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Toward an integrative Social Identity model of Collective Action: A quantitative
research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives.
van Zomeren, M.; Postmes, T.; Spears, R.
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Psychological Bulletin
2008
DOI (link to publisher)
10.1037/0033-2909.134.4.504
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van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an integrative Social Identity model of Collective
Action: A quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives. Psychological Bulletin, 134,
504-535. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.134.4.504
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Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action: A
Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-Psychological Perspectives
Martijn van Zomeren
VU University, Amsterdam
Tom Postmes
University of Groningen and University of Exeter
Russell Spears
Cardiff University
An integrative social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) is developed that incorporates 3
socio-psychological perspectives on collective action. Three meta-analyses synthesized a total of 182
effects of perceived injustice, efficacy, and identity on collective action (corresponding to these socio-
psychological perspectives). Results showed that, in isolation, all 3 predictors had medium-sized (and
causal) effects. Moreover, results showed the importance of social identity in predicting collective action
by supporting SIMCA’s key predictions that (a) affective injustice and politicized identity produced
stronger effects than those of non-affective injustice and non-politicized identity; (b) identity predicted
collective action against both incidental and structural disadvantages, whereas injustice and efficacy
predicted collective action against incidental disadvantages better than against structural disadvantages;
(c) all 3 predictors had unique medium-sized effects on collective action when controlling for between-
predictor covariance; and (d) identity bridged the injustice and efficacy explanations of collective action.
Results also showed more support for SIMCA than for alternative models reflecting previous attempts at
theoretical integration. The authors discuss key implications for theory, practice, future research, and
further integration of social and psychological perspectives on collective action.
Keywords: collective action, injustice, efficacy, social identity
What is it that mobilizes people to participate in social protest?
This has been a key question in social science from the foundation
of its various disciplines, and numerous explanations have been
explored. Research has examined social movements, social groups,
and experimental groups, embedded in different social contexts,
and studied with different methods and measures. Although qual-
itative reviews of this literature are abundant (e.g., Kelly &
Breinlinger, 1996; Klandermans, 1997, 2004; Marx & Wood,
1975; McPhail, 1971; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a), there is at present
no quantitative research synthesis of the literature that focuses on
multiple predictors of collective action and their interrelations.
This is unfortunate for several reasons.
First, although the literature on this topic is large and multifac-
eted there is substantial scope for theoretical integration (e.g.,
Klandermans, 1997, 2004). Indeed, given recent calls for greater
integration in this domain, a quantitative synthesis that evaluates
and integrates these theoretical advances would seem both timely
and valuable. Second, a quantitative research synthesis of psycho-
logical predictors of collective action is of interest to disciplines
including psychology, sociology, political science, and economics.
In such a multidisciplinary arena, a key challenge is to bridge
subjective (psychological) and social (structural) perspectives on
when, why, and how people engage in social protest. This chal-
lenge is underlined by several recent efforts in the literature to
advance our understanding of the interaction between the two (e.g.,
Klandermans, 1997; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). This is not just
a theoretical concern—a greater understanding of the interplay
between individual and social conditions that foster mobilization
has important practical consequences as well.
However, in order to successfully meet this challenge we
need an integrative psychological perspective that specifies the
key subjective predictors of collective action as well as their
interrelationships. The main aim of this quantitative research
synthesis is therefore to integrate three socio-psychological
perspectives on collective action that focus on subjective injus-
tice, identity, and efficacy as key predictors of collective action.
We first review each of these perspectives on collective action,
and then propose an integrative social identity model of collec-
tive action (SIMCA) that—unlike previous attempts at theoret-
ical integration—accounts for the relationships between the
three predictors as well as their predictive effects on collective
action. Second, we meta-analytically examine (a) the viability
of the three perspectives in isolation, (b) the viability of a
number of moderator variables suggested in the literature, and
Martijn van Zomeren, Department of Social Psychology, VU Univer-
sity, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Tom Postmes, Department of Social
and Organizational Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, The
Netherlands, and University of Exeter, Exeter, England; Russell Spears,
School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, England.
We would like to thank all authors who kindly responded to our request
for unpublished work on collective action.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Martijn
van Zomeren, Department of Social Psychology, VU University, Amster-
dam, Van der Boechorstraat 1, 1081 BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
E-mail: m.van.zomeren@psy.vu.nl
Psychological Bulletin Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
2008, Vol. 134, No. 4, 504 –535 0033-2909/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.134.4.504
504
(c) the evaluation of, and comparisons between, SIMCA and
models based on previous attempts at theoretical integration.
Three Theoretical Perspectives on Collective Action
Collective action has been of long-standing interest to many
different disciplines, including sociology, political science, eco-
nomics, history, and psychology (e.g., Blumer, 1939; Davies,
1962; Davis, 1959; Gurr, 1968, 1970; McAdam, 1982; M. Olson,
1968; Smelser, 1962; Tarrow, 1998; R. H. Turner & Kilian, 1972).
The starting point of many approaches to collective action is the
assumption that it is a response to an objective state of disadvan-
tage. This implies that one can identify specific material conditions
as ulterior “causes” of collective strife (e.g., Hovland & Sears,
1940).
Although objective conditions are undoubtedly important, large-
scale systematic historical analyses demonstrate that their empir-
ical relation to collective action, popular disturbance, and mass
violence is elusive and weak at best (e.g., Green, Glaser, & Rich,
1998; Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly, 1975). Perhaps as a result, over the past
3 decades or so the literature has increasingly concerned itself with
the more proximal socio-psychological determinants of collective
action (Klandermans, 1997). The starting assumption of these
approaches is that people respond to a subjective sense of disad-
vantage, which can (to some extent) appear to deviate from, and
hence not necessarily flow from, the “objective” physical condi-
tions (e.g., Major, 1994; Postmes, Branscombe, Spears, & Young,
1999). Indeed, many current theories and studies of collective
action make little or no attempt to consider the objective material
conditions and focus almost exclusively on the social and psycho-
logical dimension of protest. It is these theories and their tests that
are central to this research synthesis.
The three subjective variables that could affect collective action
that have received most scholarly attention are perceived injustice,
perceived efficacy, and a sense of social identity
1
(Gamson, 1992;
Klandermans, 1997, 2004). Each of these constructs stems from its
own distinct theoretical tradition, and these schools of thought
have sometimes been portrayed as providing conflicting explana-
tions for collective action (e.g., Finkel & Rule, 1987; Gurney &
Tierney, 1982; Walker & Smith, 2002). More recently, however,
some attempts at theoretical integration have been made (e.g.,
Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Klander-
mans, 1984, 1997, 2004; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke,
1999; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a). Crucially, these different at-
tempts make different predictions, yet none of them considers all
the relationships between these three factors and their predictive
effects on collective action, and none therefore succeeds in being
truly integrative across the theoretical spectrum. To this end, we
propose SIMCA as a new and integrative perspective on collective
action, which proposes that social identity is central to collective
action because it directly motivates collective action and simulta-
neously bridges the injustice and efficacy explanations of collec-
tive action. Before outlining our model, however, we first discuss
the three dominant perspectives on collective action in isolation.
Explaining Collective Action Through Perceived Injustice
Following the traditional assumption that (objective) depriva-
tion propels collective action, the emphasis in research and theory
gradually shifted from studying the consequences of objective
inequality to studying the consequences of its subjective experi-
ence. This development was initiated by observations that objec-
tive deprivation alone did not predict collective action particularly
well. Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, and Williams (1949)
introduced the concept of relative deprivation to explain why
objective deprivation does not always predict peoples’ dissatisfac-
tions with their lots. This research examined, among other things,
why military police who were given slow promotions were nev-
ertheless more satisfied than air corpsmen who were given rapid
promotions. Research such as this led to the development of
relative deprivation theory (RDT; e.g., Crosby, 1976, 1982;
Folger, 1986, 1987; Merton & Kitt, 1950; Pettigrew, 1967; Runci-
man, 1966; Stouffer et al., 1949; Walker & Smith, 2002), which
focused on the subjective experience of unjust disadvantage. Based
on ideas derived, among others, from social comparison theory
(Festinger, 1954), RDT proposes that feelings of deprivation de-
velop on the basis of social comparisons with specific others. In
line with this, Stouffer et al. (1949) concluded that the military
police did not compare themselves with air corpsmen and hence
did not feel deprived. According to RDT, it is only when social
comparisons result in a subjective sense of injustice that collective
action to redress the injustice is likely to occur.
The notion that the subjective experience of inequality carries
greater weight than its objective, material origins is echoed in more
recent developments in the social-psychological literature on fair-
ness judgments, which has explored how people respond to dis-
tributive and procedural fairness (Adams, 1965; Leventhal, 1980;
Lind & Tyler, 1988; Miller, 2000; Thibault & Walker, 1975; Tyler,
Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). For
example, authorities’ use of fair procedures typically diminishes
individuals’ negative reactions to unfavorable outcomes (e.g.,
Folger, 1977). Moreover, theory and research have suggested that
social inequality in distributions can be perceived as fair (e.g., Jost
& Major, 2001; Major, 1994).
RDT developed in two important ways in the last decades. The
first development has been to clarify what social comparisons
foster collective action. H. J. Smith and Ortiz (2002) found meta-
analytic evidence for Runciman’s (1966) proposal that collective
action is likely when people experience fraternal,orgroup-based,
deprivation (see also Cook, Crosby, & Hennigan, 1977; Dion,
1986; Dube´-Simard & Guimond, 1986; Guimond & Dube´-Simard,
1983). There is a conceptual “fit” between the intergroup compar-
isons on which group-based deprivation is based and the inter-
group nature of collective action (Postmes et al., 1999). Indeed,
egoistic deprivation (also referred to as individual-based depriva-
tion, and based on interpersonal comparisons) is less likely to
1
We refer to identity as an explanation of collective action in terms of
peoples’ subjective sense of identification with a group. We chose the term
identity (and not identification) to be in sync with the terms injustice and
efficacy as explanations of collective action. Whereas identification refers
to the subjective affiliation with the group, social identity refers to the
socially shared understandings of what it means to be a group member, and
this typically includes stereotypes of in- and out-groups in relation to each
other as well as appreciations of the relative status of those groups. The
core distinction is therefore that identification reflects the individuals’
relationship to the group, whereas social identity reflects what is consen-
sually held to be the social reality of the group (Postmes & Jetten, 2006).
505
PREDICTING COLLECTIVE ACTION
result in collective action and even has clear negative effects on the
individual’s well-being (Koomen & Fra¨nkel, 1992; Walker &
Mann, 1987; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984).
The second important development in RDT was to explore
what made deprivation such a powerful motivator. In particu-
lar, researchers have examined whether cognitive or affective
components of group-based deprivation affected collective ac-
tion (e.g., Guimond & Dube´-Simard, 1983; Tyler & Smith,
1998). Originally, RDT proposed that collective actions are
propelled by profound feelings of injustice. However, empirical
work in the 1980s and 1990s began to focus more on peoples’
perceptions or cognitive interpretations of inequality. Despite
obvious connections, the two are nonetheless fundamentally
different—the cold knowledge of being less well off than some-
one else may sometimes elicit feelings of injustice, but at other
times such inequality may not be questioned, or even perceived
as just and legitimate. In a meta-analytic test of the traditional
assumptions of RDT, H. J. Smith and Ortiz (2002) found that
whereas perceptions of group-based deprivation predicted col-
lective action, feelings of deprivation were a more powerful
predictor.
This finding resonates with recent theorizing in the area of
intergroup or group-based emotions (Mackie & Smith, 2002; E. R.
Smith, 1993), which, in line with appraisal theories of emotion
(e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Roseman, 2001; Scherer,
1984, 2001; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; for an overview, see
Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001), proposes that group-based
emotions such as anger form a conceptual bridge between group-
based appraisal and specific action tendencies (e.g., Mackie &
Smith, 2002; E. R. Smith, 1993; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, &
Leach, 2004; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). In
contrast to the classic view on emotion in collective action (as
individual and dysfunctional responses; e.g., Le Bon, 1895/1995;
Oberschall, 1973), this contemporary view of group-based emo-
tions assumes that they are functional responses to situations or
events that are relevant to one’s group. More specific to collective
action, when group-based inequality or deprivation is perceived as
unjust, group-based emotions like anger should motivate collective
action because they invoke specific action tendencies to confront
those responsible in order to redress their unfair deprivation. In
other words, such feelings of group-based anger are states of action
readiness (Frijda, 1986).
The current research synthesis therefore examines (a) whether
peoples’ subjective experience of injustice in terms of group-based
inequality or deprivation predicts collective action and (b) whether
the affective experience of injustice produces stronger effect sizes
than those of the non-affective (cognitive) perception of injustice.
Moreover, the synthesis addresses the issue of causality in this
relationship. As such, we go beyond H. J. Smith and Ortiz’s (2002)
meta-analysis of RDT that pertained to relative deprivation but not
to more general perceptions and experiences of injustice. More-
over, the purpose of this research synthesis is not just to test
predictions about peoples’ experiences of injustice derived from
RDT but, more generally, to integrate this perspective with two
other major perspectives on collective action, based in efficacy and
identity concerns, to form a more comprehensive and complete
account of collective action.
Explaining Collective Action Through Perceived Efficacy
RDT came under attack in the seventies by scholars arguing that
a subjective sense of injustice is not sufficient for collective action
to occur (Finkel & Rule, 1987; Gurney & Tierney, 1982; McPhail,
1971; for reviews, see Ferree & Miller, 1985; Klandermans, 1989;
Walker & Smith, 2002). Building on the argument that social
inequality and discrimination exist in almost all societies and are
therefore too pervasive and general to predict collective action,
resource mobilization theorists proposed that the mobilization of
resources by quasi-political organizations is key to moving people
to action (e.g., McCarthy & Zald, 1977; see also Gamson, 1975;
Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978). Resource mobilization theory as-
sumes that social protest constitutes a set of rational collective
actions by groups to advance their goals and interests, pressurizing
those in power to submit to the demands of the disadvantaged. In
this perspective, collective action is a strategic and political enter-
prise rather than a passionate response to felt injustices.
Research on resource mobilization focused accordingly on the
formation and organization of political institutions, in particular of
social movement organizations (SMOs). This focus on objective,
structural factors carried with it an assumption, sometimes im-
plicit, that collective action was based on decisions made by
rational individual actors. In this line of thought, individual deci-
sions to engage in collective action are based on choices to
minimize personal losses and maximize personal gains (M. Olson,
1968). Ironically, despite this emphasis on the individual and his or
her decisions, the concern with rather abstract and instrumental
decision-making processes meant that research attention drifted
away from the consideration of individuals and their subjective
motives for collective action. Instead, resource mobilization re-
search focused largely on more objective social-structural vari-
ables that were hypothesized to serve as anchors or inputs for those
decisions.
Klandermans’s (1984) integration of elements of sociological
and social-psychological theories of collective action marked a
return to combining a consideration of subjective and socio-
structural predictors of collective action. Based on M. Olson’s
(1968) theory of collective action and theories of the attitude–
behavior link (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975, Klandermans (1984) proposed that individual mo-
tives for collective action could be measured by subjective value-
expectancy products. The expectancy component was a particu-
larly important element as it contained peoples’ subjective
expectation of whether collective action would be effective in
achieving its goal(s). Klandermans’s (1984) contribution, although
criticized for being too individualistic (Schrager, 1985), succeeded
in bringing back the subjective element in instrumental explana-
tions of collective action.
2
In line with this reorientation, efficacy has become one of the
key instrumental explanations of collective action—the idea being
that people engage in collective action if people believe this will
make it more likely that relevant goals are achieved. Consistent
2
Theoretically, individual cost-benefit calculation motives should pre
-
dict collective action independent of social identity motives (e.g., Simon et
al., 1998; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a). We therefore expect the former to—if
anything—increase the explained variance in collective action independent
of the SIMCA variables.
506
VAN ZOMEREN, POSTMES, AND SPEARS
with one of the developments in RDT, more recent thinking about
efficacy has begun to explore the group as a basis of the efficacy
construct. Mummendey et al. (1999) proposed that group efficacy
is the more proximal predictor of collective action, defined as the
shared belief that one’s group can resolve its grievances through
unified effort (see also Bandura, 1995, 1997; Folger, 1986, 1987).
Their analysis of group efficacy echoes certain properties of the
classic sociological construct of agency, which similarly refers to
beliefs that individual actions have the potential to shape, and thus
change, the social structure (e.g., Gergen, 1999). In other words,
group efficacy gives people a sense of collective power or strength
on the basis of which they believe themselves capable of trans-
forming the situation and destiny of their group (Drury & Reicher,
2005; Reicher, 1996, 2001). This means that the stronger the
subjective sense of the group’s efficacy, the more likely people are
to engage in collective action (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2006; Kelly &
Breinlinger, 1996; Mummendey et al., 1999).
In line with these accumulated ideas about efficacy, the current
research synthesis examines whether there is an empirical basis for
the proposition that the subjective experience of group efficacy
facilitates collective action. Moreover, the synthesis addresses the
issue of causality in this relationship. However, the main purpose
of this research synthesis is to reconcile the efficacy perspective
with the injustice perspective by using the concept of social
identity as a conceptual bridge between the two.
Explaining Collective Action Through Social Identity
In the seventies, a new social-psychological perspective on
collective action emerged in the form of social identity theory
(SIT; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). SIT proposes that
people generally strive for and benefit from positive social iden-
tities associated with their membership groups. This raises the
question of why people would identify with groups that reflect
negatively on them (e.g., disadvantaged or low status groups).
SIT’s answer is that three socio-structural variables affect how
people manage their identity concerns: The permeability of group
boundaries, the legitimacy of intergroup relations, and their sta-
bility. Permeable group boundaries allow disadvantaged group
members to leave their group for a higher status group, whereas
impermeable group boundaries offer no such “exit” (see also
Hirschmann, 1970). If exit is impossible, people have to make the
most of their situations. They can do so in multiple ways—and one
of them is to engage in social competition, of which collective
action is the clearest expression.
According to SIT, when members of a lower status group
perceive the intergroup status differential to be illegitimate and
unstable, they are more likely to identify with their group and
engage in collective action to change the intergroup status differ-
ential (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel, 1978; Turner & Brown, 1978).
Thus, people need to perceive that there are cognitive alternatives
to the status quo before social identification with their group leads
them to mobilize them for collective action. Therefore SIT predicts
that identification with the disadvantaged group is the proximal
predictor of collective action (Ellemers, 1993; Kelly & Brein-
linger, 1996; Mummendey et al., 1999; Tajfel, 1978).
3
Note here
that the illegitimacy and instability of intergroup status differences
are not necessarily identical to perceptions of group-based injus-
tice and efficacy. Whereas the former refer to the more distal
socio-structural factors that SIT predicts will influence social iden-
tities, the latter two refer to more proximal psychological expla-
nations of collective action (see also Mummendey et al., 1999).
Reicher and colleagues in particular have applied these ideas to
collective action (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000, 2005;
Reicher, 1996, 2001), in their argument that social identity serves
to mobilize people for social change. Simon, Stu¨rmer, and col-
leagues (e.g., Simon et al., 1998; for a review, see Stu¨rmer &
Simon, 2004a) took this argument one step further in the context
of SMOs by proposing that identification with an SMO is even
more predictive of collective action than is identification with the
disadvantaged group because the former is a politicized identity.
As Simon and Klandermans (2001) defined the concept, people
“evince politicized collective identity to the extent that they en-
gage as self-conscious group members in a power struggle on
behalf of their group knowing that it is the more inclusive societal
context in which this struggle has to be fought out” (p. 319). In
other words, people can develop more specific “activist” identities
through engaging in collective action. Not unlike the political
focus of resource mobilization theory, politicized identity focuses
on the political struggle for power with the authorities in the public
domain (see also Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996), which allows the
political to become a (personal) identity project (see Klein, Spears,
& Reicher, 2007) that transforms individuals’ identity from one
defined by social circumstance into a more agentic one (Drury &
Reicher, 1999). Politicized identity more specifically connects
people to the structural plight of the disadvantaged group, resulting
in an “inner obligation” to participate in social movement activities
(Stu¨rmer, 2000; Stu¨rmer & Simon, 2004a).
In sum, the current research synthesis examines whether social
identity predicts collective action. Moreover, the synthesis ad-
dresses the issue of causality in this relationship. We also take into
account the nature of that identity in order to investigate whether
politicized identities are more strongly bound up with collective
action than are non-politicized identities.
Aims of the Quantitative Research Synthesis
The overarching purpose of the research synthesis is to ascertain
the magnitude and stability of the effect of each of the three
predictors of collective action identified above. Within, we focus
on three key issues. First, we examine whether there is evidence
for the causal assumption that injustice, efficacy, and identity
predict collective action. Second, we examine evidence for mod-
erator variables of the effect sizes (e.g., affective injustice should
produce stronger effects than does non-affective injustice, and
politicized identity should produce stronger effects than does non-
politicized identity). Third, the viability of SIMCA and alternative
3
This relationship between group identification and collective action is
only predicted to exist under the conditions of relative impermeability,
illegitimacy, and instability (Tajfel, 1978) because these are the conditions
when collective action becomes viable as an identity management strategy.
Because those conditions were met in virtually all the studies included in
this meta-analysis, we could not test this aspect of the predictions made by
SIT (but see Ellemers, 1993; Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001).
However, it did allow us to test the predictions of SIT regarding the effects
of social identification more effectively.
507
PREDICTING COLLECTIVE ACTION
