Showing papers on "Social cognitive theory of morality published in 2016"
Book•
15 Dec 2016TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that when they defend their formal model of rationality, most economists implicitly espouse contestable moral principles, such as freedom, rights, equality, and justice.
Abstract: This book shows through argument and numerous policy-related examples how understanding moral philosophy can improve economic analysis, how moral philosophy can benefit from economists' analytical tools, and how economic analysis and moral philosophy together can inform public policy. Part I explores the idea of rationality and its connections to ethics, arguing that when they defend their formal model of rationality, most economists implicitly espouse contestable moral principles. Part II addresses the nature and measurement of welfare, utilitarianism and cost-benefit analysis. Part III discusses freedom, rights, equality, and justice - moral notions that are relevant to evaluating policies, but which have played little if any role in conventional welfare economics. Finally, Part IV explores work in social choice theory and game theory that is relevant to moral decision making. Each chapter includes recommended reading and discussion questions.
254 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a meta-analysis examined the relationship between moral identity and moral behavior, based on 111 studies from a broad range of academic fields including business, developmental psycholog...
Abstract: This meta-analysis examined the relationship between moral identity and moral behavior. It was based on 111 studies from a broad range of academic fields including business, developmental psycholog...
211 citations
TL;DR: This work begins by presenting six types of distress that fall outside the bounds of the traditional definition and explaining why they should be recognized as forms of moral distress, and proposes and defends a new and more expansive definition ofmoral distress.
Abstract: On the traditional view, moral distress arises only in cases where an individual believes she knows the morally right thing to do but fails to perform that action due to various constraints. We seek to motivate a broader understanding of moral distress. We begin by presenting six types of distress that fall outside the bounds of the traditional definition and explaining why they should be recognized as forms of moral distress. We then propose and defend a new and more expansive definition of moral distress and examine how it can enable the development of a taxonomy of moral distress.
154 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that people are often willing to take a moral act that imposes personal material costs when confronted with a clear-cut choice between “right” and “wrong,” such decisions often seem to be dramatically influenced by the specific contexts in which they occur.
Abstract: Research yields ample evidence that individual's behavior often reflects an apparent concern for moral considerations. A natural way to interpret evidence of such motives using an economic framework is to add an argument to the utility function such that agents obtain utility both from outcomes that yield only personal benefits and from acting kindly, honestly, or according to some other notion of “right.” Indeed, such interpretations can account for much of the existing empirical evidence. However, a growing body of research at the intersection of psychology and economics produces findings inconsistent with such straightforward, preference-based interpretations for moral behavior. In particular, while people are often willing to take a moral act that imposes personal material costs when confronted with a clear-cut choice between “right” and “wrong,” such decisions often seem to be dramatically influenced by the specific contexts in which they occur. In particular, when the context provides suffi...
140 citations
TL;DR: The Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES) uniquely predicted willingness to prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and national self-interest, willingness to sacrifice one's life to save others, and volunteering behavior.
Abstract: The nature of our moral judgments-and the extent to which we treat others with care-depend in part on the distinctions we make between entities deemed worthy or unworthy of moral consideration-our moral boundaries. Philosophers, historians, and social scientists have noted that people's moral boundaries have expanded over the last few centuries, but the notion of moral expansiveness has received limited empirical attention in psychology. This research explores variations in the size of individuals' moral boundaries using the psychological construct of moral expansiveness and introduces the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES), designed to capture this variation. Across 6 studies, we established the reliability, convergent validity, and predictive validity of the MES. Moral expansiveness was related (but not reducible) to existing moral constructs (moral foundations, moral identity, "moral" universalism values), predictors of moral standing (moral patiency and warmth), and other constructs associated with concern for others (empathy, identification with humanity, connectedness to nature, and social responsibility). Importantly, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to engage in prosocial intentions and behaviors at personal cost independently of these established constructs. Specifically, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and national self-interest, willingness to sacrifice one's life to save others (ranging from human out-groups to animals and plants), and volunteering behavior. Results demonstrate that moral expansiveness is a distinct and important factor in understanding moral judgments and their consequences. (PsycINFO Database Record
135 citations
TL;DR: If robotic design truly commits to building morally competent robots, then those robots could be trustworthy and productive partners, caretakers, educators, and members of the human community.
Abstract: Robot ethics encompasses ethical questions about how humans should design, deploy, and treat robots; machine morality encompasses questions about what moral capacities a robot should have and how these capacities could be computationally implemented. Publications on both of these topics have doubled twice in the past 10 years but have often remained separate from one another. In an attempt to better integrate the two, I offer a framework for what a morally competent robot would look like (normally considered machine morality) and discuss a number of ethical questions about the design, use, and treatment of such moral robots in society (normally considered robot ethics). Instead of searching for a fixed set of criteria of a robot's moral competence I identify the multiple elements that make up human moral competence and probe the possibility of designing robots that have one or more of these human elements, which include: moral vocabulary; a system of norms; moral cognition and affect; moral decision making and action; moral communication. Juxtaposing empirical research, philosophical debates, and computational challenges, this article adopts an optimistic perspective: if robotic design truly commits to building morally competent robots, then those robots could be trustworthy and productive partners, caretakers, educators, and members of the human community. Moral competence does not resolve all ethical concerns over robots in society, but it may be a prerequisite to resolve at least some of them.
123 citations
TL;DR: This paper reviewed contemporary work on cultural factors affecting moral judgments and values, and those affecting moral behaviors, highlighting examples of within-societal cultural differences in morality, to show that these can be as substantial and important as cross-Societal differences.
Abstract: We review contemporary work on cultural factors affecting moral judgments and values, and those affecting moral behaviors. In both cases, we highlight examples of within-societal cultural differences in morality, to show that these can be as substantial and important as cross-societal differences. Whether between or within nations and societies, cultures vary substantially in their promotion and transmission of a multitude of moral judgments and behaviors. Cultural factors contributing to this variation include religion, social ecology (weather, crop conditions, population density, pathogen prevalence, residential mobility), and regulatory social institutions such as kinship structures and economic markets. This variability raises questions for normative theories of morality, but also holds promise for future descriptive work on moral thought and behavior.
104 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a theoretical model based on social cognitive theory was used to examine leaders' moral identity and moral attentiveness as antecedents of perceived ethical leadership, and follower moral identity, moral attention, and moral attention as outcomes of ethical leadership.
Abstract: In the expanding field of ethical leadership research, little attention has been paid to the association between ethical leaders’ ethical characteristics (beyond personality) and perceived ethical leadership, and, more importantly, the potential influence of ethical leadership on followers’ ethical characteristics. In this study, we tested a theoretical model based upon social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986) to examine leaders’ moral identity and moral attentiveness as antecedents of perceived ethical leadership, and follower moral identity and moral attentiveness as outcomes of ethical leadership. Based upon data from 89 leaders and 460 followers in China, collected at two points in time, we found that leaders’ moral identity and moral attentiveness are associated with follower’s perceptions of ethical leadership. Ethical leadership is, in turn, associated with their followers’ moral identity and moral attentiveness. We found furthermore that ethical leadership mediates the effect of leaders’ moral identity on followers’ moral identity, but not the effect of leaders’ moral attentiveness on followers’ moral attentiveness. We discuss the findings, theoretical contributions, practical implications, and future research
104 citations
TL;DR: The Foreign Language Effect (FLE) as discussed by the authors is defined as the activation of systematic reasoning processes by thinking in a foreign language, and it has been shown to extend to moral judgment.
Abstract: Many have argued that moral judgment is driven by one of two types of processes. Rationalists argue that reasoned processes are the source of moral judgments, whereas sentimentalists argue that emotional processes are. We provide evidence that both positions are mistaken; there are multiple mental processes involved in moral judgment, and it is possible to manipulate which process is engaged when considering moral dilemmas by presenting them in a non-native language. The Foreign-Language Effect (FLE) is the activation of systematic reasoning processes by thinking in a foreign language. We demonstrate that the FLE extends to moral judgment. This indicates that different types of processes can lead to the formation of differing moral judgments. One implication of the FLE is that it raises the possibility that moral judgments can be made more systematic, and that the type of processing used to form them might be relevant to normative and applied ethics.
98 citations
TL;DR: Virtual Reality (VR) moral paradigms examining the action individuals take in a high emotionally arousing, direct action-focused, moral scenario are introduced and suggest that moral action may be viewed as an independent construct to moral judgment.
Abstract: The nature of moral action versus moral judgment has been extensively debated in numerous disciplines. We introduce Virtual Reality (VR) moral paradigms examining the action individuals take in a high emotionally arousing, direct action-focused, moral scenario. In two studies involving qualitatively different populations, we found a greater endorsement of utilitarian responses–killing one in order to save many others–when action was required in moral virtual dilemmas compared to their judgment counterparts. Heart rate in virtual moral dilemmas was significantly increased when compared to both judgment counterparts and control virtual tasks. Our research suggests that moral action may be viewed as an independent construct to moral judgment, with VR methods delivering new prospects for investigating and assessing moral behaviour.
97 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors empirically examined the moral antecedents and consequences of authentic leadership and found that Machiavellianism offsets the positive relationship between moral reasoning and authentic leadership.
Abstract: Drawing on cognitive moral development and moral identity theories, this study empirically examines the moral antecedents and consequences of authentic leadership. Machiavellianism, an individual difference variable relating to the use of the ‘end justifies the means’ principle, is predicted to affect the link between morality and leadership. Analyses of multi-source, multi-method data comprised case studies, simulations, role-playing exercises, and survey questionnaires were completed by 70 managers in a large public agency, and provide support for our hypotheses. Our findings reveal that Machiavellianism offsets the positive relationship between moral reasoning and authentic leadership. Specifically, we show that when Machiavellianism is high, both the positive relationship between moral reasoning and authentic leadership, and the positive relationship between authentic leadership and moral actions, are reversed. This study offers new insights on the underlying processes contributing to the emergence of leaders’ authentic behavior and moral action. Implications for the moral development of leaders, and directions for improved leadership training are provided.
TL;DR: Across all samples and decision tasks men were more likely to make utilitarian moral judgments and act selfishly compared to women, providing further evidence that there are robust gender differences in moral decision-making.
Abstract: Do individuals intuitively favor certain moral actions over others? This study explores the role of intuitive thinking—induced by time pressure and cognitive load—in moral judgment and behavior We conduct experiments in three different countries (Sweden, Austria, and the United States) involving over 1,400 subjects All subjects responded to four trolley type dilemmas and four dictator games involving different charitable causes Decisions were made under time pressure/time delay or while experiencing cognitive load or control Overall we find converging evidence that intuitive states do not influence moral decisions Neither time-pressure nor cognitive load had any effect on moral judgments or altruistic behavior Thus we find no supporting evidence for the claim that intuitive moral judgments and dictator game giving differ from more reflectively taken decisions Across all samples and decision tasks men were more likely to make utilitarian moral judgments and act selfishly compared to women, providing further evidence that there are robust gender differences in moral decision-making However, there were no significant interactions between gender and the treatment manipulations of intuitive versus reflective decision-making
TL;DR: The concept of ethical competence can be defined in terms of character strength, ethical awareness, moral judgement skills and willingness to do good and will guide educators, as well as managers in healthcare, to support the development of ethical conduct in healthcare.
Abstract: Background:Exploring the concept of ethical competence in the context of healthcare is essential as it pertains to better quality of care. The concept still lacks a comprehensive definition covering the aspects of ethical expertise, ethical knowledge and action of a health professional.Objective:This article aims to report an analysis of the concept of ethical competence.Method:A modified strategy suggested by Walker and Avant was used to analyse the concept.Results:As a result, the concept of ethical competence can be defined in terms of character strength, ethical awareness, moral judgement skills and willingness to do good. Virtuous professional, experience of a professional, human communication, ethical knowledge and supporting surroundings in the organisation can be seen as prerequisites for ethical competence. Ethical competence results in the best possible solutions for the patient, reduced moral distress at work and development and democratisation of society.Conclusion:The results of the analysis ...
TL;DR: The authors investigated the link between moral foundations and sustainable consumption and found that people with individualising moral foundations, who tend to the political left, are more likely to engage in sustainable consumption behaviour and demonstrate their commitment to change through political action on sustainability issues than people who hold binding moral foundations.
TL;DR: The Moral Disengagement in Meat Questionnaire (MDMQ) as mentioned in this paper is a measure of selective deactivation of moral self-regulatory processes when considering the impact of meat consumption.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a theoretical model of ethical decision making to explain why a social entrepreneur's perception of moral intensity of the social problem, coupled with their personal desire for control, can significantly influence scaling decisions.
Abstract: While research has focused on why certain entrepreneurs elect to create innovative solutions to social problems, very little is known about why some social entrepreneurs choose to scale their solutions while others do not. Research on scaling has generally focused on organizational characteristics often overlooking factors at the individual level that may affect scaling decisions. Drawing on the multidimensional construct of moral intensity, we propose a theoretical model of ethical decision making to explain why a social entrepreneur’s perception of moral intensity of the social problem, coupled with their personal desire for control, can significantly influence scaling decisions. Specifically, we propose that higher levels of perceived moral intensity will positively influence the likelihood of scaling through open as opposed to closed modes in order to achieve greater speed and scope of social impact. However, we also propose this effect will be negatively moderated by a social entrepreneur’s higher levels of desire for control. Our model has implications for research and practice at the interface of ethics and social entrepreneurship.
TL;DR: A case-study of a Moral Case Deliberation with the dilemma method in a health care institution for people with an intellectual disability is presented, describing the theoretical background and the practical application of the dilemma process.
Abstract: Background
Moral Case Deliberation is a specific form of bioethics education fostering professionals’ moral competence in order to deal with their moral questions. So far, few studies focus in detail on Moral Case Deliberation methodologies and their didactic principles. The dilemma method is a structured and frequently used method in Moral Case Deliberation that stimulates methodological reflection and reasoning through a systematic dialogue on an ethical issue experienced in practice.
TL;DR: This article showed that people can be induced to view their own attitudes as grounded in moral bases, and that this perception alone leads to outcomes associated with strong attitudes, including attitude-relevant behavior and resistance in the face of social influence.
TL;DR: This article found that consumers also engage in moral coupling, a distinct moral reasoning process which allows consumers to integrate judgments of performance and judgments of morality, and found that moral coupling is prevalent and has unique predictive utilities in explaining consumers' evaluation of the transgressor.
Abstract: Public figures’ transgressions attract considerable media attention and public interest. However, little is understood about the impact of celebrity endorsers’ transgressions on associated brands. Drawing on research on moral reasoning, we posit that consumers are not always motivated to separate judgments of performance from judgments of morality (moral decoupling) or simply excuse a wrongdoer (moral rationalization). We propose that consumers also engage in moral coupling, a distinct moral reasoning process which allows consumers to integrate judgments of performance and judgments of morality. In three studies, we demonstrate that moral coupling is prevalent and has unique predictive utilities in explaining consumers’ evaluation of the transgressor (Studies 1 and 2). We also show that transgression type (performance related vs. performance unrelated) has a significant impact on consumers’ choice of moral reasoning strategy (Study 2). Finally, we demonstrate that consumers’ support for (or opposition toward) a brand endorsed by a transgressor is a direct function of moral reasoning choice (Study 3). Findings suggest that public figure’s immoral behavior and its spillover to an extended brand is contingent on consumers’ moral reasoning choices.
TL;DR: First evidence that – at least in middle childhood – moral developmental status seems to be independent from children’s general intelligence assessed by figural inductive reasoning tests is provided.
Abstract: This study investigates the relationship between intelligence and individual differences in children's moral development across a range of different moral transgressions. Taking up prior research that showed morality and intelligence to be related in adolescents and adults, the current study wants to test if these findings can be extended to younger children. The study was designed to address some of the shortcomings in prior research by examining young children aged between 6 years; 4 months and 8 years; 10 months, using a broad concept of moral development including emotional aspects and applying an approach that is closely connected to children's daily lives. Participants (N = 129) completed a standardized intelligence test and were presented four moral transgression stories to assess moral development. Results demonstrated that findings from prior research with adolescents or adults cannot simply be extended to younger participants. No significant correlations of moral development and intelligence were found for any of the presented stories. This provides first evidence that - at least in middle childhood - moral developmental status seems to be independent from children's general intelligence assessed by figural inductive reasoning tests.
TL;DR: The authors found that although people consider intelligence a key factor in determining animals' moral status, they disregard this information when it is self-relevant, and that people believe that learning about pig intelligence will lead to high levels of moral concern, yet when they themselves learn about pigs intelligence, moral concern remains low.
Abstract: Why are many Westerners outraged by dog meat, but comfortable with pork? This is particularly puzzling, given strong evidence that both species are highly intelligent. We suggest that although people consider intelligence a key factor in determining animals’ moral status, they disregard this information when it is self-relevant. In Study 1, we show that intelligence plays a major role in the moral concern afforded to animals in the abstract. In Study 2, we manipulated the intelligence of three animals—pigs, tapirs, and a fictional animal—and find that only for pigs does this information not influence moral standing. Finally, in Study 3, we show that people believe that learning about pig intelligence will lead to high levels of moral concern, yet when they themselves learn about pig intelligence, moral concern remains low. These findings demonstrate an important, predictable inconsistency in how people think about minds and moral concern.
TL;DR: This article draws on the biomedical “enhancement” literature in order to develop a novel ethical framework for evaluating FGM (and related interventions) that takes into account the genuine harms that are at stake in these procedures, but which does not suffer from being based on cultural or moral double standards.
Abstract: The spectrum of practices termed "Female Genital Mutilation" (or FGM) by the World Health Organization is sometimes held up as a counterexample to moral relativism. Those who advance this line of thought suggest the practices are so harmful in terms of their physical and emotional consequences, as well as so problematic in terms of their sexist or oppressive implications, that they provide sufficient, rational grounds for the assertion of a universal moral claim--namely, that all forms of FGM are wrong, regardless of the cultural context. However, others point to cultural bias and moral double standards on the part of those who espouse this argument, and have begun to question the received interpretation of the relevant empirical data on FGM as well. In this article I assess the merits of these competing perspectives. I argue that each of them involves valid moral concerns that should be taken seriously in order to move the discussion forward. In doing so, I draw on the biomedical "enhancement" literature in order to develop a novel ethical framework for evaluating FGM (and related interventions--such as female genital "cosmetic" surgery and nontherapeutic male circumcision) that takes into account the genuine harms that are at stake in these procedures, but which does not suffer from being based on cultural or moral double standards.
TL;DR: Results showed that moral disengagement was associated with bullying and defending behavior at high levels of IAMS, however not when IAMS was low, while self-importance of moral values was not significantly associated to the two behaviors when Iams was high whereas both associations were significant at low levels ofIAMS.
TL;DR: In this article, the influence of individual and situational differences in predicting (un)ethical behavior in these moral gray zones using an in-basket exercise that included covert moral issues in which managers could give unethical instructions to their followers.
Abstract: In the business context, there is a broad spectrum of practices that potentially harm others, yet might benefit the organization. We examined the influence of individual and situational differences in predicting (un)ethical behavior in these moral gray zones using an in-basket exercise that included covert moral issues in which managers could give unethical instructions to their followers. Results show that individual differences in moral disengagement directly predicted unethical behavior and functioned as a mediator of the relationship between authenticity and unethical behavior. Furthermore, effects differed in weak compared to strong situations. Study 2, replicated the results from Study 1, developed a direct test of the situational strength hypothesis, and showed that high versus low situation strength moderated the relation of moral disengagement to unethical behavior.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action, i.e., an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right.
Abstract: To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory (whatever it is); it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a cognitive element—in particular, it involves moral knowledge. I argue that the Rightness Condition is both necessary and sufficient for moral worth. I also argue that the Rightness Condition gives us an attractive account of actions performed under imperfect epistemic circumstances: by agents who rely on moral testimony or by those who, like Huckleberry Finn, have false moral convictions.
TL;DR: It is argued that this puzzling U-shaped trajectory in children’s judgments is best accounted for by a model that posits developmental continuity in moral competence and emphasizes the effect of immature executive function skills on preschoolers’ performance.
Abstract: When preschoolers evaluate actions and agents, they typically neglect agents’ intentions and focus on action outcomes instead. By contrast, intentions count much more than outcomes for older children and adults. This phenomenon has traditionally been seen as evidence of a developmental change in children’s concept of what is morally good and bad. However, a growing number of studies shows that infants are able to reason about agents’ intentions and take them into account in their spontaneous socio-moral evaluations. Here we argue that this puzzling U-shaped trajectory in children’s judgments is best accounted for by a model that posits developmental continuity in moral competence and emphasizes the effect of immature executive function skills on preschoolers’ performance.
TL;DR: A model of morality is outlined which proposes that the evaluation of basic harmful actions relies on complex interactions between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind (ToM) capacities, and inhibitory control resources.
Abstract: Findings in the field of experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have shed new light on our understanding of the psychological and biological bases of morality. Although a lot of attention has been devoted to understanding the processes that underlie complex moral dilemmas, attempts to represent the way in which individuals generate moral judgments when processing basic harmful actions are rare. Here, we will outline a model of morality which proposes that the evaluation of basic harmful actions relies on complex interactions between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind (ToM) capacities, and inhibitory control resources. This model makes clear predictions regarding the cognitive processes underlying the development of and ability to generate moral judgments. We draw on data from developmental and cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychopathology research to evaluate the model and propose several conceptual and methodological improvements that are needed to further advance our understanding of moral cognition and its development.
TL;DR: In this paper, a conceptual model incorporating athlete identification, moral emotions, moral reasoning strategies, and consumer evaluations was proposed and examined to examine how fans maintain their support for the wrongdoer.
Abstract: Athlete endorsers’ transgressions pose a dilemma for loyal fans who have established emotional attachments toward the individual. However, little is known regarding how fans maintain their support for the wrongdoer. Drawing on moral psychology and social identity theory, the current study proposes and examines a conceptual model incorporating athlete identification, moral emotions, moral reasoning strategies, and consumer evaluations. By using an actual scandal involving an NFL player (i.e., Ray Rice), the results show that fan identification suppresses the experience of negative moral emotions but facilitates fans’ moral disengagement processes, which enables fans to support the wrongdoer. Moreover, negative moral emotions motivate the moral coupling process. Findings contribute to the sport consumer behavior literature that highly identified fans seem to regulate negative emotions but deliberately select moral disengagement reasoning strategies to maintain their positive stance toward the wrongdoer and ...
TL;DR: It is argued that health care institutions can be moral communities and profoundly affect the work and identity and, therefore, the moral agency of all who work within those structures, including nurses.
Abstract: It may be the case that the most challenging moral problem of the twenty-first century will be the relationship between the individual moral agent and the practices and institutions in which the moral agent is embedded. In this paper, we continue the efforts that one of us, Joan Liaschenko, first called for in 1993, that of using feminist ethics as a lens for viewing the relationship between individual nurses as moral agents and the highly complex institutions in which they do the work of nursing. Feminist ethics, with its emphasis on the inextricable relationship between ethics and politics, provides a useful lens to understand the work of nurses in context. Using Margaret Urban Walker's and Hilde Lindemann's concepts of identity, relationships, values, and moral agency, we argue that health care institutions can be moral communities and profoundly affect the work and identity and, therefore, the moral agency of all who work within those structures, including nurses. Nurses are not only shaped by these organizations but also have the power to shape them. Because moral agency is intimately connected to one's identity, moral identity work is essential for nurses to exercise their moral agency and to foster moral community in health care organizations. We first provide a brief history of nursing's morally problematic relationship with institutions and examine the impact institutional master narratives and corporatism exert today on nurses' moral identities and agency. We close by emphasizing the significance of ongoing dialogue in creating and sustaining moral communities, repairing moral identities, and strengthening moral agency.
TL;DR: This paper used mathematical models to formally describe how features of moral dilemmas are transformed into decisions, revealing latent subcomponents of moral decisions, improving prediction of moral behavior, and bridging moral psychology and moral neuroscience.
Abstract: The cognitive and affective processes that give rise to moral judgments and decisions have long been the focus of intense study. Here, I review recent work that has used mathematical models to formally describe how features of moral dilemmas are transformed into decisions. Formal models have traditionally been used to study perceptual and value-based learning and decision making, but until recently they had not been applied to the study of moral psychology. Using examples from recent studies, I show how formal models can provide novel and counterintuitive insights into human morality by revealing latent subcomponents of moral decisions, improving prediction of moral behavior, and bridging moral psychology and moral neuroscience.