Showing papers on "Social cognitive theory of morality published in 2008"

Moral disengagement in ethical decision making: A study of antecedents and outcomes.

Abstract: This article advances understanding of the antecedents and outcomes of moral disengagement by testing hypotheses with 3 waves of survey data from 307 business and education undergraduate students. The authors theorize that 6 individual differences will either increase or decrease moral disengagement, defined as a set of cognitive mechanisms that deactivate moral self-regulatory processes and thereby help to explain why individuals often make unethical decisions without apparent guilt or self-censure (Bandura, 1986). Results support 4 individual difference hypotheses, specifically, that empathy and moral identity are negatively related to moral disengagement, while trait cynicism and chance locus of control orientation are positively related to moral disengagement. Two additional locus of control orientations are not significantly related to moral disengagement. The authors also hypothesize and find that moral disengagement is positively related to unethical decision making. Finally, the authors hypothesize that moral disengagement plays a mediating role between the individual differences they studied and unethical decisions. Their results offer partial support for these mediating hypotheses. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for future research and for practice.

With a Clean Conscience: Cleanliness Reduces the Severity of Moral Judgments

Abstract: Theories of moral judgment have long emphasized reasoning and conscious thought while downplaying the role of intuitive and contextual influences. However, recent research has demonstrated that incidental feelings of disgust can influence moral judgments and make them more severe. This study involved two experiments demonstrating that the reverse effect can occur when the notion of physical purity is made salient, thus making moral judgments less severe. After having the cognitive concept of cleanliness activated (Experiment 1) or after physically cleansing themselves after experiencing disgust (Experiment 2), participants found certain moral actions to be less wrong than did participants who had not been exposed to a cleanliness manipulation. The findings support the idea that moral judgment can be driven by intuitive processes, rather than deliberate reasoning. One of those intuitions appears to be physical purity, because it has a strong connection to moral purity.

On the Concept of Moral Panic

Abstract: The article develops a critical analysis of the concept of moral panic and its sociological uses. Arguing that some of the concept's subtlety and power has been lost as the term has become popular, the article foregrounds its Freudian and Durkheimian aspects and explicates the epistemological and ethical issues involved in its use. Contrasting the dynamics of moral panics to the dynamics of culture wars, the author shows that both phenomena involve group relations and status competition, though each displays a characteristically different structure. The piece concludes by situating `moral panics' within a larger typology of concepts utilized in the sociology of social reaction.

Moral Distress Reconsidered

Abstract: Moral distress has received much attention in the international nursing literature in recent years. In this article, we describe the evolution of the concept of moral distress among nursing theorists from its initial delineation by the philosopher Jameton to its subsequent deployment as an umbrella concept describing the impact of moral constraints on health professionals and the patients for whom they care. The article raises worries about the way in which the concept of moral distress has been portrayed in some nursing research and expresses concern about the fact that research, so far, has been largely confined to determining the prevalence of experiences of moral distress among nurses. We conclude by proposing a reconsideration, possible reconstruction and multidisciplinary approach to understanding the experiences of all health professionals who have to make difficult moral judgements and decisions in complex situations.

Reasoning: The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment

Abstract: Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural. evolutionary. and biological psychology. as well as in anthropology and primatology.

Experiments in Ethics

Abstract: In the past few decades, scientists of human nature - including experimental and cognitive psychologists, neuroscientists, evolutionary theorists, and behavioural economists - have explored the way we arrive at moral judgments They have called into question commonplaces about character and offered troubling explanations for various moral intuitions Research like this may help explain what, in fact, we do and feel But can it tell us what we ought to do or feel? In "Experiments in Ethics", the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah explores how the new empirical moral psychology relates to the age-old project of philosophical ethicsSome moral theorists hold that the realm of morality must be autonomous of the sciences; others maintain that science undermines the authority of moral reasons Appiah elaborates a vision of naturalism that resists both temptations He traces an intellectual genealogy of the burgeoning discipline of "experimental philosophy," provides a balanced, lucid account of the work being done in this controversial and increasingly influential field, and offers a fresh way of thinking about ethics in the classical traditionAppiah urges that the relation between empirical research and morality, now so often antagonistic, should be seen in terms of dialogue, not contest And he shows how experimental philosophy, far from being something new, is actually as old as philosophy itself Beyond illuminating debates about the connection between psychology and ethics, intuition and theory, his book helps us to rethink the very nature of the philosophical enterprise

Moral attentiveness: who pays attention to the moral aspects of life?

Abstract: This research draws from social cognitive theory to develop a construct known as moral attentiveness, the extent to which an individual chronically perceives and considers morality and moral elements in his or her experiences, and proposes that moral attentiveness affects a variety of behaviors. A series of 5 studies with undergraduates, MBA students, and managers were conducted to create and validate a reliable multidimensional scale and to provide evidence that moral attentiveness is associated with (a) the recall and reporting of self- and others' morality-related behaviors, (b) moral awareness, and (c) moral behavior. Results of the studies suggest that moral attentiveness has a significant effect on how individuals understand and act in their moral worlds.

Principled Moral Sentiment and the Flexibility of Moral Judgment and Decision Making

Abstract: Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, and by thinking styles (intuitive vs. deliberative). In Studies 2 and 3, participants evaluated policy decisions to knowingly do harm to a resource to mitigate greater harm or to merely allow the greater harm to happen. When evaluated in isolation, approval for decisions to harm was affected by endorsement of moral rules and by thinking style. When both choices were evaluated simultaneously, total harm - but not the do/allow distinction - influenced rated approval. These studies suggest that moral rules play an important, but context-sensitive role in moral cognition, and offer an account of when emotional reactions to perceived moral violations receive less weight than consideration of costs and benefits in moral judgment and decision making.

The neural basis of moral cognition: sentiments, concepts, and values.

Abstract: The human moral nature has perplexed laymen and academics for millennia. Recent developments in cognitive neuroscience are opening new venues for unveiling the complex psychological and neurobiological mechanisms underling human morality and its impairments. Here we review these lines of evidence and key topics of debate and explain why investigating the mechanisms of cognition–emotion interaction and of the neural bases of moral sentiments and values will be critical for our understanding of the human moral mind.

Toward a Model of Cross-Cultural Business Ethics: The Impact of Individualism and Collectivism on the Ethical Decision-Making Process.

Abstract: In this paper, we explore the impact of individualism and collectivism on three basic aspects of ethical decision making – the perception of moral problems, moral reasoning, and behavior. We argue that the inclusion of business practices within the moral domain by the individual depends partly upon individualism and collectivism. We also propose a pluralistic approach to post-conventional moral judgment that includes developmental paths appropriate for individualist and collectivist cultures. Finally, we argue that the link between moral judgment and behavior is related to individualism and collectivism.

Control, responsibility, and moral assessment

Abstract: Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments. Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as they attempt to ground an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is a fact) that they express who she is as a moral agent. As such, they seem to be open to some of the same objections Wolf originally raised to such accounts, and in particular to the objection that they cannot license the sorts of robust moral assessments involved in our current practices of moral responsibility. My aim in this paper is to try to respond to this challenge, by clarifying the kind of robust moral assessments I take to be licensed by (at least some) non-volitional accounts of responsibility and by explaining why these assessments do not in general require the agent to have voluntary control over everything for which she is held responsible. I also argue that the limited applicability of the distinction between “bad agents” and “blameworthy agents” on these accounts is in fact a mark in their favor.

Morality: An Evolutionary Account.

Abstract: Refinements in Darwin's theory of the origin of a moral sense create a framework equipped to organize and integrate contemporary theory and research on mo- rality.Moralityoriginatedindeferential,cooperative,and altruistic''social instincts,''ordecision-makingstrategies, that enabled early humans to maximize their gains from social living and resolve their conflicts of interest in adaptive ways. Moral judgments, moral norms, and con- science originated from strategic interactions among members of groups who experienced confluences and con- flicts of interest.Moral argumentation buttressed bymoral reasoning is equipped to generate universal and impartial moral standards. Moral beliefs and standards are prod- ucts of automatic and controlled information-processing and decision-making mechanisms. To understand how people make moral decisions, we must understand how early evolved mechanisms in the old brain and recently evolved mechanisms in the new brain are activated and howtheyinteract.Understandingwhatasense ofmorality is for helps us understand what it is.

The constitution of agency : essays on practical reason and moral psychology

Abstract: PART ONE: THE PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL REASON PART TWO: MORAL VIRTUE AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY PART THREE: OTHER REFLECTIONS

The Influence of Perceived Importance of an Ethical Issue on Moral Judgment, Moral Obligation, and Moral Intent

Abstract: The study extends and tests the issue contingent four-component model of ethical decision-making to include moral obligation. A web-based questionnaire was used to gauge the influence of perceived importance of an ethical issue on moral judgment and moral intent. Perceived importance of an ethical issue was found to be a predictor of moral judgment but not of moral intent as predicted. Moral obligation is suggested to be a process that occurs after a moral judgment is made and explained a significant portion of the variance in moral intent.

Planet of the Durkheimians: Where Community, Authority, and Sacredness Are Foundations of Morality

Abstract: Most academic efforts to understand morality and ideology come from theorists who limit the domain of morality to issues related to harm and fairness. For such theorists, conservative beliefs are puzzles requiring non-moral explanations. In contrast, we present moral foundations theory, which broadens the moral domain to match the anthropological literature on morality. We extend the theory by integrating it with a review of the sociological constructs of community, authority, and sacredness, as formulated by Emile Durkheim and others. We present data supporting the theory, which also shows that liberals misunderstand the explicit moral concerns of conservatives more than conservatives misunderstand liberals. We suggest that what liberals see as a non-moral motivation for system justifi cation may be better described as a moral motivation to protect society, groups, and the structures and constraints that are often (although not always) benefi cial for individuals. Finally, we outline the possible benefi ts of a moral foundations perspective for system justifi cation theory (SJT), including better understandings of (a) why the system justifying motive is palliative despite some harmful effects, (b) possible evolutionary origins of the motive, and (c) the values and worldviews of conservatives in general. It has not yet been revealed to the public, but we have it on good authority that intelligent life was recently discovered on a planet several light years away. The planet has been given an unpronounceable technical name, but scientists refer to the planet informally as “Planet Durkheim.” Judging by the television signals received, Durkheimians look rather like human beings, although their behavior is quite different. Durkheimians crave, above all else, being tightly integrated into strong groups that cooperatively pursue common goals. They have little desire for self-expression or individual development, and when the requirements of certain jobs force individuals to spend much time alone, or when the needs of daily life force individuals to make their own decisions or express their own preferences, Durkheimians feel drained and unhappy. In extreme cases of enforced individualism, they

Moral Panic Analysis: Past, Present and Future

Abstract: Contemporary news events indicate the continuing relevance of moral panic analysis. Of two versions one is British, formulated by Stan Cohen, exemplified by the 1970s emergence of mugging. The second is American, formulated by Goode and Ben-Yehuda, exemplified by the 1980s missing children campaign. Each model conceptualises the agents and dynamics of moral panics, their causes and consequences. The models have been applied mainly to seven main areas: AIDS, child abuse, drugs, immigration, media violence, street crime and youth deviance. Empirical data have confirmed basic features of the original models and enabled generalisations about the presence and functions of moral panics in capitalist democracies. Critics express reservations about the models’ ambiguous terminology, assumptions of media effects, predetermined dynamics, and vague outcomes. Some advocate revision of the models, others their abandonment. Future development of moral panic analysis requires connection to three important sociological themes: discourse, risk and moral regulation.

John Dewey's Ethics: Democracy as Experience

Abstract: IntroductionPart 1. Moral Theory and Experience1. Experience as Method 2. Moral Theory and Moral Practice 3. The Normative Standpoint of PragmatismPart 2. Dewey's View of Moral Experience4. Morality as Experience 5. The "What" of Moral Experience 6. The "How" of Moral Experience 7. Character and Conduct: Dewey and the Great Divide in Ethics 8. Present Activity and the Meaning of Moral Life 9. Conclusion: The Need for a Recovery of Moral PhilosophyPart 3. The Ideal Moral Life 10. The Intelligent, Aesthetic, and Democratic Way of Life 11. The Ideal Moral Self 12. Democracy as the Ideal Moral Community 13. A Philosophical Justification of DemocracyConclusion

The Cognitive and Affective Dimensions of Moral Conviction: Implications for Attitudinal and Behavioral Measures of Interpersonal Tolerance

Abstract: The present studies investigate the role of both cognitive and affective dimensions of moral conviction in contributing to negative interpersonal responses. After demonstrating that the cognitive and affective dimensions of moral conviction are distinct constructs, the studies show that the cognitive dimension is sufficient to produce many forms of interpersonal intolerance. Simply believing an issue to be moral (i.e., objectively grounded, non-negotiable) results in greater intolerance for (Study 1), less sharing with (Study 2), and greater distancing from (Study 3) people with divergent attitudes. The emotional intensity with which beliefs are experienced is not alone explanatory. Nonetheless, it interacts with moral beliefs to produce the highest levels of interpersonal intolerance, distancing from dissimilar others, and context insensitivity. This interaction pattern between moral beliefs and affect was specific to emotional intensity and not other measures of attitude strength (Study 3).

On the Reasons We Want Teachers of Good Disposition and Moral Character

Abstract: The point of this article is to make a case for teachers of moral disposition without regard for the moral development of students. The article concludes that there are multiple reasons for wanting teachers of good disposition and moral character; that teachers' dispositions are best conceived as modifiers to the methods that they employ; and that the crux of the dispositions debate is ultimately grounded in avoiding poor moral character. Implications of the article point teacher educators toward a conception of teacher education that focuses on preparing teachers of good disposition and moral character simply for the sake of teaching that accords with what is good, right, and virtuous. The analysis suggests that the scope of a teacher's dispositions should be broadened to include all matters of classroom life and teacher effectiveness.

Social intuitionists answer six questions about morality

Abstract: We review the state of the art in moral psychology to answer 6 questions: 1) Where do moral beliefs and motivations come from? 2) How does moral judgment work? 3) What is the evidence for the social intuitionist model? 4) What exactly are the moral intuitions? 5) How does morality develop? And 6) Why do people vary in their morality? We describe the intuitionist approach to moral psychology. The mind makes rapid affective evaluations of everything it encounters, and these evaluations (intuitions) shape and push subsequent moral reasoning. This approach to moral judgment has a variety of implications for moral philosophy and for the law in that it questions common assumptions about the reliability and causal efficacy of private, conscious reasoning.

A Blueprint for Social Cognitive Development

Abstract: The field of social cognitive development (SCD) has historically failed to emerge as a dominant approach in developmental psychology. We take this opportunity to articulate the assumptions, goals, and contributions of SCD with the aim of invigorating research from this perspective. We begin by describing the current landscape of social and cognitive development, suggesting what they have and have not given us. We then outline major goals of the social cognitive developmental approach and walk through examples of successful SCD research. Finally, we examine the unique potential of the social cognitive approach to cross-fertilize social and cognitive development (as well as related fields such as social psychology and neuroscience) and to answer new questions about development.

Moral behaviour in sport: a critical review of the literature

Abstract: The moral domain comprises behaviours that have consequences for the rights and welfare of others (Turiel, 1983). In this review, research examining such behaviours in the sport context is discussed. Researchers have approached the study of moral behaviour in sport from different theoretical and methodological perspectives. Two approaches that have spawned a considerable number of studies in recent years are Rest's (1984) four-component model of moral action and Bandura's (1991) social cognitive theory of moral thought and action. Research emanating from these approaches is discussed followed by work on good and bad sport behaviours, fair play, and aggression. Within each perspective, the measurement approach to behaviour is described, findings of relevant studies are discussed, and strengths and weaknesses of these studies are identified. The review concludes by identifying emerging trends in the literature and offering directions for future research.

Moral Status As a Matter of Degree

Abstract: Some people contend that fetuses have moral status but less than that of paradigm persons. Many people hold views implying that sentient animals have moral status but less than that of persons. These positions suggest that moral status admits of degrees. Does it? To address this question, we must first clarify what it means to speak of degrees of moral status. The paper begins by clarifying the more basic concept of moral status and presenting two models of degrees of moral status. It then sketches several significant considerations in favor of, and several against, the assertion of degrees of moral status. The paper concludes by drawing lessons from the discussion.

On dual processing and heuristic approaches to moral cognition

Abstract: We examine the implications of dual‐processing theories of cognition for the moral domain, with particular emphasis upon ‘System 1’ theories: the Social Intuitionist Model (Haidt), moral heuristics (Sunstein), fast‐and‐frugal moral heuristics (Gigerenzer), schema accessibility (Lapsley & Narvaez) and moral expertise (Narvaez). We argue that these theories differ from each other in important ways and should be carefully distinguished. We examine these theories in the light of the ‘Berkowitz Rule’ with respect to educational practice and conclude with some thoughts about the implications of this work for resetting the boundary between ethical theory and moral psychology.

Relationships among values, achievement orientations, and attitudes in youth sport

Abstract: This research examines the value-expressive function of attitudes and achievement goal theory in predicting moral attitudes. In Study 1, the Youth Sport Values Questionnaire (YSVQ; Lee, Whitehead, & Balchin, 2000) was modified to measure moral, competence, and status values. In Study 2, structural equation modeling on data from 549 competitors (317 males, 232 females) aged 12–15 years showed that moral and competence values predicted prosocial attitudes, whereas moral (negatively) and status values (positively) predicted antisocial attitudes. Competence and status values predicted task and ego orientation, respectively, and task and ego orientation partially mediated the effect of competence values on prosocial attitudes and of status values on antisocial attitudes, respectively. The role of sport values is discussed, and new research directions are proposed.