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Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition

Alex Gershkov, +1 more
- 01 Jan 2009 - 
- Vol. 144, Iss: 1, pp 36-68
TLDR
It is shown that, of all mechanisms, a sequential one is optimal and works as follows: one agent at a time is selected to acquire information and report the resulting signal and the restriction to ex-post efficiency is shown to be without loss when the available signals are sufficiently imprecise.
About: 
This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory.The article was published on 2009-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 96 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Optimal decision.

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Book ChapterDOI

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Giving and Receiving Advice

Joel Sobel
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors classify the literature on communication between informed experts and uninformed decision makers along four dimensions: strategic, technological, institutional, and cultural, and provide some insight into what constitutes a persuasive statement and under what conditions a decision maker will benefit from consulting an expert.
Journal ArticleDOI

Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning

Yeon-Koo Che, +1 more
- 01 May 2018 - 
TL;DR: This article studies how a recommender system may incentivize users to learn about a product collaboratively and “seed” incentives for user exploration and determine the speed and trajectory of social learning.
Journal ArticleDOI

Optimal auctions with information acquisition

Xianwen Shi
- 01 Mar 2012 - 
TL;DR: In this article, the optimal auction design in a private value setting with endogenous information gathering was studied and it was shown that the optimal monopoly price is always lower than the standard monopoly price.
Journal ArticleDOI

Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process

Raphael Boleslavsky, +1 more
- 01 Jan 2013 - 
TL;DR: In this article, a model of long-term contracting in which the buyer is privately informed about the stochastic process by which her value for a good evolves is examined. And the realized values are also private information.
Journal Article

A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Yukio Koriyama, +1 more
- 09 Jun 2009 - 
TL;DR: In this article, the optimal size of a deliberating committee where there is no conflict of interest among individuals and information acquisition is costly is analyzed, and it is shown that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k*-2.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting

Timothy J. Feddersen, +1 more
- 01 Mar 1998 - 
TL;DR: The authors showed that the probability of acquitting an innocent defendant may actually increase with the size of the jury and that a wide variety of voting rules, including simple majority rule, lead to much lower probabilities of both kinds of error.
Journal ArticleDOI

Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information

Timothy J. Feddersen, +1 more
- 01 Sep 1997 - 
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed two-candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters and showed that the fraction of voters whose vote depends on their private information goes to zero as the size of the electorate goes to infinity.
Journal ArticleDOI

Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding

Paul Milgrom
- 01 Jul 1981 - 
TL;DR: In this article, a bidding model is developed which has the market-like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information, and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing.
Journal ArticleDOI

Multistage games with communication

Roger B. Myerson
- 01 Mar 1986 - 
TL;DR: It is shown that a communication equilibrium is a sequential communication equilibrium if and only if it never uses codominated actions, and Predominant communication equilibria are defined by iterative elimination of codominatedactions and are shown to exist.
Journal ArticleDOI

Correlated Information and Mechanism Design

R. Preston McAfee, +1 more
- 01 Mar 1992 - 
TL;DR: In this article, a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided, and a two-person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first-order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition.
Related Papers (5)

Committee Design with Endogenous Information

Nicola Persico
- 01 Jan 2004 - 

Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

David Austen-Smith, +1 more
- 01 Jan 1996 - 

The Swing Voter's Curse

Timothy J. Feddersen, +1 more
- 01 Jun 1996 - 

Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting

Timothy J. Feddersen, +1 more
- 01 Mar 1998 - 

Strategic information transmission

Vincent P. Crawford, +1 more
- 01 Nov 1982 - 
Frequently Asked Questions (5)
Q1. What are the contributions in "Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition∗" ?

This paper analyzes a voting model where ( i ) there is no conflict of interest among the voters, and ( ii ) information acquisition is costly and unobservable. The social planner asks, at random, one voter at a time to invest in information and to report the resulting signal. Voters are informed of neither their position in the sequence nor the reports of previous voters. Obeying the planner by investing and reporting truthfully is optimal for voters. In this scheme, the social planner stops aggregating information and makes a decision when the precision of his posterior exceeds a cut-off which decreases with each additional report. 

The authors also show that, if the cost of information acquisition is small, then, surprisingly, the ex-ante optimal mechanism is often ex-post inefficient. 

It will be shown that if the cost of information acquisition is small enough, then the optimal ex-post efficient mechanism can be improved upon by replacing a continuation mechanism with an ex-post inefficient continuation mechanism. 

Since the SP orders the voters independently of the realizations of the signals,p (A ∩B) = p (s) 2i+ d N ,where (2i+ d) /N is the probability that the deviator is asked to report a signal if a decision is made after a sequence with length 2i+d. 

The authors argue that for given p and c, there always exists a k0 ∈ N such that the mechanism is not incentive compatible if the SP stops asking voters only if |d| ≥ k0.