Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México

About: Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México is a education organization based out in Mexico City, Mexico. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Politics & Population. The organization has 1098 authors who have published 2532 publications receiving 39083 citations. The organization is also known as: Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico & Mexico Autonomous Institute of Technology.

Preprocessing and analysis of ECG signals - A self-organizing maps approach

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to consider self-organizing maps (SOMs) as a vehicle for analysis of ECG data and making decisions as to further preprocessing and selecting classification algorithms. In contrast to other commonly used methods of unsupervised learning (such as e.g., Fuzzy C-Means or K-Means), the results formed by SOMs are more user-oriented allowing for an intensive interaction with the user in supporting various tasks of ''what-if'' analysis. In this manner, the map scan serve as a preliminary vehicle supporting a detailed system design. In the study, the standard model of SOM is augmented by several interpretation-oriented features such as region analysis and feature descriptors. The map helps reveal a structure in a set of ECG patterns and visualize a topology of such data. The role of the designer of any subsequent classifier or signal analyzer is associated with an inspection of some already visualized regions of the self-organizing map characterized by a significant level of data homogeneity and based on the discovered topology, make decisions as to the development of classification schemes. The experimental part illustrating the proposed design practices is concerned with the data coming from the MIT-BIH ECG database being commonly utilized in the realm of ECG signal analysis and classifier design.

Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study

Abstract: We conduct a laboratory study of the group-on group ultimatum bargaining with restricted within-group interaction. In this context, we concentrate on the effect of different within-group voting procedures on the bargaining outcomes. Our experimental observations can be summarized in two propositions. First, individual responder behavior across treatments does not show statistically significant variation across voting rules, implying that group decisions may be viewed as aggregations of independent individual decisions. Second, we observe that proposer behavior significantly depends (in the manner predicted by a simple model) on the within-group decision rule in force among the responders and is generally different from the proposer behavior in the one-on-one bargaining.