultural orientation. Finally, we show strong evidence that personal but irrelevant communication significantly increases ORPs.

The challenge of affluence : self-control and well-being in the United States and Britain since 1950

Abstract: Explores the ways in which affluence breeds impatience, and impatience undermines well-being, in the United States and the United Kingdom. Considers how the resources of well-being are conventionally evaluated, focusing on the impact of economic resources on subjective and social well-being. Studies the psychic challenges of reconciling a variety of wants and desires at different time ranges. Investigates reciprocity, the main source of rewards outside the market. Examines how advertising balances its dependence on expectations of honesty with the temptation to deceive. Analyzes eating as a straightforward conflict between the satisfaction of appetite and the consequences for physical appearance and health. Investigates the hedonic dynamics of anticipation and habituation, focusing on household appliances and automobiles. Explores the rewards of status, with the advantages of ranking over other people, and the psychic, economic, and health costs of status complaints, or ranking below other people. Discusses the dilemmas of love under affluence. Traces the costs of these dilemmas. Offer is Chichele Professor of Economic History at the University of Oxford, Fellow of All Souls College, and Fellow of the British Academy. Bibliography; index.

Microeconomic models of family transfers

Abstract: Standard homo economicus lives in a world of complete markets and maximizes utility which is a function of his personal consumption. This approximation cannot account for parents making transfers to adult children, children taking care of old parents, nor for gifts, inheritance and many other services exchanged within families. Such behavior can be derived from three main mechanisms. Firstly, in the so-called pure altruism model, the parent's utility is augmented by the utility of his child. This leads to transfers from the parent to his child. An important feature of this model is the strong property of redistributive neutrality: since parents and child pool their income, any government transfer to one will be undone by the other adjusting his transfer. In a second model, altruism is impure as the parents want the child to behave in a certain way: exchange and strategic considerations enter the picture, as both parents' and child's income become endogenous. Thirdly, in a non-altruistic setting, with imperfect credit market, transfers to children and to old parents correspond to a reciprocity contract and are an investment for old age. Families embody long term and widespread commitments: born as a needy child, one becomes a parent and ultimately a (perhaps) needy grandparent. Moreover for much of what is exchanged within families, there is no market substitute. These features explain why the network of reciprocities can be large both in time and space, why those transfers change but do not disappear as market or public insurance develop, and why displacing them can have perverse side effects. Family transfers influence intra- and inter-generational inequality, hence the importance to assess their motivation. Tests usually conclude that the income pooling predicted by pure altruism is not observed, but family transfers are also far from being entirely motivated by direct exchange considerations.

A survey of economic theories and field evidence on pro-social behavior

Abstract: In recent years, a large number of economic theories have evolved to explain people's pro-social behavior and the variation in their respective behavior. This paper surveys economic theories on pro-social behavior and presents evidence - mainly from the field - testing these theories. In addition, the survey emphasizes that institutional environment might significantly interact with pro-social preferences and explain some of the variation in observed pro-social behavior.

Microeconomic models of family transfers

Abstract: Standard homo economicus lives in a world of complete markets and maximizes utility which is a function of his personal consumption. This approximation cannot account for parents making transfers to adult children, children taking care of old parents, nor for gifts, inheritance and many other services exchanged within families. Such behavior can be derived from three main mechanisms. Firstly, in the so-called pure altruism model, the parent's utility is augmented by the utility of his child. This leads to transfers from the parent to his child. An important feature of this model is the strong property of redistributive neutrality: since parents and child pool their income, any government transfer to one will be undone by the other adjusting his transfer. In a second model, altruism is impure as the parents want the child to behave in a certain way: exchange and strategic considerations enter the picture, as both parents' and child's income become endogenous. Thirdly, in a non-altruistic setting, with imperfect credit market, transfers to children and to old parents correspond to a reciprocity contract and are an investment for old age. Families embody long term and widespread commitments: born as a needy child, one becomes a parent and ultimately a (perhaps) needy grandparent. Moreover for much of what is exchanged within families, there is no market substitute. These features explain why the network of reciprocities can be large both in time and space, why those transfers change but do not disappear as market or public insurance develop, and why displacing them can have perverse side effects. Family transfers influence intra- and inter-generational inequality, hence the importance to assess their motivation. Tests usually conclude that the income pooling predicted by pure altruism is not observed, but family transfers are also far from being entirely motivated by direct exchange considerations.

The elements of justice

Abstract: What is justice? Questions of justice are questions about what people are due. However, what that means in practice depends on the context in which the question is raised. Depending on context, the formal question of what people are due is answered by principles of desert, reciprocity, equality, or need. Justice, therefore, is a constellation of elements that exhibit a degree of integration and unity. Nonetheless, the integrity of justice is limited, in a way that is akin to the integrity of a neighborhood rather than that of a building. A theory of justice offers individuals a map of that neighborhood, within which they can explore just what elements amount to justice.

Social capital online: Collective use of the Internet and reciprocity as lubricants of democracy

Abstract: This article puts the democratic potential of using the Internet into perspective through an analysis of how collective uses of the Internet promote social capital. Research results reveal that social capital online (i.e. trust and reciprocity) is enhanced by involvement in collective use of the Internet such as participation in online communities and use of the Internet among informal groups in everyday life. This process could counter negative aspects of Internet use. Further, accumulated online social capital can be a powerful predictor of online political participation, i.e. online reciprocity has a positive effect on intention to participate in online civic discussion. Finally, the authors' analyses indicate the possibility of a spillover of online social capital into offline arenas. It is concluded that collective use of the Internet can be a lubricant for democracy.

Familial Roles and Social Transformations Older Men and Women in Sub-Saharan Africa

Abstract: By focusing on old people in sub-Saharan Africa, the author illustrates the need for comparative analyses of how culture, sociopolitical systems, and sweeping social change shape lives, interconnections, opportunities, and constraints among older people. In such work, gender contrasts are critical. Because of their position in reproduction and marital patterns, women in sub-Saharan Africa have tended to use lineal strategies, focused on children and grandchildren, in contrast to the more lateral, partner-oriented strategies followed by men. Migration into urban areas and the AIDS pandemic have left many older women in charge of grandchildren in rural areas with inadequate resources and infrastructure. Shaped by traditional values, norms, and roles in their early lives, they currently find many expectations unmet. Indeed, some of the traditional norms that ensured respect, support, reciprocity, and embeddedness may now leave many older people, especially women, isolated, weakened, and victims of illness an...

The Evolution of Contingent Cooperation

Abstract: Reciprocal altruism has been proposed as a foundation of cooperation in humans. The core feature of reciprocity is the contingent relationship between acts of giving and receiving among social partners. However, contingency has remained largely an elusive concept with little empirical scrutiny. Food sharing in smallscale, nonmarket societies is a classic context for examining conditional cooperation. The debate concerning whether food sharing is a crucial component of household provisioning or a form of display geared toward personal benefit hinges on whether food is given conditionally. Several forms of contingency are defined here, and it is shown that a significant contingency relationship exists in food exchange among two groups of forageragriculturalists, the Ache of Paraguay and the Hiwi of Venezuela. Exchange imbalances tend to favor lowerproducing families, close kin, and nearby neighbors. These results have implications for understanding fairness in forager societies.

Social psychology and economics

Abstract: Contents: Preface. Part I: Introduction. D. De Cremer, M. Zeelenberg, J.K. Murnighan, Social Animals and Economic Beings: On Unifying Social Psychology and Economics. Part II: Preferences, Utility, and Choice. D.M. Messick, Utility and the Psychology of Preference. A. Schotter, Conventional Behavior. C.K.W. De Dreu, W. Steinel, Social Decision Making in Fuzzy Situations: Motivated Information Processing and Strategic Choice. E.T. Higgins, How Regulatory Fit Creates Value. Part III: Emotions. T. Ketelaar, The Role of Moral Sentiments in Economic Decision Making. M. Zeelenberg, R. Pieters, Feeling Is for Doing: A Pragmatic Approach to the Study of Emotions in Economic Behavior. Part IV: Reciprocity, Cooperation, and Fairness. E. van Dijk, D. De Cremer, Tacit Coordination and Social Dilemmas: On the Importance of Self-Interest and Fairness. T.R. Tyler, D. De Cremer, Cooperation in Groups. K. McCabe, The Neuroeconomics of Personal and Interpersonal Decision Making. Part V: Social Distance. K. Fujita, Y. Trope, N. Liberman, The Role of Mental Construal in Self-Control. I. Bohnet, How Institutions Affect Behavior: Insights From Economics and Psychology. L. Babcock, M. Gelfand, D. Small, H. Stayn, Gender Differences in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations. Part VI: Challenges to Social Psychology and Economics. M.H. Bazerman, D. Malhotra, Economics Wins, Psychology Loses, and Society Pays. C.D. Batson, "Not All Is Self-Interest After All": Economics of Empathy-Induced Altruism. R. Croson, Contrasting Methods and Comparative Findings in Psychology and Economics. Part VII: Collaborative Reflections and Projections. J.K. Murnighan, A.E. Roth, Some of the Ancient History of Experimental Economics and Social Psychology: Reminiscences and Analysis of a Fruitful Collaboration.

Moral Development in Early Childhood and Social Interaction in the Family

Abstract: Children face moral issues within their families from very early in their lives. The tensions between a child’s own desires and needs, and issues of control, discipline, reciprocity, justice and rights, obligation, and thewelfare of others are daily experienced and negotiated with other familymembers.Young children’s parents and siblings talk every day to children and to each other about why people behave and feel the way they do; about what is allowed and what is not; about moral matters pertaining to welfare, fairness, and property rights; and about social rules that reflect the conventional precepts of the particular social system within which the child is growing up. And from their second year, children participate in (and indeed initiate) such conversations with increasing frequency (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Dunn, 1988; Tizard & Hughes, 2002). Some of these family discussions focus on relatively minor social rules, some are urgent matters of other people’s welfare and rights; some are culture-wide, and some more local issues of practices within the family. Children even in their early years have views on the permissibility of actions, and provide justifications for their views, and they distinguish between different domains of morality and convention (Much & Shweder, 1978; Slomkowski & Killen, 1992; Smetana, 1989; Turiel, 2002).

Self-help groups as mutual support: what do carers value?

Abstract: The literature suggests that the United Kingdom, in common with Europe, North America, Canada and Scandinavia, has seen significant growth in single-issue self-help/mutual aid groups concerned with health and social care issues since the 1970s, but there is only ad hoc academic and policy interest in such groups in the United Kingdom. This article presents findings from a doctoral study with two self-help/mutual aid groups for carers in South-East England. The data are drawn from semistructured interviews with 15 active members which explored reasons for joining, benefits derived from membership, and perceived differences between support gained by membership and their relationship with professionals. Most group members had prior experience of voluntary work/activity, which influenced their decision to join, often prompted by a failure of the 'usual' support network of family/friends to cope or adjust to the carer's needs. Members reported personal gains of empathy, emotional information, experiential knowledge and practical information, based on a core value of reciprocity through peer support. It is this latter benefit that sets apart membership of self-help groups from groups supported by professionals who may not appreciate the scope and breadth of carers' responsibilities, or of the importance of their relationship with the person for whom they care. In this way, self-help groups offered additional, but not alternative, 'space' that enabled members to transcend their traditional role as a 'carer'. It is concluded that self-help/mutual aid groups, based on reciprocal peer support, offer a valuable type of resource in the community that is not replicable in professional-client relations. The findings have contemporary relevance given the raft of new policies which value the experiential knowledge built by both individual and collectives of carers.

Chapter 1 Introduction to the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity

Abstract: Altruism, giving and pro-social conduct, and reciprocity, are the basis of the existence and performance of societies, through their various occurrences: in families; among the diverse motives of the political and public sector; as the general respect and moral conduct which permit life in society and exchanges; for remedying “failures” of markets and organizations (which they sometimes also create); and in charity and specific organizations. Altruism has various origins: it can be hedonistic or natural altruism in empathy, affection, sympathy, emotional contagion, pity, and compassion; or normative altruism of the moral, non-moral social, and rational types. Giving can be altruistic, aimed at producing some social effect in the fields of social sentiments, situations or relations, an intrinsic norm, or self-interested. Reciprocity, in which a gift elicits another gift, is a pervasive social relation due to either a desire of balance (and possibly fairness), or to liking a benevolent giver (moreover, self-interested sequential exchanges look like it). Joint giving for alleviating poverty and need makes giving a contribution to a pure public good for which efficient public transfers crowd out private gifts. Yet, private giving can be an intrinsic norm or a demand of reason, or it can be motivated by the non-moral concern about judgments of others or of oneself. Families – the institutions for love and giving – are networks of reciprocities. Intertemporal giving includes gifts to future generation through bequests, and to earlier generations through the relevant public indebtedness (“retro-gifts”). Normative opinions about societies, and in particular about justice, imply and require altruism and constitute a form of it. Moreover, altruism is the mark of good social relations and good persons. Altruism and giving have always been analysed by economics, notably by all great economists, with an upsurge of studies in the last third of the 20th century.

Evolution in tourism: the theory of reciprocal altruism and tourist-host interactions.

Abstract: Although cooperation in tourism has been studied for some time in regional development, alliance, and marketing contexts, missing is a focus on cooperative relationships which are not based solely on an economic agenda. In this study, the sociobiological theory of reciprocal altruism is explored to explain why cooperation should not take place in tourism. Cooperation is premised on the emergence of long-term, stable relationships based on reciprocity and altruism. The nature of tourism, i.e. limited interactions based on restricted periods of time, stands in the way of cooperation with implications at the micro scale (tourist–host interactions) and at the macro scale (collective interactions within the region as a whole). Ethical and educational strategies are discussed as important intervening variables which may help to stabilise relationships for mutual benefit and symbiosis.

Toward a New Framework of "Server" and "Served": De(and Re)constructing Reciprocity in Service-Learning Pedagogy.

Abstract: This article problemetizes the contemporary view of reciprocity and offers a philosophical foundation for an enriched view based on Dewey’s critique of early stimulus-response theory in psychology and his view of democracy. We situate the argument for reconsidering the provider/recipient model of service learning in the context of a collaboration between a university and school serving children 5-9 years old while implementing an after-school tutoring program. We develop and describe the traditional and enriched models of reciprocity and create a vision for the future establishment of similar collaborations.

Chapter 13 Microeconomic models of family transfers

Abstract: Standard homo economicus lives in a world of complete markets and maximizes utility which is a function of his personal consumption. This approximation cannot account for parents making transfers to adult children, children taking care of old parents, nor for gifts, inheritance and many other services exchanged within families. Such behavior can be derived from three main mechanisms. Firstly, in the so-called pure altruism model, the parent's utility is augmented by the utility of his child. This leads to transfers from the parent to his child. An important feature of this model is the strong property of redistributive neutrality: since parents and child pool their income, any government transfer to one will be undone by the other adjusting his transfer. In a second model, altruism is impure as the parents want the child to behave in a certain way: exchange and strategic considerations enter the picture, as both parents' and child's income become endogenous. Thirdly, in a non-altruistic setting, with imperfect credit market, transfers to children and to old parents correspond to a reciprocity contract and are an investment for old age. Families embody long term and widespread commitments: born as a needy child, one becomes a parent and ultimately a (perhaps) needy grandparent. Moreover for much of what is exchanged within families, there is no market substitute. These features explain why the network of reciprocities can be large both in time and space, why those transfers change but do not disappear as market or public insurance develop, and why displacing them can have perverse side effects. Family transfers influence intra- and inter-generational inequality, hence the importance to assess their motivation. Tests usually conclude that the income pooling predicted by pure altruism is not observed, but family transfers are also far from being entirely motivated by direct exchange considerations.

Social capital or group style? Rescuing Tocqueville’s insights on civic engagement

Abstract: Social capital has become the preeminent concept for studying civic relationships, yet it will not help us assess their meanings, institution-like qualities, or potential for social capacity. Alexis de Tocqueville’s insights on these three features of civic relationships continue to be highly influential, and the popular social capital concept claims a strongly Tocquevillian heritage while systematically missing what a Tocquevillian imagination illuminates. Scenes from volunteer group settings in a midwestern US city show how a concept of group style apprehends the varying meanings, routines, and social capacities of civic ties. Group style also illuminates the process by which civic groups create “bridging” ties beyond the group. Without rejecting the social capital concept entirely, I highlight research questions and findings that social capital would ignore or misapprehend. A concluding discussion draws out implications for democratic theory, and sketches an agenda for future research on civic group style that makes good on Tocquevillian insights while moving beyond Tocqueville’s own limits.

Monitoring, reputation, and ‘greenbeard’ reciprocity in a Shuar work team

Abstract: Summary A collective action (CA), i.e., a group of individuals jointly producing a resource to be shared equally among themselves, is a common interaction in organizational contexts. Ancestral humans who were predisposed to cooperate in CAs would have risked being disadvantaged compared to free riders, but could have overcome this disadvantage through ‘greenbeard’ reciprocity, that is, by assessing the extent to which co-interactants were also predisposed towards cooperation, and then cooperating to the extent that they expected co-interactants to reciprocate. Assessment of others’ cooperativeness could have been based on the direct monitoring of, and on reputational information about, others’ cooperativeness. This theory predicts that (1) CA participants should monitor accurately, and (2) perceived higher-cooperators should have better reputations. These predictions were supported in a study of real-life CAs carried out by a group of Shuar hunter-horticulturalists: (1) members accurately distinguished ‘intentional’ non-cooperators (who could have cooperated but chose not to) from ‘accidental’ noncooperators (who were unable to cooperate), and their perceptions of co-member cooperativeness accurately reflected more objective measures of this cooperativeness; and (2) perceived intentional cooperators had better reputations than perceived intentional non-cooperators. These results have direct applications in organizational contexts, for example, for increasing cooperativeness in self-directed work teams. Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. The evolution of cooperation/altruism (the two terms are often considered essentially synonymous in biology) is a central problem in behavioral biology. Many researchers agree that humans engage in cooperation to a degree that is beyond the explanatory reach of widely-accepted evolutionary theories of cooperation such as kin altruism (Hamilton, 1964; Williams & Williams, 1957) and dyadic reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971). Recent attention has focused on the origins of collective action (CA), defined here as multiple (not necessarily genetically related) individuals cooperating to produce some resource to be shared equally among themselves. The organizational behavior literature has focused on several forms of CA, most commonly on work teams, for example, a team of auto engineers designing

Chapter 21 Altruism, reciprocity and cooperation in the workplace

Abstract: This paper surveys economic models where cooperation arises in the workplace because individuals' utility functions involve a concern for others (altruism) or a desire to respond to like with like (reciprocity). It also discusses empirical evidence which bears on the relevance of these theories. The paper considers separately the feelings employees have for their employers or their supervisors, those that employees have for others that occupy similar positions as themselves and the feelings of supervisors towards their subordinates. Altruism appears to play a role in the last two settings while reciprocity seems useful to explain the way employees react to employer actions which the employees regard as unfair.

The Economics of Human Relationships

Abstract: Behind my reciprocation of a friend's gift may lie both instrumental reasons (I expect further future gifts) and `communicative' reasons (I want to establish or confirm a friendship per se). In a theory of rational individual action, such `communicative' reasons can be incorporated as an argument of an agent's objective function. This chapter starts by reviewing a recent literature that takes this direction and introduces `relational' concerns through the concept of `socially provided goods'. From a `relational' perspective, however, individual intentions are not all that matters: a relation is characterized by the two (or more) persons linked and by the kind of link they have. This perspective, which in our view should complement the more traditional, individualistic one, is particularly suited to embed individual motivations in their social context and to study their co-evolution. In particular, we focus on the conditions under which reciprocity and altruism may survive and even spread over as social norms. Drawing from the literature on the dynamics of social norms, we argue that the combination of individual incentives and the forces of social selection may lead to a contraposition between a society's material success and its well-being, i.e., between its `vitality' and its `satisfaction'. Finally, we consider that the recent literature on the economic analysis of human relationships invites to a new reading of the `classics' of economics and of moral and political philosophy. Both the new and the old literature point at the need to broaden the scope of economic modeling, to lay down the building blocks of a new, up-to-date approach to political economy that is equipped to tackle the challenges posed by advanced industrial societies in their social, cultural and economic selection dimensions.

El valor histórico del pituto: clase media, integración y diferenciación social en Chile

Abstract: This article deals with a practice deeply rooted in the social life of the Chilean middle class : the exchange of favors which, through reciprocity and friendship ties, insures access to diverse types of goods and services. A large array of socio-historical analyses has established that this form of organic solidarity finds its social origins in the very formation of the middle class at the turn of the Twentieth century. I argue here, however, that this practice was affected by macro-sociological processes of social change that significantly transformed it in the course of the following decades. The article describes, analyzes and explains reciprocity through a double historical and sociological lense, examining the various logics at work in this form of social solidarity. Keywords : reciprocity, middle class, social integration.

Towards a typology of reciprocal constructions: focus on German and Japanese

Abstract: The aim of this article is twofold: (a) to offer a detailed analysis of reciprocal constructions in German and Japanese against the background of a preliminary typology of such constructions developed in analogy to the one proposed by L. Faltz (1985) for reflexivity and (b) to examine the implications of these analyses for supporting and possibly refining this typology. Reciprocity is defined as the grammatical encoding of symmetric relations, and four different types of reciprocal constructions are distinguished. Languages typically have more than one strategy at their disposal, which can often be combined but may also contrast and differ in their interpretation. It is shown that symmetric predicates play an important role in reciprocal structures and provide in fact one of their historical foundations. Combinations of quantifiers (and alterity expressions like other), another important source for the development of reciprocal markers, are shown to manifest considerable variation across languages, which is not compatible with the view that they can simply be subsumed under the category "anaphor." Our typological approach provides some new perspectives and perhaps even solutions for some traditional puzzles in the analysis of reciprocal constructions in German and Japanese.