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Journal ArticleDOI

The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations

TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.
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This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.

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Citations
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Family Firm Heterogeneity and Corporate Policy: Evidence from Diversification Decisions

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the effect of family ownership, management, and supervision on diversification strategies and show that firms owned by families have higher levels of diversification than those managed by families.
Journal ArticleDOI

Concentrated ownership and firm performance: does family control matter?

TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate whether family ownership adds value beyond that provided by concentrated ownership and find that, in general, firms with concentrated ownership outperform firms with dispersed ownership, while there are no significant performance differences among family-controlled firms and firms controlled by either foreign corporations or the state.
Journal ArticleDOI

Corporate governance and stakeholder conflict

TL;DR: In this paper, a review of corporate governance and stakeholder conflict is presented, which highlights the important, but often neglected, intra-stakeholder type of conflict in various organizations and provides a basis for understanding their various manifestations and consequences under the different systems of governance.
Journal ArticleDOI

Ownership concentration, family control and performance of firms

TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored the relationship between firm performance, measured by Tobin's Q and very powerful controlling shareholders in a sample of Belgian listed firms and showed that overall the largest shareholders have a negative effect on firm performance.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Evolution of Corporate Ownership after IPO: The Impact of Investor Protection

TL;DR: This paper showed that firms in countries with strong investor protection are more likely to experience decreases in ownership concentration after listing and that these decreases appear in response to growth opportunities, and that they are associated with new share issuance.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Posted Content

Law and Finance

TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Book

The Modern Corporation and Private Property

TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration

TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Journal ArticleDOI

Corporate Ownership Around the World

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.
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