Journal ArticleDOI
Group Identity and Social Preferences
Yan Chen,Sherry Xin Li +1 more
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This paper found that participants are significantly more likely to choose social welfare-maximizing actions when matched with an ingroup member when compared to when they are matched with a non-group identity.Abstract:
We present a laboratory experiment that measures the effects of induced group identity on social preferences. We find that when participants are matched with an ingroup member, they show a 47 percent increase in charity concerns and a 93 percent decrease in envy. Likewise, participants are 19 percent more likely to reward an ingroup match for good behavior, but 13 percent less likely to punish an ingroup match for misbehavior. Furthermore, participants are significantly more likely to choose social-welfare-maximizing actions when matched with an ingroup member. All results are consistent with the hypothesis that participants are more altruistic toward an ingroup match. (read more
Citations
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Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in Groups
Gerhard Riener,Simon Wiederhold +1 more
TL;DR: It is shown in a laboratory experiment that the same method of group induction carries different behavioral consequences, and the importance of manipulation checks in group-formation tasks in economic experiments is indicated.
Journal ArticleDOI
Leadership, cheap talk and really cheap talk
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate whether leadership effects can be attributed exclusively to the common information that leaders provide to a group, irrespective of the source of that information, and they design a public goods game in which non-binding contribution suggestions originate with either a human or computer leader.
Journal ArticleDOI
Facing Your Opponents Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests and find significant over-expenditure of effort relative to the standard theoretical predictions.
Journal ArticleDOI
Vive la Différence: Social Banks and Reciprocity in the Credit Market
Simon Cornée,Ariane Szafarz +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the behavior of social banks on the credit market, and propose both theory and empirics to rationalize the idea that reciprocity can generate better repayment performances.
Journal ArticleDOI
Contagion of pro- and anti-social behavior among peers and the role of social proximity
TL;DR: In this article, the authors used a novel experimental design to study the contagion of pro- and anti-social behavior and the role of social proximity among peers in social and economic environments.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Controlling the false discovery rate: a practical and powerful approach to multiple testing
Yoav Benjamini,Yosef Hochberg +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a different approach to problems of multiple significance testing is presented, which calls for controlling the expected proportion of falsely rejected hypotheses -the false discovery rate, which is equivalent to the FWER when all hypotheses are true but is smaller otherwise.
Book ChapterDOI
The social identity theory of intergroup behavior
Henri Tajfel,John C. Turner +1 more
TL;DR: A theory of intergroup conflict and some preliminary data relating to the theory is presented in this article. But the analysis is limited to the case where the salient dimensions of the intergroup differentiation are those involving scarce resources.
Journal ArticleDOI
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
TL;DR: Z-Tree as mentioned in this paper is a toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, which allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time and is stable and easy to use.
Journal ArticleDOI
A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation
Ernst Fehr,Klaus M. Schmidt +1 more
TL;DR: This paper showed that if some people care about equity, the puzzles can be resolved and that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior in cooperative games.