Showing papers in "Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory in 2019"

Mix and Match: How Contractual and Relational Conditions Are Combined in Successful Public–Private Partnerships

Abstract: In explaining public–private partnership (PPP) performance, both contractual and relational conditions play a role. Research has shown that these conditions may complement each other in successful PPPs. However, which specific combinations of conditions and how these combinations may influence PPP performance remains unclear. Building on the ideas of neo-institutional economics, principal–agent theory, relational contracting, and governance theories, this article explores the mix and match of contractual aspects and relational characteristics in successful PPP projects. A fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of 25 PPP projects in the Netherlands and Flanders (Belgium) was used to test how contractual factors, such as the use of sanctions and risk allocation, and relational conditions, such as trust and conflict management, jointly shape the performance of PPPs. The results show three different combinations of conditions that match with high performing PPPs. These configurations often consist of a mix of contractual and relational conditions, which confirms our initial expectation that these factors complement each other, but a combination of only relational conditions is also present.

Best Practice Recommendations for Replicating Experiments in Public Administration

Abstract: Replication is an important mechanism through which broad lessons for theory and practice can be drawn in the applied interdisciplinary social science field of public administration. We suggest a common replication framework for public administration that is illustrated by experimental work in the field. Drawing on knowledge from other disciplines, together with our experience in replicating several experiments on topics such as decision making, organizational rules, and government-citizen relationships, we provide an overview of the replication process. We then distill this knowledge into seven decision points that offer a clear set of best practices on how to design and implement replications in public administration. We conclude by arguing that replication should be part of the normal scientific process in public administration to help to build valid middle-range theories and provide valuable lessons to practice.

Reducing Minority Discrimination at the Front Line—Combined Survey and Field Experimental Evidence

Abstract: Despite laws of universalistic treatment, bureaucrats have been shown to discriminate against minorities. A crucial question for public administration is how bureaucracies can be organized in ways that minimize illegitimate discrimination. Especially, since theories suggest that prejudices happen unintentionally and particularly under high workload, bureaucrats’ working conditions may be important. Four randomized experiments support the notion that bureaucrats discriminate as a way of coping with high workload. Most notably, a field experiment randomly assigned teachers to reduced workloads by giving them resources to have more time with the same group of students. In a subsequent survey experiment—using a fictitious future scenario unrelated to the resources provided in the field experiment—discrimination was minimized in the field treatment group, but persisted in the control group. The results thereby support the notion that even though discrimination among bureaucrats does not (only) occur in a reflective manner it can be reduced by altering the way bureaucrats’ work is organized.

JPART Virtual Issue on Citizen-State Interactions in Public Administration Research

Abstract: In this virtual issue, we bring together a collection of research articles that—although not usu- ally grouped together—all illustrate the importance of citizen-state interactions. Specifically, we include articles that directly incorporate citizens' perceptions, attitudes, experiences of, or behav- ior related to public administration. About 10% of all JPART articles over the life of the journal so far (1991-2015) met our inclusion criteria. Of those articles, we selected seven for this virtual issue on the basis that they have offered important insights into citizen-state interaction at differ- ent stages of the policy cycle. We argue that public administration scholarship should focus much more on the role of citizens and citizen-state interactions at all stages of the policy cycle. This research should focus both on the different forms of interaction citizens have with administrators, and the outcomes of these interactions, for bureaucracy and for citizens themselves.

Behavioral Dishonesty in the Public Sector

Abstract: We investigate the usefulness of the dice game paradigm to public administration as a standardized way of measuring (dis)honesty among individuals, groups, and societies. Measures of dishonesty are key for the field’s progress in understanding individual, organizational, and societal differences in unethical behavior and corruption. We first describe the dice game paradigm and its advantages and then discuss a range of considerations for how to implement it. Next, we highlight the potential of the dice game paradigm across two diverse studies: prospective public employees in Denmark (n = 441) and prospective public employees in 10 different countries with very different levels of corruption (n = 1,091). In the first study, we show how individual-level behavioral dishonesty is very strongly negatively correlated with public service motivation. In the second study, we find that widely used country-level indicators of corruption are strongly correlated with the average behavioral dishonesty among prospective public employees. The results illustrate the importance of the validated dice game paradigm to shed light on core questions that link micro- and macro-level dynamics of dishonesty and corruption in the public sector.

Theorizing from qualitative research in public administration: plurality through a combination of rigor and richness

Abstract: Scholars emphasize the need for additional rigor in qualitative research. This inadvertently encourages formulaic and standardized approaches that undermine the benefits of theorizing from rich data. Our study extends debate by emphasizing the importance of sound qualitative public administration research that blends rigor with richness and thereby facilitates effective theorization. Evidence from a narrative review of 31 qualitative studies published within six leading public administration journals demonstrates that effective theorizing is linked to transparency in research design, analytic approach and theoretical contribution. In-depth interrogation of four studies that illustrate ‘inductive theorizing’ and ‘abductive theorizing’ identifies plurality in the balance struck between rigor and richness. We derive a broad set of principles that enable researchers to make a convincing ‘conceptual leap’ between data, analysis and contribution. We also emphasize the need to accommodate pluralistic approaches to theorizing by nuancing requirements for essential aspects of qualitative reporting, versus those amenable to variation.

Nonprofit Spending and Government Provision of Public Services: Testing Theories of Government-Nonprofit Relationships

Abstract: Empirical studies and theories of government-nonprofit relationships have assumed a unidirectional funding flow from governments to nonprofits and therefore focusing on the impact of governments on nonprofits. By bringing in the critical mass theory and utilizing a unique panel dataset that contains nonprofit and city government spending on parks, this article examines several prominent theoretical models of government-nonprofit relationships to answer the question of how expenditures of park-supporting charities influence public spending on parks and recreation services. The findings suggest that nonprofit spending on parks in a city has a non-linear decreasing effect on public spending on parks, which supports the market niche model. In addition, this relationship is mainly driven by local governments’ non-capital expenditures on parks. Finally, this article suggests that a two-way understanding is essential for theory building in government-nonprofit relationships. Ostrom Workshop Research Series Yuan (Daniel) Cheng

Can Government Public Communications Elicit Undue Trust? Exploring the Interaction between Symbols and Substantive Information in Communications

Abstract: Effective public communications have been proposed as a remedy for citizens’ distrust in government. Recent studies pointed to the emotional effect of symbolic elements, entangled in government public communications (e.g., logos, images, and celebrities). Still, they did not examine the interaction between these symbols and the substantive information in communications about bureaucracies’ performance and policies. Exploring this interaction is important for understanding the theoretical mechanisms underlying the effect of symbolic communication on citizens’ trust. Also, it is essential to assess symbols’ potency to unduly compensate for unfavorable or logically unpersuasive information, and enable public organizations to escape justified public criticism. Building on the social psychology Elaboration Likelihood Model, I theorize that symbols may increase citizens’ trust by conducing citizens to pay less attention to logically unpersuasive information, and thus offsetting its negative effect. I test this indirect mechanism via a large survey experiment, focusing on the Israeli Environment Protection Ministry. The experimental results support the research hypotheses and suggest that the effect of symbolic elements is stronger when communications include logically unpersuasive information. I discuss the implications of these findings for democratic responsiveness and accountability.

Executive Control and Turnover in the Senior Executive Service

Abstract: If presidents wish to see their policy priorities implemented, they need control over key decision-making positions often occupied by career executives. This article examines whether political conflict with a new administration drives career executives from their positions. This can happen because presidents target specific individuals or because career professionals anticipate conflict and strategically exit before a new president takes office. To assess this dynamic, we use novel data that combine individual survey responses with personnel records to analyze the probability that an agency executive departs her position from March 2015 to July 2017. Given our findings that turnover is driven by both presidential marginalization and strategic exit by bureaucrats, we conclude with implications for presidential efforts to control the bureaucracy. Modern governance is increasingly bureaucratic governance. Legislatures have responded to the expanding volume and complexity of government work by delegating more policymaking authority to the administrative state. In the U.S. government of close to 2.8 million civilian employees, only a fraction of management positions are filled by political appointment. Members of the permanent bureaucracy staff the remainder of important positions. In theory, career executives staffing agencies are neutral and serve presidents of either party equally well. Yet, many career executives have preferences over the direction of agency policymaking that conflict those of the president. The strength of those preferences may make it difficult for them to work with an administration and some may resist implementation of the president’s policy agenda if it conflicts with their views. Ideological conflict between career executives and the president affects both the incentives of presidents to control agencies and the incentives of career executives to remain in their position. In this article, we ask whether position and ideology affect the departure decisions of civil servants after elections. The transition from President Obama to President Trump illustrates the conflict between presidents and career executives and its implications for the career decisions of civil servants. In news reports, career executives describe the new administration’s use of tactics intended to drive them from their positions, including involuntary reassignments, exclusion from policymaking, and being asked to retire (Clement 2017; Cohen 2017; Price 2017; Shear and Lichtblau 2017). For example, a scientist in the Department of the Interior described being involuntarily reassigned from a policy analyst position that focused on adaptation to climate change to an accounting office (Clement 2017). Others explain that exit is the result of deep disagreement with the policies of the Trump administration (Cohen 2017; Price 2017; Rank 2017). These anecdotal accounts suggest an exodus of federal bureaucrats who find themselves in conflict with the Trump administration with some exiting before the transition and others after. In what follows, we aim to provide a careful exploration of how the political environment affects departures of high-level bureaucrats. D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /jpart/arti/2/159/5237879 by gest on 24 O cber 2021 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2019, Vol. 29, No. 2 160 If presidents wish to see their priorities implemented, they need to establish control over key decision-making positions. Some positions exert more authority over the direction of agency policymaking, particularly individuals in positions that personnel officials have labeled as “choke points” for policymaking (Heclo 1977; Lewis 2011; Lewis and Waterman 2013). These are positions that are the spigots of policymaking in the agencies. Persons holding such positions often must sign off on key decisions. We contend that presidents are more likely to target those in such positions. We also expect that presidents are more likely to marginalize individuals with ideologically divergent preferences who are unlikely to support their agenda. As a result, turnover among these individuals should increase after a presidential transition. Yet, because of the protections that civil service rules provide, we argue that the incentives of career officials also affect turnover. We contend that after an election, career executives consider working conditions under a new presidential administration, and some will strategically exit before a transition occurs if they anticipate conflict under the new administration. We assess presidential efforts to control positions filled by high-level career executives by examining the behavior of members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) through the transition from President Obama to President Trump. Members of the SES typically occupy top-level positions, and by design, serve as the link between the administration and the career officials more generally. They are a class of career bureaucrats that have an impact on policymaking in the agency and are visible enough that they may be targeted by a presidential administration.1 Although we focus on the SES, we believe that our argument is generalizable to other career executives at a comparable level of management, but do not expect that argument extends to those occupying lower level positions (Bolton, de Figueiredo, and Lewis 2017). To test the claims advanced in the article, we use a novel dataset that combines individual survey responses (providing details of career executives’ positions and policy views) with personnel records (providing details about their careers including exit). With this data, we analyze the probability that an agency executive departs her position each month from March 2015 to July 2017. In the past, it has been difficult to identify key positions and examine both the views and actual careers of their occupants. Yet with access to new data, we are able to obtain information about an individual career executive’s ideology, professional responsibilities, and exit decisions. The paper leverages new data to assess these questions more systematically and with greater precision than has been previously possible. We find suggestive evidence that in the transition from President Obama to President Trump, individuals in positions with more authority over the direction of policymaking are more likely to leave. Departure is clearly more likely when civil servants experience ideological conflict with the president. After President Trump’s election, liberal executives were more likely to depart than conservative executives. This contrasts with the 2 years prior to the election, when ideology is not associated with departure decisions. Departures by ideologically distant career executives enhance presidential control over key positions held by career service personnel because turnover provides the new administration with the opportunity to promote likeminded bureaucrats to important positions. We conclude that new presidential administrations have substantial latitude to reshape the key positions in government held by civil servants, partly because of voluntary choices made by these career executives. Of course, the cost of this form of control is the loss of experienced civil servants. Knowledgeable and experienced career executives are vital for the successful implementation of complex policies and the presence of executives with views contrary to the president checks the influence of the new administration on policy outcomes (Harris and Milkis 1989; Rourke 1990). Presidential Control and Exit Decisions Extensive research examines the factors that drive turnover among agency personnel. Some scholars have examined how factors, such as job security, agency-specific expertise, policy discretion, and job market conditions, affect a civil servant’s incentives to remain in the agency and develop expertise (Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Gailmard and Patty 2007, 2012; Huber and McCarty 2004). Others focus on the impact of economic opportunity and paths of professional advancement on the decision to remain in a position or depart (Adolph 2013; Lee and Whitford 2008; Teodoro 2011; Whitford and Lee 2015). Another important area examines the influence of public service motivation and values on the decision to remain in public service (see, e.g., Bright 2008; Perry and Wise 1990). Research has also explored how organizational factors, such as performance pay, affect career decisions (Bertelli 2006; Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan 2008; Pitts, Marvel, and Fernandez 2011). The political environment also importantly shapes exit. The primary means by which presidents exert 1 Although the argument applies to top-level career bureaucrats and is tested on a sample of career SES, we refer to these individuals with several terms, including career executives and civil servants throughout the text. D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /jpart/arti/2/159/5237879 by gest on 24 O cber 2021 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2019, Vol. 29, No. 2 161 control over the bureaucracy is through the strategic use of personnel (see, e.g., Durant 1987, 1992; Nathan 1975; Weko 1995). Scholars have carefully examined presidential strategies for controlling agency personnel through appointments (see, e.g., Heclo 1977; Mackenzie 1981; Moe 1985; Lewis 2008; Light 1995; Pfiffner 1996; Weko 1995). Considerably less research assesses how senior career executives respond to conflict with elected officials and their appointees. Scholars have examined executive self-reports from interviews and surveys that highlight instances of appointees marginalizing ideologically divergent bureaucrats, particularly during the Nixon and Reagan administrations (e.g., Aberbach and Rockman 2000; Durant 1987, 1992; Golden 1992, 2000; Maranto 1993, 2005; Nathan 1975). Although one response to conflict is shirking or sabotage, another is for bureaucrats with skills to exit the agency

Acceptance or Disapproval: Performance Information in the Eyes of Public Frontline Employees

Abstract: Public frontline employees are increasingly exposed to performance information, and their acceptance of this information as a valid, legitimate, and useful foundation for decision-making is central to the success of performance management systems. However, despite this we know very little about what affects frontline employees’ acceptance or disapproval of performance information as well as their willingness to take causal responsibility for the information. We contribute to filling this gap by developing hypotheses claiming that frontline employees are more likely to accept and take causal responsibility for performance information, when their organization is performing well on the performance indicators. Using a survey experiment including 1988 public high school teachers from 121 organizations, we offer evidence that supports our hypotheses. The implication of our argument and results is an ironic problem: Performance information has least creditability as a management tool, among frontline employees, in poorly performing organizations. Preliminary draft. Please do not cite or quote the paper.

Using Large-Scale Social Media Experiments in Public Administration: Assessing Charitable Consequences of Government Funding of Nonprofits

Abstract: In this article we introduce and showcase how social media can be used to implement experiments in public administration research. To do so, we pre-registered a placebo-controlled field experiment and implemented it on the social media platform Facebook. The purpose of the experiment was to examine whether government funding to nonprofit organizations has an effect on charitable donations. Theories on the interaction between government funding and charitable donations stipulate that government funding of nonprofit organizations either decreases (crowding-out), or increases (crowding-in) private donations. To test these competing theoretical predictions, we used Facebook’s advertisement facilities and implemented an online field experiment among 296,121 Facebook users nested in 600 clusters. Through the process of cluster-randomization, groups of Facebook users were randomly assigned to different nonprofit donation solicitation ads, experimentally manipulating information cues of nonprofit funding. Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find that government funding does not seem to matter; providing information about government support to nonprofit organizations does neither increase nor decreases people’s propensity to donate. We discuss the implications of our empirical application, as well as the merits of using social media to conduct experiments in public administration more generally. Finally, we outline a research agenda of how social media can be used to implement public administration experiments.

Causal Inference Methods: Lessons from Applied Microeconomics

Abstract: This paper discusses causal inference techniques for social scientists through the lens of applied microeconomics. We frame causal inference using the standard of the ideal experiment, emphasizing problems of omitted variable bias and reverse causality. We explore how laboratory and field experiments can succeed and fail to meet this ideal in practice. We then outline how different methods and the statistical assumptions behind them can lead to causal inference in non-experimental contexts. We explain when problems with omitted variables bias can and cannot be addressed using observed controls. We consider tools for studying natural experiments, including difference-in-differences, instrumental variables, and regression discontinuity techniques. Finally, we discuss additional concerns that may arise such as weighting, clustering, multiple inference, and external validity. We include Stata code for implementing each of these methods as well as a series of checklists for researchers detailing important robustness and design checks. Throughout, we emphasize the importance of understanding the context of a study and implementing analyses in a way that acknowledges strengths and limitations.

Public Goods, Private Partnerships, and Political Institutions

Abstract: Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become an essential vehicle for infrastructure development worldwide. Theoretical arguments primarily focus on build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreements as a canonical form of PPP, though they rarely discuss the political underpinnings of governments' decisions to enter such agreements. How does a government's longevity, stability and its capacity to raise revenue make BOTs more attractive than other types of partnerships? Extending recent theoretical advances through concepts of control rights and veto players and statistically analyzing a database of more than 4,300 PPP agreements for new construction of infrastructure in 83 developing economies between 1990-2014, I provide the first large-scale quantitative evidence of the influence of political institutions on government choices to adopt BOTs. I find that BOTs are less attractive as the tenure of the longest-serving veto player increases, when veto players are more frequently replaced, and when governments can generate more tax revenue, but more likely when that revenue is above a country's historic average. My findings contribute to literatures on distributive public policy, hybrid governance, complex project management, and to the policy debate about the role of PPPs in economic development.

Predicting Budgetary Change: The Effect of Performance Gaps

Abstract: Literature on punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) explains the reasons organizations undergo incremental and punctuated policy changes. This study examines PET within the budgeting process. Alongside disproportionate information processing and institutional friction, recent innovations in PET have incorporated organizational history and theories from public administration to explain budgetary fluctuations. Part of the work merging PET with public administration has demonstrated how policy feedback (measured as the absolute level of performance) influences budgetary changes. Building upon this work, this study adds to the literature by examining another measure of policy feedback–organization performance gaps. This is a theoretically interesting question in how managers respond to performance growth and decline over time. It addresses performance budgeting and evidence based policymaking. Results show that while incremental budgetary changes are the most prevalent no matter the performance change, the probability of negative and positive budgetary changes differ across the spectrum of positive and negative performance gaps.

Organizational Dissolutions in the Public Sector: An Empirical Analysis of Municipal Utility Water Districts

Abstract: The proliferation of special-purpose districts and the increasing complexity of local governance systems has been well documented. However, even as new special districts are created, others are being dissolved. This article investigates the extent to which both internal and external factors are at play in municipal utility district dissolutions. Decades of existing empirical studies on private, nonprofit, and interest organizations show that factors internal to organizations, such as institutional structure and resources are significant covariates of organizational mortality. Equally important are external factors, where density dependence and resource partitioning pressures influence organizational survival. Public sector organizations, such as special-purpose water districts, operate in relatively well monitored and statutorily constrained environments, however. Drawing upon the organizational mortality literature, we examine when and why municipal utility water districts that operate in fragmented service delivery systems dissolve. The results show that the relationship between internal and external organizational variables and special-purpose organizational dissolutions is more nuanced than existing research suggests.

Managing the Behavior of Public Frontline Employees through Change-Oriented Training: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment

Abstract: Most public frontline employees work out of sight of management. Direct management through authority and incentives is therefore often challenging. We argue that managers can rely on change-oriented training as an effective management tool that can affect employee behavior and work as an alternative or supplement to commands and incentives. First, we outline the concept of change-oriented training and explain how it can direct the behavior of public employees towards organizational goals and political priorities. Second, we test the effect of change-oriented training on employee behavior in a large-scale field experiment of teachers in Danish public schools. We show that training has a substantial effect on teachers’ behavior in the classroom and infer from this that training should be seen as a valuable management tool with the ability to influence the behavior of frontline employees.

Finding the Golden Mean: Country Size and the Performance of National Bureaucracies

Abstract: This article contributes to the debate on environmental determinants of public service performance by analyzing the effect of country size (population size) on public service effectiveness. It theoretically describes and empirically tests a size-induced trade-off between economies and diseconomies of scale in national bureaucracies. The main argument is that public service performance increases with size due to economies of scale, but it decreases after the optimal country size when bureaucracies become too large and cumbersome to manage. The hypothesized curvilinear effect is tested for the first time empirically in cross-sectional regression models and multilevel within-between RE models that isolate the theoretically relevant between-country effect. The results support the expected inverse U-shaped relation on a global scale and in the subsample of democracies. The findings and their implication for research and practice are discussed: Public management must adapt theoretically and practically to country size as it is a contextual factor beyond the control of managers.

When Your Group Fails: The Effect of Race-Based Performance Signals on Citizen Voice and Exit

Abstract: Abstract: In recent years, performance-based accountability reforms have become widespread— particularly in the public education system—as a means of enhancing service delivery, knowledge, and citizen engagement with government. While an ever-growing literature has considered the overall effects of these administrative systems, few have fully considered the effect of such systems on underlying subgroups of relevance and inequalities in responses across these groups. In this paper, we examine how citizens of various racial subgroups respond when governments send negative race-based signals about the performance of inand out-racial groups. Specifically, we explore whether No Child Left Behind’s (NCLB) race-based failure signals affect racial groups’ use of voice in school board elections and their use of exit from local public schools. To do so, we combine school and voter administrative records in North Carolina with a regression discontinuity design that leverages exogenous variation at NCLB’s race-based school failure cutoffs. Consistent with our theoretical framework, we find that white and black citizens respond differently to race-based failure signals. We find the whites are more responsive overall; responding to failure signals of various types both by voting in local school board elections and exiting local failing schools. African Americans, however, seem much more sensitive to racialized cues—responding at the ballot box but not by exiting when their group fails. These results show that while performance accountability systems have broader effects than previously realized: shifting the composition of local elections and distorting the racial makeup of schools.

Beyond Policy Diffusion: Spatial Econometric Models of Public Administration

Abstract: Interdependence in the decision making or behaviors of various organizations and administrators is often neglected in the study of public administration Failing to account for such interdependence risks an incomplete understanding of the choices made by these actors and agencies As such, we show how researchers analyzing cross-sectional or time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) data can utilize spatial econometric methods to improve inference on existing questions, and, more interestingly, engage a new set of theoretical questions Specifically, we articulate several general mechanisms for spatial dependence that are likely to appear in research on public administration (isomorphism, competition, benchmarking, and common exposure) We then demonstrate how these mechanisms can be tested using spatial econometric models in two applications: first, a cross-sectional study of district-level bilingual education spending and, second, a TSCS analysis on state-level health care administration In our presentation, we also briefly discuss many of the practical challenges confronted in estimating spatial models (eg, weights specification, model selection, effects calculation) and offer some guidance on each