Showing papers on "Deterrence theory published in 2017"

The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis

Abstract: The literature on deterrence theory has undergone a number of changes in recent years. With the rise of new ways of thinking about rational decision-making and offending, four developments have changed the way criminologists view the deterrence perspective: the effectiveness of certain situational crime prevention strategies; the recognition of the importance of the "non-legal costs" of criminal behavior; the integration of deterrence theory with other criminological perspectives, such as social learning and self-control theories; and how the imposition of sanctions can actually lower individuals' perceived estimates of getting caught in the future, known as the "resetting effect". The body of "shaming" research points to the growing recognition of the complex effects that criminal sanctions have on individuals' future criminal behaviour. Even independent of shame, however, research has emerged indicating that individuals who have been punished end up being more inclined to commit future offenses than those who have not been punished.

Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace

Abstract: Understanding deterrence and dissuasion in cyberspace is often difficult because our minds are captured by Cold War images of massive retaliation to a nuclear attack by nuclear means. The analogy to nuclear deterrence is misleading, however, because many aspects of cyber behavior are more like other behaviors, such as crime, that states try (imperfectly) to deter. Preventing harm in cyberspace involves four complex mechanisms: threats of punishment, denial, entanglement, and norms. Even when punishment is used, deterrent threats need not be limited to cyber responses, and they may address general behavior as well as specific acts. Cyber threats are plentiful, often ambiguous, and difficult to attribute. Problems of attribution are said to limit deterrence and dissuasion in the cyber domain, but three of the major means—denial by defense, entanglement, and normative taboos—are not strongly hindered by the attribution problem. The effectiveness of different mechanisms depends on context, and the question of...

The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence

Abstract: Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, "counterforce" disarming attacks—those aimed at eliminating an opponent's nuclear forces—were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around the world considerably more vulnerable. Specifically, two key approaches that countries have relied on to ensure arsenal survivability since the dawn of the nuclear age—hardening and concealment—have been undercut by leaps in weapons accuracy and a revolution in remote sensing. Various methods, evidence, and models demonstrate the emergence of new possibilities for counterforce disarming strikes. In short, the task of securing nuclear arsenals against attack is far more difficult than it was in the past. The new era of counterforce challenges the basis for confidence in contemporary deterrence stability, raises critical issues for national and international security policy, and sheds light on one of the enduring theoretical puzzles of the nuclear era: why international security competition has endured in the shadow of the nuclear revolution.

The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy:

Abstract: Asylum seekers and refugees continue to face serious obstacles in their efforts to access asylum. Some of these obstacles are inherent to irregular migration, including dangerous border crossings a...

Do Takeover Defense Indices Measure Takeover Deterrence

Abstract: Many researchers use the G-index or E-index to measure firms’ takeover defenses. Others argue that these indices are not related to firms’ takeover likelihoods. We find that, unlike their raw values, the instrumented versions of these indices are significantly and negatively related to acquisition likelihood. The difference between the raw and instrumented results indicates that the G-index and E-index include an endogenous component and highlights the importance of accounting for endogeneity in tests that use takeover indices to measure takeover deterrence. We provide data on new instruments that researchers can use to address these issues.Received April 13, 2016; editorial decision October 14, 2016 by Editor David Dennis.

Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy

Abstract: Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive.

Young and unaffected by road policing strategies: Using deterrence theory to explain provisional drivers’ (non)compliance

Abstract: Newly licenced drivers are disproportionately represented in traffic injuries and crash statistics. Despite the implementation of countermeasures designed to improve safety, such as graduated driver licencing (GDL) schemes, many young drivers do not comply with road rules. This study used a reconceptualised deterrence theory framework to investigate young drivers’ perceptions of the enforcement of road rules in general and those more specifically related to GDL. A total of 236 drivers aged 17–24 completed a questionnaire assessing their perceptions of various deterrence mechanisms (personal and vicarious) and their compliance with both GDL-specific and general road rules. Hierarchical multiple regressions conducted to explore noncompliant behaviour revealed that, contrary to theoretical expectations, neither personal nor vicarious punishment experiences affected compliance in the expected direction. Instead, the most influential factors contributing to noncompliance were licence type (P2) and, counterintuitively, having previously been exposed to enforcement. Parental enforcement was also significant in the prediction of transient rule violations, but not fixed rule violations or overall noncompliance. Findings are discussed in light of several possibilities, including an increase in violations due to more time spent on the road, an ‘emboldening effect’ noted in prior studies and possible conceptual constraints regarding the deterrence variables examined in this study.

Is Pollution Value-Maximizing? The DuPont Case

Abstract: DuPont, one of the most respectable U.S. companies, caused environmental damage that ended up costing the company around a billion dollars. By using internal company documents disclosed in trials we rule out the possibilities that this bad outcome was due to ignorance, an unexpected realization, or a problem of bad governance. The documents rather suggest that the polluting was a rational decision: under reasonable probabilities of detection, polluting was ex-ante optimal from the company’s perspective, even if the cost of preventing pollution was lower than the cost of the health damages produced. We then examine why different mechanisms of control – legal liability, regulation, and reputation – all failed to deter a behavior that was inefficient from a social point of view. One common reason for the failures of deterrence mechanisms is that the company controls most of the information and its release. We then sketch potential ways to mitigate this problem.

Beyond deterrence : Strategies of focus and fairness

Abstract: This chapter addresses each of the elements, assesses the evidence base regarding impact, and focuses on the new status of focused deterrence as a crime prevention framework. Deterrence is a venerable, simple, and powerful idea. “Deterrence” centers on the shaping of behavior through risks and sanctions created by legal structures and actions. Focused-deterrence interventions are routinely based on, and operationally focused on, the empirical observation that for certain extreme public safety problems, very small numbers of exceptional actors are at their core. The original “Ceasefire” intervention and its evolving replications focused on groups and group dynamics. Focused-deterrence interventions have tended to identify and then maintain narrow theoretical and operational attention to particular and limited public safety outcomes. Drug market interventions have created certainty and swiftness by developing prosecutable drug sales cases for all dealers in a given market and then “banking” those cases.

We know where you are, what you are doing and we will catch you: Testing deterrence theory in digital drug markets

Abstract: Is crime reduced by highly publicized punishment events? Is crime reduced by law enforcement’s public relations work? These longstanding questions are addressed in a novel context—digital drug markets. An analysis of trade data from two large and illegal e-commerce websites, collected on a daily basis for ten months, examined how market revenue was affected by (1) media coverage of police work on such markets and (2) the highly publicized conviction and life-sentencing of a market founder. Trade increased after periods with elevated media coverage, and also after the two court events. Possible explanations for the increase in trade after the trial outcomes are discussed in an analysis of textual conversations in three online forums associated with illegal e-commerce.

China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States

Abstract: : Since its first nuclear test in October 1964, China has maintained a modest nuclear force to achieve limited deterrence goals. In many ways, Chinas limited nuclear arsenal and restrained posture have made it an outlier in the nuclear world. In recent years, however, new trends have turned Chinas outlier status on its head; while the established nuclear states, especially the United States and Russia, have reduced their nuclear inventories, China has increased the numbers of its strategic missiles and warheads and dramatically improved the quality of its force. Understanding the future of China's nuclear forces, doctrine, and policy is critical to shaping an appropriate U.S. approach to strategic issues. This report examines the key drivers, including both external and internal forces, that will shape Chinese nuclear decision making over the next ten years. While it pays particular attention to Chinas strategic relationship with the United States, which remains Beijings primary focus in formulating policy, it also considers the role that developments in third countries might playa topic other studies have seldom treated and never systematically. In this context, Chinas emergent nuclear relationship with India and dynamics on the South Asian subcontinent are likely to be particularly important. The analysis of internal drivers addresses the potential impacts of bureaucratic politics, organizational processes, and the availability of resources. This research should be of interest to nuclear specialists, Asian foreign policy and security experts, policymakers, military officers, and anyone interested in Chinese or nuclear issues.

‘Cumulative Deterrence’ as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence

Abstract: This article suggests that there is a paradigm crisis in the sub-field of cyber deterrence. Cyber deterrence is evolving slowly and unpromisingly as a strategic tool in both theory and practice, mostly due to the ill-fitting theoretical framework and underlining assumptions it borrows from the absolute-nuclear-deterrence context. Therefore, this article suggests replacing the accepted yet inadequate paradigm of absolute deterrence with a better-fitting restrictive-cumulative-deterrence paradigm that draws on the Israeli approach to deterrence, introducing it into the cyber domain. The article further criticizes the current discourse in the field, including some ‘common knowledge’ (mis)understandings of cyberspace and the ways it affects the possibility of deterrence.

Corruption and Firms: Evidence from Randomized Audits in Brazil

Abstract: We estimate the causal real economic effects of a randomized anti- corruption crackdown on local governments in Brazil using rich micro-data on corruption and firms. After anti-corruption audits, municipalities experience an in- crease in the number of firms concentrated in sectors most dependent on government relationships. Through the estimation of geographic spillovers and additional tests, we show that audits operate via both a direct detection effect as well as through indirect deterrence channels. Politically connected firms suffer after the audits. Our estimates indicate the anti-corruption program generates significant local multipliers which are consistent with the presence of a large corruption tax on government-dependent firms.

Deterrence and Risk Preferences in Sequential Attacker-Defender Games with Continuous Efforts.

Abstract: Most attacker–defender games consider players as risk neutral, whereas in reality attackers and defenders may be risk seeking or risk averse. This article studies the impact of players' risk preferences on their equilibrium behavior and its effect on the notion of deterrence. In particular, we study the effects of risk preferences in a single-period, sequential game where a defender has a continuous range of investment levels that could be strategically chosen to potentially deter an attack. This article presents analytic results related to the effect of attacker and defender risk preferences on the optimal defense effort level and their impact on the deterrence level. Numerical illustrations and some discussion of the effect of risk preferences on deterrence and the utility of using such a model are provided, as well as sensitivity analysis of continuous attack investment levels and uncertainty in the defender's beliefs about the attacker's risk preference. A key contribution of this article is the identification of specific scenarios in which the defender using a model that takes into account risk preferences would be better off than a defender using a traditional risk-neutral model. This study provides insights that could be used by policy analysts and decisionmakers involved in investment decisions in security and safety.

Restrained by design: the political economy of cybersecurity

Abstract: Purpose The empirical record of cyberattacks features much computer crime, espionage and hacktivism, but none of the major damage feared in prevalent threat narratives. The purpose of this article is to explain the absence of serious adverse consequences to date and the durability of this trend. Design/methodology/approach This paper combines concepts from international relations theory and new institutional economics to understand cyberspace as a complex global institution with contracts embodied in both software code and human practice. Constitutive inefficiencies (market and regulatory failure) and incomplete contracts (generative features and unintended flaws) create the vulnerabilities that hackers exploit. Cyber conflict is a form of cheating within the rules, rather than an anarchic struggle, more like an intelligence-counterintelligence contest than traditional war. Findings Cyber conflict is restrained by the collective sociotechnical constitution of cyberspace, where actors must cooperate to compete. Maintenance of common protocols and open access is a condition for the possibility of attack, and successful deceptive exploitation of these connections becomes more difficult in politically sensitive situations as defense and deterrence become more feasible. The distribution of cyber conflict is, thus, bounded vertically in severity but unbounded horizontally in the potential for creative exploitation. Originality/value Cyber conflict can be understood with familiar political economic concepts applied in fresh ways. This application provides counterintuitive insights at odds with prevalent threat narratives about the likelihood and magnitude of cyber conflict. It also highlights the important advantages of strong states over the weaker non-state actors widely thought to be empowered by cyberspace.

"Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It": The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence (November 2017)

Abstract: Why is the instinct for vengeance so strong even when it is clear that widespread death and destruction would be a much more likely outcome than any kind of “victory”? In the event of a nuclear war, why is second-strike retaliation so certain when it may gain nothing of social or material value? We believe these things because humans share a universal thirst for retaliation in the face of threat and in the wake of loss, no matter what classical economists may say to the contrary about how people “should” behave. Indeed, the psychology of revenge and the hatred on which it rests make a seemingly irrational second strike entirely credible. We can apply this analysis to nuclear weapons, but the basic drive is no different than the one that makes most people want to kill anyone who threatens their child, or to hurt a cheating spouse. The instinct for revenge is universal, automatic, and immediate. It also serves a function: to deter the threat of future exploitation.

Social Scientific Analysis of Nuclear Weapons: Past Scholarly Successes, Contemporary Challenges, and Future Research Opportunities

Abstract: Scholars interested in researching nuclear security are increasingly expressing the fear that the “important questions” have already been answered. At the same time, recent studies highlight the po...

Comparative compliance: digital piracy, deterrence, social norms, and duty in China and the United States

Abstract: The study of compliance has been predominantly Western, and we do not know whether existing theories and findings also apply elsewhere. As a first venture in developing a comparative view on compliance, this study seeks to gain a comparative understanding of compliance decision making amongst Chinese and American students. It studies their decisions in response to two scenarios that offer an opportunity to use pirated online content. It tests how their decisions are shaped by subjective deterrence, social norms, and perceived duty to obey the law, comparing a control group with a group who received an explicit deterrence message from a strong campaign targeting the use of pirated digital content. The results indicate that, regardless of the explicit enforcement context, Chinese students' inclination to engage in digital piracy hinges chiefly on the perceived behavior and approval of others. This stands in contrast to US students. Within an explicit enforcement context, both social norms and perceived enforcement affect US students' decision making, whereas when there is no explicit enforcement context, both social norms and perceived duty to obey the law affect decision-making. This study thus provides a warning that compliance theories and findings may not generalize well beyond the Western context. This necessitates the development of comparative compliance studies and more cross-national replication. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

On sanction-goal justifications: How and why deterrence justifications undermine rule compliance.

Abstract: Authorities frequently justify their sanctions as attempts to deter people from rule breaking. Although providing a sanction justification seems appealing and harmless, we propose that a deterrence justification decreases the extent to which sanctions are effective in promoting rule compliance. We develop a theoretical model that specifies how and why this occurs. Consistent with our model, 5 experiments demonstrated that-compared with sanctions provided without a justification or sanctions provided with a just-deserts justification-sanction effectiveness decreased when sanctions were justified as attempts to deter people from rule breaking. This effect was mediated by people feeling distrusted by the authority. We further demonstrated that (a) the degree to which deterrence fostered distrust was attenuated when the sanction was targeted at others (instead of the participant) and (b) the degree to which distrust undermined rule compliance was attenuated when the authority was perceived as legitimate. We discuss the practical implications for authorities tasked with promoting rule compliance, and the theoretical implications for the literature on sanctions, distrust, and rule compliance. (PsycINFO Database Record

Taming the evil : US non-proliferation coercive diplomacy and the counter-strategies of Iran and North Korea after the Cold War

Abstract: In the 40 years since the end of World War II, the most critical strategic problem for the US was containment of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, scholars and experts focused on building deterrence theories on how to confront communist aggression. In comparison, the theory of diplomatic coercion, which tries to use threats or a limited amount of force to influence the behaviour of another by making it choose to comply, was popular neither among decision-makers nor scholars. Since a favourable international environment for applying coercive diplomacy began after the Cold War finished in the 1990s, coercive diplomacy and the coercion literature have proved to be less rich and less cumulative than that of other political theories. However, regardless of this weak enthusiasm for it, the concept of coercion was adopted as state foreign policy and diplomatic coercion was executed as a strategy. The US administrations after the fall of the Soviet Union have implemented coercive diplomacy to influence their adversaries. The non-proliferation policy of the US was no exception. Regardless of the differences in the doctrines and policies of each administration, Clinton, Bush and Obama had a consistent policy on nuclear non-proliferation. Having become the hegemonic state of unipolar system with the ability to conduct a war in any place in the world, the execution of coercion was the most convenient policy strategy for the US among the other alternatives. From a basis of dominant military strength and economic power, the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations attempted to dismantle the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea by every conceivable means, utilizing hard power, soft power and smart power. The coercive, non-coercive and persuasive inducements of coercive diplomacy were applied to stop these nuclear programmes. None of the administrations allowed the full fledge nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. Instead, they labelled Iran and North Korea rogue states or ‘axis of evil’ during the span of the three presidents. Admittedly, the Obama administration showed differences in terms of rhetoric, but the ‘strategic patience’ which it applied to Iran and North Korea during its first term was not much different from the policy of its predecessors. Moreover, Obama applied the most severe economic sanctions, which even prohibited the Iranian oil trade. However, the coercive diplomacy of the US administrations did not have tangible success in disarming these states of their nuclear programmes; instead, they increased their nuclear capabilities. Although a nuclear deal has recently been reached in the Iranian case, it will take a process lasting 15 years to complete the settlement. It seems that US coercive diplomacy is most likely to be maintained during this period. This study focuses on the non-proliferation coercive diplomacy of the US against the ‘axis of evil’ of Iran and North Korea and their counterstrategies in order to examine the dispute process as a whole and to provide more efficient policy proposals regarding the subject.

Deterring deviant consumer behaviour: when ‘it’s wrong, don’t do it’ doesn’t work

Abstract: Tactics to deter deviant consumer behaviour have received limited attention in the literature despite deviance being an ongoing problem in the marketplace. Across two studies, the findings suggest there is a heterogeneous response to the rules placed on consumers’ behaviour, which manifests from an absence of consensus among consumers on what is right and wrong behaviour undermining the it’s wrong, don’t do it approach to deterrence. Further, risk perceptions of being caught and punished are low, if not absent, undermining the you will be caught and punished approach to deterrence. Alternate underlying mechanisms were tested and found to influence deviant consumer behaviour (perceived prevalence, perceived outcomes and moral identity), which could underpin alternate deterrence tactics, including social proofing, moral triggers and humanising the victim.

Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective

Abstract: America’s alliances in Europe and East Asia all involve some institutional cooperation on U.S. nuclear weapons policy, planning or employment—from consultative fora in Asia to joint policy and sharing of nuclear warheads in NATO. Such cooperation is often analyzed through the prism of “extended nuclear deterrence,” which focuses on the extension of U.S. security guarantees and their effect on potential adversaries. This article argues that this underplays the importance of institutional factors: Allies have historically addressed a range of objectives through such cooperation, which has helped to catalyze agreements about broader alliance strategy. The varied form such cooperation takes in different alliances also flows from the respective bargaining power of allies and the relative importance of consensus, rather than perceived threats. The article concludes that nuclear weapons cooperation will remain crucial in successful U.S. alliance management, as allies negotiate their relationship with eac...

Taking Deterrence Seriously: The Wide-Scope Deterrence Theory of Punishment

Abstract: A deterrence theory of punishment holds that the institution of criminal punishment is morally justified because it serves to deter crime. Because the fear of external sanction is an important ince...

Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2006–16

Abstract: What are the sources of deterrence stability and under what conditions can weak actors deter stronger adversaries? To deter a superior adversary, the weak actor must convince it that if conflict br...

Deterrence Dilemma in Latvia and Estonia: Finding the Balance between External Military Solidarity and Territorial Defence

Abstract: While potential threats from Russia and NATO collective defence commitments are similar for Latvia and Estonia, both countries have adopted different approaches in the balancing exercise between territorial defence and military solidarity. Notwithstanding their differences, both are by their nature fully non-aggressive – without room for pre-emptive initiatives, extra territoriality or asymmetrical tools. Given that in a case of a hypothetical large-scale conventional attack both countries would almost entirely have to rest on the allies, external military solidarity is essential. Until the Ukraine crisis, both offered more military solidarity towards their NATO allies than the latter offered to them. As the result of the Ukrainian crisis, allies became more military-solidary with the Baltic nations, especially having established the Enhanced Forward Presence, while Estonian and especially Latvian contributions to international missions and operations dropped. Therefore, it is suggested that both countries increase their efforts to the allied international endeavours.

Experience or deterrence? Revisiting an old but neglected issue

Abstract: Deterrence theory states that fear of sanctions secures compliance with the law. Empirical research on the deterrent effect of legal sanctions has remained inconclusive though. This applies especia...