Showing papers on "Rationality published in 2007"

Coloniality and modernity/rationality

Abstract: With the conquest of the societies and the cultures which inhabit what today is called Latin America, began the constitution of a new world order, culminating, five hundred years later, in a global...

The illusion of conscious will

Abstract: Wegner (Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press) argues that conscious will is an illusion, citing a wide range of empirical evidence. I shall begin by surveying some of his arguments. Many are unsuccessful. But one—an argument from the ubiquity of self-interpretation—is more promising. Yet is suffers from an obvious lacuna, offered by so-called ‘dual process’ theories of reasoning and decision making (Evans, J., & Over, D. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Psychology Press; Stanovich, K. (1999). Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning. Lawrence Erlbaum; Frankish, K. (2004). Mind and supermind. Cambridge University Press). I shall argue that this lacuna can be filled by a plausible a priori claim about the causal role of anything deserving to be called ‘a will.’ The result is that there is no such thing as conscious willing: conscious will is, indeed, an illusion.

Introduction: Understanding Public Policy through Its Instruments—From the Nature of Instruments to the Sociology of Public Policy Instrumentation

Abstract: Public policy instrumentation and its choice of tools and modes of operation are treated either as a kind of evidence (governing means making regulations, taxing, entering into contracts, communicating, etc.) or as if the questions it raises (the properties of instruments, justifications for choosing them, their applicability, etc.) are part of a rationality of methods without any autonomous meaning. This paper aims to explain the significance of a political sociology approach to public policy instruments in accounting for processes of public policy change: (1) public policy instrumentation is a major issue in public policy, since it reveals a (fairly explicit) theorization of the relationship between the governing and the governed: every instrument constitutes a condensed form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it; and (2) instruments at work are not neutral devices: they produce specific effects, independently of the objective pursued (the aims ascribed to them), which structure public policy according to their own logic.

Institutional Rationality and Practice Variation: New Directions in the Institutional Analysis of Practice

Abstract: In this paper, I highlight how popular understandings of neoinstitutionalism as a theory of isomorphism need to be revised as institutionalists have shifted attention towards the study of organizational heterogeneity. As part of this shift, old emphases on arational mimicry and stability have been replaced with new emphases on institutional rationality and ongoing struggle and change. I discuss these new directions and the implications for the study of accounting practice. I argue that given recent efforts by institutionalists to account for actors and practice diversity, there is an important opportunity for dialogue with practice theorists, such as those drawing on Actor Network Theory, and the creation of a more comprehensive approach to the study of practice that attends to both institutional and micro-processual dynamics.

Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning

Abstract: Book synopsis: Are people rational? This question was central to Greek thought and has been at the heart of psychology and philosophy for millennia. This book provides a radical and controversial reappraisal of conventional wisdom in the psychology of reasoning, proposing that the Western conception of the mind as a logical system is flawed at the very outset. It argues that cognition should be understood in terms of probability theory, the calculus of uncertain reasoning, rather than in terms of logic, the calculus of certain reasoning.

Emotion and rationality: A critical review and interpretation of empirical evidence.

Abstract: The relation between emotion and rationality is assessed by reviewing empirical findings from multiple disciplines. Two types of emotional phenomena are examined— incidental emotional states and integral emotional responses—and three conceptions of rationality are considered—logical, material, and ecological. Emotional states influence reasoning processes, are often misattributed to focal objects, distort beliefs in an assimilative fashion, disrupt self-control when intensely negative, but do not necessarily increase risk-taking. Integral emotional responses are often used as proxies for values, and valuations based on these responses exhibit distinct properties: efficiency, consistency, polarization, myopia, scale- insensitivity, and reference-dependence. Emotions seem to promote social and moral behavior. Conjectures about the design features of the affective system that give rise to seeming sources of rationality or irrationality are proposed. It is concluded that any categorical statement about the overall rationality or irrationality of emotion would be misleading.

Base-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual processes.

Abstract: The phenomenon of base-rate neglect has elicited much debate. One arena of debate concerns how people make judgments under conditions of uncertainty. Another more controversial arena concerns human rationality. In this target article, we attempt to unpack the perspectives in the literature on both kinds of issues and evaluate their ability to explain existing data and their conceptual coherence. From this evaluation we conclude that the best account of the data should be framed in terms of a dual-process model of judgment, which attributes base-rate neglect to associative judgment strategies that fail to adequately represent the set structure of the problem. Base-rate neglect is reduced when problems are presented in a format that affords accurate representation in terms of nested sets of individuals.

Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms

Abstract: Part I. Rationality, Markets, and Institutions: 1. Rediscovering the Scottish philosophers 2. On two forms of rationality Part II. Impersonal Exchange: The Extended Order of the Market: 3. Relating the two concepts of a rational order 4. Market institutions and performance 5. Asymmetric information and equilibrium without process 6. Spectrum auctions and combinatorial designs: theory and experiment 7. Psychology and markets 8. What is rationality? Part III. Personal Social Exchange: 9. Emergent order without the law 10. The effects of context on behavior Appendix: behavioral deviation from prediction: error, confusion, or evidence of brain function? 11. Investment trust games: effects of gains from exchange in dictator giving 12. Reciprocity in trust games Part IV. Order and Rationality in Method and Mind: 13. Rationality in science 14. Neuroeconomics: the internal order of the mind 15. A summary.

Environments That Make Us Smart Ecological Rationality

Abstract: Traditional views of rationality posit general-purpose decision mechanisms based on logic or optimization. The study of ecological rationality focuses on uncovering the “adaptive toolbox” of domain-specific simple heuristics that real, computationally bounded minds employ, and explaining how these heuristics produce accurate decisions by exploiting the structures of information in the environments in which they are applied. Knowing when and how people use particular heuristics can facilitate the shaping of environments to engender better decisions.

Risk and rationality in entrepreneurial processes

Abstract: This study begins with a historical overview of the connection between risk and rationality. It then broadens beyond this historical trajectory by taking entrepreneurship as a point of departure for understanding risk and rationality. Drawing from the research of Littlechild (1986), Buchanan and Vanberg (1991), and Sarasvathy et al. (2003), this study considers three entrepreneurial processes: opportunity recognition, opportunity discovery, and opportunity creation. Associated with each of these processes are unique conceptualizations of risk and rationality, reflected in distinct research streams. The final section of the study considers implications of the process-contingent nature of risk and rationality, and motivates a broadening of the research agenda from entrepreneurial decision making to practices. Copyright © 2007 Strategic Management Society

The Rationality of Informal Argumentation: A Bayesian Approach to Reasoning Fallacies

Abstract: Classical informal reasoning "fallacies," for example, begging the question or arguing from ignorance, while ubiquitous in everyday argumentation, have been subject to little systematic investigation in cognitive psychology. In this article it is argued that these "fallacies" provide a rich taxonomy of argument forms that can be differentially strong, dependent on their content. A Bayesian theory of content-dependent argument strength is presented. Possible psychological mechanisms are identified. Experiments are presented investigating whether people's judgments of the strength of 3 fallacies--the argumentum ad ignorantiam, the circular argument or petitio principii, and the slippery slope argument--are affected by the factors a Bayesian account predicts. This research suggests that Bayesian accounts of reasoning can be extended to the more general human activity of argumentation.

The Influence of Decision, Environmental and Firm Characteristics on the Rationality of Strategic Decision‐Making*

Abstract: This paper develops an integrated model of strategic decision-making rationality. The model is informed by three perspectives that respectively identify decision, environmental and firm characteristics as influences on the rationality of decision processes. The results of a study in Egypt indicate that the rationality of strategic decision-making processes is shaped by variables identified by all three perspectives, and that such decision processes cannot adequately be modelled in terms of a single perspective only. However, the study also suggests that the three perspectives do not contribute in equal measure to explaining strategic decision making, and that the national setting is relevant for the extent to which strategic decision-makers take account of environmental characteristics. The location of the investigation in Egypt highlights some deviations from previous research that could be attributed to nation-specific factors, both cultural and institutional.

Critical Thinking and Learning

Abstract: This paper introduces some of the debates in the field of critical thinking by highlighting differences among thinkers such as Siegel, Ennis, Paul, McPeck, and Martin, and poses some questions that arise from these debates. Does rationality transcend particular cultures, or are there different kinds of thinking, different styles of reasoning? What is the relationship between critical thinking and learning? In what ways does the moral domain overlap with these largely epistemic and pedagogical issues? The paper concludes by showing how Peters, Evers, Chan and Yan, Ryan and Louie, Luntley, Lam, Doddington, and Kwak, respond to these questions.

Power, rationality, and the art of living through socio-technical change

Abstract: Most information systems research takes for granted the assumption that IS practice and associated organizational change can be effectively understood as a process of technical reasoning and acting governed by a mix of concerns about software construction, administrative control, and economic gain. Its mission has been to empower managers, IS engineers, and information and communication technology users with knowledge and techniques for effective decision making. However, empirical research frequently encounters human activity that is at odds with the assumed pattern of rational behavior. Recent work tries to explain behavior in IS and organizational change in terms of social processes rather than as a consideration of rational techniques of professional practice. In this paper we address this ambivalence of the IS field with regard to technical/rational knowledge and practice. We draw from the theoretical work of Michel Foucault on power/knowledge and the aesthetics of existence to argue that the rational techniques of IS practice and the power dynamics of an organization and its social context are closely intertwined, requiring each other to be sustained. Furthermore, we develop a context-specific notion of rationality in IS innovation, through which interested parties judge the value of an innovation for their lives and consequently support or subvert its course. We demonstrate these ideas with a case study of a social security organization in Greece.

Human nature : the categorial framework

Abstract: Preface. Part I: The Project. 1. Human Nature. 2. Philosophical Anthropology. 3. Grammatical Investigation. 4. Philosophical Investigation. 5. Philosophy and 'Mere Words'. 6. A Challenge to the Autonomy of the Philosophical Enterprise: Quine. 7. The Platonic and the Aristotelian Traditions in Philosophical Anthropology. Part II: Substance. 1. Substances: Things. 2. Substances: Stuffs. 3. Substance-referring Expressions. 4. Conceptual Connections between Things and Stuffs. 5. Substances and their Substantial parts. 6. Substances Conceived as Natural Kinds. 7. Substances Conceived as a Common Logico-linguistic Category. 8. A Historical Digression: Misconceptions of the Category of Substance. Part III: Causation. 1. Causation: Humean, Neo-Humean and Anti-Humean. 2. On Causal Necessity. 3. Event Causation is not a Prototype. 4. The Inadequacy of Hume's Analysis: Observability, Spatio-temporal Relations, and Regularity. 5. The Flaw in the Early Modern Debate. 6. Agent Causation as Prototype. 7. Agent Causation is Only a Prototype. 8. Event Causation and Other Centres of Variation. 9. Overview. Part IV: Powers. 1. Possibility. 2. Powers of the Inanimate. 3. Active and Passive Powers of the Inanimate. 4. Power and its Actualization. 5. Power and its Vehicle. 6. First- and Second-order Powers Loss of Power. 7. Human Powers: Basic Distinctions. 8. Human Powers: Further Distinctions. 9. Dispositions. Part V: Agency. 1. Inanimate Agents. 2. Inanimate Needs. 3. Animate Agents: Needs and Wants. 4. Volitional Agency: Preliminaries. 5. Doings, Acts and Actions. 6. Human Agency and Action. 7. A Historical Overview. 8. Human Action as Agential Causation of Movement. Part VI: Teleology and Teleological Explanation. 1. Teleology and Purpose. 2. What Things have a Purpose?. 3. Purpose and Axiology. 4. The Beneficial. 5. A Historical Digression: Teleology and Causality. Part VII: Reasons and Explanation of Human Action. 1. Rationality and Reasonableness. 2. Reason, Reasoning and Reasons. 3. Explaining Human Behaviour. 4. Explanation in Terms of Agential Reasons. 5. Causal Mythologies. Part VIII: The Mind. 1. Homo loquens. 2. The Cartesian Mind. 3. The Nature of the Mind. Part IX: The Self and the Body. 1. The Emergence of the Philosophers' Self. 2. The Illusions of the Philosophers' Self. 3. The Body. 4. The Relationship between Human Beings and their Bodies. Part X: The Person. 1. The Emergence of the Concept. 2. An Unholy Trinity: Descartes, Locke and Hume. 3. Changing Bodies and Switching Brains: Puzzle Cases and Red Herrings. 4. The Concept of a Person. Index

Political polarization

Abstract: Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy, whereas others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic contexts and consistent with Bayesian rationality. agreeing to disagree Bayes' Theorem

A Critique of the New Public Management and the Neo-Weberian State: Advancing a Critical Theory of Administrative Reform

Abstract: The New Public Management (NPM) has often been favorably contrasted with European Public Administration (EPA). This paper attempts to balance this Anglo-American perspective with a relatively new European critique of NPM which its authors call the Neo-Weberian State (NWS). Despite their differences in some key respects, however, it is argued that the NPM and NWS are similar in their sweeping paradigmatic character, their ambiguities and internal inconsistencies, their inability to go beyond instrumental rationality and incorporate forms of hermeneutic and critical reason, and in their advocacy of bureaucracy via participation under certain historical conditions, hence consistent with Weber’s characterization of modern organization and management. The paper, based on the authors’ rendering of critical social theory, provides a fresh means for bridging the two perspectives.

Power, rationality, and the art of living through socio-technical change

Abstract: Most information systems research takes for granted the assumption that IS practice and associated organizational change can be effectively understood as a process of technical reasoning and acting governed by a mix of concerns about software construction, administrative control, and economic gain. Its mission has been to empower managers, IS engineers, and information and communication technology users with knowledge and techniques for effective decision making. However, empirical research frequently encounters human activity that is at odds with the assumed pattern of rational behavior. Recent work tries to explain behavior in IS and organizational change in terms of social processes rather than as a consideration of rational techniques of professional practice. In this paper we address this ambivalence of the IS field with regard to technical/rational knowledge and practice. We draw from the theoretical work of Michel Foucault on power/knowledge and the aesthetics of existence to argue that the rational techniques of IS practice and the power dynamics of an organization and its social context are closely intertwined, requiring each other to be sustained. Furthermore, we develop a context-specific notion of rationality in IS innovation, through which interested parties judge the value of an innovation for their lives and consequently support or subvert its course. We demonstrate these ideas with a case study of a social security organization in Greece.

The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology

Abstract: Paradoxes of game-theoretic reasoning have played an important role in spurring developments in interactive epistemology, the area in game theory that studies the role of the players' beliefs, knowledge, etc. This paper describes two such paradoxes - one concerning backward induction, the other iterated weak dominance. We start with the basic epistemic condition of "rationality and common belief of rationality" in a game, describe various 'refinements' of this condition that have been proposed, and explain how these refinements resolve the two paradoxes. We will see that a unified epistemic picture of game theory emerges. We end with some new foundational questions uncovered by the epistemic program.

The politics of standards in modern management: Making 'the project' a reality

Abstract: In this paper, we explore the standardization of contemporary management knowledge, focusing in particular upon the role of 'standards' in creating and reifying 'organizational objects', with powerful consequences and with often unrecognized ethical implications. It is our argument that modernist beliefs in 'general, abstract and timeless ideas' (Brunsson et al, 2000, p. 173), enshrined in a universal and abstract rationality, results in the marginalization of more reflexive forms of rationality and the suppression of autonomy, creativity and discretion in organizations. To investigate the consequences of standardization, we take as the focus of our analysis a specific management model which has a significant and growing impact on many sectors of contemporary industry; that of project management. Drawing on the work of Timmermans and Berg (1997), Bowker and Star (1999) and Brunsson et al. (2000), we draw attention to the reification of the object of management; in this case, the project itself, as a transhistorical, 'real world' object. By tracing efforts to establish and institutionalize 'standards' in this and other fields of management, in particular through the creation and dissemination of a universal 'body of knowledge' for this field, we draw attention to the political and moral significance of the 'blackboxing' of knowledge. It is our broader intention here to help to denaturalize this organizational object, to legitimize other modes of knowledge and practice in the field, and thereby to reopen debate in this and other arenas of standardization. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2007.

The Ends of Deliberation: Meta‐consensus and Inter‐subjective Rationality as Ideal Outcomes

Abstract: Normative deliberative theory has contributed much to an understanding of ideal procedural standards, but there is considerable uncertainty regarding the appropriate nature of desired deliberative outcomes. In this paper we identify two inter-related concepts of meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality as outcomes that an authentic deliberative process ought to produce. Importantly, these deliberative ends are consistent with ideal deliberative procedure. They are also empirically tractable, where preference transformation can be described in terms of underlying values, and judgments. Methods for assessing deliberative ends are provided and demonstrated using a case study.

Value of Children and the Framing of Fertility: Results from a Cross-cultural Comparative Survey in 10 Societies

Abstract: To overcome incomplete explanations of cross-cultural differences in fertility behaviour, three complementary approaches are systematically related to each other: the ‘demand’-based economic theory of fertility (ETF), a revised version of the ‘supply’-based ‘value-of-children’-approach (VOC) as a special theory of the general social theory of social production functions, and the framing theory of variable rationality. A comprehensive model is specified, which accounts both for the variable efficiency of having children for the optimization of physical well-being and of social esteem of (potential) parents, and for the variable rationality of fertility decisions. The model is tested with a data set, which comprises information on VOC and fertility of women within social settings of 10 societies (Peoples Republic of China, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Ghana, Israel, Palestine, Turkey, the Czech Republic, and Germany), using multivariate models with births of different parity as dependents. As empirical research both on ETF and VOC only exists for intra-societal comparisons, the simultaneous test in a cross-cultural context goes beyond the current state of fertility research. It provides evidence about the cross-cultural validity of the model, systematic effects of VOC on fertility, and changing rationality of fertility decisions in the demographic transition.

Corporate Directors and Social Responsibility: Ethics versus Shareholder Value

Abstract: This paper reports on the results of an experiment conducted with experienced corporate directors. The study findings indicate that directors employ prospective rationality cognition, and they sometimes make decisions that emphasize legal defensibility at the expense of personal ethics and social responsibility. Directors recognize the ethical and social implications of their decisions, but they believe that current corporate law requires them to pursue legal courses of action that maximize shareholder value. The results suggest that additional ethics education will have little influence on the decisions of many business leaders because their decisions are driven by corporate law, rather than personal ethics.

Judgment Aggregation by Quota Rules: Majority Voting Generalized

Abstract: The widely discussed `discursive dilemma' shows that majority voting in a group of individuals on logically connected propositions may produce irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority voting by considering quota rules, which accept each proposition if and only if the number of individuals accepting it exceeds a given threshold, where different thresholds may be used for different propositions. After characterizing quota rules, we prove necessary and sufficient conditions on the required thresholds for various collective rationality requirements. We also consider sequential quota rules, which ensure collective rationality by adjudicating propositions sequentially and letting earlier judgments constrain later ones. Sequential rules may be path dependent and strategically manipulable. We characterize path independence and prove its essential equivalence to strategy proofness. Our results shed light on the rationality of simple-, super-, and sub-majoritarian decision making.

Reason to Believe: Cultural Agency in Latin American Evangelicalism

Abstract: A Note on Translations and Names Acknowledgments PART ONE: BEGINNINGS 1. Making Sense of Cultural Agency 2. The Venezuelan Context: Confronting La Crisis PART TWO: IMAGINATIVE RATIONALITY 3. Imagining Social Life I: Confronting Akrasia, Crime, and Violence 4. Imagining Social Life II: Addressing Personal and Social Issues 5. Imagining Evangelical Practice PART THREE: RELATIONAL IMAGINATION 6. The Social Structure of Conversion 7. Two Lives, Five Years Later 8. Toward a Relational Pragmatic Theory of Cultural Agency Epilogue Appendix A: Status of Evangelical Respondents after Five Years Appendix B: Methods and Methodology Appendix C: Quantitative Analysis of Networks and Conversion Glossary of Spanish Terms References Index

Media-generated Shortcuts: Do Newspaper Headlines Present Another Roadblock for Low-information Rationality?:

Abstract: This article identifies news headlines as media-generated shortcuts for heuristic information about politics. Functionally speaking, headlines are simplifying mechanisms that summarize and attract ...

The Power of Shame and the Rationality of Trust

Abstract: Experimental evidence and a host of recent theoretical ideas take aim at the common economic assumption that individuals are selfish. The arguments made suggest that intrinsic social preferences of one kind or another are at the heart of unselfish, pro-social behavior that is often observed. I suggest an alternative motive based on shame that is imposed by the extrinsic beliefs of others, which is distinct from the more common approaches to social preferences such as altruism, a taste for fairness, reciprocity, or self-identity perception. The motives from shame are consistent with observed behavior in previously studied experiments, but more importantly, they imply new testable predictions. A new set of experiments confirm both that shame is a motivator, and that trusting players are strategically rational in that they anticipate the power of shame. Some implications for policy and strategy are discussed.

Wide or Narrow Scope

Abstract: This paper is a response to ‘Why Be Rational?’ by Niko Kolodny. Kolodny argues that we have no reason to satisfy the requirements of rationality. His argument assumes that these requirements have a logically narrow scope. To see what the question of scope turns on, this comment provides a semantics for ‘requirement’. It shows that requirements of rationality have a wide scope, at least under one sense of ‘requirement’. Consequently Kolodny’s conclusion cannot be derived.

Th e Decision to Contract Out: A Study of Contracting for E‐Government Services in State Governments

Abstract: Government contracting, especially for information technology products and services, has accelerated in recent years in the United States. Drawing on the insights of privatization studies, the authors examine the economic and political rationales underpinning government decisions to contract out e-government services. This article tests the extent to which economic and political rationality influence governments’ contracting decisions using data from multiple sources: a survey conducted by National Association of State Chief Information Officers, a survey by the National Association of State Procurement Officers, the Council of State Legislatures, and macro-level state data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Important factors affecting the state-level contracting decision are population size, market size, the competitiveness of the bidding process, the professional management of contracts, the partisan composition of legislatures, and political competition. Political rationales appear to play a major role in state contracting decisions. Some arguments associated with markets and economic rationality are clearly politically motivated.