University of Southern California

About: University of Southern California is a education organization based out in Los Angeles, California, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & Cancer. The organization has 73160 authors who have published 169955 publications receiving 7838906 citations. The organization is also known as: USC & University of Southern CA.

Psychology of Habit.

Abstract: As the proverbial creatures of habit, people tend to repeat the same behaviors in recurring contexts. This review characterizes habits in terms of their cognitive, motivational, and neurobiological properties. In so doing, we identify three ways that habits interface with deliberate goal pursuit: First, habits form as people pursue goals by repeating the same responses in a given context. Second, as outlined in computational models, habits and deliberate goal pursuit guide actions synergistically, although habits are the efficient, default mode of response. Third, people tend to infer from the frequency of habit performance that the behavior must have been intended. We conclude by applying insights from habit research to understand stress and addiction as well as the design of effective interventions to change health and consumer behaviors.

RAP: An End-to-End Rate-Based Congestion Control Mechanism for Realtime Streams in the Internet.

Abstract: End-to-end congestion control mechanisms have been critical to the robustness and stability of the Internet. Most of today's Internet traffic is TCP, and we expect this to remain so in the future. Thus, having "TCP-friendly" behavior is crucial for new applications. However, the emergence of non-congestion-controlled realtime applications threatens unfairness to competing TCP traffic and possible congestion collapse. We present an end-to-end TCP-friendly rate adaptation protocol (RAP), which employs an additive-increase, multiplicative-decrease (AIMD) algorithm. It is well suited for unicast playback of realtime streams and other semi-reliable rate-based applications. Its primary goal is to be fair and TCP-friendly while separating network congestion control from application-level reliability. We evaluate RAP through extensive simulation, and conclude that bandwidth is usually evenly shared between TCP and RAP traffic. Unfairness to TCP traffic is directly determined by how TCP diverges from the AIMD algorithm. Basic RAP behaves in a TCP-friendly fashion in a wide range of likely conditions, but we also devised a fine-grain rate adaptation mechanism to extend this range further. Finally, we show that deploying RED queue management can result in an ideal fairness between TCP and RAP traffic.

Robots for Use in Autism Research

Abstract: Autism spectrum disorders are a group of lifelong disabilities that affect people's ability to communicate and to understand social cues. Research into applying robots as therapy tools has shown that robots seem to improve engagement and elicit novel social behaviors from people (particularly children and teenagers) with autism. Robot therapy for autism has been explored as one of the first application domains in the field of socially assistive robotics (SAR), which aims to develop robots that assist people with special needs through social interactions. In this review, we discuss the past decade's work in SAR systems designed for autism therapy by analyzing robot design decisions, human-robot interactions, and system evaluations. We conclude by discussing challenges and future trends for this young but rapidly developing research area.

Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them

Abstract: Currently, we are in the midst of a reexamination of chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration that has more than the usual amount of energy and substance. While much of the fury over CEO pay has been aimed at executives associated with accounting scandals and collapses in the prices of their company's shares, the controversies over GE CEO Jack Welch and NYSE CEO Richard Grasso signal a watershed. In their cases the competence and performance of both men were unquestioned: the issue seems to be the perception that they received "too much" and that there was inadequate disclosure. We provide, history, analysis and over three dozen recommendations for reforming the system surrounding executive compensation. Section I introduces a conceptual framework for analyzing remuneration and incentives in organizations. We then analyze the agency problems between managers and shareholders and between board members and shareholders, and discuss how well designed pay packages can mitigate the former while well designed corporate governance policies and processes can mitigate the latter. We say "mitigate" because no solutions will eliminate these agency problems completely. Since bad governance can easily lead to value destroying pay practices our discussion includes analyses of corporate governance as well as pay design. Because optimal remuneration policies cannot be designed and managed without consideration of the powerful relations and interactions between the financial markets and the firm, its top-level executives and the board, we devote significant space to these factors. Section II offers a brief history of executive remuneration from 1970 to the present. Section III examines and explains the forces behind the US-led escalation in share options. We argue that boards and managers falsely perceive stock options to be inexpensive because of accounting and cash-flow considerations and, as a result, too many options have been awarded to too many people. Section IV defines and discusses the agency costs of overvalued equity as the source of recent corporate scandals. Agency problems associated with overvalued equity are aggravated when managers have large holdings of stock or options. Because neither the market for corporate control or the usual incentive compensation systems can solve the agency problems of overvalued equity, they must be resolved by corporate governance systems. And few governance systems were strong enough to solve the problems. As the overvalued equity problem illustrates, while remuneration can be a solution to agency problems, it can also be a source of agency problems. Section V discusses several widespread problems with pay processes and practices, and suggests changes in both corporate governance and pay design to mitigate such problems: including problems with the appointment and pay-setting process, problems with equity-based pay plans, and problems with the design of traditional bonus plans. We show how traditional plans encourage managers to ignore the cost of capital, manage earnings in ways that destroy value, and take actions to deceive investors and capital markets. Section VI defines and analyzes a new concept: what we call the Strategic Value Accountability issue. This is the accountability for making the link between strategy formulation and choice and the value consequences of those choices - basically the link between internal managers and external capital markets. The critical importance of this accountability, its assignment, and its implications for performance measurement and remuneration have long been unrecognized and therefore ignored in most organizations. Section VII analyzes the complex relationships between managers, analysts, and the capital market, the incentives firms have to manage earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts, and shows how managers playing the earnings-management game systematically erode the integrity of their organization and destroy organizational value. We highlight the puzzling equilibrium in this market that seems to suggest collusion between analysts and managers at the expense of investors - an area that is ripe for further research.