Institution
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
Education•Mexico City, Mexico•
About: Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México is a education organization based out in Mexico City, Mexico. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Politics & Population. The organization has 1098 authors who have published 2532 publications receiving 39083 citations. The organization is also known as: Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico & Mexico Autonomous Institute of Technology.
Topics: Politics, Population, Estimator, Interest rate, Context (language use)
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: The paper studies the performance of an algorithm that dispenses with the geometry phase altogether (and therefore does not attempt to control the position of the interpolation set) and data are presented describing the evolution of the condition number of theinterpolation matrix and the accuracy of the gradient estimate.
Abstract: A numerical study of model-based methods for derivative-free optimization is presented. These methods typically include a geometry phase whose goal is to ensure the adequacy of the interpolation set. The paper studies the performance of an algorithm that dispenses with the geometry phase altogether (and therefore does not attempt to control the position of the interpolation set). Data are presented describing the evolution of the condition number of the interpolation matrix and the accuracy of the gradient estimate. The experiments are performed on smooth unconstrained optimization problems with dimensions ranging between 2 and 15.
50 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the effect of participation quorum in referenda was analyzed in the context of a group turnout model and it was shown that the expected voter turnout exceeds the expected quorum only if this requirement is not imposed.
Abstract: We analyze the effect of turnout requirements in referenda in the context of a group turnout model. We show that a participation quorum requirement may reduce the turnout so severely that it generates a "quorum paradox": in equilibrium, the expected turnout exceeds the participation quorum only if this requirement is not imposed. Moreover, a participation quorum does not necessarily imply a bias for the status quo. We also show that in order to induce a given expected turnout, the quorum should be set at a level that is lower than half the target, and the effect of a participation quorum on welfare is ambiguous. On the one hand, the quorum decreases voters' welfare by misrepresenting the will of the majority. On the other hand, it might also reduce the total cost of voting. Finally, we show that an approval quorum is essentially equivalent to a participation quorum.
50 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, an enforcement mechanism that resembles a court is described by two parameters that correspond to enforcement costs and the amount of creditor/debtor protection, and the authors provide a theoretical and quantitative characterization of the effect of these enforcement parameters on the contract loan rate, the default probability and welfare.
Abstract: This paper analyzes how an enforcement mechanism that resembles a court affects firm finance. The court is described by two parameters that correspond to enforcement costs and the amount of creditor/debtor protection. We provide a theoret- ical and quantitative characterization of the effect of these enforcement parameters on the contract loan rate, the default probability and welfare. We analyze agents' incentive to default and pursue bankruptcy and show that when the constraints that govern these decisions bind, the enforcement parameters can have a sharply non-linear effect on finance. We also compute the welfare losses of "poor institutions" and show that they are non-trivial. The results provide guidance on when models which abstract from enforcement provide good approximations and when they do not.
50 citations
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TL;DR: Results from this application shows that the proposed methodology can clearly guide the re-design of business processes to support SCI.
50 citations
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TL;DR: The authors explore the Mexican oil industry from 1911 to 1929 and demonstrate that informal rather than formal institutions were key, permitting oil companies to coordinate their responses to increases in taxes or the redefinition of their de facto property rights.
Abstract: Changes in formal institutions do not always affect economic outcomes. When an industry has specific technological features that limit a government's ability to expropriate it, or when the industry is able to call on foreign governments to enforce its de facto property rights, economic agents can easily mitigate changes in formal institutions designed to reduce these property rights. We explore the Mexican oil industry from 1911 to 1929 and demonstrate that informal rather than formal institutions were key, permitting oil companies to coordinate their responses to increases in taxes or the redefinition of their de jure property rights.
50 citations
Authors
Showing all 1112 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
Stanislav Pospisil | 105 | 966 | 44510 |
Romeo Ortega | 82 | 778 | 30251 |
Enrique Alba | 57 | 530 | 14535 |
Maria Merino | 56 | 190 | 11282 |
Manuel A. S. Santos | 47 | 255 | 9081 |
Aaron Tornell | 46 | 139 | 10575 |
Georges Zaccour | 43 | 319 | 7245 |
Carlos Velasco | 42 | 220 | 6186 |
Francisco J. Cervantes | 37 | 144 | 5401 |
Hussain Shareef | 35 | 376 | 5377 |
Diego Restuccia | 31 | 95 | 5817 |
Stephen Haber | 30 | 98 | 4326 |
Igor Prünster | 29 | 106 | 3033 |
Víctor M. González | 28 | 165 | 4209 |
Antonio Lijoi | 28 | 123 | 3066 |