Federal Reserve System

About: Federal Reserve System is a other organization based out in Washington D.C., District of Columbia, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Inflation. The organization has 2373 authors who have published 10301 publications receiving 511979 citations.

Understanding the Effects of Government Spending on Consumption

Abstract: Recent evidence suggests that consumption rises in response to an increase in government spending. That finding cannot be easily reconciled with existing optimizing business cycle models. We extend the standard new Keynesian model to allow for the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers. We show how the interaction of the latter with sticky prices and deficit financing can account for the existing evidence on the effects of government spending. (JEL: E32, E62)

Approximately Normal Tests for Equal Predictive Accuracy in Nested Models

Abstract: Forecast evaluation often compares a parsimonious null model to a larger model that nests the null model. Under the null that the parsimonious model generates the data, the larger model introduces noise into its forecasts by estimating parameters whose population values are zero. We observe that the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) from the parsimonious model is therefore expected to be smaller than that of the larger model. We describe how to adjust MSPEs to account for this noise. We propose applying standard methods (West (1996)) to test whether the adjusted mean squared error difference is zero. We refer to nonstandard limiting distributions derived in Clark and McCracken (2001, 2005a) to argue that use of standard normal critical values will yield actual sizes close to, but a little less than, nominal size. Simulation evidence supports our recommended procedure.

Forecasting and conditional projection using realistic prior distributions

Abstract: This paper develops a forecasting procedure based on a Bayesian method for estimating vector autoregressions. The procedure is applied t o 10 macroeconomic variables and is shown to improve out-of-sample forecasts relative to univariate equations. Although cross-variable responses are damped by the prior, considerable interaction among the variables is shown to be captured by the estimates We provide unconditional forecasts as of 1982:12 and 1983:3. We also describe how a model such as this can be used to make conditional projections and to analyze policy alternatives. As an example, we analyze a Congressional Budget Office forecast made in 1982: 12 Although no automatic causal interpretations arise from models like ours, they provide a detailed characterization of the dynamic statistical interdependence of a set of economic variables, information that may help in evaluating causal hypotheses without containing any such hypotheses.

What Explains the Stock Market's Reaction to Federal Reserve Policy?

Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of unanticipated changes in the Federal funds target on equity prices, with the aim of both estimating the size of the typical reaction, and understanding the reasons for the market’s response. On average over the May 1989 to December 2001 sample, a “typical” unanticipated 25 basis point rate cut has been associated with a 1.3 percent increase in the S&P 500 composite index. The estimated response varies considerably across industries, with the greatest sensitivity observed in cyclical industries like construction, and the smallest in mining and utilities. Very little of the market’s reaction can be attributed to policy’s effects on the real rate of interest or future dividends, however. Instead, most of the response of the current excess return on equities can be traced to policy’s impact on expected future excess returns. JEL codes: E44, G12.

A Theory of Friendly Boards

Abstract: We analyze the consequences of the board's dual role as advisor as well as monitor of management. Given this dual role, the CEO faces a trade-off in disclosing information to the board: If he reveals his information, he receives better advice; however, an informed board will also monitor him more intensively. Since an independent board is a tougher monitor, the CEO may be reluctant to share information with it. Thus, management-friendly boards can be optimal. Using the insights from the model, we analyze the differences between sole and dual board systems. We highlight several policy implications of our analysis.