Journal ArticleDOI
The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations
TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.About:
This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems, and discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform.
Journal ArticleDOI
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-f low ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms and test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies.
Journal ArticleDOI
The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations
Mara Faccio,Larry H.P. Lang +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the ultimate ownership and control of 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries were analyzed, and the majority of firms were either widely held (36.93%) or family controlled (44.29%).
Journal ArticleDOI
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings
TL;DR: In this article, the authors disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership and find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect.
Journal ArticleDOI
How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?
Belen Villalonga,Raphael Amit +1 more
TL;DR: The authors found that the classic owner-manager conflict in non-family firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms, and that the conflicts between family shareholders in descendant- CEO firms are more costly.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity
TL;DR: In this paper, a leaf filter cloth for a pressure vessel including a flat retaining sack or bag which encloses the leaf filter is presented, and an outlet opening is contained in the sack through which the filtered product can be extracted.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the structure of corporate ownership in a sample of Japanese firms in the mid 1980s and find that ownership concentration in independent Japanese firms is positively related to the returns from exerting greater control over management.
Posted Content
Expropriation of minority shareholders: evidence from East Asia
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined evidence of the expropriation of minority shareholders for 2,658 corporations in nine East Asian countries in 1996 and concluded that the risk of expropriative is the major principal-agent problem for large corporations, as suggested by La Porta and colleagues.
BookDOI
Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine evidence of the expropriation of minority shareholders for 2,658 corporations in nine East Asian countries in 1996 and conclude that the risk of expropriative is the major principal-agent problem for large corporations, as suggested by La Porta and colleagues.