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Group Identity and Social Preferences
Yan Chen,Sherry Xin Li +1 more
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This paper found that participants are significantly more likely to choose social welfare-maximizing actions when matched with an ingroup member when compared to when they are matched with a non-group identity.Abstract:
We present a laboratory experiment that measures the effects of induced group identity on social preferences. We find that when participants are matched with an ingroup member, they show a 47 percent increase in charity concerns and a 93 percent decrease in envy. Likewise, participants are 19 percent more likely to reward an ingroup match for good behavior, but 13 percent less likely to punish an ingroup match for misbehavior. Furthermore, participants are significantly more likely to choose social-welfare-maximizing actions when matched with an ingroup member. All results are consistent with the hypothesis that participants are more altruistic toward an ingroup match. (read more
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<mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline" id="d1e2972" altimg="si1.svg"><mml:mi mathvariant="bold">Θ</mml:mi></mml:math> The cultural transmission of trust norms: Evidence from a lab in the field on a natural experiment
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors conduct trust games in three villages in a northeastern Romanian commune and find that participants on the Austrian side that also have family roots in the village are indeed more likely to trust outsiders.
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The influence of group identity on farmer’s decision making: an experimental economics approach on a family farming case in Costa Rica
TL;DR: In this article, a case study analyzes the interdependence between individual identification intensity and revealed commitment for a commodity specific association that is based on individual membership, where both members and non-members of the association participated in a questionnaire followed by a natural field experiment concerning their social identity towards the existing pepper association.
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Efficiency, Team building, and Spillover in a Public-goods Game
TL;DR: The authors conducted public-goods experiments in which they permit endogenous group-formation and vary whether there is a team-building exercise and whether some people receive an endowment twice as much as others receive.
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Is Allocation Affected by the Perception of Others' Irresponsible Behavior and by Ambiguity?
TL;DR: Estimation results show that a substantial share of the respondents allocate significantly more to the hereditary cancer, which may indicate that these respondents care about others' irresponsible behavior and ambiguity regarding probabilities.
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Journal ArticleDOI
Controlling the false discovery rate: a practical and powerful approach to multiple testing
Yoav Benjamini,Yosef Hochberg +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a different approach to problems of multiple significance testing is presented, which calls for controlling the expected proportion of falsely rejected hypotheses -the false discovery rate, which is equivalent to the FWER when all hypotheses are true but is smaller otherwise.
Book ChapterDOI
The social identity theory of intergroup behavior
Henri Tajfel,John C. Turner +1 more
TL;DR: A theory of intergroup conflict and some preliminary data relating to the theory is presented in this article. But the analysis is limited to the case where the salient dimensions of the intergroup differentiation are those involving scarce resources.
Journal ArticleDOI
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
TL;DR: Z-Tree as mentioned in this paper is a toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, which allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time and is stable and easy to use.
Journal ArticleDOI
A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation
Ernst Fehr,Klaus M. Schmidt +1 more
TL;DR: This paper showed that if some people care about equity, the puzzles can be resolved and that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior in cooperative games.