Showing papers on "Rationality published in 2014"
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a model of endogeneity among organizations, the professions, and legal institutions, which suggests that organizations and the professors strive to construct rational responses to law, enabled by "rational myths" or stories about appropriate solutions that are themselves modeled after the public legal order.
Abstract: Most accounts of organizations and law treat law as largely exogenous and emphasize organizations' responses to law. This study proposes a model of endogeneity among organizations, the professions,and legal institutions. It suggests that organizations and the professors strive to construct rational responses to law, enabled by "rational myths" or stories about appropriate solutions that are themselves modeled after the public legal order. Courts, in turn, recognize and legitimate organizational structures that mimic the legal form, thus conferring legal and market benefits upon organizational structures that began as gestures of compliance. Thus, market rationality can follow from rationalized myths: the professions promote a particular compliance strategy, organizations adopt this strategy to reduce costs and symbolize compliance, and courts adjust judicial constructions of fairness to include these emerging organizational practices. To illustrate this model, a case study of equal employment opportunity (EEO) grievance procedures is presented in this article.
476 citations
08 Jul 2014
TL;DR: This paper introduces a reverse auction framework to model the interactions between the platform and the smartphones, and rigorously proves that optimally determining the winning bids is NP hard.
Abstract: In this paper, we tackle the problem of stimulating smartphone users to join mobile crowdsourcing applications with smartphones. Different from existing work of mechanism design, we uniquely take into consideration thecrucial dimension of location informationwhen assigning sensing tasks to smartphones. However, the location awareness largely increases the theoretical and computational complexity. In this paper, we introduce a reverse auction frameworkto model the interactions between the platform and the smartphones. We rigorously prove that optimally determining the winning bids isNP hard. In this paper we design a mechanism called TRACwhich consists of two main components. The first component is a near-optimal approximate algorithm for determining the winning bids with polynomial-time computation complexity, which approximates the optimal solution within a factor of 1+l n(n), wheren is the maximum number of sensing tasks that a smartphone can accommodate. The second component is a critical payment scheme which, despite the approximation of determining winning bids, guarantees that submitted bids of smartphones reflect their real costs of performing sensing tasks. Through both rigid theoretical analysis and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed mechanism achieves truthfulness, individual rationality and high computation efficiency.
375 citations
TL;DR: This work uses a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states and investigates the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole.
Abstract: Both in philosophy and in psychology, human rationality has traditionally been studied from an 'individualistic' perspective. Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality. In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states. Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole.
260 citations
TL;DR: A framework for including information-processing bounds in rational analyses based on the idea that behaviors are generated by cognitive mechanisms that are adapted to the structure of not only the environment but also the mind and brain itself is proposed.
Abstract: We propose a framework for including information-processing bounds in rational analyses. It is an application of bounded optimality (Russell & Subramanian, 1995) to the challenges of developing theories of mechanism and behavior. The framework is based on the idea that behaviors are generated by cognitive mechanisms that are adapted to the structure of not only the environment but also the mind and brain itself. We call the framework computational rationality to emphasize the incorporation of computational mechanism into the definition of rational action. Theories are specified as optimal program problems, defined by an adaptation environment, a bounded machine, and a utility function. Such theories yield different classes of explanation, depending on the extent to which they emphasize adaptation to bounds, and adaptation to some ecology that differs from the immediate local environment. We illustrate this variation with examples from three domains: visual attention in a linguistic task, manual response ordering, and reasoning. We explore the relation of this framework to existing “levels” approaches to explanation, and to other optimality-based modeling approaches.
143 citations
TL;DR: This paper raised a set of cautions regarding public value governance along two dimensions: the first is that public value is often presented as a democratizing agenda, leading works sidestep foundational questions of power and conflict and advance prescriptions that are at odds with important democratic values, which risks producing a new variant of neoliberal rationality, extending and strengthening the de-democratizing, market-oriented project that its proponents seek to overturn.
Abstract: This article raises a set of cautions regarding public value governance along two dimensions. First, it questions the common claim that public value governance poses a direct challenge to the economistic logic of neoliberalism. Second, although public value is often presented as a democratizing agenda, leading works sidestep foundational questions of power and conflict and advance prescriptions that are at odds with important democratic values. Without attending to these problems, the public value concept risks producing a new variant of neoliberal rationality, extending and strengthening the de--democratizing, market-oriented project that its proponents seek to overturn.
136 citations
TL;DR: This article argued that traditional intuitions are incomplete because they ignore the eect that changes in voter behavior have on the equilibrium behavior of politicians, and that increases in voter information or voter rationality sometimes make democratic performance better and sometimes makes democratic performance worse.
Abstract: A long research tradition in behavioral political science evaluates the performance of democracy by examining voter competence. This literature got its start arguing that voters’ lack of information undermines a defense of democracy rooted in electoral accountability. A more recent literature deepens the debate, with some authors claiming that voters eectively use cues to substitute for information about candidates and policies, and other authors claiming that voters are insuciently rational to do so. We argue that, regardless of its conclusions about voter competence, this literature’s singleminded focus on voter behavior is misguided. We use a sequence of formal models to show that traditional intuitions are incomplete because they ignore the eect that changes in voter behavior have on the equilibrium behavior of politicians. When this strategic interaction is taken into account, increases in voter information or voter rationality sometimes make democratic performance better and sometimes makes democratic performance worse. One simply cannot assess the implications of voter characteristics for democratic performance without also studying how those characteristics aect the
132 citations
TL;DR: It is suggested that it is convenient to distinguish between two behavioral approaches to improve economic analyses, which highlights violations of the rational model and proposes descriptive models that capture these violations.
Abstract: The rationality assumption that underlies mainstream economic theory has proved to be a useful approximation, despite the fact that systematic violations to its predictions can be found. That is, the assumption of rational behavior is useful in understanding the ways in which many successful economic institutions function, although it is also true that actual human behavior falls systematically short of perfect rationality. We consider a possible explanation of this apparent inconsistency, suggesting that mechanisms that rest on the rationality assumption are likely to be successful when they create an environment in which the behavior they try to facilitate leads to the best payoff for all agents on average, and most of the time. Review of basic learning research suggests that, under these conditions, people quickly learn to maximize expected return. This review also shows that there are many situations in which experience does not increase maximization. In many cases, experience leads people to underweight rare events. In addition, the current paper suggests that it is convenient to distinguish between two behavioral approaches to improve economic analyses. The first, and more conventional approach among behavioral economists and psychologists interested in judgment and decision making, highlights violations of the rational model and proposes descriptive models that capture these violations. The second approach studies human learning to clarify the conditions under which people quickly learn to maximize expected return. The current review highlights one set of conditions of this type and shows how the understanding of these conditions can facilitate market design.
125 citations
TL;DR: The main goal of as discussed by the authors is to argue against the claim that people can entertain a proposition without believing it, and demonstrate that we cannot withhold assent from any proposition we happen to consider.
Abstract: The idea that people can entertain propositions without believing them is widespread, intuitive, and most probably false. The main goal of this essay is to argue against the claim that people can entertain a proposition without believing it. Evidence is presented demonstrating that we cannot withhold assent from any proposition we happen to consider. A model of belief fixation is then sketched and used to explain hitherto disparate, recalcitrant and somewhat mysterious psychological phenomena. The proposed model is one where beliefs are the automatic output of a computationally null belief acquisition reflex. In short, the model holds that the mere activation of a mentally represented truth apt proposition leads to immediately believing it. The essay concludes by considering some consequences that the proposed model of belief acquisition has for our concept of rationality.
119 citations
01 Jan 2014
TL;DR: The authors analyzes how political forms shape interests and underlines a contradiction: whereas the institutions of liberal democracy underlie modes of thought and action that favor monologic rationality, the working class because it is dominated in the class structure, needs dialogic modes of organization so as to arrive at its true interests.
Abstract: The article starts by criticizing the concept of “interest group” on the grounds that it creates a false equivalence between labor and employer organizations, thus dissimulating the asymmetries of power between labor and capital. It then analyzes how political forms shape interests and underlines a contradiction: whereas the institutions of liberal democracy underlie modes of thought and action that favor monologic rationality, the working class, because it is dominated in the class structure, needs dialogic modes of organization so as to arrive at its true interests. The distinction between dialogic and monologic modes of action leads to two levels of class conflict being revealed. The first level is the economic conflict within the existing political forms. The second level is the conflict about the political forms themselves.
112 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that in most natural observation structures besides the canonical single-file case, full rationality dictates that people must ''anti-imitate'' some of those they observe; and in every observation structure full rationality demands that people who do not anti-im imitate can, in essence, imitate at most one person among predecessors who share common information.
Abstract: Rationality leads people to imitate those with similar tastes but different information. But people who imitate common sources develop correlated beliefs, and rationality demands that later social learners take this redundancy into account. This implies severe limits to rational imitation. We show that (i) in most natural observation structures besides the canonical single-file case, full rationality dictates that people must \anti-imitate" some of those they observe; and (ii) in every observation structure full rationality dictates that people who do not anti-imitate can, in essence, imitate at most one person among predecessors who share common information. We also show that in a very broad class of settings, virtually any learning rule in which people regularly do imitate more than one person without anti-imitating others will lead to a positive (and, in some environments, arbitrarily high) probability of people converging to confident and wrong long-run beliefs. When testing either the rationality or the efficiency of social learning, researchers should not focus on whether people follow others' behaviour but instead whether they follow it too much.
110 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the current preoccupation with win-win situations in CSR may not serve societal interests and develop a global governance framework for CSR that provides more democratic forms of decision making in the political economy that will enable corporate social responsibility to overcome the constraints imposed by corporate rationality.
Abstract: Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to argue that there are structural and functional limits to corporate social responsibility (CSR) that determine the boundary conditions of corporate social initiatives. The current preoccupation with win-win situations in CSR may not serve societal interests. For CSR to produce social outcomes that are not necessarily constrained by corporate rationality there needs to be a change in the normative framework of public decision making at the institutional level. The author develops a global governance framework for CSR that provides more democratic forms of decision making in the political economy that will enable corporate social responsibility to overcome the constraints imposed by corporate rationality. Design/methodology/approach – This is a conceptual paper and critique. Findings – The author develops a global governance framework for CSR that provides more democratic forms of decision making in the political economy that will enable corporate social responsibili...
Book•
07 Aug 2014
TL;DR: Hubert Dreyfus and the Phenomenology of human intelligence as mentioned in this paper discuss the notion of knowledge and its relation to the human mind and the human ability to reason about the world.
Abstract: Introduction: Hubert Dreyfus and the Phenomenology of Human Intelligence SECTION ONE: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SKILLS 1. From Socrates to Expert Systems: The Limits of Calculative Rationality (with Stuart E. Dreyfus) (1985) SECTION TWO: INTENTIONALITY AND MIND 2. The Perceptual Noema: Gurwitsch's Crucial Contribution (1972) 3. Heidegger's Critique of the Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality (1993) 4. Todes's Account of Nonconceptual Perceptual Knowledge and Its Relation to Thought (2001) 5. Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise (2005) SECTION THREE: PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 6. Holism and Hermeneutics (1980) 7. The Primacy of Phenomenology over Logical Analysis (2001) 8. From Depth Psychology to Breadth Psychology: A Phenomenological Approach to Psychopathology (with Jerome Wakefield) (1988) 9. What is Moral Maturity? Towards A Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise (with Stuart E. Dreyfus) (1992) SECTION FOUR: EMBODIED COPING AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 10. Making a Mind Versus Modeling the Brain: Artificial Intelligence Back at a Branchpoint (with Stuart E. Dreyfus) (1988) 11. Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science (2004) 12. Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing it Would Require Making it More Heideggerian (2007) Bibliography Index
TL;DR: The authors provide a historical overview of research on bias in human cognition, ranging from early work in psychology through the detailed, quantitative examinations of belief revision in the 1960s, the Heuristic and Biases program initiated by Kahneman and Tversky, and bias focused research in personality and social psychology.
Abstract: In this chapter, we provide a historical overview of research on bias in human cognition, ranging from early work in psychology through the detailed, quantitative examinations of belief revision in the 1960s, the Heuristic and Biases program initiated by Kahneman and Tversky, and bias focused research in personality and social psychology. Different notions of “bias” are identified and compared with the notion of bias in statistics, machine learning, and signal detection theory. Comparison with normative models then forms the basis for a critical look at the evidence that people succumb to motivated reasoning aimed at enabling them “to believe what they want to believe.”
TL;DR: Human resource development (HRD) has become powerfully influenced by a dominant rationality in which masculine characteristics of assertiveness, objectivity, control, and performance are strongly influenced as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The ProblemHuman resource development (HRD) has become powerfully influenced by a dominant rationality in which masculine characteristics of assertiveness, objectivity, control, and performance are
TL;DR: In this paper, the Foucauldian notion of political rationality is employed to map discussions and ideals about the responsibility of science toward society, and four political rationalities are identified: the demarcation rationality, which aims to exclude the social from the scientific production in order to make it objective and thereby responsible.
Abstract: This article employs the Foucauldian notion of ‘political rationality’ to map discussions and ideals about the responsibility of science toward society. By constructing and analyzing an archive of 263 journal papers, four political rationalities were identified: the Demarcation rationality, which aims to exclude the social from the scientific production in order to make it objective and thereby responsible; the Reflexivity rationality, which sees it as science's responsibility to let itself be guided by problems in society in choice of research focus and methods; the Contribution rationality, which insists that responsible science should live up to public demands for innovation and democracy; and the Integration rationality, which advocates that science should be co-constructed with societal actors in order to be socially responsible. While each rationality is distinct, the article argues that all of them address the issue of a boundary (or integration) between science and society. Hence, it is not possib...
TL;DR: The authors argued that Aristotelian rationality is a matter of being able to grasp accounts in general, i.e., accounts that identify the right action and say why it is right.
Abstract: Something Aristotle calls ‘right logos’ plays a crucial role in his theory of virtue. But the meaning of ‘logos’ in this context is notoriously contested. I argue against the standard translation ‘reason’, and—drawing on parallels with Plato’s work, especially the Laws—in favor of its being used to denote what transforms an inferior epistemic state into a superior one: an explanatory account. Thus Aristotelian phronēsis, like his and Plato’s technē and epistēmē, is a matter of grasping explanatory accounts: in this case, accounts that identify the right action and say why it is right. Arguably, Aristotelian rationality is a matter of being able to grasp accounts in general.
04 Apr 2014
TL;DR: Carpendale, Carpendale and Muller as discussed by the authors described the development of Rationality and Morality through social interaction and development of rationality and morality in infants, and discussed the relation between Moral and Secular Reasoning.
Abstract: Contents: JIM Carpendale, U Muller, Social Interaction and the Development of Rationality and Morality: An Introduction WF Overton, A Relational and Embodied Perspective on Resolving Psychology's Antinomies RF Kitchener, Piaget's Social Epistemology J Boom, Individualism and Collectivism: A Dynamic Systems Interpretation of Piaget's Interactionism TG Amin, J Valsiner, Coordinating Operative and Figurative Knowledge: Piaget, Vygotsky and Beyond MH Bickhard, The Social Ontology of Persons R Dobert, The Development and Overcoming of "Universal Pragmatics" in Piaget's Thinking BW Sokol, MJ Chandler, A Bridge Too Far: On the Relations Between Moral and Secular Reasoning L SmithDevelopmental Epistemology and Education L Nucci, Social Interaction and the Construction of Moral and Social Knowledge U Muller, JIM Carpendale, From Joint Activity to Joint Attention: A Relational Approach to Social Development in Infancy O Lourenco, Piaget's Theory and Children's Development of Prosocial Behavior: The Force of Negation TP Racine, Wittgenstein's Internalistic Logic and Children's Theories of Mind
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a formal mathematical model of responsible leadership that considers different types of incentives for stakeholder engagement and reveal that monetary and instrumental incentives are neither sufficient nor necessary for business leaders to consider societal and environmental stakeholder needs.
Abstract: Business leaders are increasingly responsible for the societal and environmental impacts of their actions. Yet conceptual views on responsible leadership differ in their definitions and theoretical foundations. This study attempts to reconcile these diverse views and uncover the phenomenon from a business leader’s point of view. Based on rational egoism theory, this article proposes a formal mathematical model of responsible leadership that considers different types of incentives for stakeholder engagement. The analyses reveal that monetary and instrumental incentives are neither sufficient nor necessary for business leaders to consider societal and environmental stakeholder needs. Non-monetary and non-instrumental incentives, such as leaders’ values and authenticity, as well as their planning horizons, counterbalance pure monetary and instrumental orientations. The model in this article complements the growing body of research on responsible leadership by reconciling its various conceptual views and providing a foundation for future theory development and testing.
TL;DR: In this article, a logic of generalization based on rationalistic social mechani... is proposed for drawing general inferences on the basis of single-case and small-n studies.
Abstract: Drawing general inferences on the basis of single-case and small-n studies is often seen as problematic. This article suggests a logic of generalization based on thinly rationalistic social mechani...
TL;DR: A new preface to the forthcoming paperback edition of Why Tolerate Religion? as mentioned in this paper discusses the reception of the book, in both Europe and the United States, focusing especially on the response of some conservative Christian readers and "scholars."
Abstract: This is a new preface to the forthcoming paperback edition of Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton, cloth edition, 2013). I briefly discuss the reception of the book, in both Europe and the United States, focusing especially on the response of some conservative Christian readers and "scholars." I also clarify some themes from the book, and explain why this book does not devote much time to the topic of the possible rationality of religious belief.
TL;DR: This paper investigates rationality postulates that logic-based argumentation systems that are based on deductive logics and that use Dung's semantics should satisfy and study the links between the postulates and explore conditions under which they are guaranteed or violated.
TL;DR: In this paper, an ethnographic analysis shows that actors involved with moving money have divergent and sometimes-conflicting aspirations, motivations, and agendas, within which cash plays multiple roles simultaneously.
Abstract: In Mumbai elections, an influx of money is not leading to the commoditization of the vote. Rather, as ethnographic analysis shows, actors involved with moving money have divergent and sometimes-conflicting aspirations, motivations, and agendas, within which cash plays multiple roles simultaneously. Election-time cash flow inhabits a deeply political landscape of contestation where issues at the heart of Mumbai's modernity—land use, infrastructural investment, and business prospects—are negotiated and speculated on. These findings critically engage a conceptual terrain that counterposes individual rationality and political choice to traditional forms of authority mediated by relations of patronage, while producing important insights into long-standing anthropological debates on money and exchange. [exchange, gift, trust, money, democracy, Mumbai]
TL;DR: In this article, the authors derive a hybrid process decision-making model to integrate the effects from cognition and emotions varying with the levels of uncertainty, and seek to differentiate the rationality of emotions from the instrumental, functional, and expressive mechanisms in decision making.
Abstract: Decision-making continues to be a vital area of research on organizations, particularly in Asia. After years of research under the cognitive approach, there has been an upsurge of scholarly attention connecting decision-making to emotion. Nonetheless, competing accounts of the role played by emotion in decision-making have created a conundrum as to whether emotion is rational or irrational and whether it should even be considered along with other cognitive aspects of the decision-making process. In response, we derive a hybrid process decision-making model to integrate the effects from cognition and emotions varying with the levels of uncertainty. In proposing this model, we seek to differentiate the rationality of emotions from the instrumental, functional, and expressive mechanisms in decision-making. In particular, we proffer that affective construal legitimates the rational account of emotions under high uncertain situation. Finally, we draw some key implications and recommendations for organizational research in the Asian region.
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the Sure Thing Principle is derived in this setting and a characterization of generalized qualitative probability that includes and blends both traditional qualitative probability and the ranked structures used in logical approaches.
Abstract: Preferences among acts are analyzed in the style of L. Savage, but as partially ordered. The rationality postulates considered are weaker than Savage's on three counts. The Sure Thing Principle is derived in this setting. The postulates are shown to lead to a characterization of generalized qualitative probability that includes and blends both traditional qualitative probability and the ranked structures used in logical approaches.
TL;DR: A case study tracks the journey of one high-profile study of neurobiological sex differences from its scientific publication through various layers of the public domain and suggests that embedding stereotype patterns in neuroscience may intensify their rhetorical potency by lending them the epistemic authority of science.
Abstract: Neuroscience research on sex difference is currently a controversial field, frequently accused of purveying a 'neurosexism' that functions to naturalise gender inequalities. However, there has been little empirical investigation of how information about neurobiological sex difference is interpreted within wider society. This paper presents a case study that tracks the journey of one high-profile study of neurobiological sex differences from its scientific publication through various layers of the public domain. A content analysis was performed to ascertain how the study was represented in five domains of communication: the original scientific article, a press release, the traditional news media, online reader comments and blog entries. Analysis suggested that scientific research on sex difference offers an opportunity to rehearse abiding cultural understandings of gender. In both scientific and popular contexts, traditional gender stereotypes were projected onto the novel scientific information, which was harnessed to demonstrate the factual truth and normative legitimacy of these beliefs. Though strains of misogyny were evident within the readers' comments, most discussion of the study took pains to portray the sexes' unique abilities as equal and 'complementary'. However, this content often resembled a form of benevolent sexism, in which praise of women's social-emotional skills compensated for their relegation from more esteemed trait-domains, such as rationality and productivity. The paper suggests that embedding these stereotype patterns in neuroscience may intensify their rhetorical potency by lending them the epistemic authority of science. It argues that the neuroscience of sex difference does not merely reflect, but can actively shape the gender norms of contemporary society.
14 Mar 2014
TL;DR: The model of frame selection (MFS) as discussed by the authors is based on the assumption of adaptive or "variable" rationality that is taken from dual-process/systems models in social psychology.
Abstract: In analytical sociology, and in sociology more generally, a theory of action should meet the three requirements: wide applicability; heuristic/hypothesis-generating power; and modularity. The chapter discusses the model of frame selection (MFS) as a theory of action that fulfills the requirements. MFS is based on the assumption of adaptive or “variable” rationality that is taken from dual-process/systems models in social psychology. It allows construction of highly simplified models of individual behavior in applications that focus on complex social dynamics. The chapter shows how MFS can be and has been used to derive new hypotheses in a wide range of sociological fields. To further illustrate its explanatory power, the chapter presents an application to the case of voter participation. In the final sections, the chapter shows how the MFS can provide flexible microfoundations for analytical sociology.
TL;DR: The authors argued that rationality and conventions are compatible but reasonable behavior may be conventional or (partly) unconventional, and stressed the importance of creativity and an optimistic disposition to face uncertainty (animal spirits).
Abstract: When discussing the relation between rationality and conventions under non-neoclassical uncertainty, almost all economists focus on the rationality of following a convention. This paper contributes to the construction of an alternative approach, which argues that conventions and rationality are compatible but reasonable behavior may be conventional or (partly) unconventional. The paper reviews several arguments for the reasonableness of following a convention. It then stresses the importance of factors such as creativity and an optimistic disposition to face uncertainty (animal spirits) and shows how these factors are crucial for determining whether behavior will be conventional or not.
TL;DR: According to Ernst Cassirer, the transition from the concept of substance to that of mathematical function as a guide of knowledge coincided with the end of ancient and the beginning of modern theo
Abstract: According to Ernst Cassirer, the transition from the concept of substance to that of mathematical function as a guide of knowledge coincided with the end of ancient and the beginning of modern theo
Posted Content•
TL;DR: It is argued that consumers potentially apply either of two social codes when forming value judgments about restaurants: an apparently rational science-based code of hygiene involving compliance with local health regulations or a context-activated code of authenticity involving conformity to cultural norms.
Abstract: Organization theory highlights the spread of norms of rationality in contemporary life. Yet rationality does not always spread without friction; individuals often act based on other beliefs and norms. We explore this problem in the context of restaurants and diners. We argue that consumers potentially apply either of two social codes when forming value judgments about restaurants: (1) an apparently rational science-based code of hygiene involving compliance with local health regulations or (2) a context-activated code of authenticity involving conformity to cultural norms. We propose that violations of the hygiene code recede in importance when the authenticity code is activated. This claim is supported by empirical analyses of 442,086 online consumer reviews and 52,740 governmental health inspections conducted from 2004 to 2011.
Journal Article•
TL;DR: It is shown that the backward dominance procedure selects precisely those strategies that can rationally be chosen under common belief in future rationality if the authors would not impose (common belief in) Bayesian updating.