Journal ArticleDOI
The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations
TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.About:
This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Excess Control Rights, Financial Crisis and Bank Profitability and Risk
Nadia Saghi-Zedek,Amine Tarazi +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the impact of shareholders' excess control rights on bank profitability and risk before, during, and after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, and find that the presence of such control rights is associated with lower profitability, higher risk-taking and higher default risk.
Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate voluntary disclosure and the separation of cash flow rights from control rights
TL;DR: In this article, the authors find that corporate voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with the separation of cash flow rights from control rights and that firms with greater external financing needs are more likely to experience information asymmetry.
Journal ArticleDOI
Governance reform and IPO underpricing
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that the lower price protection associated with fewer instances of absolute control retention by pre-issue insiders during the post-reform period, not reduction in the expropriation risk.
Journal ArticleDOI
What Do Shareholders’ Coalitions Really Want? Evidence from Italian voting trusts
TL;DR: In this article, the effects of having multiple large shareholders who share the control of firms, by analyzing a unique dataset of Italian shareholders' agreements (voting trusts), are investigated.
Book ChapterDOI
Dividend payment and ownership structure in china
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors found that the relation between dividend payment level and ownership structure is nonlinear and concluded that the managers of Chinese listed companies are likely to cater for the preference of different shareholders.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Posted Content
Law and Finance
Rafael La Porta,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Andrei Shleifer,Robert W. Vishny,Robert W. Vishny +7 more
TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Sanford J. Grossman,Oliver Hart +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate Ownership Around the World
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.