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Showing papers by "Charles Efferson published in 2018"


Journal ArticleDOI
Daniel J. Benjamin1, James O. Berger2, Magnus Johannesson1, Magnus Johannesson3, Brian A. Nosek4, Brian A. Nosek5, Eric-Jan Wagenmakers6, Richard A. Berk7, Kenneth A. Bollen8, Björn Brembs9, Lawrence D. Brown7, Colin F. Camerer10, David Cesarini11, David Cesarini12, Christopher D. Chambers13, Merlise A. Clyde2, Thomas D. Cook14, Thomas D. Cook15, Paul De Boeck16, Zoltan Dienes17, Anna Dreber3, Kenny Easwaran18, Charles Efferson19, Ernst Fehr20, Fiona Fidler21, Andy P. Field17, Malcolm R. Forster22, Edward I. George7, Richard Gonzalez23, Steven N. Goodman24, Edwin J. Green25, Donald P. Green26, Anthony G. Greenwald27, Jarrod D. Hadfield28, Larry V. Hedges15, Leonhard Held20, Teck-Hua Ho29, Herbert Hoijtink30, Daniel J. Hruschka31, Kosuke Imai32, Guido W. Imbens24, John P. A. Ioannidis24, Minjeong Jeon33, James Holland Jones34, Michael Kirchler35, David Laibson36, John A. List37, Roderick J. A. Little23, Arthur Lupia23, Edouard Machery38, Scott E. Maxwell39, Michael A. McCarthy21, Don A. Moore40, Stephen L. Morgan41, Marcus R. Munafò42, Shinichi Nakagawa43, Brendan Nyhan44, Timothy H. Parker45, Luis R. Pericchi46, Marco Perugini47, Jeffrey N. Rouder48, Judith Rousseau49, Victoria Savalei50, Felix D. Schönbrodt51, Thomas Sellke52, Betsy Sinclair53, Dustin Tingley36, Trisha Van Zandt16, Simine Vazire54, Duncan J. Watts55, Christopher Winship36, Robert L. Wolpert2, Yu Xie32, Cristobal Young24, Jonathan Zinman44, Valen E. Johnson18, Valen E. Johnson1 
University of Southern California1, Duke University2, Stockholm School of Economics3, Center for Open Science4, University of Virginia5, University of Amsterdam6, University of Pennsylvania7, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill8, University of Regensburg9, California Institute of Technology10, Research Institute of Industrial Economics11, New York University12, Cardiff University13, Mathematica Policy Research14, Northwestern University15, Ohio State University16, University of Sussex17, Texas A&M University18, Royal Holloway, University of London19, University of Zurich20, University of Melbourne21, University of Wisconsin-Madison22, University of Michigan23, Stanford University24, Rutgers University25, Columbia University26, University of Washington27, University of Edinburgh28, National University of Singapore29, Utrecht University30, Arizona State University31, Princeton University32, University of California, Los Angeles33, Imperial College London34, University of Innsbruck35, Harvard University36, University of Chicago37, University of Pittsburgh38, University of Notre Dame39, University of California, Berkeley40, Johns Hopkins University41, University of Bristol42, University of New South Wales43, Dartmouth College44, Whitman College45, University of Puerto Rico46, University of Milan47, University of California, Irvine48, Paris Dauphine University49, University of British Columbia50, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich51, Purdue University52, Washington University in St. Louis53, University of California, Davis54, Microsoft55
TL;DR: The default P-value threshold for statistical significance is proposed to be changed from 0.05 to 0.005 for claims of new discoveries in order to reduce uncertainty in the number of discoveries.
Abstract: We propose to change the default P-value threshold for statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.005 for claims of new discoveries.

1,586 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Information about the choices of others led participants to converge rapidly on similar normative evaluations that continued to hold sway in subsequent asocial settings, at least partly owing to the combined effects of conformity and self-consistency.
Abstract: The importance of culture for human social evolution hinges largely on the extent to which culture supports outcomes that would not otherwise occur. An especially controversial claim is that social learning leads groups to coalesce around group-typical behaviours and associated social norms that spill over to shape choices in asocial settings. To test this, we conducted an experiment with 878 groups of participants in 116 communities in Sudan. Participants watched a short film and evaluated the appropriate way to behave in the situation dramatized in the film. Each session consisted of an asocial condition in which participants provided private evaluations and a social condition in which they provided public evaluations. Public evaluations allowed for social learning. Across sessions, we randomized the order of the two conditions. Public choices dramatically increased the homogeneity of normative evaluations. When the social condition was first, this homogenizing effect spilled over to subsequent asocial conditions. The asocial condition when first was thus alone in producing distinctly heterogeneous groups. Altogether, information about the choices of others led participants to converge rapidly on similar normative evaluations that continued to hold sway in subsequent asocial settings. These spillovers were at least partly owing to the combined effects of conformity and self-consistency. Conformity dominated self-consistency when the two mechanisms were in conflict, but self-consistency otherwise produced choices that persisted through time. Additionally, the tendency to conform was heterogeneous. Females conformed more than males, and conformity increased with the number of other people a decision-maker observed before making her own choice.

9 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 2018-Nature
TL;DR: A study assessing scenarios in which people judge each other shows that a simple moral rule suffices to drive the evolution of cooperation.
Abstract: The evolution of cooperation is a frequently debated topic. A study assessing scenarios in which people judge each other shows that a simple moral rule suffices to drive the evolution of cooperation. The evolution of cooperation is a frequently debated topic. A study assessing scenarios in which people judge each other shows that a simple moral rule suffices to drive the evolution of cooperation.

8 citations